of plaintiff, that plaintiff never having waived or relinquished the tax, on the contrary, having collected and received the proceeds of the tax annually in said parishes, that the question of granting the aid not having been resubmitted to the taxpayers of the parishes and municipality before named, the plaintiff and the Arkansas Southern Railroad Company are not, and have never been, exempt from taxation in the parish of Union. The construction to be placed on the second paragraph of article 230, Const. 1898, gives rise to the question before us for decision. The paragraph reads as follows:

"There shall also be exempt from taxation for a period of ten years from date of its completion any railroad or part of such railroad that may hereafter be constructed and completed prior to January 1, 1904; provided, that when aid has heretofore been voted by any parish, ward or municipality to any railroad not yet constructed, such railroad shall not be entitled to the exemption from taxation herein established, unless it waives and relinquishes such aid or consents to a resubmission of the question of granting such aid to a vote of the property tax payers' petition for the same within six months after the adoption of this Constitution."

Can plaintiff retain the aid voted by the parishes of Lincoln and Winn and by the town of Ruston, and be entitled to exemption from taxation in the parish of Union?

In our opinion the construction to be placed on the paragraph affirmatively answers the question.

An analysis of the paragraph shows that it was the intention in inserting it as part of the Constitution to restrict the effect of the waiver required, or to resubmit the question of taxation. The provision of the

paragraph does not refer to the parishes, but in the singular to the "ward" or "municipality," as the political subdivision in which there must be a "waiver," "relinquishment," or "resubmission" in order to obtain the benefit of exemption. It refers to the one political subdivision, evidently limiting the right to the exemption to it.

In some instances the state leaves it to the local subdivisions to determine whether property shall be assessed or not. The whole matter is under the supervision, direction, and control of her officers in the tax collecting department.

If the taxpayers were to attempt an improper interference by voting an illegal exemption, it would soon be remedied.

We are led to this conclusion because the argument on the part of the defense leads to the conclusion that the authority should not be sanctioned because it would lead to an interference with the authority of the state in matter of exempting property from taxation.

The state leaves it to an enterprise such as a railroad to determine whether it will accept a tax or an exemption.

In this instance the enterprise accepts the exemption, and has thereby necessarily waived all right to a tax in the parish of Union.

This can be done without having to waive its right to a tax which it had acquired in other subdivisions.

It may be to the interest of the enterprise or it may be to the interest of a subdivision in one locality to provide the aid through taxation; while, in another subdivision, they may refuse to tax the taxpayers in the event the exemption is granted.

The tax provided in a small municipality may be collected if the exemption is not allowed therein without such action interfer

ing with the wishes of another locality in which other interests and conditions prevail.

Moreover, the state in this instance is not a party here, and it follows does not complain.

Why should defendants object. They have no right to interfere on behalf of the state except with her sanction.

The law and the evidence considered, and being in favor of appellee, the judgment is affirmed.

No. 17,697.

(125 La, 877)

CASTERA'S HEIRS v. NEW ORLEANS LAND CO.

(Supreme Court of Louisiana. March 14, 1910. Rehearing Denied April 11, 1910.)

(Syllabus by the Court.) 1. DEEDS (8 38*)-DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY -TITLE.

of property rights, a title must sufficiently deIn order to be good and serve as the basis scribe the property so as to identify it, and when, as in the case of defendant's title, it fails to describe land claimed by the defendplaintiffs who possess a title to the land that ants, it will not serve to avail them against is the subject of the suit.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. $$ 65-79; Dec. Dig. § 38.*]

2. ADVERSE POSSESSION (8 80*) - TITLE TRANSLATIVE OF PROPERTY DESCRIPTION OF LAND.

In order to acquire property by means of the prescription of 10 years, it is necessary that the one pleading this prescription should possess by a title translative of property, and one of the essential requisites of this title is that it should correctly and properly describe the land so as to identify it.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 463-467; Dec. Dig. § 80.*]

3. ADVERSE POSSESSION (§ 14*)-POSSESSION

-EVIDENCE.

Possession is one of the essential elements of the 10 years' prescription, and the evidence does not show that either the defendants or the authors of their title were in possession for this prescription cannot avail them. 10 years prior to the filing of the suit, and so

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Adverse Pos session, Dec. Dig. § 14.*]

Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.

Action by the heirs of Louis Castera against the New Orleans Land Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Chas. Louque, for appellant. Wm. Winans Wall, for appellees.

BREAUX, C. J. Plaintiffs brought this suit to recover part of 23 certain squares of land in the Second district of New Orleans, bounded by Bayou St. John, Scott and Brooks streets, and in the rear by property formerly owned by the Canal Bank.

This land measures 189 feet on Bayou St. John by a depth hereafter stated. Plaintiffs set up a chain of title back to the year 1853.

