between the representative of a deceased partner and the surviving partner.1 Where all the partners are dead, and a suit is instituted between their representatives, a Receiver will be appointed as a matter of "for," as Lord Kenyon observed, "where there is a copartnership there is a confidence between the parties; and if one dies, the confidence in the other partner remains, and he shall receive; but where both are dead, there is no confidence between the representatives, and therefore the Court will appoint a Receiver."2 The Court will also appoint a Receiver, pending an investigation into the title to an estate, in a suit for the specific performance of an agreement; and this it will do at the suggestion of the vendor, reserving, however, the consideration of the question at whose expense it should be ;3 in Boehm v. Wood, where an appointment of this nature had been made, and the purchaser was afterwards compelled to take the title, Lord Eldon held it to be clear that the Receiver was to be considered as his Receiver. In Hall v. Jenkinson,5 which was also a case of specific performance, the Court, at the instance of the plaintiffs, granted a Receiver after the answer of the purchaser, who was in possession, upon his admission of insolvency and intention to sell and convey. A Receiver may likewise be appointed of the rents and profits of an infant's estate, where a bill has been filed; but it has not been the practice to appoint a Receiver, in such cases, on petition merely. It seems, however, that in the case of idiots or lunatics, 1 Clegg v. Fishwick, 1 Mac. & Gor. 294; Collyer on Partnership (5th Am. ed.) § 357. If the surviving copartner wastes the funds, the Court would, on a proper application, protect the estate of his deceased copartner, by obliging him to give security, or will appoint a receiver. Higginson v. Adir, 1 Desaus. 429. Phillips v. Atkinson, 2 Bro. C. C. 272. Receivers may be appointed, in Massachusetts, to take charge of the estate and effects of a corporation, and to collect the debts and property due and belonging to it, &c., when the charter of the corporation expires or is annulled, or the corporation is dissolved, under the provisions of the law. Genl. Sts. c. 68, s. 37. 2 V. & B. 125. And see Dawson v. Yates, 2 Beav. 301; Osborne v. Harvey, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 116; Stratton v. Davidson, 1 R. &. M. 484. 7 Anon., 1 Atk. 489, 578; Ex parte Whitfield, 2 Atk. 315. See supra, p. 1399. See, however, now, Seton on Decrees, 316. a Receiver has been appointed upon petition, where no person could be found disposed to act as committee.1 Having considered the circumstances under which the Court will appoint a Receiver, it is convenient in this place to call the reader's attention to the nature of the property which the Court will take under its protection by means of such appointment. It may be collected from what has been already laid down, that a Receiver may be appointed of the rents and profits of lands, houses, &c., and also of all personal estate which is capable of being reduced into possession.2 In Davis v. The Duke of Marlborough, it was held, that in favor of equitable creditors the Court will ap point a Receiver of all property against which a legal creditor might obtain execution; upon this ground a Receiver has been appointed of the profits of a rectory, under an elegit. The ap pointment is not, however, confined to such property as is liable to be taken under an execution at Law, but has been extended to whatever is considered in Equity as assets; and, therefore, in Blanchard v. Cawthorne 5 a Receiver was appointed at the instance of a judgment creditor of the office of master forester of a royal forest. So, also, in Palmer v. Vaughan,6 the profits of the office of Clerk of the Peace for a county having been assigned for the payment of creditors, a Receiver was appointed, pending the discussion of a question, as to the validity of the assignment: but in Cooper ". Reilly a Receiver was refused, pending such a discussion, of the salary of Assistant Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury, on the ground that the salary of such an office was not assignable, upon grounds of public policy. It has already been shown, that a pension granted by the crown 1 Ex parte Warren, 10 Ves. 622; and see Anon. 1 Atk. 578. 2 Walkens v. Brent, 1 M. & C. 103; Richards v. Perkins, 2 Y. & C. 299; Rendall v. Rendall, 1 Hare, 152. 32 Swanst. 132. Silver v. Bishop of Norwich, 3 Swanst. 112; White v. Bishop of Peterborough, ibid. 109. See, however, Hawkins v. Gathercole, 6 De Gex, Mac & G. 1. 6 4 Sim. 566. 3 Swanst. 173. ? Sim. 560; 1 R. & M. 560, S. C. is capable of being taken under a sequestration for want of an answer, it may therefore be assumed, that such a pension may be the subject of a Receiver; the rule, however, will not extend to the half-pay of an officer in the Army or Navy, which, as we have also seen, is, upon grounds of public policy, exempt from the operation of a sequestration.2 So, also, it has been held, that a pension granted by the 4 & 5 Ann. c. 4, for the more honorable support of the dignities of the Duke of Marlborough, to the persons, severally and successively, to whom the same should come. by virtue of that Act, with a proviso, that the acquittance of every such person should be a sufficient discharge, was, upon grounds of public policy, inalienable, and therefore not the subject of a Receiver; although the estates (which by the 5 Ann. c. 3, were limited to the Duke for life, with remainder in tail male, &c., in such manner that they might always go along and be enjoyed with the titles and dignities, with a proviso, that they should not be aliened to the injury of the persons in remainder,) were held to be alienable during the life of the person in possession, and to be therefore the subject of a Receiver during his life. A Receiver will also be appointed of heirlooms, or of turnpike tolls, but the Court will not appoint a Receiver of parochial rates, which are to be assessed and collected at a future period. It is not necessary, in order to authorize the Court to make an order for a Receiver, that the property in respect of which he is to be appointed should be in England; a Receiver will be appointed here, of property in the East Indies, in which case the Receiver must find sureties who are resident in England. A Receiver may also be appointed of estates in Ireland, but it seems that in such cases the recognizances of the Receiver and his sureties may be entered into and enrolled in that country.8 1 Ante, pp. 1068, 1069. And see Noud v. Backhouse, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 529 ; Tunstall v. Sir W. Boolber, 10 Sim. 542. 