our interest and our duty. Our judgments and our hearts tell us so. We are willing and anxious to be governed; because we regard legitimate government, not as a curse, but as a blessing. But give us only one master. We cannot love and serve

two.

3. The Executive Power.

The Executive power of the Nation should be vested in a President, who should be a native citizen of the United States, and be elected by a direct vote of the people. He should hold his office for a term of twenty years, be ineligible for a second term, incapable of holding any other office, and subject to removal by impeachment. All officers appointed by him, except judicial, should hold their offices during his pleasure. He should have, besides, the right to demand the written opinions of all heads of departments, a Cabinet to consist of the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, and of War, and the Attorneygeneral, who should be entitled to seats in the House of Representatives, but without the right to vote. In addition to the other powers conferred upon him by the present Constitution, and those mentioned above, he should have the power to declare martial law, and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for a limited period, during the recess of Congress.

It may be objected, and with much reason, that an elective Executive can never entirely escape from the influence of those aspirants for office under him, to whose efforts he is mainly indebted for his own elevation to power; and that an hereditary Executive is the only one that can avoid the influence of party spirit, as he comes into office without pledges or obligations, either expressed or implied. It may also be said, that an elective theory is more apt to give rise to frequent civil wars.

It must be conceded that both theories are liable to some objections. The theory of an hereditary Executive is certain to place in power a greater number of incompetent and unworthy persons. The history of France, England, and other monarchies will show, that the hereditary theory does not lessen the dangers of civil war. Frequent and bloody civil wars have occurred in struggles for the succession. Questions of legitimacy often arise, exceedingly difficult to determine. Governments

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have been perplexed, and nations wasted, because it could not be certainly known, whether a particular marriage was legal or otherwise. If legal, one claimant would be the rightful heir to the crown; if illegal, then the other. These discussions are often of a very painful and indelicate character; and every correct theory of government should give no cause for them.

Besides, the danger of civil war, under the theory of an elective Executive, arises mainly from the fact, that the incumbent is eligible for another term. He being a candidate for another term, and being in possession of the office, and in command of the army and navy, and these being large in proportion to the entire population, and the race being sufficiently close to give rise to plausible doubt as to which competitor is really entitled to the office, it is easy, in such cases, to make charges of fraud in the election; and, as fraud vitiates every thing, a plausible case may be made out by the incumbent, who will not hesitate to use his power over the army and navy, and over his party friends, to retain power. But when the incumbent is plainly limited to a single term, this danger cannot arise from any defect in the theory. It would be a case of plain usurpation.

A very grave and serious, objection to the theory of an hereditary Executive is, that the people are often made to bleed and suffer, simply to gratify the pride and personal resentment of the monarch. The pages of history are full of such instances. Royal families necessarily connect themselves with those of other' countries by marriage, and thus form family alliances, often very detrimental to their own governments.

It will be obvious, upon reflection, that the long term of the Presidential office, will avoid most of the evils of the present theory. It must be conceded, that candidates for that office would most likely be nominated by conventions, as heretofore; but the futility of requiring aspirants to commit themselves so long in advance, to any particular line of policy, must be apparent. The long term would more likely lead to the selection of better men. The new President, when once in power, is placed in an independent position, has no hopes of future promotion himself, and no plausible excuse for sweeping removals, for mere political reasons. The long term before him will allow him to wait for vacancies occasioned by deaths, resignations,

and removals for cause. The operation of the executive power would be steady, energetic, and consistent. The President would have time to deliberately adopt and successfully carry out his measures. The power of impeachment would not only be the more promptly enforced, but the fear of forfeiting his long term of office, would deter even an incumbent of doubtful integrity from any gross violation of duty. The theory of long terms of office has these very decisive advantages: 1. It gives the incumbent ample time to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the duties of his position; 2. It removes the temptation to delinquency; 3. It is a powerful check upon it.

A President placed in that secure position would have nothing to fear while he did right. He would have ample time and opportunity to make himself a true statesman, and every motive to lay a solid foundation for deserved and enduring fame, in a vigorous, honest, and wise administration. The mere passions and excitements of the hour would not often influence his action. Placed above party trammels, and beyond the reach of party and sectional prejudice, his administration would not only be good in itself, but it would command the confidence and respect of the people, from the absence of all motive to do wrong. Under the practical operation of such a theory, we should have every reason to expect a long succession of illustrious men in the highest office in the world.