In one of these titles, J. F. Beugnot was the vendor and Louis Castera the vendee. The deed is dated June 16, 1862.

Plaintiffs are the heirs of Louis Castera. There are a number of deeds going back to the government. There is no necessity of detailing them here at length.

The defendant pleaded the prescription of 10 years and 30 years.

It alleged that, in exchange with the New Orleans & Western Railroad Company, it became the owner of certain lands, which it avers is the same land which plaintiffs claim. The act of exchange is dated June 18, 1895.

In a supplemental answer, the defendant alleged that on January 15, 1907, it bought lands from George Fredericks.

The Fredericks' lands were formerly owned by Beugnot.

Respondent in the alternative claims a large amount for improvements made by it, as it alleged, and also an amount for taxes it claims to have paid.

The whole of the property had belonged to the Castera heirs. It was sold at tax sale and bought at that sale by George Fredericks, the defendant in the present suit.

The owners whose property had been thus sold brought suit to recover the whole property.

Part of it was correctly described by the tax collecting department, and by the said act of adjudication at tax sale the property passed to the adjudicatee, George Fredericks.

The remainder of the property in question, also sold at tax sale, was so imperfectly described that it could not be identified. The court held that it remained the property of the plaintiffs, the Castera heirs.

Fredericks sold all the property that he had recovered in the suit to the New Orleans & Western Railroad Company.

The New Orleans & Western Railroad Company having acquired that property, it claimed that it held title to the whole property; that which it had bought, and that which it did not buy.

This claim was based upon title back to the government, as defendant contends.

The differences that have arisen between plaintiffs and defendant arise from the imperfect description of the land. In other words, the land claimed by defendant is not within the limits of the land bought by the New Orleans Land Company from the New Orleans & Western Railroad Company.

Mr. Pilie, a surveyor and civil engineer, testified that the two properties-that is, the property claimed by the defendant and the property claimed by the plaintiffs-are distinct and different from each other; that the squares numbered as above formed part of a tract of land four arpents fronting on Bayou St. John by a depth to the New Orleans Bank property. This land, as described, is commonly known as the "Beugnot property." It was sold to Castera by the former by deed before Laresche, notary, many

Pilie, as a witness, insisted that the plaintiffs' tract was on the Allard tract, and the land of defendant is what is known as the "Alpuente tract."

In several of the deeds, the name of Gordon appears as the owner of the tract of land in which is the Allard tract.

This is evidently a mistake.

The Louis Allard tract subsequently became the Beugnot tract, according to this witness, and the Alpuente, Demorouelle, and other tracts are situated beyond in the direc tion of the lake.

In the act of exchange, above referred to, the Alpuente tract is referred to, as well as the Gordon tract, as boundaries.

It seems that these are misleading boundaries and only add to the difficulty in locating the lines.

It further appears that the Alpuente tract was at one time claimed by McDonogh; it

Prescription of 10 years, as a mode of acquiring title, requires more than a mere indefinite claim without local habitation and

a name. It requires that possession be taken by one who has good reason to believe himself the owner with title.

If one takes possession of a tract of land under a deed which does not contain a description sufficiently correct to enable an average surveyor, in point of ability, to identify it, he cannot claim to be a possessor in good faith.

Mr. Pilie, surveyor, testified in this case that the description in one of the titles under which defendant claims is not sufficiently clear to identify the land by it.

It is necessary that the description should be sufficiently complete to serve the purpose of identification.

In the chain of titles in this case, there are deeds under private signature of very ancient dates.

They were introduced in evidence without proof of the genuineness of the signatures. Objection was urged to their admissibility on the ground that they did not of themselves make proof of the genuineness of the signature.

They are mentioned in deeds of transfer of property of dates subsequent, and thereby they were made admissible as proof.

To conclude: Admitting all that defendant claims in regard to the origin of its

goes back at least to the Beugnot title. It passed into the hands of a purchaser at tax sale, who testified as to his possession of this land.

After the tax deed was decreed null, the land reverted to the plaintiffs.

The defendant took possession at one time under one title, but not title to the land in question.

Despite the confusing surveys and maps, it remains that defendant's title goes back to the Alpuente tract, while the plaintiffs' title goes back to the Allard tract.

The owner of land under the Allard title cannot be heard to claim the Alpuente title, and vice versa.

The defendants reconvened and asked that

they be paid for the betterment due to their energy and enterprise.

Until the advent of railroads, these were lost lands. The defendant company and others in interest have built levees; made roads and drains. They have redeemed the land. It is now high and valuable.

With the evidence before us, there is no possibility of allowing this claim. It is not sufficiently evident to whom plaintiffs owe for the improvements, and it does not appear in what respect or to what extent the general benefit derived is shared by plaintiffs.

