from conferring the power in question, but as a whole the constitutional provisions upon the subject give reason for inference to the contrary. The intended limitations are well defined and powers granted in general terms. By section 13, art. 15:

"The legislature shall provide for the incorporation and organization of cities and villages, and shall restrict their powers of taxation, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit."

Section 14, art. 15, provides:

"Judicial officers of cities and villages shall be elected and all other officers shall be elected or appointed at such time and in such manner as the legislature may direct."

And, in general, by section 38, art. 4:

"The legislature may confer upon organized townships, incorporated cities, and villages, and upon the board of supervisors of the several counties, such powers of a local, legislative, and administrative character as they may deem proper."

The power conferred in the charter of Grand Rapids to remove its officers was but recognition of ancient usage, and an inherent incident of its incorporation, with stated limitations, was forbidden by no constitutional restriction and thus expressly conferred by its accepted charter, governed and limited corporate action in that particular. People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (9 Am. Rep. 103).

Neither can we recognize force in the contention that the power to remove local officers rests exclusively in the governor of the State, and the provision of the charter in question, if otherwise of any validity, is repealed by Act No. 149, Pub. Acts 1915, providing in part:

"SEC. 6. The governor may remove all county officers chosen by the electors of any county or appointed

by him; and shall also remove all justices of the peace and township officers chosen by the electors of any township; or city or village officers chosen by the electors of any city or village, or any ward or voting district thereof, when he shall be satisfied from sufficient evidence submitted to him as hereinafter provided, that such officer is incompetent to execute properly the duties of his office, or has been guilty of official misconduct, or of wilful neglect of duty. or of extortion," etc.

This is but an amendment of Act No. 190, Pub. Acts 1879 (1 Comp. Laws, § 1159, 1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 245), and so far as applicable here is in the exact language of the former act, which it reaffirms; the minor particulars in which section 6 is amended being altogether foreign to the question raised here.

The provisions of section 7, art. 9, of the new Constitution, and section 8, art. 12, of the old, confer upon the governor the same general powers to examine into the acts of any public officer, elective or appointive, and remove him for stated causes. Said Act No. 190 of 1879 (amended in 1915) is but affirmative legislation in harmony with those constitutional provisions defining procedure for exercising the constitutional authority. Even where repeal by implication is inferable, the old law is repealed only pro tanto-to the extent of the repugnancy. There is nothing in the Constitution or legislation making this power exclusive or forbidding the legislature from also conferring the power to remove its own officers upon municipalities. When this is done, concurrent power exists and resort may be had to either. In view of the so-called "home rule" provision for cities found in the new Constitution and the trend of legislation in that direction, it is difficult to find in the new Constitution, or legislation under it, any indication of a purpose to restrict or repeal any municipal rights or privileges existing under the former Constitution and previously existing city

charters, and we can discover no inferences of that import here.

It is stated broadly in 29 Cyc. p. 1410, that:

"Where removal may be made for cause only, the cause must have accrued during the present term of the officer. Misconduct prior to the present term even during a preceding term will not justify a removal.”

This statement in its entirety appears to find support in some authorities cited. Thurston v. Clarke, 107 Cal. 285 (40 Pac. 435); State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law, 536; Conant v. Grogan, 6 N. Y. St. Rep. 322. While other well-considered cases, recognizing the general rule, make an exception where the accused officer, continuing in office by re-election, was charged with official misconduct in the same office during a preceding term. State v. Bourgeois, 45 La. Ann. 1350 14 South. 28); Brackenridge v. State, 27 Tex. App. 513 (11 S. W. 630, 4 L. R. A. 360); State v. Welsh, 109 Iowa, 19 (79 N. W. 369). Counsel for petitioner also cite and quote as follows from Gill v. Watertown, 9 Wis. 254:

"There are a number of charges, but the return admits that all except the last, relates to acts or omissions of the relator during a prior term of office. Now, without examining those charges, to determine whether they would show good cause of removal, if occurring during the term, when the removal was sought, which we think very doubtful, yet we think it a sufficient answer to them, that they did not relate to anything occurring during that term."

Stopping here this seems quite conclusive, but in the next sentence the court said:

"We do not say that in no case could acts done during a prior term justify a removal. Thus, if, after a treasurer was elected, it should be discovered that during his prior term he had committed a defalcation, and been guilty of gross frauds in the management of

his office, it might perhaps be just grounds for removal."

The case of Speed v. Common Council of Detroit, supra, which states the general doctrine that "the misconduct for which an officer may be removed must be found in his acts and conduct in the office from which his removal is sought," is not directly in point, because Speed had not previous to his then term been an incumbent of the office from which it was sought to remove him. We are not prepared to find in this case, nor to hold as a general rule, that the misconduct of an officer, who is his own successor, committed during the preceding term, may not be inquired into and furnish ground for his removal.

Under title 3 of the Grand Rapids Charter (Act No. 593, Local Acts 1905), entitled "Powers and Duties of the Common Council," power is given to legislate for various purposes, amongst which is:

"SEC. 11. To provide for and regulate the election. and appointment of all officers and for their removal from office, and the filling of vacancies."

It is urged this was a mandatory prerequisite to exercising the power, and, because the council had not passed a guiding ordinance or otherwise provided by legislation any regulations or course of procedure for removal from office, this hearing was a nullity. Having been given in general terms, under title 2 of the charter, a limited power of removal for cause, the language used in title 3 seems to suggest a legislative intent that before exercising such power the council would prescribe rules, or regulate by some preadopted method the manner in hich it would be administered. Considerations of fairness, certainty, and convenience suggest the wisdom of such a course before assuming to exercise the power. The language of the charter appears to be in its nature permissive and directory rather than imperative.

It was said in State v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383 (24 S. W. 457, 41 Am. St. Rep. 663):

"It is true that neither charter nor ordinance make any provision for the means whereby the amotion of an appointive officer is to be effected; but, where a grant of power is given, all the means necessary to effectuate the power pass as incidents of the grant."

While this omission may be an element entering into consideration of what was done, we cannot say that it ipso facto nullified the action of the council because in direct violation of a mandatory provision. Limited authority to remove for cause being conferred upon the council, the mandatory requirements are that the steps taken in that behalf be recorded in its proceedings, a copy of the charges be served with 10 days' notice of time and place of hearing, opportunity to the accused to make a defense to such charges, and a two-thirds affirmative vote of all aldermen elect.

After written charges are preferred and notice given to the accused officer, the council, in session as such, at the legally noticed time and place of hearing, with the necessary quorum in attendance, complies with all statutory requirements in that particular, and may enter upon the hearing, the proceedings of which are to be entered in its records, without any reorganization or special formalities to resolve itself into a court. The members of the council are not judicial officers and when acting as a removing board that body is not a court in any strict sense nor bound by all the rules and technicalities recognized and enforced in regularly constituted courts; but when proceeding to hear and determine, in the exercise of the limited power to remove for cause an elective officer, the hearing is judicial in its nature, the body necessarily acts in a quasi judicial capacity, and the procedure must be of a quasi judicial character. Fuller v. Attorney General, 98