It is a matter of great practical importance, that the ordinary advisory body of the Executive should not be too large; because it is not safe to intrust the keeping of Cabinet secrets to many persons; and it is not convenient to assemble and consult so many as often as may be required. Even large advisory bodies move slowly. It is also of great practical importance that members of the Cabinet should be allowed seats in the House of Representatives, so that the President may propose his measures through them, and sustain those measures by argument and explanation. In legislating for a great nation, time is very important, and moments become valuable. Every facility, therefore, for expediting business, and for the correction and prevention of errors in legislation, should be adopted. The members of the Cabinet, being familiar with the views of the President, could at once, in many cases, afford that information, which it now requires resolution of inquiry to obtain. So, the

members of the Cabinet, being also acquainted with the prac tical operation of the laws, the business of the principal departments, and the existing state of legislation, would be more competent to draw up bills for many purposes, than the regular members themselves. Many of the perplexing errors now found in Acts of Congress would be thus avoided. There is nothing more difficult than to frame a bill upon a complex subject, and yet have the bill full, clear, concise, and consistent.

In a country so extensive and diversified as ours, it is important to the national safety, and the best ultimate humanity, that the President should have the power to declare martial law, and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in cases of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, and for a limited. time, during the recess of Congress. The late distressing events in our country, have shown the wisdom and necessity of such a provision. There is no means more efficient, and at the same time more humane in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, than the power of promptly arresting and imprisoning suspected individuals. It separates the leaders to whom the secrets of the plot are alone confided, confuses their plans of operation, dispirits their adherents, and often prevents the dire necessity of shedding blood. In the midst of military operations, there is no time to issue writs of habeas corpus, and calmly investigate the alleged causes of imprisonment. No doubt mistakes and abuses must and will occur, and innocent persons suffer for a time. But when the peace and safety of the government are at stake, individuals had better suffer temporary wrong, in some cases, than that a greater evil should befal an entire community. The maxim of the law, that it is better that ninety-nine guilty should escape, than that one innocent person should suffer, is often carried too far, and is not applicable to the extreme case where the nation is in peril.

It is very true that the English people are so jealous of their personal liberty, that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is alone reserved to Parliament. (1 Black. Com. 136.) But the reasons for this restriction upon the powers of the crown would not exist with us. The king holds his crown for life, with succession to his heirs, and is not criminally responsible for any act whatever. The English Constitution leaves him without sufficient checks, and with many induce

inents to increase his powers. In the hands of the crown, the power of suspension would be highly dangerous. But the President would hold his office for a single term, without succession, and subject to impeachment. He would, therefore, have no motive for the wilful abuse of the power, and the danger of impeachment would operate as a powerful check upon him.

There can be no doubt that, under the existing Constitution, the power of suspension is alone vested in Congress. This is conclusively shown by Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion delivered in the late case of ex parte John Merryman. As a judge, the Chief Justice could only declare the law as it is; not as, in his opinion, it should be. But the necessity for the existence of this power in the President, during the recess of Congress, has led to violations of the present Constitution by some of our military officers, whose acts have been overlooked upon the ground of necessity. But the plea of necessity is a dangerous precedent to indulge under a government of limited powers.

It may be said by some, that it would be better for the President to hold his office during good behavior, rather than for the long and fixed term of twenty years. But this is objectionable, because it makes the periods of election irregular. The people should always know with certainty, and long in advance, when they are to exercise the privilege of electing their President. They would thus have ample time for discussion and reflection. Besides, it would become necessary that the vacancy should be filled temporarily, until the result of the election could be known; and this would increase the interruptions in the administration of this department, and render its policy more fluctuating and unsteady.

The Vice-President should possess the same qualifications, and be elected at the same time, and for the same term, as the President. The Vice-President should possess the powers conferred upon the office by the present Constitution. Provisions for filling vacancies in the office of President and Vice-President should be the same as at present.

§ 4. The Legislative Power.

The Legislative power should be vested in a Congress, to consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. Members