CHAPTER III.

THE ULTIMATE REMEDY.

§ 1. The ultimate remedy stated.

A WRITER Who objects to things as they are, should suggest a remedy for the alleged evils to which his objections refer. To simply complain, without being able to point out any remedy, is to gratify a mere fault-finding disposition; and this is doing an idle, if not a vicious thing. The writer will endeavor to comply with the reasonable duty incumbent upon those who make objections.

In assigning the alleged defects of our governmental theory, as the fundamental causes of the present crisis in the affairs of the Nation, the proposed ultimate and permanent remedy has been already incidentally suggested. This remedy consists in removing the causes themselves; and to do this, the theory of the Government must be thoroughly and radically amended. Partial and temporary remedies are deceptive. They may give relief for a time, only to be followed by evils more distressing than ever. We must go back and begin at the beginning, and profit by our later and more dearly-bought experience. It is a rule of logic, that errors should be corrected in the places where they occur. With a fresh, ample, and fertile territory, and, comparatively, a sparse population, and, consequently, a people generally free from want, and, for that reason, virtuous and independent, our theory succeeded very well at the beginning. But as, in the natural progress of things, our circumstances approached the condition of the populations of the Old World, the practical defects of our theory became more and more apparent.*

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* Malthus assumes these positions as true:

"The increase of population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence. Population invariably increases when the means of subsistence increases, unless prevented by powerful and obvious checks.

“These checks, and the checks which keep the population down to the level of the means of subsistence, are moral restraint, vice, and misery.

"Corn countries are more populous than pasture countries, and rice countries more populous than corn countries."-(Malthus on Population, vol. i., 532-4.)

The theory should be amended in these three general respects:

1. It should be made more simple.

There is no governmental theory in the world so complex as our own. This is agreed to by all our jurists and statesmen. All avoidable complexity should be excluded from the theory. It should be made as simple as the great and various purposes of government will allow. Government, at best, is a vast and complex machine; but like the machinery of a great steamship, though complex, it should be harmonious in its operations.

2. It should be made more conservative.

The acute and profound Mons. De Tocqueville, in his able work upon America, very justly says:

"In conformity with this principle, America is, at the present day, the country in the world where laws last the shortest time." (p. 278.)

Few countries have suffered so much from hasty, changeable, and excessive legislation as our own. We have not, in our rushing mad pursuit of objects before us, stopped to secure the steps already taken. Majorities alternate in our country as elsewhere; and in our theory there are no efficient checks upon the interests and passions of mere majorities, for the time being. The same elegant writer remarks upon this unchecked power of present majorities, as follows:

"The majority, therefore, in that country exercise a prodigious actual authority, and a moral influence scarcely less preponderant; no obstacles exist which can impede, or so much as retard its progress, or which can induce it to heed the complaints of those whom it crushes upon its path. This state of things is fatal in itself and dangerous for the future."—(p. 277.) 3. It should be made stronger.

The Federal Government is too weak, and there are too many restrictions upon its powers, in view of the extent of our country, its varied productions, antagonistic interests, and different domestic institutions. There is no government less worthy of the respect of mankind, and of the obedience of those whom it mocks with a farcical rule and protection, than that which is impotent to accomplish the very ends for which government is alone instituted. A strong government may oppress its people;

but it, at least, gives them protection as against foreign enemies, and as against each other.

"The circumstances," says Hamilton, "that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason, no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the councils which are appointed to preside over the common defence."

This was said in reference to the power "to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support." In reference to the extent of our territory, he said:

"This, at all events, must be evident, that the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is the strongest argument in favor of an energetic government; for any other can certainly never preserve the union of so large an empire."-(Federalist, No 23.)

It is very true that these observations of Hamilton were made in answer to the objection, that too much power had been conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution. But when it is remembered that he was decidedly in favor of a much stronger form of government, his remarks may justly be taken in a more general sense. The heading of the number from which these extracts are taken, is in these words: "The necessity of a government, at least equally energetic with the one proposed."

The great end to be accomplished, is to combine strength in the Government with security and liberty in the governed, so far as this can be done. To accomplish this end, restrictions upon the powers of government are not generally so safe, and at the same time efficient, as their proper distribution among different departments, which act as checks upon each other. “I repeat here," says the same great statesman, "what I have observed in substance in another place, that all observations, founded upon the danger of usurpation, ought to be referred to the composition and structure of the government, not to the nature and extent of its powers."-(Federalist, No. 31.)

§ 2. There should be no State sovereignty.

The States should be strictly subordinate corporations, and only permitted to exercise such powers as may be allowed by Congress. In other words, they should possess no sovereignty, in fact or in theory, and should bear to the Government substantially the same relation that Territorial governments now bear to that of the Union. The acts of their legislatures should be only prima facie valid, and be subject to the negative of Congress. The Governor of each State should be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and should hold his office at the pleasure of the President. He should have a qualified negative upon the bills of the State Legislature, which should be composed of a Senate and House of Representatives. Members of the State Senate should be elected by the people of their respective senatorial districts, and should hold their positions for life, subject to the right of expulsion by their own body; and members of the House of Representatives should be elected by the people of their respective counties, and for a term of four years. The appointment of all subordinate executive and ministerial State officers should be vested in the Governor, except those of municipalities.

Such an amendment would relieve our theory of that political monster—a divided sovereignty. Every citizen would then plainly know the government to which his allegiance was rightfully due. He would not then be placed in the painful and illogical predicament, of having to love and serve two different supremes, of contrary wills. He could not then, as now, by the same act, commit two different offences; and thus be subjected to double punishment. It would then be out of the power of fathers to teach their sons, and of politicians to persuade the people, that their superior allegiance was due to the State. Rebellion would then be plain, unmistakable rebellion; and not, as now, a forcible attempt upon plausible grounds, to sustain alleged Constitutional rights. The theory of our Government would then be simple. It would be harmonious in theory and practice.

The vast amount of time heretofore consumed, in all the Courts and Legislative Assemblies, State and National, and by our law writers, politicians, and statesmen, in discussing the

multiplied and perplexing questions, continually arising, regarding the respective constitutional powers of the Federal and State Governments, would then be saved. Any one who will examine the subject, will see the amount of labor, time, and intellect heretofore consumed in these discussions. Should the present theory continue half a century longer, it is difficult to conceive how Congress and the Federal Courts could possibly despatch the business before them. This evil has become one of great magnitude.

This illogical attempt to divide sovereignty, has mainly given rise to the bitter and intemperate discussions in Congress, so injurious to our feelings as a people, and to our honor at home and abroad. It has also led to the most deplorable results among the people themselves. Their bitterness is but the reflection of that engendered in Congress and in the State Legislatures. Grievances, real or imaginary, will arise from time to time, under the best, and the best administered government in the world. Even measures substantially just under the circumstances, will bear harder upon one class, or upon one section, than upon another. These partial evils cannot be avoided by human wisdom.

This being true, the misfortune of our theory is, that these evils can generally be plausibly imputed to violations of the Constitution to encroachments upon State rights-to an invasion of State sovereignty. And when a citizen is once convinced that the Constitutional rights of his State have been invaded, he feels indignant; and when satisfied that this invasion has been deliberate, and continued for any considerable period of time, and that it will, in all probability, become permanent, all his energies and resentments are aroused, his soul is stirred within him, and his hatred of his supposed oppressor becomes, in time, so intense, that he is ready to die a martyr to that which he believes to be the right.

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These temptations to forcible resistance, under the name of defending the Constitution, should be removed. We should have a governmental theory, simple and clear enough in its main features-those that are fundamental-so that the good sense of every man can understand, at least, what officers he is bound to obey. We should not be left in doubt as to our rightful master. We are ready to give due obedience. It is both