An amount is also claimed in reconvention for taxes. This amount, likewise, is not susThere is not direct tained by the evidence. proof that defendants have paid taxes on these particular squares.

To go back for a moment to the title, we will state:

There are some expressions in the deeds and some of the testimony brings out the facts somewhat differently from those heretofore found by us. In other words, titles seem to deflect from the regular line of title. But, after a careful consideration, we arrive at the conclusion that they are derived as before mentioned, and that an accidental erroneous expression cannot be taken as basis for title.

It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be, and the same is hereby, affirmed, at appel. lant's costs.

(125 La. 883)

No. 17,834.

ANDIRAC v. RICHARDSON.

(Supreme Court of Louisiana. March 14, 1910. Rehearing Denied April 11, 1910.)

(Syllabus by the Court.) ATTORNEY AND CLIENT (§ 147*)-Contract FOR CONTINGENT FEE-VALIDITY.

It is lawful for an attorney at law to contract with a client for the payment of a fee conditioned on his success in recovering property or collecting claims. The amount of the contingent fee, being fixed by contract, is binding on the client, in the absence of fraud practiced, or error induced, by the attorney.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. § 351; Dec. Dig. § 147.*]

Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.

Action by Marie Lucie Andirac against F. Rivers Richardson. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

T. M. & J. D. Miller, for appellant. Richardson & Soule and Donelson Caffery, for appellee.

LAND, J. The petition alleges: That the plaintiff, a French woman unacquainted with the language and customs of the United States, employed the defendant as her attorney to collect certain moneys and notes due her by J. N. Villavasso and the late Eugene Aveilhe, aggregating nearly $4,000.

That the defendant, imposing upon plaintiff's ignorance, and taking advantage of the relations existing between attorney and client, fixed his fee or charge for making the said collections at 50 per cent. of the amount thereof.

That the plaintiff, through ignorance, consented to the said charge, and placed the business in the hands of the said Richardson accordingly, through ignorance of the customary and equitable fees charged by attorneys for such service, although the said charge of 50 per cent. was excessive and exorbitant, and contrary to good conscience and the ethics of the legal profession.

That defendant has collected for account of plaintiff about $3,864.15, and that, allowing the defendant a fair and usual fee of 10 per cent. for making said collections, there would be a balance of $3,477.74 due plaintiff, subject to a credit of $1,129.75 received from the defendant.

Plaintiff prays for judgment for $2,347.99, or such larger sum as may be found due on a settlement of accounts.

The defendant, after excepting to the petition, answered, denying all the allegations of the petition except such as might be admitted, and setting forth an express contract for a contingent fee of 50 per cent. made with plaintiff as a condition of his employment.

The answer further sets forth a full history of the nature of the claims of the plaintiff against the two parties named, the uncertainty and difficulty of collecting anything from either of them, and the services rendered and amounts collected from time to time during a period of three years.

The answer avers that defendant owed the plaintiff a balance of $527.32, which he had tendered prior to the institution of the suit, and which the plaintiff refused to accept.

tion seems to have been cumulated with Defendant's exception of no cause of ac the merits, and was not decided by the judge below. There was judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $560.25, and costs. Plaintiff has appealed, and the defendant has answered praying that the judgment be reversed, and that his exception be sustained, and the suit be dismissed, with costs.

1. Considering the relations which should exist between an attorney and his client, we are not prepared to hold that the allegations, although vague, do not show a cause of action.

2. The evidence does not support the allegations of ignorance and imposition.

Plaintiff's husband lived and died in Louisiana, after a residence of two years. He appears to have left a last will and testament, and that Eugene Aveilhe, a Catholic priest, was his executor. The probate record was not offered in evidence. The interest of the widow in the estate is not shown. We gather from the testimony of the witnesses that the executor loaned $3,843 to J. N. Villavasso, taking eight interest-bearing notes; that the executor collected some of these notes, and the remainder were turned over by him to the plaintiff; that one of these notes was paid to an attorney for the plaintiff; that in 1904 the plaintiff came to New Orleans with four notes aggregating $2,080.41; that Villavasso had become insolvent in fact and unable to meet his obligations; that the plaintiff consulted three different lawyers about her claims against the maker of the notes and the executor, but none of them would take her case; and that she, finally, accompanied by an interpreter, came to defendant's office and employed him.

It is clearly shown that the defendant told the plaintiff that he would not undertake the collection of claims of such a nature for less than a contingent fee of 50 per cent., and that the plaintiff, then and there, with a perfect understanding of the propositions, employed the defendant to collect such claims, aggregating $4,000, as alleged in the petition, and agreed to pay him a commission of 50 per cent. on the amounts collected. The receipt for the four notes signed by the defendant and delivered to the plaintiff reads: