from the equity between the parties. Dyers have likewise a lien on the goods sent to them to dye, for the balance of a general account. A banker, like an attorney, has also a lien on all the paper securities which come to his hands, for the general balance of his account, subject equally to be controlled by special circumstances. The same thing may be said of an insurance broker, and his lien exists even though the consignor should assign the interest covered by the policy, for the assignee would take subject to the lien. If, however, the insurance broker be employed by an agent of the principal, and with knowledge that he acted as agent, the broker has no lien upon the policy, for any general balance that may be due to him from the agent.e

But it would be inconsistent with my general purpose, to pursue more minutely the distinctions that abound in this doctrine of lien; and I will conclude by observing, that a lien is, in many cases, like a distress at common law, and gives the party detaining the chattel the right to hold it as a pledge or security for the debt but not to sell it. It was once said by Popham, Ch. J., in the Hostler's case,f that an innkeeper might have the horse of his guest appraized and sold, after he had eaten as much ashe was worth. But this was a mere extra-judicial dictum, and it was contrary to the law, as it had been previously, and as it has been subsequently adjudged. The right to sell, in

a Porter v. Lane, 8 Johnson's Rep. 357.

6 Johns. Ch. Rep. 317.

6 Savill v. Barchard, 4 Esp. Rep. 53.

Mohawk Bank v. Burrows,

c Davis v. Bowsher, 5 Term Rep. 488. Jourdaine v. Lefreve, 1 Esp. Rep. 66.

d Gordin v. London Assurance Company, 1 Burr. 469. Whitehead . Vaughan, Cooke's B. L. 316.

è Maanss v. Henderson, 1 East, 325.

f Yelv. 66.

g Waldbroke v. Griffin, 2 Rol. Abr. 85. A. pl. 5. Moore, 876. Jones v. Pearle, 1 Str. 556. Pothonier v. Dawson, 1 Holt's M. P. Rep. 383.

such a case, is allowed by the custom of London, but not by the general custom of the realm. I presume that satisfaction from a lien may be enforced by a bill in chancery ; and a factor, having a power to sell, has the means of payment within his control; and a right to sell may, in special cases, be implied from the contract between the parties. It would be very convenient to allow an innkeeper to sell the chattel without suit, in like manner as a pawnee may do, in a case of palpable default, and on reasonable notice to redeem; for the expense of a suit in equity by an innkeeper would, in most instances, more than exhaust the value of the pledge.

(4.) Of the termination of agency.

It may terminate ath of the agent; by the

by

The authority of the agent may terminate in various ways. limitation of the power to a particular period of time; by the execution of the business which the agent was constituted to perform; by a change in the state or condition of the principal; by his express revocation of the power ; and by his death.

1. The agent's trust is not transferable either by the act of the party, or by operation of law. It terminates by his death, and this results, of course, from the personal nature of the trust. According to the civil law, if the agent had entered upon the execution of the trust in his lifetime, and left it partially executed, but incomplete at his death, his legal representatives would be bound to go on and complete it. Pothier adopts this principle as just and reasonable, and there can be no doubi, that the principal will be bound to complete a contract partly performed by him by the act of his agent, by a suit at law, or in equity, according to the nature of the case, but the representatives of the agent

a Dig. 17. 1. 27. 3. Pothier, Contrat de Mandat, No. 101.

b Dig. 17. 1. 14. and 17. 2. 40.

will have nothing to do with it unless the business be in such a situation, that it cannot be performed without their intervention. The cases stated in the civil law, and by Pothier, were between the principal and the agent, and not between a third person and the representatives of the agent dealing in the character of agent. Nor can an authority given for private purposes to two persons, be executed by the survivor, unless it be so expressly provided, or it be an authority coupled with an interest.a

2. A power of attorney is, in general, from the nature of it, revocable at the pleasure of the party who gave it." But where it constitutes part of a security for money, or is necessary to give effect to such security, or where it is given for a valuable consideration, it is not revocable. In the case of a lawful revocation of the power by the act of the principal, it is requisite that notice be given to the attorney, and all acts bona fide done by him under the power, prior to the notice of the revocation, are binding upon the principal. This rule is necessary to prevent imposition, and for the safety of the party dealing with the agent ; and it was equally a rule in the civil law. Even if the notice had reached the agent, and he concealed the knowledge of the revocation from the public, and the circumstances attending the revocation were such, that the public had no just ground to presume a revocation, his acts done under his former power would still be binding upon his principal. He can, likewise, according to Pothier, conclude a

a Pothier, Contrat de Mandat, No. 102. Co. Litt. 112. b. 181. b. b Vinyor's case, Co. 81. b.

