for principal and interest, and void | maritime interest is understood the for the excess. Banks are bound to profit of money lent on bottomry or pay twelve per cent. interest on all respondentia, which is allowed to be their notes during a suspension of greater than simple interest because specie payment. 37 Acts 30, Act of the capital of the lender is put in February 25, 1839. Swan's Coll. 129. jeopardy. There is no limit by law Pennsylvania. Interest is allowed as to the amount which may be at the rate of six per centum per an- charged for maritime interest. It is num for the loan or use of money or fixed generally by the agreement of other commodities. Act of March 2, the parties. The French writers 1723; and lawful interest is allowed employ a variety of terms in order on judgments. Act of 1700, 1 to distinguish it according to the naSmith's L. of Penn. 12. See 6 Watts, ture of the case. They call it inte53; 12 S. & R. 47; 13 S. & R. rest, when it is stipulated to be paid 221; 4 Whart. 221; 6 Binn. 435; by the month, or at other stated pe1 Dall. 378; 1 Dall. 407; 2 Dall. riods. It is a premium when a gross 92; 1 S. & R. 176; 1 Binn. 488; sum is to be paid at the end of the 2 Pet. 538; 8 Wheat. 355. voyage, and here the risk is the principal object they have in view. When the sum is a per centage on the money lent, they call it exchange, considering it in the light of money lent at one place to be returned in another, with a difference in amount between the sum borrowed and that which is paid, arising from the dif ference of time and place. When they intend to combine these various Tennessee. The interest allowed shades into one general denomination, by law is six per centum per annum. they make use of the term maritime When more is charged it is not reco-profit, to convey their meaning. verable, but the principal and legal Hall on Mar. Loans, 56, n. interest may be recovered. Act of 1835, c. 50, Car. & Nich. Comp. 406, 407.

Rhode Island. Six per centum per annum is allowed for interest on loans of money. 3 Griff. Law Reg.

116.

South Carolina. Seven per centum per annum, or at that rate, is allowed for interest. 4 Cooper's Stat. of S. C. 364. When more is reserved, the amount lent and interest may be recovered. 6 Id. 409.

Vermont. Six per centum per annum is the legal interest. If more be charged and paid it may be recovered back in an action of assumpsit. But these provisions do not extend "to the letting of cattle and other usages of a like nature among farm. ers, or maritime contracts, bottomry or course of exchange, as has been customary." Rev. St. c. 72, s. 3, 4, 5.

INTERESTED CONTRACT, civil law, is one in which both parties have an interest; it is put in opposition to a contract of mere benevolence; the contracts of partnership, sale, hiring, exchange or barter, are of this kind. Poth. Oblig. n. 12. Contract.

INTERLINEATION, in contracts, evidence, is writing between two lines. Interlineations are made either before or after the execution of an instrument. Those made before should be noted previous to its Virginia. Interest is allowed at execution; those made after are made the rate of six per centum per annum. either by the party in whose favour Act of 22 Nov. 1796, 1 Rev. Code they are, or by strangers. When ch. 209. made by the party himself, whether INTEREST, MARITIME. By the interlineation be material or im

INTERPRETATION, is the explication of a law, agreement, will, or other instrument, which appears obscure or ambiguous. The object of interpretation is to find out or collect the intention of the maker of the instrument, either from his own words, or from other conjectures, or both. It may then be divided into three sorts, according to the different means it makes use of for obtaining its end. These three sorts of interpretations are either literal, rational, or mixed. When we collect the intention of the writer from his words only, as they lie before us, this is a literal interpretation. When his words do not express his intention perfectly, but either exceed it, or fall short of it, so that we are to col. lect it from probable or rational conjectures only, this is rational inter

