Justitia patrem et matrem nescit: veritatem for a period equaling that required for the solam spectat justitia. State ex rel. Morris v. passing of a generation. Mason, 43 La. Ann. 694, 9 South. 813. Considering the matter from a business point of view, his exI close my dissenting opinion with the fore-perience seems to verify the proverb that going quotation, expressive of my own feelings on this occasion. (Syllabus by the Court.) EMINENT DOMAIN (§ 262*)—COMPENSATION— REVIEW ON APPEAL. In an expropriation proceeding, where only the question of value and damage is at issue, the verdict of the jury, approved by the trial judge, will be approved, unless it appears to this court to be unreasonable. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. § 685; Dec. Dig. § 262.*] Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; Harney F. Brunot, Judge. "all things come to those who wait"; for, whilst the plantation, when he acquired it, was so remote from the business centers of the country that few sensations reached it from those sources, it has, within the past few years, been connected with the outside world by railroads running to the four points of the compass, and has established, within its own boundaries, a city in embryo, with city lots, streets, sidewalks, and (it is to be hoped) proper sanitary regulations. In 1905, the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company (one of the components of the Illinois Central System), having built a road running north and south, through the property, acquired the entire batture of the plantation below, which is separated from that of defendant by a tract some 800 feet in width, and established on the river bank the necessary facilities for the ferrying of cars to and from the trans-Mississippi territory. The Colorado Southern Railroad Com Action by the Louisiana Railway & Navi-pany, coming from the west, reached the gation Company against William J. Knox. From the judgment, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed. Wise, Randolph & Rendall and S. J. Kernan, for appellant. T. Jones Cross and Dart, Kernan & Dart, for appellee. Statement of the Case. bank of the river at a point about opposite the lower end of defendant's plantation, and there established similar facilities. And it is said in one of the briefs that each of the companies mentioned was to handle the traffic of the other, but that they disagreed (and the records of this court show that fact), with the result that the one has no landing on the one bank, and the other none on the MONROE, J. This is an expropriation other bank, and that the Yazoo & Mississippi proceeding, in which the plaintiff has appeal- Valley Company is now waiting for the ed, asking that the amount awarded be re- Southern Pacific to come to the west bank duced, and the defendant has answered, ask- of the river, whilst the Colorado Southern, ing for an additional allowance. The only representing the Rock Island and Frisco questions presented are as to the value of the Systems, is waiting for plaintiff to get to the property and the fact and quantum of dam- bank upon this side. These last-mentioned ages. Defendant owns a plantation of about facts, or theories, are not disclosed by the 1,000 acres, situated some two miles above evidence in the record; but it is shown that Baton Rouge and having a frontage of say the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Company a mile on the Mississippi river. At a dis- acquired the batture (and some high land) tance varying from say 600 to 1,800 feet from and built the "incline" as stated. It is also the river there is a bluff, and between the shown that the Colorado Southern has come bluff and the river there is a batture, more to the other side of the river, and there built or less wooded, subject to overflow in high an "incline." It is further shown that plainwater, and available, in ordinary stages of tiff is the owner of a road, built by its predethe river, for the purposes of pasturage, cessors (possibly three years ago), which runs but not much used for the making of crops. north and south through defendant's plantaThe river, in front, has a depth of 40 feet tion, at a distance of say three-quarters of or more (near the bank), and by reason of a mile to the eastward of that of the Yazoo the configuration immediately above there is & Mississippi Valley Company, and that it slack water, which makes the place a good now desires to acquire a certain strip, or irharbor for flatboats, barges, and rafts, though regular parcel, of land forming part of the it does not appear that defendant has hith- plantation, in order to enable it to reach erto derived ary particular revenue from the river bank and there build an "incline" that source. The estate was, however, own- on this side of the river. Hence this suit. ed by his father, and whether for that reason, or because he believed that its advantages would, some time or another, be appre- The particular parcel which is sought to ciated, he has held and paid the taxes on it be expropriated is said to contain 49.7 acres Opinion. COL. S0. MISSISSIPPI FEED and runs across the plantation, from plain- Defendant acquiesces in the expropriation, tiff's road (on the east) to the river (on the but alleges that he ought to be paid at the west), a distance of say a mile, and then rate of $700 per acre for the high land that turns northward and runs up the bank of plaintiff proposes to take, and at the rate of the river for half a mile or more; our un- $340 