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the day of election, and received the votes of these persons; there were six ballot boxes; I was Chairman of the Board; I stood at the window and received the votes, most of the time; these ballots received were folded, and none of the inspectors saw or knew the contents of any of the ballots.

Mr. Crowley. I submit it is entirely immaterial whether these inspectors saw the names upon the ballots.

The COURT. I have excluded that already. It is not competent. It is proved that they put in votes, and it is proved by one of the ladies that she did vote for a candidate for Congress.

Mr. Van Voorhis. I propose to show by the witness that he didn't know the contents of any ballot, and didn't see it.

The COURT. That will be assumed. He could not do it with any propriety.

Mr. Jones. Mr. Hall objected to receiving the votes of the women, though while I was out for a moment he took the vote of one lady and put it in the box. All three of the Inspectors had agreed to register the women, but when it came to receiving the votes, Hall objected, but he was overruled by myself and the other member. In receiving the ballots, I acted honestly in accordance with my sense of duty and my best judgment.

Mr. Van Voorhis. State whether or not challenges were entered against these voters prior to the day of election? There

was.

Mr. Van Voorhis. On their presenting their votes, what was done? I told Miss Anthony,

when she offered her vote, that she was challenged; she would have to swear her ballot in if she insisted on voting; she said she insisted upon voting, and I presented her the Bible and administered to her the preliminary oath, which she took. I turned to the gentleman that challenged her and asked him if he still insisted on her taking the general oath. He said he did; I told her she would have to take the general oath; I administered the general oath, and she took it. That was done in the case of each woman who voted.

To Mr. Crowley. At first all three of the Inspectors were not agreed in registering the women. But before their names were put in the book, we were unanimous. When they voted, myself and Mr. Marsh were in favor of receiving the votes, and Hall was opposed. When I counted the votes at night, I compared the votes with the list, and we found it fell short several ballots.

Edwin T. Marsh. Am one of the defendants, and was an Inspector for the eighth Ward appointed by the Common Council. Am 33 years old. The evidence of Mr. Jones is substantially correct.

Mr. Van Voorhis. Registering and receiving these votes, you believed that the law required you to do it, and you acted conscientiously and honestly? Objected to.

The COURT. Put the question as you did to the other witness

whether in receiving these votes he acted honestly and according to the best of his judgment.

Mr. Van Voorhis. that question, please.

Answer

Mr. Marsh. I most assuredly presion that I swore I was a did. male citizen, is an erroneous one.

William C. Storrs. Reside in Rochester. Have been United States Commissioner for fifteen years.

Mr. Van Voorhis. Was any application made to you, by any person, at any time, for a warrant against them for this offense? Objected to.

Mr. Van Voorhis. If the counsel objects, I will not insist upon the evidence.

Susan B. Anthony. I would like to know if the testimony of a person who has been convicted of a crime, can be taken?

The COURT. They call you as a witness, madam.

Mr. Van Voorhis. Miss Anthony, I want you to state what occurred at the Board of Registry, when your name was registered? That would be very tedious, for it was full an hour.

Mr. Van Voorhis. State generally what was done, or what occupied that hour's time? Well the question of our right to be registered was a subject of discussion there, between the supervisors, inspectors and myself.

Mr. Van Voorhis. What occurred when you presented yourself at the polls on election day?

Mr. Crowley. I submit to the court that unless the counsel expects to change the version given by the other witnesses, it is not necessary to take up time.

The COURT. As a matter of discretion, I don't see how it will be of any benefit. It was fully related by the others, and doubtless correctly.

Mr. Crowley. It is not disputed.

Miss Anthony. I would like to say, if I might be allowed by the Court, that the general im

Mr. Van Voorhis. You took the two oaths there, did you? Yes, sir.

The COURT. You presented yourself as a female, claiming that you had a right to vote? I presented myself not as a female at all, sir; I presented myself as a citizen of the United States. I was called to the United States ballot box by the fourteenth amendment, not as a female, but as a citizen, and I went there.

Mr. Van Voorhis. We have a number of witnesses to prove what occurred at the time of registry, and what advice was given by these federal supervisors, but under your Honor's ruling it is not necessary for us to call them. Inasmuch as Mr. Hall is absent, I ask permission to put in his evidence as he gave it before the Commissioners.

Mr. Crowley. I have not read it, but I am willing they should use so much of it as is competent under your Honor's ruling.

The COURT. Will it change the case at all, Mr. Van Voorhis?

Mr. Van Voorhis. It only varies it a little as to Hall. He stated that he depended in consenting to the registry, upon the advice of Mr. Warner, who was his friend, and upon whom he looked as a political father.

The COURT. I think you have everything that any evidence could give you in the case. These men have sworn that they acted honestly, and in accordance with their best judgment. Now, if that is a defense, you have it, and it will not make it any stronger to multiply evidence. Mr. Van Voorhis. I suppose

it will be conceded that Hall stands in the same position as to his motives?

Mr. Crowley. Yes; we have no evidence to offer upon that question at all.

Mr. Van Voorhis. May it please the Court, I submit that there is no ground whatever to charge these defendants with any criminal offense. 1. Because the women who voted were legal voters. 2. Because they were challenged and took the oaths which the Statute requires of Electors, and the Inspectors had no right, after such oath, to reject their votes. Construing the Statute under which this indictment is found the Court of Appeals of the State in People v. Pease held that Inspectors of Election have no authority by statute. to reject a vote except in three cases: (1) after a refusal to take the preliminary oath, or (2) fully to answer any questions put, or (3) on refusal to take general oath. Davies J., in his opinion after an examination of the provisions of the Statute says: "It is seen, therefore, that the inspectors have no authority, by statute, to reject a vote except in the three cases: after refusal to take preliminary oath, or fully to answer any questions put, or on refusal to take the general oath. And the only judicial discretion vested in them is, to determine whether any question put to the person offering to vote, has or has not, been fully answered. If the questions put have been fully answered, and such answers discover the fact, that the person offering to vote is not a qualified voter, yet if he persists in his claim to vote it is imperative upon the inspectors to administer to him the general oath, and if taken, to receive the vote and deposit the same in the ballot box." And Selden J., who wrote in the same case, examines this question with great care and reaches the same conclusion. These views were concurred in by all the judges. Denio J., who wrote a dissenting opinion in the case, concurred with the other judges as to the powers and duties of inspectors. The defendants, then, have not in the least violated any law of the state of New York. They performed their duty according to the statute and in accordance with

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the decision of the highest court of the state, and in accordance with the printed instructions furnished them by the Secretary of State. What further can be demanded of them? No United States statute prescribes or attempts to prescribe their duties. They cannot legally be convicted and should be discharged.

2. Because no malice is shown. Whether the women were entitled to have their names registered and to vote or not, the defendants believed they had such right, and acted in good faith, according to their best judgment, in allowing the registry of their names-and in receiving their votesand whether they decided right or wrong in point of law, they were not guilty of any criminal offense.

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The substance of the statute is, as to registration: "If any such officer shall knowingly and wilfully register as a voter any person not entitled to be registered, or refuse to register any person entitled to be registered such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime." And as to voting: "If any person shall knowingly and wilfully receive the vote of any person not entitled to vote, or refuse to receive the vote of any person entitled to vote

.

every such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime." To bring an inspector within either of these sections he must know as a matter of fact, that the person offering to vote, or to be registered, is not entitled to be registered or to vote.

The inspectors were compelled to decide the question, and to decide it instantly, with no chance for examination or even consultation—and if they decided in good faith, according to the best of their ability, they are excused, whether they decided correctly or not in point of law.

This is too well settled to admit of dispute settled by authority as well as by the plainest principles of justice and common sense. The law never yet placed a public officer in a position where he would be compelled to decide a doubtful legal question, and to act upon his decision, subject to the penalty of fine or imprisonment if he chanced to err in his decision. All that is ever required of an officer, so placed,

whether a judicial or ministerial officer, so far as is necessary to escape any imputation of crime, is good faith. Ministerial officers may be required, in some cases, to act at their peril as to civil responsibilities, but as to criminal responsibilities never. Inspectors of elections, however, acting in good faith, incur neither civil nor criminal responsibilities." Besides when the statute speaks of "knowledge," aside from the expression "wilfully" it means knowledge as a fact-not any forced presumption of knowledge against the clear facts of the case.

To this extent and to this extent only, does the presumption that defendants were bound to know the law go, viz: They were bound to know that if they as a fact "knowingly and wilfully registered as a voter any person not entitled to be registered" or "knowingly and wilfully received the vote of any person not entitled to vote," in either case they were liable to the penalty; and they could not be allowed to urge in their defense any ignorance that the law made those facts criminal. Here is a total absence of any pretense of malice. The defendants acted honestly and according to their best judgment. This is conceded. The most that can be said against them is, that they have erred in judgment. They are not lawyers, nor skilled in the law. They had presented to them a legal question which, to say the least, has puzzled some of the ablest legal minds of the nation. The penalty is the same, on which ever side they err. If they can be convicted of crime, a test must be imposed upon them, which no judge in the land could stand.

The defendants should be discharged by the Court.

Mr. Crowley rose

The COURT. I don't think it is necessary for you to spend time in argument, Mr. Crowley. I think upon the last authority cited by the counsel there is no defense in this case. It

7 Mr. Van Voorhis cited Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns, 114; Goetchens v. Matthewson, 5 Lans. 214; Harman v. Tappenden, 1 East, 555; Barnardiston v. Some, 2 Lev., 114; Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Salk., 396.

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