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Lin, 117; 5 John. Ch. R. 44. This offence differs from maintenance, in this, that in the latter the person assisting the suitor receives no benefit, while in the former he receives one half, or other portion, of the thing sued for. Punishment, fine and imprisonment. 4 Bl. Com. 135. This was an offence in the civil law. Poth. Pand. lib. 3,1.1. App. n. 1, tom. 3, p. 104; 15 Ves. 139; 7 Bligh's R. 369; S. C. 20 E. C. L. R. 165; 5 Moore & P. 193; 6 Carr. & P. 749,
5. C. 25 E. C. L. R. 631; 1 Russ. Cr. 179; Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 84, s.
6. To maintain a defendant may be champerty. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 84, s. 8; 3 Ham. 541 ; 6 Monr. 392; 8 Yerg. 484; 8 John. 479; 1 John. Ch. R. 444; 7 Wend. 152; 3 Cowen, 624; 6 Cowen, 90.
CHAMPION, he who fights for another, or takes his place in a quarrel; it also includes him who fights his own battles. Bract. lib. 4, t. 2, c. 12.
CHANCE, accident. As the law punishes a crime only when there is an intention to commit it, it follows that when those acts are done in the performance of a lawful act by mere chance or accident, which would have amounted to a crime if there had been an intention express or implied to commit them, there is no crime. For example, if workmen were employed in blasting rocks in a retired field, and a person not knowing of the circumstance should enter the field, and be killed by a piece of the rock, there would be no guilt in the workmen. 1 East, P. C. 262; Foster, 262; 1 Hale's P. C. 472; 4 Bl. Com. 192. Vide Accident.
CHANCE-MEDLEY, criminal law, is a sudden affray; this word is sometimes applied to any manner of homicide by misadventure, but in strictness it is applicable to such killing only as happens se defendendo, (q. v.) 4 Bl. Com. 184.
CHANCELLOR, is an officer appointed to preside over a court of chancery, invested with various powers, in the several states. The office of chancellor is of Roman origin. He appears at first to have been a chief scribe or secretary, but he was afterwards invested with judicial power, and had the superintendence over the other officers of the empire. From the Romans, the title and office passed to the church, and therefore every bishop of the catholic church has to this day, his chancellor, the principal judge of his consistory. When the modern kingdoms of Europe were established upon the ruins of the empire, almost every state preserved its chancellor, with different jurisdictions and dignities, according to their different constitutions. In all, he seems to have had a supervision of all charters, letters and such other public instruments of the crown, as were authenticated in the most solemn manner, and when seals came into use, he had the custody of the public seal. An officer bearing this title is to be found in most countries of Europe, and is generally invested with extensive authority. The title and office of chancellor came to us from England. Many of our state constitutions provide for the appointment of this officer, who is by them, and by the laws of the several states, invested with power as they provide. Vice Encyclopedie, h. t.; Encycl. Amer. h. t.; Diet. de Jur. h. t.; Merl. Rep. h. t.; 4 Vin. Ab. 374; Blake's Ch. Index, h. t.; Wooddes. Lect. 95.
CHANCERY. The name of a court exercising jurisdiction at law, but mainly in equity. It is not easy to determine how courts of equity originally obtained the jurisdiction they now exercise. Their authority and the extent of it have been subjects of much question, but time has firmly established them; and the limits of their jurisdiction seem to be in a great degree fixed and ascertained. 1 Story on Eq. ch. 2; Mitf. PI. Introd.; Coop. Eq. PI. Introd.
The judge of the court of chancery, often called a court of equity, bears the title of chancellor. The equity jurisdiction in England is vested, principally, in the high court of chancery. This court is distinct from courts of law. "American courts of equity are, in some instances, distinct from those of law; in others, the same tribunals exercise the jurisdiction both of courts of law and equity, though their forms of proceeding are different in their two capacities. The supreme court of the United States, and the circuit courts, are invested with general equity powers, and act either as courts of law or equity, according to the form of the process and the subject of adjudication. In some of the states, as New York, Virginia and South Carolina, the equity court is a distinct tribunal, having its appropriate judge, or chancellor, and officers. In most of the states, the two jurisdictions centre in the same judicial officers, as in the courts of the United States; and the extent of equity jurisdiction and proceedings is very various in the different states, being very ample in Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina, and more restricted in Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. But the salutary influence of these powers on the judicial administration generally, by the adaptation of chancery forms and modes of proceeding to many cases in which a court of law affords but an imperfect remedy, or no remedy at all, is producing a gradual extension of them in those states where they have been heretofore very limited."
