disclosed had no reference to profes sional employment, though disclosed while the relation of attorney and client subsisted, Peake's R. 77;—7, when the attorney made himself a subscribing witness. 10 Mod. 40; 3 Burr. 1687;-8, when he was directed to plead the facts to which he is called to testify. 7 N. S. 179. See a well written article on this sub

p. 304. Vide generally, Stark. Ev. h. t.; 1 Peters's R. 356; 1 Root, 383; Whart. Dig. 275; Cary's R. 88, 126, 143; Toth. R. 177; Peake's Cas. 77 ; 2 Stark. Cas. 274; 4 Wash. C. C. R. 718; 11 Wheat. 280; 3 Yeates, R. 4; 4 Munf. R. 273; 1 Porter, R. 433; Wright, R. 136; 13 John. R. 492. As to a confession made to a catholic priest, see 2 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 77. Vide 2 Ch. Pr. 18-21. Confessor.

CONFIRMATION, conveyancing.

contracts,

of the attorney. The rule is, in general, strictly confined to counsel, solicitors or attorneys, except indeed the case of an interpreter between the counsel and client, when the privilege rests upon the same grounds of necessity. 3 Wend. R. 339. In New York, contrary to this general rule, it has been decided that information disclosed to a physician while attending upon the defendant in his profes-ject in the American Jurist, vol. xvii. sional character, and which information was necessary to enable the witness to prescribe for his patient, was a confidential communication which the witness need not have testified about; and in a case where such evidence had been received by the master, it was rejected. 4 Paige, R. 460. As to the matter communicated, it extends to all cases where the party applies for professional assistance. 6 Mad. R. 47; 14 Pick. R. 416. But the privilege does not extend to extraneous or impertinent communications; 3 John. Cas. 198; nor to information imparted to a counsellor in the character of a friend, and not as counsel, 1 Caines's R. 157. The cases in which communications to counsel have been holden not to be privileged may be classed under the following heads:1, When the communication was made before the attorney was employed, at such,-1 Vent. 197; 2 Atk. 524;-2, after the attorney's employment has ceased, 4 T. R. 431;-3, when the attorney was consulted because he was an attorney, yet he refused to act as such, and was therefore only applied to as a friend, 4 T. R. 753;-4, where a fact merely took place in the presence of the attorney, Cowp. 846; 2 Ves. 189; but see Str. 1122;-5, when the matter communicated was not in its nature private, and could in no sense be termed the subject of a confidential communication, 7 East, R. 357; 2 B. & B. 176;-6, when the things VOL. I.-26.

1. A contract by which that which was voidable, is made firm and unavoidable. 2. A species of conveyance.

1. When a contract has been entered into by a stranger without authority, he in whose name it has been made, may by his own act confirm it; or if the contract be made by the party himself in an informal and voidable manner, he may in a more formal manner confirm and render it valid; and in that event it will take effect, as between the parties, from the original making. To make a valid confirmation the party must be apprised of his rights, and where there has been a fraud in the transaction, he must be aware of it, and intend to confirm his contract. Vide 1 Ball & Beatty, 353; 2 Scho. & Lef. 486; 12 Ves. 373; 1 Ves. Jr. 215; Newl. Contr. 496; 1 Atk. 301; 8 Watts, R. 280.

2. Lord Coke defines a confirmation of an estate, to be "a conveyance of an estate or right in esse,

whereby a voidable estate is made | crime, it is usually called a forfeiture. sure and unavoidable; or where a 1 Bl. Com. 299. particular estate is increased." The first part of this definition may be illustrated by the following case put by Littleton, § 516; where a person lets land to another for the term of his life, who lets the same to another for forty years, by force of which he is in possession; if the lessor for life confirms the estate of the tenant for years, by deed, and afterwards the tenant for life dies, during the term; this deed will operate as a confirmation of the term for years. As to the latter branch of the definition; whenever a confirmation operates by way of increasing the estate, it is similar in every respect to a release that operates by way of enlargement, for there must be privity of estate, and proper words of limitation. The proper technical words of a confirmation are, ratify, approve and confirm. A confirmation does not strengthen a void estate. Confirmatio est nulla, ubi donum precedens est invalidum, et ubi donatio nulla est nec valebit confirmatio. For conformation may make a voidable or defeasible estate good, but cannot operate on an estate void in law. Co. Litt. 295. The canon law agrees with this rule, and hence the maxim qui confirmat nihil dat. Toull. Dr. Civ. Fr. liv. 3, t. 3, c. 6, n. 476. Vide Vin. Ab. h. t.; Com. Dig. h. t.; Ayliffe's Pand. *386; 1 Chit. Pr. 315. 3 Gill & John. 290; 3 Yerg. R. 405; Co. Litt. 295; Gilbert on Ten. 75; 1 Breese's R. 236; 9 Co. 142, a.

