of the Senate should be chosen in the mode now adopted, but should retain their seats for life, subject to expulsion by their own body, and should be incapable of holding any other position. Members of the House should be elected by the people of their respective districts for the term of four years. The Senate and House should possess the same relative powers as at present.

A Senate thus composed would be the most dignified, illustrious, and justly conservative body in the world. The members would have ample time and opportunity, and every inducement, to make of themselves true statesmen. Their attention would not be occupied with conflicts between duty and ambition. They would have but ONE thing to do, and would be beyond the reach of passion, prejudice, or personal interest. Their fame could only be based upon real merit. No political combinations could add any thing to their reputations. To be a life-long and distinguished member of such a body would be ample to gratify reasonable ambition.

Such a body would be superior to the English House of Lords, in several material respects: 1. The House of Lords represents only certain classes of the conservative element of the nation, while the Senate would represent all. 2. The House of Lords, as a body, would be inferior in capacity, owing to the elements of which it is composed. The hereditary peers are not generally distinguished for ability. The same is true of the Bishops, whose profession does not make them practical states

men.

The provision that renders Senators incapable of all further promotion, is a very important one, and would not only exclude all topics of personal dispute, but would give the action of such a venerable body the most deserved weight with the people. There being no motive of interest or feeling to sway the judgment of Senators, (a majority of whom would, at all times, possess ample character, experience, and capacity,) there could, in most cases, be no plausible ground for objection to their action. Every man in the nation would have just reason to repose confidence in such a body of statesmen. The time of that body would not be consumed, as now, in discussing the political pretensions and antecedents of aspiring Senators for the Presi

dency, and often in fierce personal quarrels. The cause being removed, the melancholy effect would cease.*

The members of the House of Representatives would be fresh from the people, and would, therefore, represent the progressive

* The history of the proceedings of the Senate will show a number of cases where Senators were evidently influenced, to a great extent, by personal ambition. Perhaps the most noted case was the rejection of Mr. Van Buren as minister to England. Col. Benton, in his Thirty Years' View, gives the secret history of that rejection; according to which account the leading motive of those who voted against the nomination was the desire to kill off a competitor for the Presidency, who was in the way of Messrs. Clay, Calhoun, and Webster. Rejection of the nomination was not enough-a killing off in the public mind was intended; and therefore the unusual process of the elaborate preparation and the intended publication of the speeches." All the speakers abjured all, sinister motives. "The acccomplished Forsyth complimented, in a way to be perfectly understood, this excess of patriotism, which could voluntarily inflict so much self-distress for the sake of the public good; and I, most unwittingly, brought the misery of one of the gentlemen to a sudden and ridiculous conclusion by a chance remark. It was Mr. Gabriel Moore, of Alabama, who sat near me, and to whom I said, when the vote was declared: You have broken a minister, and elected a Vice-President.' He asked me how; and I told him the people would see nothing in it but a combination of rivals against a competitor, and would pull them all down and set him up. Good God!' said he, 'why didn't you tell me that before I voted, and I would have voted the other way.'" In Mr. Moore's speech, only delivered a few moments before this, is to be found this passage: "Sir, it is proper that I should declare that the evidence adduced against the character and conduct of the late Secretary of State, and the sources from which this evidence emanates, have made an impression on my mind that will require of me, in the conscientious though painful discharge of my duty, to record my vote against his nomination.' I Heard Mr. Calhoun say to one of his doubting friends, 'It will kill him, sir-kill him dead. He will never kick, sir-never kick!' and the alacrity with which he gave the casting votes, on the two occasions, both vital, on which they were put into his hands, attested the sincerity of his belief, and his readiness for the work." A tie vote was purposely produced twice, by the surplus votes against the nomination going out, and Mr. Calhoun, then being VicePresident, was thus compelled to give the casting vote and show his position. In reference to this case, Col. Benton also says:

"The famous Madame Roland, when mounting the scaffold, apostrophized the mock statue upon it with this exclamation: 'Oh Liberty! how many crimes are committed in thy name!' After what I have seen during my thirty years of inside and outside views in the Congress of the United States, I feel qualified to paraphrase the apostrophe, and exclaim: 'Oh Politics! how much bamboozling is`practised in thy game!'”—(Thirty Years' View, vol. i., 214.)