The jurisdiction of a court of equity differs essentially from that of a court of law. The remedies for wrongs or for the enforcement of right, may be
distinguished into two classes; "those which are administered in courts of law, and those which are administered in courts of equity. The rights secured by the former are called legal; those secured by the latter are called equitable. The former are said to be rights and remedies at common law, because recognised and enforced in courts of common law. The latter are said to be rights and remedies in equity, because they are administered in courts of equity or chancery, or by proceedings in other courts analogous to those in courts of equity or chancery. Now, in England and America, courts of common law proceed by certain prescribed forms, and give a general judgment for or against the defendant. They entertain jurisdiction only in certain actions, and give remedies according to the particular exigency of such actions. But there are many cases in which a simple judgment for either party, without qualifications and conditions, and particular arrangements, will not do entire justice, ex aqua et bono, to either party. Some modification of the rights of both parties are required; some restraints on one side or the other; and some peculiar adjustments, either present or future, temporary or perpetual. Now, in all these cases, courts of common law have no methods of proceeding, which can accomplish such objects. Their forms of actions and judgment are not adapted to them. The proper remedy cannot be found, or cannot be administered to the full extent of the relative rights of all parties. Such prescribed forms of actions are not confined to our law. They were known in the civil law; and the party could apply them only to their original purposes. In other cases, he had a special remedy, such cases, where the courts of common law cannot grant the proper remedy or relief, the law of England and of the United States (in those states where equity is administered) authorises an application to the courts of equity or chancery, which are not confined or limited in their modes of relief by such narrow regulations, but which grant relief to all parties, in cases where they have rights, ex aquo ct bono, and modify and fashion that relief according to circumstances. The most general description of a court of equity is, that it has jurisdiction in cases where a plain, adequate and complete remedy cannot be had at law; that is, in the common law courts. The remedy must be plain; for, if it be doubtful and obscure at law, equity, will assert a jurisdiction. So it must be adequate at law; for, if it fall short of what the party is entitled to, that founds a jurisdiction in equity. And it must be complete; that is, it must attain its full end at law; it must reach the whole mischief and secure the whole right of the party, now and for the future; otherwise equity will interpose, and give relief. The jurisdiction of a court of equity is sometimes concurrent with that of courts of law; and sometimes it is exclusive. It exercises concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the rights are purely of a legal nature, but where other and more efficient aid is required than a court of law can afford, to meet the difficulties of the case, and ensure full redress. In some of these cases courts of law formerly refused all redress; but now will grant it. But the jurisdiction having been once justly acquired at a time when there was no such redress at law, it is not now relinquished. The most common exercise of concurrent jurisdiction is in cases of account, accident, dower, fraud, mistake, partnership and partition. The remedy is here often more complete and effectual than it can be Vol. I.—22.
at law. In many cases falling under these heads, and especially in some cases of fraud, mistake and accident, courts of law cannot and do not afford any redress; in others they do, but not always in so perfect a manner. A court of equity also is assistant to the jurisdiction of courts of law, in many cases, where the latter have no like authority. It will remove legal impediments to the fair decision of a question depending at law. It will prevent a party from improperly setting up, at a trial, some title or claim, which would be inequitable. It will compel him to discover, on his own oath, facts which he knows are material to the right of the other party, but which a court of law cannot compel the party to discover. It will perpetuate the testimony of witnesses to rights and titles, which are in danger of being lost before the matter can be tried. It will provide for the safety of property in dispute pending litigation. It will counteract and control, or set aside, fraudulent judgments. It will exercise, in many cases, an exclusive jurisdiction. This it does in all cases of merely equitable rights, that is, such rights as are not recognised in courts of law. Most cases of trust and confidence fall under this head. Its exclusive jurisdiction is also extensively exercised in granting special relief beyond the reach of the common law. It will grant injunctions to prevent waste, or irreparable injury, or to secure a settled right, or to prevent vexatious litigations, or to compel the restitution of title deeds; it will appoint receivers of property, where it is in danger of misapplication; it will compel the surrender of securities improperly obtained; it will prohibit a party from leaving the country in order to avoid a suit; it will restrain any undue exercise of a legal right, against conscience and equity; it will decree a specific per
formance of contracts respecting real estates; it will, in many cases, supply the imperfect execution of instruments, and reform and alter them according to the real intention of the parties; it will grant relief in cases of lost deeds or securities; and, in all cases in which its interference is asked, its general rule is, that he who asks equity must do equity. If a party, therefore, should ask to have a bond for a usurious debt given up, equity could not decree it unless he could bring into court the money honestly due without usury. This is a very general and imperfect outline of the jurisdiction of a court of equity; in respect to which it has been justly remarked, that, in matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, where substantial justice entitles the party to relief, but the positive law is silent, it is impossible to define the boundaries of that jurisdiction, or to enumerate, with precision, its various principles." Ency. Am. art. Equity.
Vide Fonb. Eq.; Story on Eq.; Smith on Eq.; Madd. Ch. Pr.; 10 Amer. Jur. 227; Coop. Eq. PL; Redesd. PL; Newl. Ch. Practice; Beames's PI. Eq.; Jeremy on Eq.; Encycl. Amer. article Equity.
CHANGE. The exchange of money for money. The giving, for example, dollars for eagles, dimes for dollars, cents for dimes. This is a contract which always takes place in the same place. By change is also understood small money. Poth. Contr. de Change, n. 1.
CHANGE TICKET. The name given in Arkansas to a species of promissory notes issued for the purpose of making change in small transactions. Ark. Rev. Stat. ch. 24.