per acre for the batture; that, by crossderstanding of the delimitation of the par- ing the batture near the lower end and buildcel in question being attempted in the shaded ing its embankment near the water's edge, figure "1, 2, 3" on the subjoined sketch, which upstream, plaintiff will pocket, or render inhas been reduced (more or less inaccurately) accessible, all the land between the embankfrom one of several plats offered in evidence. | ment and the bluff (represented on the sketch BDX YARD BRICK CO DOUGHERTY LAKE BAYOU SARA ROAD BATON ROUGE CITY LINE Standard Oil) seven years before at $40 per acre, and sold it to a Mr. Towl, on February 26, 1909, at $225 an acre; and, it appearing that Mr. Towl was acting for the Standard Oil Company, and that the purpose was to establish a refinery plant at a cost of a million or two of dollars, and the witness being interrogated in regard to his information on that subject at the time that he made the sale, he said: "Previous to the Standard Oil Company making their announcement [which was some time in April, and after the institution of this suit] I had no knowledge as to who purchased the property." And he further testified as follows: "Q. What, in your judgment, is the effect of the erection of a plant such as you have described on land adjacent to the same? A. Very great. Q. In favor or against? A. In favor of surdustry has increased the value of property? rounding property. Q. The arrival of this inA. Since they have announced their plans, yes, sir; they have increased." by letter A); that by extending its piling, as Mr. Webb testifies that he bought the 34.81 it proposes to do, in front of the bank, down- acres, contained in the Feed Company tract, stream, it will blanket, or shut in, 15 acres with a sugar factory and machinery on it, (represented on the sketch by letter B), which at forced sale and within the past few years, will be behind the piling; that 19 acres, ly- for $70,000; that the buildings were of little ing immediately below the 15 acres. mention- or no value, that the machinery was valued ed, will be depreciated in value to the extent at $20,000, and that the value of the land, as of $85 per acre. Wherefore he prays judg-represented in the purchase, was something ment for various sums, which are said to over $1,400 an acre. Plaintiff's witness, Mr. amount in the aggregate to $49,133. (There Hummel, who was the only real estate dealare, we think, some errors in the figures er and expert who was examined, testified stated in the petition; but, as they will be that he bought the tract immediately adjoinlost in the general result, they need not being defendant's property (marked G and G1, further referred to.) Plaintiff placed on the stand its assistant president, Mr. Ellerbe; its roadmaster, Mr. Mee; its secretary, and general superintendent, Mr. Helm; its president, Mr. Edenborn; Mr. Woodside, the parish assessor; Mr. J. C. Hamilton, a citizen of Baton Rouge, engaged in the oil business; Mr. B. R. Mayer, who has been in the grocery business; Mr. Gottlieb, a banker; Mr. R. J. Hummel, a real estate dealer and expert; and Mr. F. A. Hebert, wharfmaster. On behalf of defendant, there were called Mr. Swart, a civil engineer; Mr. Dozier, president of the Standard Box Company (whose property, near the river, is indicated on the sketch); Mr. Steele, State Treasurer, and an old resident of Baton Rouge; Mr. Webb, president of the Feed Company (whose property, on the river, is indicated on the sketch); Capt. Robert Cothell, owner of the property marked (on the sketch) "Ship Yard"; Mr. K. H. Knox, defendant's son; and defendant himself, both of them being lifelong residents of Baton Rouge and owners of property. There were offered in evidence, on one side or the other, a number of acts of sale, assessment rolls, plats, blue prints, etc., and the jury, accompanied by counsel, visited the property, after which (and the argument and the charge) they brought in a verdict in favor of plaintiff, on the question of expropriation, and assessed the property to be taken at $275 per acre, or a total of $13,667.50, to which they added $2,890 as damages. Some idea of the difference of opinion among the witnesses may be gathered from the fact that Mr. Ellerbe, plaintiff's assistant president, referring to the batture land, said, "I should say that the stuff is worth about $25 an acre," and he considered an offer of $100 an acre, all around, a liberal one. Capt. Cothell, on the other hand, who owns the "Ship Yard" (34 acres), values it at $2,000 an acre, and does not care to sell at that price; and he thinks that defendant's batture ought to be worth from $500 to $1,000 an acre. Mr. Dozier, acting for the box factory, paid $750 an acre for 18 acres (lot E), behind the batture, some two or three years ago, and his company paid $7,000, in 1902 or 1903, for the 34 acres in lot F on the river bank. Referring to defendants' property, he says: He The increase to which he refers is further evidenced by the fact that, two weeks before this case was tried, defendant's son, who is assisting him in the management of his affairs, laid off a small tract of his land (indicated on the sketch as "Suburb Monteseno") in lots (30x135), with streets and alleys, and sold them almost as fast as they were offered at from $175 to $225 per lot, increasing the price by $50 per lot after the first 20 had been sold, and realizing, after deducting cost of survey, paving, etc., $750 per acre. (or defendant) then, in order to make