CONFISCATION is the act by which the estate, goods or chattels, of a person who has been guilty of some crime, or who is a public enemy, is declared to be forfeited for the benefit of the public treasury. Domat, Droit Public, liv. 1, tit. 6, s. 2, n. 1. When property is forfeited as a punishment for the commission of

It is a general rule that the property of the subjects of an enemy found in the country may be appro priated by the government, without notice, unless there be a treaty to the contrary. 1 Gallis. R. 563; 3 Dall. R. 199; N. Car. Cas. 79. It has been frequently provided by treaty that foreign subjects should be permitted to remain and continue their business, notwithstanding a rupture between the governments, so long as they conducted themselves innocently; and when there was no such treaty, such a liberal permission has been announced in the very declaration of war. Vattel, liv. 3, c. 4, 4, § 63. Sir Michael Foster, (Discourses on High Treason, p. 185, 6,) mentions several instances of such declarations by the king of Great Britain; and he says that aliens were thereby enabled to acquire personal chattels and to maintain actions for the recovery of their personal rights, in as full a manner as alien friends. 1 Kent, Com. 57. In the United States, the broad principle has been assumed "that war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found. The mitigations of this rigid rule, which the policy of modern times has introduced into practice, will more or less affect the exercise of this right, but cannot impair the right itself." 8 Cranch, 122, 3. Commercial nations have always considerable property in the possession of their neighbours; and when war breaks out, the question what shall be done with enemy's property found in the country, is one rather of policy than of law, and is properly addressed to the consideration of the legislature, and not to courts of law. The strict right of confiscation exists in congress; and without a legislative act authorising

See Chit. Law of Nations, c. 3; Marten's Law of Nat. lib. 8, c. 3, s. 9; Burlamaqui, Princ. of Pol. Law, part 4, c. 7; Vattel, liv. 3, c. 4, § 63. The claim of a right to confiscate debts, contracted by individuals in times of peace, and which remain due to subjects of the enemy in time of war, rests very much upon the same principles as that concerning the enemy's tangible property, found in the country at the commencement of the war. But it is the universal practice to forbear to seize and confiscate debts and credits. 1 Kent, Com. 64, 5; vide 4 Cranch, R. 415; Charlt. 140; 2 Harr. & John. 101, 112, 471; 6 Cranch, R. 286; 7 Conn. R. 428; 2 Tayl. R. 115; 1 Day, R. 4; Kirby, R. 228, 291; C. & N. 77, 492.

its confiscation it cannot be con- | Cowp. R. 208; 2 Hagg. C. R. 383; demned. 8 Cranch, 128, 129. It is proper, however, to observe, that ambassadors and other public ministers, while in the territory of the state to which they are delegates, are exempt from the local jurisdiction. Vide Ambassador. And the persons composing a foreign army, or fleet, marching through, or stationed in the territory of another state, with whom the foreign nation is in amity, are also exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Wheat Intern. Law, part 2, c. 2, § 10; Casaregis, Disc. 136-174; vide 7 Cranch, R. 116. Possessing exclusive authority, with the above qualification, a state may regulate the manner and circumstances, under which property, whether real or personal, in possession or in action, within it, shall be held, transmitted or transferred, by sale, barter, or bequest, or recovered or enforced; the condition, capacity, and state, of all persons within it; the validity of contracts and other acts done there; the resulting rights and duties growing out of these contracts and acts; and the remedies, and modes of administering justice in all cases. Story, Confl. of Laws, § 18; Vattel, B. 2, c. 7, § 84, 85; Wheat. Intern. Law, part 1, c. 2, § 5.

CONFLICT OF LAWS. This phrase is used to denote that the laws of different countries, on the subject-matter to be decided, are in opposition to each other; or that certain laws of the same country are contradictory. When this happens to be the case, it becomes necessary to decide which law is to be obeyed. This subject has occupied the attention and talents of some of the most learned jurists, and their labours are comprised in many volumes. A few general rules have been adopted on this subject which will be here noticed.