CHAPLAIN. A clergyman appointed to say prayers and perform divine service. Each house of Congress usually appoints its own chaplain.
CHAPMAN. One whose business
is to buy and sell goods or other things. 2 Bl. Com. 476.
CHAPTER, eccl. law. A congregation of clergymen. Such an assembly is termed capitulum, which signifies a little head; it being a kind of head, not only to govern the diocese in the vacation of the bishopric, but also for other purposes. Co. Litt. 103.
CHARACTER, evidence, is the opinion generally entertained of a person, derived from the common report of the people who are acquainted with him. 3 Serg. & R. 336; 3 Mass. 192; 3 Esp. C. 236. There are three classes of cases on which the moral character and conduct of a person in society may be used in proof before a jury, each resting upon particular and distinct grounds. Such evidence is admissible, 1st, To afford a presumption that a particular party has not been guilty of a criminal act; 2dly, To affect the damages in particular cases, where their amount depends on the character and conduct of any individual ; and, 3dly, To impeach or confirm the veracity of a witness.
1. Where the guilt of an accused party is doubtful, and the character of the supposed agent is involved in the question, a presumption of innocence arises from his former conduct in society, as evidenced by his general character, since it is not probable that a person of known probity and humanity, would commit a dishonest or outrageous act in the particular instance. Such presumptions, however, are so remote from fact, and it is frequently so difficult to estimate a person's real character, that they are entitled to little weight, except in doubtful cases. Since the law considers a presumption of this nature to be admissible, it is in principle admissible whenever a reasonable presumption arises from it, as to the fact in question; in practice it is admitted whenever the charac-1 ter of the party is involved in the issue. See 2 St. Tr. 10:18; 1 Coxe's Rep. 424; 5 Serg. & R. 352; 3 Bibb, R. 195; 2 Bibb, R. 286; 5 Day, R. 260; 5 Esp. C. 13; 3 Camp. C. 519; 1 Camp. C. 460; Str. R. 925.
2. In some instances evidence in disparagement of character is admissible, not in order to prove or disprove the commission of a particular fact, but with a view to damages. In actions for criminal conversation with the plaintiff's wife, evidence may be given of the wife's general bad character, for want of chastity,' and even of particular acts of adultery committed by her, previous to. her intercourse with the defendant. J B. N. P. 27, 296; 12 Mod. 232; 3 Esp. C. 236. See 5 Munf. 10. In actions for slander and libel, when the defendant has not justified, evidence of the plaintiff's bad character has also been admitted. 3 Camp. C. 251; 1 M. & S. 284; 2 Esp. C. 720; 2 Nott & M'Cord, 511; 1 Nott & M'Cord, 268; and see 11 Johns. R. 38; 1 Root, R. 449; 1 Johns. R. 46. The ground of admitting such evidence is, that a person of disparaged fame is not entitled to the same measure of damages with one whose character is unblemished. When, however, the defendant justifies the slander, it seems to be doubtful whether the evidence of reports as to the conduct and character of the plaintiff can be received. See 1 M. & S. 286, n. (a); 3 Mass. R. 553; 1 Pick. R. 19.
3. The party against whom a witness is called, may disprove the facts stated by him, or may examine other witnesses as to his general character; but they will not be allowed to speak of particular facts or parts of his conduct. B. N. P. 296. For example, evidence of the general character of a prosecutrix for a rape
may be given, as that she was a street walker; but evidence of specific acts of criminality cannot be admitted. 3 Carr. & P. 589. The regular mode is to inquire whether the witness under examination has the means of knowing the former witness's general character, and whether from such knowledge he would believe him on his oath. 4 St. Tr. 693; 4 Esp. C. 102. In answer to such evidence against character, the other party may cross-examine the witness as to his means of knowledge, and the grounds of his opinion; or he may attack such witness's general character, and by fresh evidence support the character of his own. 2 Stark. C. 151; lb. 241; St. Ev. pt. 4, 1753 to 1758; 1 Phil. Ev. 229. A party cannot give evidence to confirm the good character of a witness, unless his general character has been impugned by his antagonist. 9 Watts, R. 124.
See in general as to character, Phil. Ev. Index, tit. Character; Stark. Ev. pi. 4,364; Swift's Ev. 140 to 144; 5 Ohio R. 227; Greenl. Ev. $ 54.
CHARGE, practice, is the opinion expressed by the court to the jury on the law arising out of a case before them. It should contain a clear and explicit exposition of the law, when the points of the law in dispute arise out of the facts proved on the trial of the cause, 10 Pet. 657 ; but the court ought at no time to undertake to decide the facts, for these are to be decided by the jury. 4 Rawle's R. 195; 2 Penna. R. 27; 4 Rawle's 356; lb. 100; 2 Serg. & Rawle, 464; 1 Serg. & Rawle, 515; 8 Serg. & Rawle, 150. See 3 Cranch, 298; 6 Pet. 622; 1 Gall. R. 53; 5 Cranch, 187; 2 Pet. 625; 9 Pet. 541.
CHARGE, contracts, is an obligation entered into by the owner of an estate which makes the estate responsible for its performance. Vide