again at no very distant date. His conversion was soon rewarded. After the death of Casimir Périer he became Minister of the Interior in the ministry of October, as it was called. He was now a revolutionist completely tamed. He ordered the arrest of the Duchesse de Berri, and acquired some small popularity by sending a French army into Belgium -an operation which was supposed to be at the same time a challenge to the Absolutist Powers and a means of extending the permanent influence of France. By this time he had become a perfectly subservient minister of the crown. Louis Philippe had learned the dangerous secret of power, and had discovered that the jealousies of rival sections in the Chamber, and the intrigues of the various claimants for office, permitted him to impose his own terms upon those whom he selected as his constitutional advisers. The policy of the king was a consistent one. With regard to Foreign Powers it was pacific and conciliatory, indeed almost subservient. At home its principal objects were to maintain the existing state of things, and to strengthen and consolidate the dynasty of the House of Orleans. The king had sufficient power and persistency of character to impress his personal policy on the ministries which succeeded each other rapidly. The court did not gain in popularity, but the public men, with few exceptions, were greatly discredited by their factious and impracticable policy when in opposition, and their singular flexibility when in office. The discredit of the leading statesmen was in itself a very serious calamity, but it led to consequences still more fatal. The Chamber of Deputies rapidly lost in public estimation. It soon began to be felt that the debates in the Chamber, conducted often with considerable warmth, and marked with very high ability, were but the - demonstrations of rival claimants for

SO

power, and that the true principles of representative government were being lost sight of between the disgraceful selfishness of the sovereign and the pitiful contests of officeseekers. For some time there were constant changes of ministers; but throughout the whole of Louis Philippe's reign there never was constructed a cabinet with anything approaching to a popular policy. The object of each minister was simply to resist popular demands, and the aim of the king was to obtain larger securities for the maintenance of authority, and to strengthen and enrich the Orleans dynasty. M. Thiers was neither better nor worse than his rivals. When in power he has a very sincere horror of anything like a liberal policy. His early sympathies were easily corrected by official experience or courtly habits. Yet there were times when he possessed so much real power that he might, had he so willed it, have overborne the resistance of the sovereign, and, by the advocacy of a true popular policy, have made constitutional government as dear to the French people as the recollections of the mingled glory and sufferings of the empire. But the influence of the court weighed heavily upon him, and it soon became obvious that he was willing to sacrifice whatever views he might have entertained with regard to the establishment of parliamentry government. When he first became President of the Cabinet he was as abject as, or perhaps more so, than any of his predecessors in all questions of domestic policy. With regard to foreign affairs, it is true that he advocated a decided, though a most unwise, policy. government was broken up on the question of intervention in Spain, a Course to which Louis Philippe was strongly opposed, and which neither the Chambers or the country desired. This was singularly characteristic of the view which M. Thiers took of the duties of a government. He was

His

well content to leave everythingalone in France, and his only ambition was to gain credit by a brilliant stroke of foreign policy, without considering whether itwas right or not to pledge the resources of France to the support of the then existing dynasty in Spain. It was the error of a man who could not understand what was passing before his eyes. He did not understand his own countrymen, who were sensible enough to perceive the uselessness and the hopelessness of such interference in the concerns of their neighbours. He was still living in the past, and thought that the main object of French policy was to secure what is called influence at any sacrifice, however great. Fortunately his efforts were foiled, and his country was spared the humiliation of attempting to impose by force of arms a particular form of government upon the Spanish people. Therefore the ministry of the left centre resigned, and was succeeded by a cabinet presided over by Count Molé.

But fortune still protected her favourite. In March, 1840, M. Thiers was again first minister of France. At that time the angry feelings of the different sections of opposition had somewhat cooled. The Legitimists and the Republicans were no longer formidable, and the Bonapartists were an insignificant faction, declining day by day in numbers and influence. The minister was far from being unpopular. There were pressing questions with which he might have dealt. All France was anxious for parliamentary and electoral reform. Had those questions been fairly discussed there might have been some hope of effecting a reconciliation of parties, and if a large measure of reform had been introduced by the ministry, the nation might have been enlisted in support of the Orleans dynasty and parliamentary government. But M. Thiers, either in obedience to his own impulses, or from deference

But

to his sovereign, refused to entertain any project of reform. He again threw himself into a course of foreign policy which eventually proved most disastrous to his country. His treatment of the Eastern question was such that the memorable treaty of July was signed, and the whole question was finally settled without the participation of France. But the true reason for the isolation of France and her exclusion from taking part in the settlement of a great European question was, that M. Thiers had been pursuing a policy of his own, had been encouraging the Pacha of Egypt in his resistance, and had given abundant proof to the four powers that he was not to be trusted. The consequence was, and one greatly to be regretted. that France felt herself humiliated and insulted. The national feeling was excited. The army was put upon a war footing, and the fortifications were determined upon. Louis Philippe was not disposed to encounter the risks of an European war for the remote advantages that might accrue from the development of French influence in Egypt, and therefore the ingenious and daring minister was compelled to resign in favour of M. Guizot, who took office in a cabinet presided over, nominally, by Marshal Soult. It was the second time that M. Thiers missed a great opportunity; yet even after his resignation he enjoyed a great deal of popularity, because it was thought that he had been sacrificed by the prudence or timidity of the king, when he was the one man intent upon maintaining the honour and interests of France. French feeling had been deeply wounded; even the philosophical de Tocqueville had made an energetic war speech in the Chamber, and it was assumed that M. Thiers was not to blame so much as the sovereign, who dispensed with his services as soon as he could, and who only made use of the public alarm to encircle Paris with fortresses,