But whether we give full credence to the history of this transaction or not, as given by Col. Benton, Senators (especially all those known or supposed to have aspirations for further promotion) are placed in a very delicate and embarrassing position. In cases like the one mentioned, there may be ample reason for rejecting the nomination; and yet Senators would be deterred from so voting, because it would subject their motives to plausible imputation, and in the end promote the political rise of the unworthy nominee.

element of the nation. The term of four years would seem preferable to that of two, as it would give members a reasonable time to make themselves fully acquainted with the rules of the House, and the exising state of legislation. The present term of two years is too short, considering the extent of our country and the complex character of its diversified interests. A member can now scarcely prepare himself so as properly to introduce his measures before his time is out.*

A body constituted as the House of Representatives, is indispensably necessary to arouse the attention and quicken the action of the conservative branch. There is great practical danger that, without this fresh, young, and vigorous body, the Senate would become too conservative. But as the Senate. would have every motive to do right, and none to do wrong, the persistent assertion of true principles and the advocacy of correct measures on the part of the House, could not fail, in due time, to secure the consent of the Senate. The correctness of this opinion is proven by the history of English legislation, where the House of Lords, from the nature of its structure and composition, is more apt to be swayed by the interests and habits of particular classes than would be the Senate; and for that reason, offers a greater obstacle to the passage of just and liberal measures. It required some forty years' hard exertion of Earl Grey and Major Cartwright to carry British Parliamentary reform, and long-continued exertions to carry Catholic emancipation, corn-law repeal, abolition of the slave-trade, and other great measures. But the Senate, from its composition, would be much more susceptible to the appeals of reason and justice.

§ 5. The Judiciary.

The judges of all the more important courts of record should be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and the judges of the courts of inferior im

* "Short service and not popular election, is the evil of the House of Representatives; and this becomes more apparent by contrast-contrast between the North and the South-the caucus, or rotatory system, not prevailing in the South, and useful members being usually continued from that quarter as long as useful; and thus, with fewer members, usually showing a greater number of men who have attained a distinction." (Thirty Years' View, vol. i., 207.)

portance by the Governors of the States, by and with the advice and consent of the State Senates. Both classes of judges should hold their offices during good behavior, and be subject to removal from office by impeachment. The judges of the Supreme Court of the United States should be incapable of holding any other position. A seat upon the bench of that Court should be held sufficient to satisfy human ambition.

A Supreme Court, thus constituted, would be superior to the Court of King's Bench in England. Though the judges there have now fixed salaries, and are not removable at the pleasure of the crown as formerly, they are subject to removal simply upon the address of both Houses of Parliament, and are under the influence of the hope of future promotion. In reference to the English judges, Mr. Hallam remarks:

"It is always to be kept in mind that they are still accessible to the hope of further promotion, to the zeal of political attachment, to the flattery of princes and ministers; that the bias of their prejudices, as elderly and peaceable men, will, in a plurality of cases, be on the side of power; that they have very frequently been trained, as advocates, to vindicate every proceeding of the crown; from all which we should look on them with 'some little vigilance, and not come hastily to the conclusion that, because their commissions cannot be vacated by the crown's authority, they are wholly out of the reach of its influence." (Con. His., 597.)

§ 6. Salaries.

The President, the heads of the Executive departments, judges of the Courts, and members of Congress, should receive fixed salaries, which should not be increased or diminished during the term for which they were appointed. As to the salaries of the President, heads of departments, and judges of the Courts, the Constitution itself should provide that they should be paid out of the first moneys in the Treasury, without the necessity of any appropriation by Congress for that purpose.

This provision is important to render the Executive and Judicial departments independent of a factious House of Representatives; as in this House all revenue and appropriation bills would originate, a factious majority of its members, driven by

party exasperation, might withhold the appropriations for the other departments. It is well to remove this temptation from the House. One department should not have the power over the means of living of the principal officers of the other two. The very object of a Constitutional theory is to distribute the powers of Government among independent departments. Therefore, to make one department dependent upon another is to defeat the very purpose of a free Constitution.

§ 7. Slavery.

This vexed question has been so much discussed, and often in a spirit so bitter, and so intense a feeling now exists in reference to it, that but a single remark seems proper under this head. Whatever settlement of the question should be finally adopted, should be plainly stated in the Constitution; and when thus stated, both sections of the Union might rely, with entire confidence, that the guarantees of the Constitution would be faithfully preserved, by a Government constituted as the one proposed.

§ 8. The proposed theory materially different from that

of Hamilton.

The theory proposed has never been submitted to the test of experiment, so far as my reading has enabled me to determine. It differs in several material respects from that of Alexander Hamilton. In his theory, the National Legislature consisted of two branches, with power "to pass all laws whatsoever." The executive power was vested in a Governor who held office during good behavior, with an absolute negative upon the acts of the National Legislature, and the sole power to appoint the chief officers of the Departments of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. The Senate had the sole power of declaring war, and the Governors of the States possessed an absolute negative upon the acts of the State Legislatures. (Journal of Con., 130-2, June 18, 1787.)

The process of electing the Governor, as proposed by Hamilton, was too complex, and the tenure of the executive office is liable to two objections.