of those laid by the exceptions; and sometimes, as we have seen, the Court will direct a Master to review his report, in order to afford a party an opportunity for taking in objections to the draft, as a foundation for exceptions.1

A reference back to the Master, to review a report which has not been excepted to, may be made upon the hearing for further directions; and is frequently so made when the Court is not satisfied with the Master's finding, as where the Master has not found sufficient facts for the Court to found its judgment upon. So, also, if the Master has exceeded his authority, it will either direct him to review his report or take no notice of his finding.

We have seen before, that where the report is the consequence of an order pronounced upon petition, or is upon the taxation of costs, the Court will, if the objections to the report are not apparent upon the face of it, entertain a petition to refer it to the Master to review his report.3

In some cases, also, the Court will direct a review of the Master's report, upon application by motion; thus, where there has been some omission or error in the report, which would prevent the matter being properly raised by exceptions, the Court has, upon motion, ordered the Master to review his report, as where, upon a reference of an examination for impertinence, the Master certified, generally, that the examination was impertinent, the Vice-Chancellor, on motion, referred it back to the Master to review his certificate, and state in what respects he considered the same impertinent.4

And, even where exceptions to the report have been heard and disposed of, the Court has, at the instance of a vendor, directed the Master to review his report, in order to give him an opportu

1 Vallence v. Weldon, 1 Dick. 299. Where the order for confirming the Master's report is regular, the order will not afterwards be vacated, so as to allow the defendant to except to the report, when he purposely kept back his objections at the time, and did not state them before the Master, though be had full knowledge of all the facts which formed the grounds of his exception. Slee v. Bloom, 7 John. Ch. 137. See Pickett v. Hewlings, Halst. Dig. 174. Should the Master, however, make his report without giving the parties an oppor tunity to object to it, if they see proper, the Court would, immediately on an application for the purpose, order the report back to the Master to hear the objec tions. Pickett v. Hewlings, Halst. Dig. 174.

Turner v. Turner, 1 Dick. 313; 1 Swanst. 156, n. S. C.
Ante, p. 1312.

Anon. 3 Mad. 246.

nity of completing his title. The Court has, also, as we have seen,2 referred a report, as to title, back to the Master to be reviewed, upon application, by motion, even after the report has been confirmed.3

In general, however, the Court is very cautious in admitting applications to review a Master's report after it has been confirmed; and it is only in cases of fraud, surprise, or mistake, that it will be permitted; and, even then, it will not be allowed unless a very strong case is made.5 And, it seems, that it is not competent to the Lord Chancellor to order the Master to review a report confirmed and followed by a decree of the Master of the Rolls, containing consequential directions, whilst that decree stands.6 The proper course, in such case, would be to have the cause reheard; but, even then, the Court will not permit the report to be even discussed, unless a very strong case is made out to induce the Court to allow it.7

Amendment of Report.

It is to be noticed, that the proper course for correcting errors or supplying deficiencies in a report which has been confirmed, is by bill of review, yet errors, apparent in the schedules, have been corrected, even after enrolment, on a summary application; thus

1 As to the cases in which the Court will send it back to the Master to review his report as to a title, see ante, p. 1215.

• Ibid.

The commissioner's report on matters of account may be opened after confirmation, where the fund is still in the power of the Court, for the purpose of correcting an error originating in mistake or fraud. Cockran v. Lynch, 1 Bailey, Eq. 514.

* Drought v. Redford, 1 Moll. 573.

• Turner v. Turner, 1 Jac. & W. 39. Where a matter of fact, depending on conflicting testimony, and the credibility of witnesses, has been referred to a Master, his decision will not be interfered with, on his mere judgment of facts, unless it is a very plain case of error or mistake. Izard v. Bodine, 1 Stockt. (N. J.) 309; Sinnickson v. Bruere, 1 Stockt. (N. J.) 659. Or unless there be some abuse of authority on the part of the Master; and the burden is on the excepting party to establish the mistake or misconduct alleged. Howe v. Russell, 36 Maine,

115, 127; Da Costa v. Da Costa, 3 P. Wms. 140, note; McDougald v. Dougherty, 11 Georgia, 570.

• Turner v. Turner, 1 Swanst. 154. Turner v. Turner, 1 Jac. & W. 42. Weston v. Haggerston, Coop. 134.

where, in taking an account in the Master's office, a mistake was made in the casting up of the schedules, and, upon the cause coming on upon further directions, the defendant was decreed to pay a sum, appearing by the schedules so cast up, to be due from him, and the plaintiff enrolled the decree, after which the mistake was discovered, Lord Eldon, upon an application to correct the error, said, that all errors apparent on the face of the schedules might be corrected, even after enrolment, but that there could be no correction except of such apparent errors. His Lordship accordingly permitted the mistakes in the schedules, which were apparent, to be corrected, but refused a subsequent application, by the plaintiff, in the same case, to have some further sums, which he claimed, inserted in the schedules.1

CHAPTER XXVII.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE JUDGES' CHAMBERS.