After his resignation, M. Thiers for some time took but little part in politics. During the latter years of the Guizot ministry he was always in opposition; but, as it seems to us, without adding much to his own reputation or to the dignity of the legislature of which he was a member. The last years of Louis Philippe's reign were tolerably prosperous. It was, upon the whole, a freer and better government than had ever been known in France, and until the year of famine there was no popular discontent. But the king and those who advised him seem ever to have felt the greatest distrust of the people, and those among the public men who best understood the character of the times were unable or unwilling to impress their views upon the sovereign; yet they might have seen that the country became daily more and more averse to the system. People began to look at the Chamber as a debating society, and nothing more; and, except to the candidates for office, it was very immaterial whether the government was taken from the right or from the left centre. So they drifted on to the fatal February of 1848. In those last panic-stricken moments, M. Thiers reappeared as first minister for six hours or so, during which he did as much mischief as could be in so short a space of time. He signed the fatal order which caused the troops to withdraw when there was no longer any resistance, and surrendered Paris to a revolutionary mob. He had helped to overthrow the Bourbons by his audacious attacks; and by his vanity, or want of decision, he accomplished rhe ruin of the Orleans dynasty.

After such a career it is not possible to accord to M. Thiers a high place among European statesmen; nor do we think that what he has done in later life redeems the faults that he committed when he was in the possession of undoubted power and influence. Latterly he has not in any

sense been a man of action; but he has from time to time expressed his views on great European questions; no doubt with some felicity of language, but with a superficiality of knowledge and a narrowness of view that is almost inconceivable. His recorded speeches about Italy and the Papacy would be intensely ridiculous if it were not painful to witness a man of such high reputation advocating all the obsolete traditions of the French Foreign Office, and sympathising with all the worst feelings of international jealousy. But it is some consolation to think that the world is growing wiser, and that the brilliant historian of the Consulate will fail to persuade his countrymen that the permanence of religion in France depends upon the political humiliation of the inhabitants of the States of the Church. This is not exactly consistent with the statements which he has so often made in his voluminous writings, that he has ever been the friend and the champion of liberty; but it is precisely in accordance with the doctrines promulgated in his books. His theory of history has always been so narrow and perverse that he has never hesitated to declare that the humiliation of neighbouring nations is a part of the legitimate policy of France. He is clearly of opinion that Italy ought to be divided, and kept in a state of weakness or dependence, and the Papacy upheld, for the sake of French interests. In his eyes it was the glory of the Consulate to obtain, and the misfortune of the Empire to lose, a powerful influence in Germany, which after all had only been won by force and maintained by oppression. Such views seem to us to belong to a bygone race of politicians, and it would be difficult to find many persons with audacity enough to avow them. M. Thiers, however, seems always perfectly sure of the justice of his conclusions, and, indeed, there is a certain charm

now and for an indefinite time hold its own ground in the present As-, sembly, while not one of them is at all confident of having the upper hand in a general election. Whatever illusion the Deputies may cherish on their return from their exploring expedition to the Departments, it is impossible they should flatter themselves that they can report progress. There is a perfect stagnation of opinion among the French population, the result of political disenchantment and scepticism. The French have tried everything, but nothing has stood the test of more than a few year's experience. M. Thiers exhibits little eagerness to show himself to the Chamber. The rumours which were so rife not many days ago respecting important changes in the present condition of the French Republic-especially respecting the prolongation of the President's powers, and the renewal of the Assembly by the annual election of a third or a fifth of its members-seem to have lost all foundation as the time draws near at which they should receive confirmation. In all probability what M. Thiers wants is to live on from day to day. For his own part, at least, he seems to have nothing to propose-not to have made up his mind about any thing. He will allow himself time to watch the play of parties, to study the mood of the Assembly. Even on such questions as the removal of the seat of Government to Paris, or the admission of the Princes of Orleans into the Chamber, he is slow to take the initiative. The fact is that, however eager at the outset he might be to seize the supreme power, he evidently shrinks from the responsibility of straining it. He had sufficiently clear views about the issues of war and peace, he showed ardour in his negotiations with Bismarck and energy in the subjugation of the Commune, but in dealing with the Constitutional question he seems to collapse. He has

been a Constitutional Monarchist; he finds himself at the head of a Republic: but he is a Frenchman; he wishes what is best for Francenay, what France herself thinks best; but France has no choice, neither has he. Nothing is more difficult than to guide where there is no impulse.

What adds to the difficulty of the President's position is that his impartiality is not neutrality. M. Thiers has his opinions and his predilections. On every imaginable question he has elaborate theories and clearlydefined tendencies. No man's precedents are better known; no man's mind has found so frequent, so eloquent, and so consistent an utterance. He is a Constitutional Monarchist, a stanch friend and faithful servant of the Orleans family. Could M Thiers conceive the possibility of France settling down to a second July Monarchy, who more gladly than he would consent to the appearance of the Orleans Princes in the Assembly, and to the elevation of the Duc d'Aumale to the Presi dency of the Chamber? But what if the Chamber or the country would not go along with him to the end? A first step in any given direction would be decisive; it would be a declaration of war against the parties which at Bordeaux he brought to consent to an indefinite truce. again, suppose that M. Thiers sincerely accepts the Republic as an existing Government, and yields to the solicitations of those who would extort a vote in its favour. Does M. Thiers control any party among the Republicans who are at the same time his partisans? And if his drift were to usher in the Republic and then give it up to other men's governance; if his object were only to keep the Presidential chair warm for D'Aumale or Gambetta, can he hope that all parties will be as easily amenable to his successor's ascendancy as they have hitherto been to his own? Can he expect to found

Or,