"The Union itself, which the Constitution cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition, than America disunited with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation, and her maritime resources, impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United States from the powerful nations of the world, gives them the same happy security. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or plausible as long as they continue a united people. But let it never for a moment be forgotten, that they are indebted for this advantage to their union alone. The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States or confederacies, will set the same example in the new as Charles VII. did in the old world. The example will be followed here from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of America will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies. and perpetual taxes. The features of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge. In America, the miseries springing from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe.

the present edition of that work seems to have been exhausted, and copies are difficult to be had. It is well to often recur to this mine of wisdom, and especially at this period.

"This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace; every man who loves his country; every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it."

VARIOUS causes have been assigned by our public men, and by the press, for the present unhappy condition of the country; all of which have doubtless had their influence. Some attribute it to the agitation of the slavery question; others to disappointed party and sectional ambition; and others to the general corruption of our politicians. But the true fundamental cause lies much deeper; and is to be found in the theory of our government. All others are but secondary causes; and constitute, in fact, only different tests of the theory, as did the tariff question of 1833.

A true theory will vindicate, and a false theory betray itself, sooner or later. Every man in the nation may enthusiastically support an erroneous theory of government in the beginning; and yet time will assuredly show its fallacy. The eternal and inflexible laws of logic can no more be violated with impunity than the laws of nature. Man is but a subordinate being, and cannot lift himself above the laws of truth. If he attempts to do so for the time being, his ultimate fall will be only the more painful in proportion to the extent and duration of his transgression.

The fundamental vice in our theory, is the attempt to divide, between the Federal and State Governments, that supreme element or principle which we call sovereignty-a thing, in its

very nature, indivisible. In reference to the powers conferred upon the Federal Government, we are one people; but in regard to the powers reserved to the States, we constitute distinct and antagonistic communities; and the powers reserved to the States are so great in amount, and so important in character, that, by a simple abuse of these powers, the Union can be ultimately rendered intolerable; and the theory itself provides no efficient and peaceful remedy for the evil. The only remedy provided by the Constitution in reference to the abuse of the reserved powers, is found in the will of each State, and not in that of the combined whole.

By our theory, the citizen is made capable of committing treason, at one and the same time, against two separate and distinct sovereignties. This is a solecism in government. It is very true, that the theory assumes to clearly distribute the mass of duties to be performed by the citizen into two classes, and to assign one class to each sovereignty. It requires him to serve two distinct masters; but, at the same time, claims to give each master jurisdiction over him in different respects.

Another great vice in the theory, but subordinate, perhaps, to the other, is to be found in the number of elective offices, and the short duration of their terms. Our theory of government substantially requires more public and private virtue to sustain it, than any other; and yet its inevitable tendency is ultimately to undermine and subvert the very virtue upon which alone it can hope to live.

These may be justly considered' very bold and summary positions. But are they not true? If true, they should be believed; if false, they should be unhesitatingly rejected; and

* In the case of Barron v. The City of Baltimore, Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said:

"The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves; for their own government, and not for the government of the individual States. Each State established a Constitution for itself, and, in that Constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated."

So, in the case of Ableman v. Booth, in December Term, 1858, (21 Howard, 516,) Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, said:

"And the powers of the General Government and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres."

whether true or false, time will determine. These positions are stated without hesitation, and will be supported by the reasons hereinafter given, and others that will no doubt suggest themselves to the mind of the intelligent reader. It is the simple duty of every writer to be honest, and to plainly state that which he believes to be true, without regard to apprehended praise or censure.

But while these positions are thus plainly and boldly stated, it is done with all due and becoming respect for the views of others; and especially for those of a great majority of the patriotic men, who took part in forming the Constitution. There is, however, the best reason to know, that the wisest of our statesmen of that day never did give our theory their entire approbation. They supported it, not as perfect, but as being better than the Articles of Confederation. It was considered by them as an experiment only. The authority of a few truly great minds is of more weight than that of many subordinate ones.

§ 2. Circumstances under which the Constitution was framed and ratified.

During the progress of the Revolution, and after the Colonies had declared their independence, impelled by the pressure of common dangers, sufferings, and hopes, the thirteen States entered into the Articles of Confederation. The circumstances of the times did not admit of mature deliberation.

Congress was the organ through which the Confederation spoke; and in the passage of measures each State had one vote. These measures were addressed to organized communities, and not to the individuals of whom they were composed. Each State was bound to contribute its portion to the common treasury; and this portion was based upon the value of all land within each State; but the taxes necessary to raise the national revenue were to be levied and collected by each State. The vote of nine States was necessary to pass the more important measures; such, for example, as related to war, treaties, coining money, and ascertaining the sums necessary for the defence and welfare of the United States. In the thirteenth and last article it was declared:

"Each State shall abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the articles of this Confederation shall be invariably observed by every State, and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to by a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State."

Notwithstanding the excellent dispositions of the people, and the strong pledges of inviolable fidelity contained in the Articles, the Confederation soon failed through its own weakness. In reference to this state of things, Hamilton, in the fifteenth number of the Federalist, has these forcible remarks:

"It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has at length arrested all the wheels of the National Government, and brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely possesses the means of keeping up the form of administration, till the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow of a Federal Government. Things did not come to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been specified, produced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example, and the temptation of interest to the complying, or least delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burthen? These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand, and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could not without hesitation combat. Each State yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and crush us beneath its ruins."

The Convention assembled under very embarrassing circum