material, they render the deed void, 1 Gall. Rep. 71, unless made with the consent of the opposite party. Vide 11 Co. 27 a; 9 Mass. Rep. 307; 15 Johns. R. 293; 1 Dall. R. 57; 1 Halst. R. 215; but see 1 Pet. C. C. R. 364; 5 Har. & John. 41; 2 L. R. 290; 2 Ch. R. 410; 4 Bing. R. 123; Fitzg. 207, 223; Cov. on Conv. Ev. 22. When the interlineation is made by a stranger, if it be immaterial, it will not vitiate the instrument, but if it be material, it will in general avoid it. Vide Cruise, Dig. tit. 32, c. 26, s. 8; Com. Dig. Fait, F 1. The ancient rule, which is still said to be in force, is that an alteration shall be presumed to have been made before the execution of the instrument. Vin. Ab. Evidence, Qa 2; Ib. Faits, U; 1 Swift's Syst. 310; 6 Wheat. R. 481; 1 Halst. 215; but other cases hold the pre-pretation; and when his words, sumption to be that a material interlineation was made after the execution of an instrument, unless the contrary be proved. 1 Dall. 67. This doctrine corresponds nearly with the rules of the canon law on this subject. The canonists have examined it with care. Vide 18 Pick. R. 172; Toull. Dr. Civ. Fr. liv. 3, t. 3, c. 4, n. 115, and article Erasure.

INTERLOCUTORY. This word is applied to signify something which is done between the commencement and the end of a suit or action which decides some point or matter, which however is not a final decision of the matter in issue; as, interlocutory judgments, or decrees or orders. Vide Judgment, interlocutory.

INTERLOPERS. Persons who interrupt the trade of a company of merchants, by pursuing the same business with them in the same place, without lawful authority.

INTERPLEADER, practice.Vide Bill of Interpleader, and 8 Vin. Ab. 419; Doct. Pl. 247; 3 Bl. Com. 449; Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 T; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 800.

though they do express his intention, when rightly understood, are in themselves of doubtful meaning, and we are forced to have recourse to like conjectures to find out in what sense he used them; this sort of interpretation is mixed; it is partly literal, and partly rational.

According to the civilians there are three sorts of interpretations, the authentic, the usual, and the doctrinal. 1. The authentic interpretation is that which refers to the legis lator himself, in order to fix the sense of the law. 2. When the judge interprets the law so as to accord with prior decisions, the interpretation is called usual. 3. It is doctrinal when it is made agreeably to rules of science. The commentaries of learned lawyers in this case furnish the greatest assistance. This last kind of interpretation is itself divided into three distinct classes. Doctrinal interpretation is extensive, restrictive, or declaratory. 1st. It is extensive whenever the reason of the law has a more enlarged sense

than its terms, and it is consequently
applied to a case which had not been
explained. 2d. On the contrary, it
is restrictive when the expressions
of the law have a greater latitude
than its reasons, so that by a restrict
ed interpretation, an exception is
made in a case which the law does
not seem to have embraced.
When the reason of the law and the
terms in which it is conceived agree,
and it is only necessary to explain
them to have the sense complete,
the interpretation is declaratory.

3d.

The term interpretation is used by foreign jurists in nearly the same sense that we use the word construction, (q. v.)

same act, whether they precede or follow it.

7. In case of doubt a clause ought to be interpreted against the person who stipulates any thing, and in discharge of the person who contracts the obligation.

8. However general the terms may be in which an agreement is conceived, it only comprises those things respecting which it appears, that the contracting parties proposed to contract, and not others which they never thought of.

9. When the object of the agreement is universally to include every thing of a given nature, (une universalité de choses) the general dePothier, in his excellent treatise scription will comprise all particon Obligations, lays down the follow-ular articles, although they may ing rules for the interpretation of con

tracts:

1. We ought to examine what was the common intention of the contracting parties rather than the grammatical sense of the terms.

2. When a clause is capable of two significations, it should be understood in that which will have some operation rather than that in which it will have none.

3. Where the terms of a contract are capable of two significations, we ought to understand them in the sense which is most agreeable to the nature of the contract.

not have been in the knowledge of the parties. We may state as an example of this rule an engagement which I make with you to abandon my share in a succession for a certain sum. This agreement includes every thing which makes part of the succession, whether known or not; our intention was to contract for the whole. Therefore it is decided that I cannot object to the agreement, under pretence that a considerable property has been found to belong to the succession of which we had not any knowledge.

10. When a case is expressed in a contract on account of any doubt which there may be whether the en

4. Any thing, which may appear ambiguous in the terms of a contract, may be explained by the com-gagement resulting from the contract mon use of those terms in the country where it is made.

5. Usage is of so much authority in the interpretation of agreements, that a contract is understood to contain the customary clauses although they are not expressed; in contractibus tacite veniunt ea quæ sunt moris et consuetudinis.

6. We ought to interpret one clause by the others contained in the VOL. I.-50.

would extend to such case, the parties are not thereby understood to restrain the extent which the engagement has of right, in respect to all cases not expressed.

11. In contracts as well as in testaments, a clause conceived in the plural may be frequently distributed into several particular classes.

12. What is at the end of a phrase commonly refers to the whole phrase,

For instance, if in the contract for sale of a farm, it is said to be sold with all the corn, small grain, fruits and wine that have been got this year, the terms, that have been got this year, refer to the whole phrase, and not to the wine only, and consequently the old corn is not less excepted than the old wine; it would be otherwise if it had been said, all the wine that has been got this year, for the expressian is in the singular, and only refers to the wine and not to the rest of the phrase, with which it does not agree in number.

and not only to what immediately | rial and pertinent questions, in writ precedes it, provided it agrees in ing, to necessary points, not confessgender and number with the whole ed, exhibited for the examination of phrase. witnesses or persons who are to give testimony in the cause. They are either original and direct on the part of him who produces the witnesses, or cross and counter, on behalf of the adverse party, to examine witnesses produced on the other side. Either party, plaintiff or defendant, may exhibit original or cross interrogatories. The form which interrogatories assume, is as various as the minds of of the persons who propound them. They should be as distinct as possible, and capable of a definite answer; and they should leave no loop holes for evasion to an unwilling witness. Care must be observed to put no leading questions in original interrogatories, for these always lead to inconvenience; and for scandal or impertinence, interrogatories will, under certain circumstances, be suppressed. Vide Will. on Interrogatories, passim; Gresl. Eq. Ev. pt. 1, c. 3, s. 1; Vin. Ab. h. t.; Hind's Pr. 317.

INTERPRETER. One employed to make a translation, (q. v.) An interpreter should be sworn before he translates the testimony of a witness. 4 Mass. 81; 5 Mass. 219; 2 Caines's Rep. 155. A person employed between an attorney and client to act as interpreter, is considered merely as the organ between them, and is not bound to testify as to what he has acquired in those confidential communications. 1 Pet. C. C. R. 356; 4 Munf. R. 273; 3 Wend. R. 337. Vide Confidential Communications. INTERREGNUM, polit. law. In an established government, the period which elapses between the death of a sovereign and the election of another is called interregnum. It is also understood for the vacancy created in the executive power, and for any vacancy which occurs when there is no government.

French

INTERROGATOIRE, law, is an act, or instrument, which contains the interrogatories made by the judge to the person accused, on the facts which are the object of the accusation, and the answers of the accused. Poth. Proc. crim. s. 4, art. 2, 1. Vide Information. §

INTERROGATORIES are mate

INTERRUPTION, is the effect of some act or circumstance which stops the course of a prescription or act of limitations. Interruption of the use of a thing is natural or civil. Natural interruption is an interruption in fact, which takes place whenever by some act we cease truly to possess what we formerly possessed. Vide 4 Mason's Rep. 404; 2 Y. & Jarv. 285. Civil interruption is that which takes place by some judicial act, as the commencement of a suit to recover the thing in dispute, which gives notice to the possessor that the thing which he possesses does not belong to him. When the title has once been gained by prescription, it will not be lost by any interruption of it for ten or twenty years. i Inst. 113 b. A simple acknowledgment of a debt by the debtor, is a sufficient interruption