the suburb accessible, bought a strip of land from Squires and Gowe (whose property is indicated on the sketch) running across the rear ends of their tracts to the "Suburb Dixie," at the rate of $1,250 per acre. Long prior to those occurrences, however (in 1905), the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Company had bought the land upon which its "incline" is built, together with the tract of upland marked "G2, Standard Oil," 213 acres in all, and had paid for them $53,253 cash, being a trifle over $250 an acre. For these reasons, and others which might be stated, we think defendant's land is worth more than plaintiff is disposed to pay for it, and we are inclined to concur with those wit "I consider the land, as a whole, very valuable nesses who say (and there are several of property, for commercial purposes." them) that the value of that which is not ment of an object, to be engaged in the performdefined, covers all forms of physical or mental ance of a task, duty, or the like; and, as thus exertions, or both combined, for the attainment of some object other than recreation or amuse actually to be taken will not be enhanced by | a purpose, to put forth effort for the attainbeing cut off, or measurably cut off, from the river. The entire question is, however, very much a matter of opinion, and we are not at all confident that any opinion that we might entertain would come nearer being sustained by future events than that which has been expressed in the verdict of the jury. The most that we can say is that the verdict does not appear to us to be unreasonable. The verdict and judgment appealed from are, accordingly, affirmed. (125 La. 462) No. 17,856. STATE v. ROSE ment. and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7517-7519; vol. 8, p. [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words 7837.] Provosty, J., dissenting. Appeal from Juvenile Court, Parish of Orleans; Andrew H. Wilson, Judge. Lew Rose was convicted of knowingly and unlawfully permitting a minor aged 10 years to appear and perform on the stage of a theater, and appeals. Affirmed. See, also, 124 La. 526, 50 South. 520. Arthur B. Leopold and B. C. Shields, for appellant. St. Clair Adams, Dist. Atty. (Supreme Court of Louisiana. Jan. 17, 1910. (Solomon Wolff, of counsel), for the State. Rehearing Denied Feb. 14, 1910.) (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) 3. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 118*)-EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTS-THEATERS AND SHOWS. Section 1 of Act No. 301 of 1908 makes it unlawful to permit or employ a child under 14 years of age to labor or "work" in any theater, concert hall, or in or about any place of amusement where intoxicating liquors are made or sold. Held, that the words "where intoxicating liquors are made or sold" do not qualify the word "theater." [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Dec. Dig. § 118.*] 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 48*)-VALIDITY OF STATUTE-BURDEN OF PROOF. A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden is upon one claiming the contrary to show clearly and beyond reasonable dispute that its provisions are repugnant to the organic laws of the United States or of the state. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48.*] 5. WORDS AND PHRASES "WORK"-"LA The word "work" has a much more comprehensive meaning than the term "labor," and has been defined to mean to exert one's self for LAND, J. Defendant was charged on af fidavit with knowingly and unlawfully per mitting one Rosie Mary Shields, a minor, aged 10 years, to appear and perform on the stage of the Greenwall Theater in the city of New Orleans. Defendant filed a demurrer to the charge, on the grounds that Act No. 301 of 1908, p. 453, under which he is prosecuted, is unconstitutional, in that its provisions make an arbitrary and unreasonable classification, and are not uniform in operation, in direct conflict with both federal and state Constitutions; that said statute makes a discrimi nation in favor of minors who work or labor at agricultural or domestic industries and against minors who work or labor at other pursuits; that said statute is unreasonable and its classification not uniform in operation, in that minors are permitted to work and labor in the pursuits specified in the statute, where less than five persons are employed, and are forbidden to labor or work where more than five persons are employed. This demurrer was overruled, and the deThe defendant then enfendant excepted. tered a plea of not guilty, and on trial was found guilty. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the finding was contrary to the law and the evidence. This motion was overruled. The accused thereupon filed a motion in arrest of judgment on a number of grounds, among others, that the affidavit does not disclose any crime, or offense against the statute and laws of the state of Louisiana, and that the statute in question is unconstitutional for the reasons assigned in the demurrer. The motion in arrest was overruled, and the defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $25, or, in default thereof, to serve 30 days in the parish prison. The defendant has appealed. Act No. 83 of 1908, p. 96, creating the juvenile court in the parish of Orleans, was submitted as a constitutional amendment by "Appeals from said court shall be allowed on matters of law only, and shall be direct to the Supreme Court of the state." This prosecution