2 Ibid. 6 Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 1 Swanst. 74; 2 Swanst. 125. 5 Knapp v. Williams, 4 Ves. 430; Dumville v. Ashbrooke, 3 Russ. 98, n. 'Cockburn v. Raphael, 2 S. & S. 453; Smith v. Smith, 10 Hare, App. 71. See stat. 43 Geo. III. c. 90. The order directs the recognizances of the receiver and his sureties to be acknowledged before a Master of the Court of Chancery in Ireland, and to be entered and enrolled there, and the entering and It may also be mentioned, that officers in the nature of Receiv ers are frequently appointed of plantations in the West Indies, but as a plantation in the West Indies partakes, in some measure, of the nature of a manufactory or trade, instead of a Receiver, the person appointed is usually called a Manager. SECTION II. Who may be a Receiver. GENERALLY speaking, a Receiver should be a person wholly disinterested in the subject-matter of the suit, but in some cases, although he may be mixed up with the suit, a person so situated may be appointed. Thus, in a suit to establish a will, the heirat-law has been appointed Receiver till after the trial of an issue. So, also, it has been held, that a trustee may, under circumstances, be a Receiver,2 provided he will accept the appointment without emolument. But in no case can a trustee, or other party to a cause, be a Receiver with emolument, unless no one else can be procured who will act with the same benefit to the estate; and it is to be observed, that even where he is disposed to act without emolument, the Court will not appoint a trustee to be a Receiver, where he is the person to watch and check the Receiver for the benefit of the parties interested.5 Upon the same principle it has been held, that, as it is the duty of the next friend of an infant to watch the accounts and conduct of a Receiver of the infant's estate, the two characters are incompatible with each other; and, in Taylor v. Oldham, it was held, that the son of a next friend ought not to be a Receiver. enrolling to be duly certified to the Court by the Master of the Court of Chancery in Ireland. 1 Fingal v. Blake, 2 Moll. 50. See Downshire v. Tyrrell, Hayes, 354. Sykes v. Hastings, 11 Ves. 363. A party to the suit could not be appointed by a Master, unless the order of a reference contained an express authority to that effect. See Blakeney r. De faur, 15 Beav. 44. Fingal v. Blake, 2 Moll. 50; Sykes v. Hastings, 11 Ves. 364; land, 8 Ves. 72; Anon. Ves. 515. 5 Sutton v. Jones, 15 Ves. 588; but see Hoffman v. Duncan, 18 Jur. 69. Stone v. Wishart, 2 Mad. 64. Jac. 527, 529. t. Jo Upon similar grounds it has been held, that a solicitor in the cause cannot be appointed a Receiver, because it is his duty to control the Receiver's accounts. It is no objection, however, to a person proposed, that he is a practising barrister.2 It has been held, that the Receiver-General of Taxes for a county cannot be appointed a Receiver; for having given, as such, security to the crown, if he were to become indebted to the crown, and to the estate, the crown might, by its prerogative process, sweep away all his property.3 Upon the same ground it might be held, that any person who is in the situation of an accountant to the crown would be objectionable.4 SECTION III. Appointment of Receivers. THE Court has no jurisdiction to appoint a Receiver, unless a 1 Garland v. Garland, 2 Ves. jr. 137. A receiver cannot, in any way, employ counsel engaged in the suit in which he is receiver. Adams v. Woods, 8 Cal. 306. 283. 3 Garland v. Garland, 15 Ves. 283; Wynne v. Lord Newborough, 15 Ves. Attorney-General v. Day, 2 Mad. 254. In the case of the Franklin Bank, ås referred to in The Attorney-General v. Bank of Columbia, 1 Paige, 417, Chancellor Walworth decided, that it was improper for an officer of an insolvent corporation to be the receiver of its property. This case arose before the passage of the Revised Statutes in New York. But under the New York Act of voluntary dissolution of corporations, an officer of a corporation can be appointed a receiver. 2 Rev. Stat. (N. Y.) 468, § 66. Still it does not appear that it is obligatory on the Court to appoint the officers receivers, under this statute. Edwards, Receivers, 57, 58. In the Matter of the Eagle Iron Works, 8 Paige, 385; S. C. 3 Edw. Ch. 385, it was held, that the president and bookkeeper of an insolvent manufacturing corporation can be appointed receivers. Where, in the case of a partnership, a proper case for the appointment of a receiver is made out, and the partner actually carrying on the business has not been guilty of such misconduct as to have rendered it unsafe to trust him, the Court generally appoints him the receiver and manager without salary. It is usual, however, to require him to give security duly to manage the partnership affairs, and to account for money received by him. See Wilson v. Greenwood, 1 Swanst. 471; Blakeney v. Dufaur, 15 Beav. 40. A partner who is appointed receiver becomes the officer of the Court, and must act and be respected accordingly. 2 Lindley Partn. (Eng. ed.) 856, 857. |