The record discloses that on August 16, 1915, socalled "impeachment charges" were drafted by a committee appointed for that purpose by the common council of the city of Grand Rapids, and presented to said body, accusing James S. Hawkins, treasurer of said city, petitioner herein, with official misconduct and improper performance of the duties of his office by reason of issuing tax certificates and certificates of redemption, securing the issuance of quitclaim deeds from the city, falsely representing the amount of the city's claim against certain property delinquent for taxes, altering deeds signed by authority of the common council, conspiring with unknown persons to defraud the city by obtaining transfer of the city's interests without adequate compensation to the city, etc., his alleged delinquencies, stated at great length and covering many alleged dishonest transactions, being in substance that he availed himself of his official position to dishonestly manipulate and deal in municipal tax claims and tax titles for profit in fraud of and against the rights of the city.

On August 30, 1915, petitioner appeared specially by counsel and moved dismissal of these charges for many reasons which need not be stated here, which motion was denied.

On September 8, 1915, a ten days' written notice of the time and place of hearing the charges by the common council was personally served upon petitioner, at which time he again appeared specially and by his counsel filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings on grounds previously stated and numerous others, which was also denied. Thereafter, reserving his rights under the motion to dismiss, he filed an answer, containing also what might be termed a demurrer to said charges. The council then adjourned the hearing until October 4, 1915, when, parties being present, the hearing was entered upon and taking of testimony begun.

Adjourned meetings for the hearing were held evenings, the matter being adjourned from one evening to another for taking testimony through eleven sessions until the evening of November 3, 1915. An adjournment to this meeting from November 1st was at the request of petitioner's counsel, who stated that they were not then prepared to go on with the defense, but would be present at the next meeting and take such steps as they desired, although it was understood that the parties would put in some testimony at this adjourned meeting, of November 3d, and that all the testimony which had been taken should be read by the stenographer to the aldermen before they voted. When the meeting convened, petitioner's counsel renewed his motion to dismiss, and, after further cross-examination of a witness who was produced, announced they were unable to proceed further for various reasons which he urged-among others, that the city's case was not in because it was understood that the testimony was yet to be read over. After some acrimonious discussion, it was decided the hearing should proceed, and reading of testimony was entered upon, which, with interspersed discussion and voting upon each of the charges and specifications under them, occupied the entire night. In the early morning, without intermission and against protest of petitioner's counsel with renewed request for further time in which to prepare and present his case, a resolution was adopted by a vote of 19 to 1, which, with recitals that the council had during the past month listened to the evidence produced in support of the charges, at which hearings petitioner was present in person or by counsel and given every opportunity to put in a defense, that said evidence had been re-read in whole to the council after it was taken, and the council had voted severally on the six charges filed and each specification thereunder, concludes as follows:

"Resolved further, that said James S. Hawkins be and he is hereby removed from the office of and as treasurer of the city of Grand Rapids, on account of and by reason of being guilty of the said several charges and specifications aforesaid; and that said office be, and it is declared vacant from and after November 4, 1915."

The common council of the city of Grand Rapids consisted of 24 members, 20 were present and voting at the time this resolution was adopted. Of these, but 15 had attended all the meetings and heard all the testimony, except as read that night by the stenographer who had not been sworn, nor so far as shown officially selected to act in the proceeding.

It appears undisputed that the charges all covered acts alleged to have been committed prior to respondent's induction into his then term of office, which began May 3, 1915; he having filled the office by election during previous terms and being his own successor.

Among the errors, or objections, urged in behalf of petitioner are, in substance, that the common council of the city of Grand Rapids had no jurisdiction to hear and determine charges for impeachment of an elective city officer, but the sole power of removal rested with the governor; that the provisions of the charter of Grand Rapids authorizing the council to remove a city officer are not self-executing, but the charter requires adoption of an ordinance or some other official action providing the method, machinery, and course to be pursued by the council when sitting as a court of impeachment; that an officer cannot be removed for acts done prior to his then present term of office; that the common council was disqualified to sit as a court of impeachment because certain of its members who participated and voted had prejudged the case and expressed opinions that petitioner was guilty before any testimony was taken; that the resolution was not

adopted by a two-thirds vote, because only 15 members of said "court" attended all the sessions and heard all the testimony; that continuing in session all night without any manifest reason therefor, and immediately thereafter taking final action at so early and untimely an hour, against the protests of petitioner and request for time in which to make his defense, was inimical to a full and fair trial and conducive to a miscarriage of justice; that the charges were insufficient, not cause for removal under the charter; that errors were made in the admission and rejection of testimony; and that the proceedings were without due process of law and in contravention of the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Michigan.

These proceedings were instituted under section 11, tit. 2, of the charter of the city of Grand Rapids, as revised by the legislature of 1905 (Act No. 593, Local Acts 1905), which provides in part:

"Any elective or appointive officer of the city except judges or justices of the peace may be removed by the common council for official misconduct, or for unfaithful or improper performance of the duties of his office," etc.

This section also requires that the proceedings shall be entered of record, a copy of the charges shall be served upon said officer with notice of the time and place of hearing at least 10 days prior thereto, and an affirmative vote of two-thirds of all aldermen elected shall be necessary for his removal.

It is contended this provision of the charter is unconstitutional because unauthorized by section 7, art. 12, of the old Constitution, of 1850, in force when the charter was adopted, which says, "The legislature shall provide by law for the removal of any officer elected by a county, township, or school district, in such manner and for such cause as to them shall seem just and proper," making no mention of city and village officers,

while section 8, art. 9, of the present Constitution, of 1909, substituted for the above section does as follows:

"Any officer elected by a county, city, village, township or school district, may be removed from office in such manner and for such cause as shall be prescribed by law."

From this it is urged that those who framed the new Constitution construed the old as conferring no power upon legislatures to provide for removal of city and village officers.

The address to the people from the constitutional convention, made under statutory requirement, stated "that none of the eight sections of article 9 are changed in any manner except for the purpose of phraseology" and certain purposes foreign to this question.

It is evident that no power is given cities and villages to remove their officers under said section 7 of the old Constitution, but it does not follow that they had no such power. Their officers are corporate, legislative officers, not constitutional. The power to remove their officers is, and was long before the adoption of our Constitution, inherent in municipal corporations. 2 Dillon on Mun. Corp. (5th Ed.) § 462; 2 McQuillin on Mun. Corp. § 552; Speed v. Common Council of Detroit, 98 Mich. 360 (57 N. W. 406, 22 L. R. A. 842, 39 Am. St. Rep. 555). In that case the authority of the legislature to confer such power upon a city council is recognized. There were cities and villages in Michigan before it became a State-municipalities for local government of common-law origin and with common-law rights, self-governing communities in matters of strictly local concern. The Constitution of 1850 in dealing with this subject, and authorizing the legislature to provide for the incorporation of cities and villages nowhere prohibits the legislature