is under the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 301 of 1908, p. 453, entitled "An act to regulate the employment of children, young persons and women in this state. * Section 1 reads as follows: "To exert one's self for a purpose, to put forth effort for the attainment of an object; to be engaged in the performance of a task, duty or the like." See Webster's Int. Dict. verbo. The term as thus defined covers all forms of physical or mental exertions, or both combined, for the attainment of some object other than recreation or amusement. The ob ject of the statute was to prohibit the employment of children of tender years in any kind of labor or work in the places, occupations, and establishments specified in section 1, and in all others that may be deemed dangerous or unhealthful. Section 5 goes fur"That from and after the passage of this act ther and in cases of boys under 16 years and it shall be unlawful for any person, agent, firm, of girls under the age of 18 years prohibits company, co-partnership, or corporation to require or permit or suffer or employ any child their employment at any work before 6 a. m. under the age of 14 years to labor or work in or after 7 p. m. It goes without saying that any mill, factory, mine, packing house, manu- acting or performing on the stage necessifacturing establishment, workshop, laundry, mil- tates both physical and mental toil; and in linery or dressmaking store or mercantile establishment in which more than five persons are our opinion the lawmaker intended to proemployed, or in any theatre, concert hall, or inhibit the employment of children in theaters or about any place of amusement where intoxi- for labor or work of any kind in the interest cating liquors are made or sold, or in any bowl- of their health and proper physical, moral, ing alley, boot blacking establishment, freight or passenger elevator, or in the transmission or and mental development. Whether such childistribution of messages, either telegraph or tele- dren be employed in one or another kind of phone, or any other messages, or merchandise, "labor or work" is immaterial. It may be or in any other occupation not herein enumerated which may be deemed unhealthful or dan-stated, in this connection, that the Civil Code gerous. uses the terms "servant" and "laborer" as synonymous. Articles 2746-2750. Article 2749, prescribing a penalty for sending away a "laborer" before the contract term has expired, without any serious ground for complaint, has been applied to a dancing girl. Baron v. Placide, 7 La. Ann. 229. And this court has applied the same article to an "The provisions of this section shall in no way be construed as applying to agricultural or domestic industries. Any violation of this provision shall be punishable by a fine of not less than $25 or more than $50 or by imprisonment in the parish jail (parish prison in New Orleans) for not less than ten days or more than six months or both in the discretion of the court." Section 4 of the same act reads, in part, actor. Camp v. Baldwin-Melville Co., 123 as follows: "That no child or person under the age of 18 years, and no woman shall be employed in any of the places and industries eaumerated in section 1 of this act for a longer period than ten hours per day or 60 hours per week." Section 5 reads, in part: "That no boy under the age of 16 years and no girl under the age of 18 shall be employed at any work before the hour of 6 in the morning or after the hour of 7 at night. Provided that this shall not apply to persons working in stores and mercantile establishments on Saturday nights or during 20 days before Christmas." Section 6 reads, in part: "That every person, firm or corporation, agent or manager of a corporation employing or permitting or suffering to work children under the age of 18 years and over the age of 14 in all places of business or establishments or occupations enumerated in section 1 shall post and keep posted in a conspicuous place in every room in which such help is employed or permitted or suffered to work a list containing the names, age and place of residence of every person under the age of 18 years employed, permitted or suffered to work in such room.' Defendant contends that acting, dancing, or singing on the stage of a theater is not "labor or work" in the sense of the statute. The word "work" has a much more comprehensive meaning than the term "labor," and has been thus defined: La. 257, 48 South. 927. The wisdom and policy of the statute does not concern the courts, whose function is confined to the interpretation and enforcement of the law as written. The next inquiry is as to the alleged unconstitutionality of the statute. The law is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden is on the defendant to show clearly and beyond reasonable dispute that its provisions are repugnant to the organic laws of the United States or of the state of Louisiana. We assume that the demurrer was intended to charge that the statute in question is violative of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, prohibiting the abridgment of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States or the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. In Starnes v. Albion Mfg. Co., 147 N. C. 556, 61 S. E. 525, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 602, the court said: "Child-labor laws have been adopted in nearly all the states of this Union and Canada, and are in force in nearly all the governments of Europe |