1. Every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory. The laws of every state, therefore, affect and bind directly all property, whether real or personal, within its territory; and all persons who are resident within it, whether citzens or aliens, natives or foreigners; and also all contracts made, and acts done within it. Vide Lex Loci contractus; Henry, For. Law, part 1, c. 1, § 1;

2. A state or nation cannot, by its laws, directly affect or bind property out of its own territory, or persons not resident therein, whether they are natural born or naturalized citizens or subjects, or others. This result flows from the principle that each sovereignty is perfectly independent. 13 Mass. R. 4. To this general rule there appears to be an exception, which is this, that a nation has a right to bind its own citizens or subjects by its own laws in every place; but this exception is not to be adopted without some qualification. Story, Confl. of Laws, § 21; Wheat. Intern. Law, part 2, c. 2, § 7.

CONFUSION is the concurrence of two qualities in the same subject, which mutually destroy each other. Poth. Ob. P. 3, c. 5; 3 Bl. Com. 405; Story Bailm. § 40.

3. Whatever force and obligation | cused, and maintain the truth in his the laws of one country have in an- presence. No man can be a witness other, depends upon the laws and unless confronted with the accused, municipal regulations of the latter; except by consent. that is to say, upon its own proper jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express or tacit consent. Huberus, lib. 1, t. 3, § 2. When a statute, or the unwritten or common law of the country, forbids the recognition of the foreign law, the latter is of no force whatever. When both are silent, then the question arises, which of the conflicting laws is to have effect. Whether the one or the other shall be the rule of decision must necessarily depend on a variety of circumstances, which cannot be reduced to any certain rule. No nation will suffer the laws of another to interfere with her own, to the injury of her own citizens; and whether they do or not, must depend on the condition of the country, in which the law is sought to be enforced; the particular state of her legislation, her policy, and the character of her institutions. In the conflict of laws, it must often be a matter of doubt, which should prevail; and, whenever a doubt does exist, the court which decides, will prefer the law of its own country to that of the stranger. 17 Mart. (Lo.) R. 569, 595, 596.

Vide, generally, Story, Confl. of Laws; Burge, Confl. of Laws; Liverm. on Contr. of Laws; Huberus, De Conflictu Legum; Hertius, De Collisione Legum; Boullenois, Traité de la personalité et de la réalité de lois, coutumes et statuts, par forme d'observations; Boullenois, Dissertations sur des questions qui naissent de la contrarieté des lois et des

coutumes.

CONFRONTATION, crim. law, practice, is the act by which a witness is brought in the presence of the accused, so that the latter may object to him, if he can, and the former may know and identify the ac

CONFUSION OF GOODS, is where those of two persons are so intermixed that the several portions can no longer be distinguished; if the intermixture be by consent, the proprietors have an interest in common, in proportion to their respective shares, 2 Bl. Com. 405; but if one wilfully mixes his money, corn, or hay with that of another man, without his approbation or knowledge, the law, to guard against fraud, gives the entire property without any account, to him whose original dominion is invaded and endeavoured to be rendered uncertain, without his consent. Ib.; and see 2 Johns. Ch. R. 62; 2 Kent's Comm. 297. There may be a case neither of consent nor of wilfulness, in the confusion of goods; as where a bailee by negligence or unskilfulness, or inadvertence, mixes up his own goods of the same sort with those bailed; and there may be a confusion arising from accident and unavoidable casualty. Now, in the latter case of accidental intermix. ture, the rule, following the civil law, which deemed the property to be held in common, might be adopted; and it would make no difference whether the mixture produced a thing of the same sort or not, as if the wine of two persons were mixed by accident. See Dane's Abr. ch. 76, art. 5, § 19. But in cases of mixture by unskilfulness, negligence, or inadvertence, the true principle seems to be, that if a man having undertaken to keep the property of another distinct from, mixes it with

his own, the whole must, both at law | R. 527; 3 L. R. 552; 4 L. R. 399, and in equity, be taken to be the 488. property of the other, until the former puts the subject under such circumstances that it may be distinguished as satisfactorily, as it might| have been before the unauthorised mixture on his part. 15 Ves. 440, 432, 436, 439; 2 John. Ch. R. 62; Story on Bailm. c. 1, § 40. And see 7 Mass. R. 123; Dane's Abr. c. 76, art. 3, § 15; Com. Pleader, 3 M 28; Bac. Ab. Trespass, E 2; 2 Campb. 576; 2 Roll. 566, l. 15; 2 Bul. 323; 2 Cro. 366; 2 Roll. 393; 5 East, 7; 21 Pick. R. 298.