Mr. Gibbon, in summing up his views of the character of the imperial government of Rome, very justly remarks:

"To resume, in few words, the system of the imperial government, as it was instituted by Augustus, and maintained by those princes who understood their own interest and that of the people, it may be defined an absolute monarchy disguised by the forms of a commonwealth. The masters of the Roman world surrounded their throne with darkness, concealed their irresistible strength, and humbly professed themselves the accountable ministers of the Senate, whose supreme decrees they dictated and obeyed.”—(Decline and Fall, chap. iii.)

§ 12. The same subject continued.

A permanent dissolution of the Union being accomplished, republican government would not only fail on this continent, but representative government, in any efficient form, could never be sustained. Despotism-the one-man power-would be the legitimate and inevitable ultimate result. It would be the only practical theory under the circumstances. Government must be practical to be government at all. The theory may be beautiful to the imagination, but unless strictly practical, it must fail to accomplish the very end intended by its institution.

The practical efficiency of a governmental theory depends upon its proper adaptation to the circumstances and geographical position of the country to be governed. A theory practical for one country, will not operate successfully in another differently situated. So, under a people practically free, the power over the purse and the sword of the nation must be placed in the hands of representatives freely chosen by the people themselves. In England, for example, no army can exist, and no money can be appropriated, without the consent of Parliament. Owing to her impunity from invasion, the Government can wait the sluggish movements of Parliament; but France, and other countries differently situated, cannot do this; especially in this fast age. When the country is invaded, and the national existence is in peril, it will not do to wait two months to elect a Speaker, and spend two months' time in debating over an appropriation bill. Action, prompt and united, must be

had; and only the strongest form of government can secure it; for it is true, that "great armies, prompt obedience, unlimited power over the national resources, secrecy in council, rapidity in execution, belong to an energetic and enlightened despotism." (Hallam's Con. His., 460.) On the field of battle there must be but one commander-in-chief; and a country invaded is but a large battle-field. In such a case, it will not be safe to rely upon the action of deliberative bodies; because, in times of extreme peril, they are often factious or paralyzed.* This results from the known characteristics of the human mind, men being prone to differ in their views, and apt to be tenacious of their opinions, in proportion to the estimated importance of the subject to which they relate. During the existence of the Republic, the members of the Assembly were engaged in debating some abstract philosophical theory, while their enemies were invading France.

Hasty and prejudiced writers generally speak in disparaging terms of the despotic governments of Europe. Their objections are not well and thoroughly considered. The true fundamental cause is found in the necessities of their condition. The best statesmen on the continent know that the English representative theory never can be successfully carried out, except in countries substantially situated as England is. It has been repeatedly tried and as often failed. "It is not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt, and steadily persevere for many years, in any erroneous opinions respecting their own interests." (Mr. Jay, Federalist, No. 3, p. 14.) The people of the different States of Europe are enlightened, and have had most ample time and opportunity to test the practical character of the differ

* "Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and that they are of course liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals? . . . . Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue? ”—(Hamilton, Federalist, No. 6, pp. 27 and 29.)

"But popular, that is, numerous bodies, are always prone to excess, both from the reciprocal influence of their passions, and the consciousness of irresponsibility "(Hallam's Con. His., 647.)

ent theories of government, and the conclusions of their best intellects upon this subject can hardly be erroneous.

It is the general opinion of writers upon the science of government, that a despotism is the strongest and most efficient. Time and common sense have proven this opinion to be true. In this form of government there is less security against oppression at home, and greater security against oppression from abroad. What theory a people should adopt, depends upon the question, which is the greater danger? In the Revolution, our greatest danger was from abroad; and, by making Washington a dictator, we saved our country. When that danger had passed away, we could well dispense with this energetic but despotic power. If the Union were divided, the same circumstances would compel the people of the different divisions to do the same thing; and as the danger from abroad would be immediate and permanent, the despotism must, of necessity, become permanent also. In the wars between the little States of South America, they confer dictatorial powers upon their Presidents; and though they are often blamed, it is by those who have not justly estimated the exigencies of their condition. It was the fear of invasion, that seems to have constituted one of the main reasons why the people of England submitted so readily to the despotic powers exercised by the Tudors and Stuarts. It was not the overshadowing influence of a standing army, as this was only begun under the reign of Charles II., and amounted in 1662 to only some 5,000 men, a very small force as compared to the standing armies of other European monarchies of that age.-(Hallam's Con. His., 411.)

United, we are in a better condition than England; because our position not only gives us like impunity from invasion, but exempts us, at the same time, from all pretences for entering into entangling foreign alliances, to preserve the balance of power. The practice of England in making war on the continent for this reason, has caused her very great sacrifices in blood and treasure. Her present enormous national debt is mainly the result of such wars. Whether this practice on her

* We have already seen that the national debt of Great Britain was increased in twenty-one years' war with France, more than 600 millions of pounds sterling. At the commencement of that mighty struggle, her army was very small; and, from this cause, it was years before she could act on the continent with vigor. It has been contended by

part can be justified by wise statesmanship may admit of very grave doubts. But let us sever and divide our country, and we will be in a worse condition than the people on the continent of Europe. There are many great natural features on that continent that mark the dividing lines between nations, making defence more easy, and invasion more slow and difficult; and the doctrine of the balance of power is there established, and a weak State can exist, because the Great Powers will not tolerate its conquest. In our country, we have no impassable mountains, and there is here no doctrine of the balance of power established, and the weaker State would be at the ultimate mercy of the stronger. The people of the more powerful State would, at last, come to the conclusion that their own safety and the best ultimate humanity would justify the complete conquest of their neighbor. There is every reason to believe, that, for some time before the Union, the people of England had inflexibly made up their minds to conquer Scotland. The people of both countries had been so long harassed and impoverished by their frequent wars, that the patience of both must have been well nigh exhausted. It had often required the utmost exertions of the Scots to sustain themselves. (Hallam's Con. His., 675.) From the geographical features of our country, and its position on the globe, it would seem that the Almighty never intended it to be divided.*

able writers, that it is the better and more economical policy of that kingdom to keep up a standing army of at least medium size.

"In the late war, the inability of Great Britain to act from the first with vigor, compelled her to fight twenty-one years, with incalculable waste of blood and treasure, merely to restore the balance of power; and the nation, which at first had only three battalions for service, ended, in 1814, with a mass of more than a million of men in arms."-(En. Brit., art. War, p. 736.)

*"This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien Sovereignties."-(Jay, Federalist, No. 2, p. 12.)

"The world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America have successfully felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained, has tempted her to plume herself as the mistress of the world, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men, admired as profound philosophers, have, in direct terms, attributed to

§ 13. A despotism inimical to a free press.

It would seem impossible, in the very nature of things, that a free press should ever exist under a despotism, for two

reasons:

1. The attacks of the press are levelled against a single individual; and there are but few persons who would singly bear the attacks of the press, when they have the power to restrain them. It is not in human nature.

2. The safety of the government itself would require restrictions upon the press. Though a despotism may be the very best practical government for a country invadeable by land, and situated in the vicinity of neighbors sufficiently powerful to give serious trouble; yet such is the restlessness of dense populations, that they are prone to see only results, while they overlook their causes. A free press in a despotism would be constantly making disparaging comparisons between the condition of the people at home, and that of the people living under a free government abroad; while the true cause of this difference would be carefully concealed, and the masses unjustly excited against their own government. The difference in the amount of freedom enjoyed would be palpable, but the cause of that difference would be misrepresented, and the public censure would fall upon the government. Superficial and prejudiced reasoners are almost certain to assign the wrong cause for the known effect.

§ 14. Dissolution exposes us to foreign aggression.

This chapter will be concluded with the following forcible extract from the forty-first number of the Federalist by Mr. Madison.*

her inhabitants a physical superiority; and have gravely asserted, that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in America; that even dogs cease to bark, after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.* Facts have too long supported those arrogant pretensions of the European; it belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another victim to his triumphs.”—(Hamilton, Federalist, No. 11, p. 57.)

* The reader is referred to the Appendix, containing the sixth and eighth numbers of the Federalist, by Hamilton. The reason for their republication in this form is, that

Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains.