people of Brazil have given it, to the exclusion of him who would have held it contrary to their will. This is self-evident.

The acknowledgment of the independence of Brazil strengthened, or rather consolidated, that of the other South American States. The pretensions of Spain become now ridiculous in the eyes of Europe. A right which possesses no means of maintaining itself may last for a time in the imagination of some, but cannot resist the acknowledgment of the governments de facto on the part of other nations whose interests require it. On this principle Mr. Canning answers the complaints of Spain in the document we have transcribed. This state paper deserves the greatest attention, not only from that force of reasoning and energy of style which manifest the great talents of its author, but also because it explains without prevarication or disguise the motives of England's political conduct in the most remarkable transaction of this or the last century. It is impossible to look at this paper without seeing that a new era is arrived in diplomacy, and that the cunning and sophistry, and all that verbose ambiguity and confused phraseology which characterized the notes between the different cabinets, are about to give place to a manner at once direct, noble, and firm, of arriving at an ultimatum by keeping truth only in view. As the subject of this note is connected with the independence of South America generally, we trust that we may be permitted to offer some further comment on the principles it contains and certain facts which it admits.

Mr. Canning begins by asserting that neither the law of nations nor the existing treaties with Spain

have been violated by the acknowledgment, on the part of England, of the governments established de facto, and now out of the reach of any European attack. He further establishes as a principle and political maxim, that there are cases, there are circumstances, in which a government de facto may be acknowledged as independent; and that in such cases and circumstances it must be permitted to other governments to establish amiable relations with it, or at least the common relations between one nation and another. Long before the independence of Holland and Portugal was acknowledged by Spain, those governments were recognized by many European powers.

As to the example of Buonaparte referred to by the Spanish minister Zea, Mr. Canning answers, that not only all the powers of Europe, and Spain with the rest, had recognized his government, but that even England acknowledged it by making peace with him; that even in 1814, peace would have been concluded with Buonaparte (already Emperor) had his pretensions not been so unreasonable; and that in fact Spain herself well knows that it was a question with the allies, even after treating with Buonaparte, whether it were possible to place another sovereign on the throne to the exclusion of the Bourbons.

Nothing can be more frank or explicit, nor is it possible to establish on firmer bases the necessity of often acknowledging governments de facto. Although every state possesses the unalienable right to constitute, as they think best, alter, as they deem expedient, their form of government, we know how much more frequently absolute power uses the sword than the balance of Justice. But who can call the unanimous

will of millions rebellion? Before what tribunal can the rebellion be established or the delinquents punished? By what law is the legitimacy of acquisition so sanctioned as to render resistance a crime? But it were idle and useless to discuss this question after what was said of the independence of the United States by two of the greatest statesmen of the last century Edmund Burke and Lord Chatham. We may dispose of the question in two words "To your right: says all South America; to the pretensions of Spain is opposed the injustice of its origin: to the fitness of your government, the ocean between us; and to the efforts of your ambition. our courage and our arms. Your dominion has lasted thus long because we were few and uncultivated, now that we are equal in number and equal in civilization, the contest also will, at least, be equal."

There is every reason, however, to believe that the cabinets of ancient Europe (some at least amongst them) have not ceased in their endeavours to bring about division in the policy of those infant states, in order to bring about, by manœuvres and intrigues, what they cannot effect by force. The period is apt; the opinions of men do not easily accord on matters of government; the passions are in full sway when questions of that nature are agitated, and we cannot hope to see many Washingtons or Bolivars. The re

lation of these states towards each other, their territorial boundaries, and what they owe towards each other in order to obtain the common object of the great union of America, all these, added to their internal policy are points upon which the will of so many millions cannot be expected to be unanimous, however they may unite in the great end of a separation from

Europe. It is therefore desirable to establish, on each of these different points, one opinion throughout South America; and this was the useful aim of Bolivar in the meeting of the Panama congress. May it have its proper effect to the extent intended by that generous and meritorious patriot! Let us hope that the demon of discord may be far from their councils, and the presiding men may not be so infatuated as to seek to legislate; when they should employ persuasion, to rule rather than to conciliate; and above all, that they may not extend their deliberations further than is expedient.

The principles of this congress are set forth in the circular address to all the American States, dated 5th of December. 1824, and signed by Bolivar, (It is transcribed in document No 3)-These principles, being so general as they are laid down in that paper, must necessarily be open to great difference of opinion in the discussion between the representatives of the various American states. We have therefore reason to apprehend, that the result of this confederation will be attended with many difficulties; but it may evidently be both useful and effective, ifit have for its first end the union of forces against the attempts at re-colonization on the part of the European powers; and for the second, a firm compact, which will not allow the establishment of absolute power without responsibility. Any thing beyond this will serve only to excite passion and occasion the most mischievous reaction.

The Liberator says in this circular, that "it was time to agree upon a basis on which to rest the interest and relations of the American states; that it was neces

sary to establish an authority which might serve as the faithful interpreter of treaties, and the mediator in contentions, that it was necessary to fix an international code, to consolidate the political existence of so - many newly constituted states;" and that all this could not be effected without the meeting of the representatives of the states in some appointed place (such as the isthmus of Panama), there to form themselves into a general assembly and agree as to their own attributes.

The idea is certainly grand and noble; but all its effect and practical advantage will depend on the attributes which these representatives arrogate to themselves.

There are certain questions on the internal policy of states which cannot be confided to the judgment of foreigners; the questions or differences between governments can never be subjected to the same rules as those which arise between individuals. There are cases which reject every species of arbitration or reference. If the representatives of the American states in the congress of Panama, apply themselves to the determining the territorial limits and to regulate the internal policy of the states they respectively represent, we can only look for dissention instead of harmony, for disagreement where they should accord, and in the place of peace, war and perpetual tumult. If there are certain points of essential and vital importance to all the states of South America, and with respect to which it would be of general utility to establish a firm accord and unanimity, there are others concerning which, as they possess only a relative interest to each state, no uniform will can be expected.