this judgment, in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of the State of Mississippi, November 10, 1846. Defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations of the State of Mississippi, passed in 1844, "which (1) bars all suits on judgments recovered within the State after the lapse of seven years; and (2) all suits on judgments obtained out of the State in six years, in cases of judgments thereafter rendered; and (3) all suits on judgments obtained out of the State before the act was passed are barred, unless suit be brought thereon within two years next after the date of the act. On this latter provision the defence depends." Mr. Justice Catron, who delivered the opinion of the Court, remarked:

"The stringency of the case is, that the Act of Limitations of Mississippi invites to the State and protects absconding debtors from other States, by refusing a creditor a remedy on his judgment, which is in full force in the State whence the debtor absconded. . . . . In administering justice to enforce contracts and judgments, the States of the Union act independently of each other, and their courts are governed by the laws and municipal regulations of that State where a remedy is sought, unless they are controlled by the Constitution of the United States, or by laws enacted under its authority."

The Court, in that case, decided, that "the State law is not opposed to the Constitution of the United States, or to the act of Congress of 1790." The same decision was made in a case reported in 18 Howard, 249.

This act not only made an invidious distinction between judgments rendered in and out of the State, but it allowed a very short time in which to bring suits upon the latter class of judgments. As the State had the power to fix the period of two years, it is difficult to set any limits to that power, and a much shorter period of time might have been designated. By this iniquitous measure, the fraudulent debtor was legally enabled to pay his creditor by running off. By the act, absconding to avoid honest debts was made a virtue.

§ 9. The same subject continued.

In the case of Mager v. Grima, (8 Howard, 490,) it appeared that John Mager, a citizen of the State of Louisiana, left a leg

acy to his sister, a resident of France. The statute of Louisiana imposed a tax of ten per cent. upon legacies to foreigners not domiciled within the State.* Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said:

"Now the law in question is nothing more than the exercise of the power which every State and sovereignty possesses of regulating the manner and the term upon which property, real and personal, within its dominion may be transmitted by last will and testament, or by inheritance; and of prescribing who shall and who shall not be capable of taking it."

The State had the power to impose the tax, and fix the rate; and it would seem that the discrimination made against foreigners might have been extended to the citizens of other States, and of any particular State. So, the general power “ of prescribing who shall and who shall not take property by last will and testament, or by inheritance," would extend to the citizens of other States, and of any particular State.

"A writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the Supreme Court of a State, directs the latter court to transmit the record of the case to the upper court." (Chief Justice Taney. Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard, 453.)

But how the Supreme Court could compel a compliance with its writ, in case of refusal by the State Court, is a very difficult case to determine. In the report of the case of Hunter v. Martin, (4 Munford's Vir. Rep., 1,) it is stated that "the appellee Martin obtained a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States, requiring the Court of Appeals of Virginia to certify the record for re-examination by that court. The Honorable William Fleming, president of this Court, complied with the writ by certifying a transcript improvidently,' as was afterwards decided by himself as well as the other judges."

In that case it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States, that "the return of a copy of the record, under the seal of the court, certified by the clerk, and annexed to the writ of error, is a sufficient return in such a case." Head note of the case. (6 Wheaton, 304.) In the case of Ableman v. Booth,

* To constitute domicile, "there must be actual residence in the place, with the intention that it is to be a principal and permanent residence." Language of Mr. Justice Wayne in delivering the opinion of the Court, in the case of Ennis v. Smith, (14 Howard, 423.)

(21 Howard, 506,) it appeared that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin directed the clerk of that court to "make no return to the writ of error, and to enter no order upon the journals or records of the court concerning the same." The Supreme Court of the United States, under the circumstances, permitted Mr. Black, the attorney-general of the United States, to file a certified copy of the record, which had been previously obtained. The Court was thus enabled to proceed with the case; but had the statute of the State made it a criminal act in the clerk to certify a copy of the record for any purpose, or had that officer refused to make out the transcript, the question of the power of the Supreme Court of the United States to compel a compliance with the writ of error, would have been brought up for decision. According to newspaper report, that Court has lately decided, upon the application of the Governor of Kentucky for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor of Ohio to surrender a fugitive from justice, that the Federal tribunals have no power over State officers. But until a full and authentic report of the case is made, we may not understand correctly the exact ground assumed by the Court. In the case of Tassels, already referred to, the prisoner was executed in defiance of the writ of error; and there seems to have been no power in the Supreme Court of the United States to vindicate its authority, by punishing the offending judge of the State Court.

§ 10. The same subject further considered.

By the second section of the first article of the Constitution, members of Congress shall be chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and "the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature." It therefore belongs to each State to determine who shall and who shall not be citizens of that State. The power of naturalization is exclusively conferred upon Congress; and the exercise of this power only makes the alien a citizen of the United States, and not a citizen of any particular State.*

*The question whether a person of African descent can become a citizen of the United States, was not determined in the case of Scott v. Sandford, only three justices deciding that he could not, namely: Taney, Wayne, and Daniels. Justices Grier, Nel

Every State," says Chief Justice Taney, "has the undoubted right to determine the status or domestic and social condition of the persons domiciled within its territory, except in so far as the powers of the States in this respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon them by the Constitution of the United States."-(10 Howard, 93.)

And Mr. Justice Curtis, in his most able opinion, delivered in the case of Scott v. Sandford, (19 Howard,) uses this language:

"To what citizens the elective franchise shall be confided, is a question to be determined by each State, in accordance with its own views of the necessities or expediences of its own condition. What civil rights shall be enjoyed by its citizens, and whether all shall enjoy the same, or how they may be gained or lost, are to be determined in the same way."

The clause of the Constitution which restrains the powers of the several States, and imposes duties upon them in reference to citizens of other States, is found in the second section of the third article, in these words:

"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

This clause is obscure; but from the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, in the case of Scott v. Sandford, (19 Howard, 416,) the following conclusions may be drawn:

son, Campbell, and Catron concurred in the judgment of the court upon other grounds, and expressed no opinion upon this point. Justices McLean and Curtis dissented. It was conceded by all the justices, that each State could make any person a citizen of the State. There was no difference of opinion between Chief Justice Taney and Mr. Justice Curtis in reference to the naturalization of foreigners. But as to natives, there was this difference: Chief Justice Taney, while clearly conceding the right of each State to make any one-native or foreign born-a citizen of the State, denied the right of the State to make even a native of African descent, a citizen of the United States. Mr. Justice Curtis, on the contrary, said:

"And my opinion is, that, under the Constitution of the United States, every person born on the soil of a State, who is a citizen of that State, by force of its Constitution and laws, is also a citizen of the United States."

This language is very clear and explicit; and this position was sustained by Mr. Justice Curtis, by a force of reasoning and authority that would seem to be unanswerable. But as the Constitution only gives Congress power in reference to naturalization, and confers no power as to natives; it is clear, that if the proposition of Mr. Justice Curtis be correct, the converse of it must be equally true, namely: that each State may exclude any native of the State-white or colored-from citizenship, both of the particular State, and of the United States.

1. It exempts persons who are at the same time both citizens of the United States and of a State, and being in another State, from any special laws and police regulations not applicable to citizens of the latter State.

2. It gives them the right to enter any other State, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there so long as they please, and go when and where they please, unless they transgress some law applicable to citizens of the State.

3. It gives them the full liberty of speech in public and private, so far as enjoyed by the citizens of the State.

4. It gives them the right to hold public meetings, to keep and carry arms, so far as citizens of the State would be permitted to do so.

It will be seen that none of these privileges, secured by the Constitution of the United States, relate at all to State citizenship; but that the complete power over that right is reserved to each State respectively. For example, the State of California, by a provision of her Constitution, could exclude all persons born within any particular State or States from ever becoming citizens of California.

Any one who will examine the subject carefully, will readily find that the mass of powers reserved to the States are not only the most important powers of Government, but that they are unlimited by the Constitution of the United States. And if we follow the rule of construction laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, (and followed by most of the State Courts, if not by all,) that the limitations of power contained in the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, apply only to the Government created by the instrument itself; then it is clear that the States possess such a mass of powers, that they can, by a simple abuse of those powers, render the Union ultimately intolerable. For example, the power of one State to harass another by hostile legislation and insulting resolutions, is entirely without any efficient and peaceful remedy. The most partial and invidious legislation may be resorted to, and the most harsh and insulting resolutions passed by the Legislatures of the different States. Any State may establish a religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof, abridge the freedom of the press or of speech, take private property for public uses