c Walsh v. Whitcomb, 2 Esp. Rep. 565. Lord Eldor, in Bromley v. Holland, Vesey, 28.

d Pothier, Traité des Oblig. No. 80. Buller, J. in Salter v. Field, 5 Term Rep 211. Bowerbank v. Morris, Wallace's Rep. 126. Spencer & White v. Wilson, 4 Munf. 130. Mellen, Ch. J. in Harper v. Little, 2 Greenleaf, 14.

e Dig. 17. 1. 15.

ƒ Harrison's case, 12 Mod. 346. Pothier, Contrat de Mandat, No. 121. VOL. II.

64

transaction which was not entire, but partly executed under the power when the notice of the revocation was received, and bind the principal by those acts which were required to consummate the business. The principal may, no doubt, be compelled to act in such a case • but it seems difficult to sustain the act of the agent after his power has been revoked, for he becomes a stranger after the revocation is duly announced.

3. The agent's power is determined likewise by the bankruptcy of his principal;" but this does not extend to an authority to do a mere formal act which passes no interest, and which the bankrupt himself might have been compelled to execute notwithstanding his bankruptcy.b Nor will the bankruptcy of the principal affect the personal rights of the agent, or his lien upon the proceeds of a remittance made to him under the orders of his principal before his bankruptcy, but received afterwards. If the principal was a feme sole when the power was given, it is determined likewise by her marriage; for the agent, after the marriage, cannot bind the husband without his authority, nor a feme covert without her husband.d Her warrant of attorney to confess judgment is countermanded by her marriage before the judgment be entered up.e

The authority of an agent may be revoked by the lunaey of the principal; but the better opinion would seem to be, that the fact of the existence of lunacy must have been previously established by inquisition before it could control the operation of the power. Neither the agent nor third

a Minett v. Forrester, 4 Taunton, 541. Parker v. Smith, 16 East, 382. b Dixon v. Ewart, 3 Merivale, 322.

c Alley v. Hotson, 4 Campb. 525.

d White v. Gifford, 1 Rol. Abr. 331. tit. Authoritie, E. pl. 4. Anon, Wm. Jones, 388. Charnley v. Winstanley, 5 East, 266.

e Anon. 1 Salk. 117.399.

persons dealing with him under the power, have any certa evidence short of a finding by inquisition of the state of

e mind of the principal; and, in case of partnerships, it would at least require a decree in chancery to dissolve the partnership on the ground of lunacy.a

4. The authority of an agent determines by the death of his principal; and a joint authority to two terminates by the death of one. This is the general and a settled doctrine.6 By the civil law, and the law of those countries which have adopted the civil law, the acts of an agent done bona fide after the death of the principal, and before notice of his death, are valid and binding. But this equitable principle does not prevail in the English law; and the death of the principal is an instantaneous and absolute revocation of the authority of the agent, unless the power be coupled with an interest. Even a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, though it be not revocable by the act of the party, is, nevertheless, revoked by his death; and all that the courts can do is to permit the creditor to enter upjudg

a Huddleston's case, cited in 2 Vesey, 34. 1 Swanston, 515. n. Sayer v. Bennett, 2 Cox's Cases, 107. Waters v. Taylor, 2 V'es. & Bea. 301. The principle in the Roman law was, that no valid transaction whatever was destroyed by subsequent lunacy. Neque testamentum recte factum, neque ullum aliud negotium recte gestum, postea furor interveniens perimit, Inst. 2. 12. 1.

b Litt. sec. 66. Co. Litt. ibid. Moore, 61. pl. 172. Mitchell v. Eades, Prec. in Ch. 125.

c Inst. 3.27. 10. Dig. 17. 1. 26. Ibid. 46. 3. 32. Pothier Traité des Oblig. n. 81. Pothier, Traité du Contrat de Change, part 1, ch. 6.

sec. 168, Emerigon, Traité des Assurances, tom. 2. 120.

d The King v. The Corporation of Bedford Level, 6 East, 356. Watson v. King, 4 Campb. N. P. Rep. 272. Harper v. Little, 2 Greenleaf, 14. Shipman v. Thompson, Willes' Rep. 103. note. Wynne v Thomas, ibid. 563. Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Caines' Cas. in Error, 1. Hunt v. Enis, 2 Mason, 214.