UNTIL a very recent period in the history of the Court of Chancery, it was the pratice in every suit of any degree of complication to refer to one of the Masters of the Court either inquiries to be investigated, or directions to be carried into effect. The form of these references, and the circumstances under which they were made, constituted a most material part of the general practice of the Court. The Masters exercised an almost independent jurisdiction in carrying out these references. No communications took place between the Master prosecuting a reference and the Judge who directed it, but the Master completed the duty delegated to him, and then drew up a lengthy report, stating the result of his inquiries and what he had done in obedience to the decree. After this report was made the cause came again before the Court for a final settlement, and a decree was made, based upon the decisions and investigations of the Master. The parties, by excepting to the report, might appeal to the Court against the decision of the Master, and reopen all the questions that had been decided.

1 See White v. Johnson, 2 Munf. 284; Hatchett v. Cremorne, Sausse & S. 675; Miller v. Rushforth, 3 Green Ch. 174; Howe v. Russell, 36 Maine, 115, 127; 2 Madd. Ch. Pr. 507; Mason v. Crosby, 3 Wood & M. 258.

The office of Master was abolished by the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 80, subject, however, to the final termination of some matters then before the existing Masters, and subject also to cases under the Winding-up Act, as to which the 10th section provides that, "From and after the first day of Michaelmas Term, 1852, no reference shall be made to any of the Masters in ordinary of the said Court, except in cases in which, from some previous reference made in the cause or matter, or in some other cause or matter connected therewith, the Court may think it expedient to make such reference, and except in matters arising under the JointStock Companies Winding-up Acts, 1848-1849."1 As the matters now before the Master are nearly worked out, and as it is not probable that any more references will be made to them, it will not be necessary to enter further into the practice of the Master's offices. The preamble of the Act of Parliament abolishing the office of Master, in the following short vigorous language, states the desire of the Commissioners, and of almost every one else who recollects the former practice of the Court and of the Masters' offices: "Whereas proceedings before the Masters in ordinary of the High Court of Chancery are attended with much delay and expense, and it is expedient that the business now disposed of in the offices of such Masters should be transacted by and under the more immediate direction and control of the Judges of the said Court."

It is intended in this Chapter to explain in what manner the object of the Act has been carried into effect, and by what means the business formerly conducted in the Masters' offices is now transacted, under the more immediate direction and control of the Judges of the said Court.

In the first place the Act provides, that the Judges themselves should preside over and take part in the duties performed at chambers. For by the 11th section it is provided, that "It shall be lawful for the Master of the Rolls, and the Vice-Chancellors, for the time being, and they are hereby required, to sit at chambers for the despatch of such part of the business of the Court as can, without detriment to the public advantage, arising from the discussion of questions in open Court, be heard in chambers, according to the directions hereinafter in that behalf specified or referred to."

'The Judge has, however, a discretion to refer cases under the Winding-up Acts to himself in chambers. See 17 Beav. 470.

In former times the jurisdiction of the Master was limited strictly by the terms of the reference to him. He could prosecute no other inquiries than those contained in the decree, nor deviate in any manner from the strict terms of the reference. But now, by the 13th section, "The Master of the Rolls, and every one of the Vice-Chancellors respectively, when sitting at chambers, shall have the same power and jurisdiction in respect of the business to be brought before them, as if they were respectively sitting in open Court."1 A Judge will not therefore be compelled to prosecute any inquiry against the wishes of the parties, and which may turn out to be unnecessary. Moreover, there is no want of jurisdiction to prevent a Judge at chambers varying the terms of the inquiry, though such a step is not usual.2

By the 40th section, the Judge in chambers has power to act upon the opinion of conveyancing counsel in certain matters which were formerly referred to such counsel by the Master;3 and, by the 36th section of the Act, he has all the "powers, authorities and jurisdiction" which the Masters formerly possessed under any Act of Parliament; and by the 58th Order of 16th October, 1852, the Judges in chambers may exercise all the jurisdiction which the Masters possessed under any order of the Court; and, by the 59th of the same Orders, "The power of the Court, and of the Judge sitting in chambers, to enlarge or abridge the time for doing any act, or taking any proceeding, and to give any special direction as to the course of proceeding in any cause or matter, is unaffected by the Orders." This Order prevents any doubt as to the jurisdiction of a single Judge in chambers to vary the times fixed by General Orders.

The orders of the Judges at chambers have the same force and effect as orders of the Court of Chancery, and may be signed and enrolled in like manner. They are usually drawn up by the clerks of the Judges, but a power is given, enabling the Judges to direct that particular orders be drawn up by the Registrars of the Court in the same manner as orders made in open Court are Any Judge of the Court, whose chambers may be open for business during the vacation, may issue summonses for the purpose of any proceedings before the Master of the Rolls or any Vice-Chancellor after the vacation. 2d Order of June, 1854.

1

2 Saunders v. Walter, 9 Hare, Appx. v.

For the manner in which these counsel are appointed, see post, the chapter on Sales of Estates.