RECEINING STOLEN GOODS-Continued.

the defendant whether the person offering it for sale came by it honestly or not. Mere possession of stolen goods, standing by itself, does not establish such knowledge of guilt; but it is a circumstance to be considered with all the other evidence in the case. Ibid.

3. Where the testimony on the part of the State showed that defendant received the stolen property on July 19, held sufficient to support the indictment charging it on the 22d of same month; evidence of a transaction on the 22d being admitted to throw light on the question of guilty knowledge. Ibid. RECEIVER OF TAXES AND COUNTY TREASURER.-See OBTAINING MONEY BY FALSE PRETENSES.

RECORD OF JUSTICE.-See CERTIORARI; JUSTICE OF PEACE.
RECOGNIZANCE.

Defendants, under a criminal charge, gave security for their appearance at Court and appeared. The grand jury had been discharged, and State asked that the cases be continued to the next term under new recognizances. Held that there was no law or practice that would justify the Court in making such an order, and the defendants were discharged, the State having the right to proceed de novo. In re Tomer et al., 31.

RECOUPMENT.

Where goods are sold at a specific price, and delivered under an agreement that they shall be of a certain quality, there is an implied warranty that they are of such quality, which goes with the goods. If they prove to be inferior in quality, it is a breach of the warranty, and the buyer, even after acceptance, where the goods have not been paid for, may plead the breach of the warranty in reduction of damages, in an action brought by the vendor for goods sold and delivered; and he would be entitled to a reduction of the price agreed upon to the extent of the damage he may have sustained by reason of the delivery of such inferior goods. The measure of the plaintiff's damage in such case would be the market value of the goods at the time and place where they were sold and delivered. Leonard & Co. vs. J. Forge Co., 104.

REFUSAL TO ACCEPT.-See ACCEPTANCE.

RENT.-See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

REPEAL BY IMPLICATION.

I. Authoritative adjudications clearly show that, in determining questions of repeal by implication, the legislative intention is the controlling factor, and its ascertainment the paramount object. Husbands vs. Talley, 88.

2. The enactment of a general system of government complete in itself, or the revision of a previous statute or statutes, covering the entire subject of such prior enactments, and the consolidation thereof, especially with new provisions, in a single act complete in itself, is regarded as evidence of the legislative intent and purpose to substitute the latter for the former, and consequently is a repeal thereof. Ibid.

See CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

REPEALING ACT.-See CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

REPLEVIN.

Action of. Ellison vs. Dolbey, 45.

REPUGNANCY.-See DUPLICITY.

REPUTATION.-See GENERAL Reputation.

RESCISSION OF CONTRACT.

I. Where the contract provided for the delivery of goods, cash payable on receipt of each one hundred tons, and the defendant demanded that plaintiffs should put into his hands two or three cars over the one hundred tons, by way of pledge or guaranty for the performance of the contract, as a new condition for the payment already due thereunder; held that plaintiffs were relieved from any further delivery by such a refusal under the circumstances of the case. If the buyer not only refuses to pay for an installment, but puts his refusal on such grounds as justifies the inference that he repudiates the entire contract, or insists upon new terms diffierent from the original agreement, the vendor may be relieved from any subsequent delivery. Leonard & Co. vs. J. Forge Co., 104.

2. A contract for the sale and delivery of a specific quantity of iron, requiring payment in installments on the delivery of each 100 tons is a contract of sale which is entire on one side and apportionable on the other. Johnson Forge Co. vs. Leonard & Co., 342.

3. In contracts of this nature if there be a default by one party in making stipulated payments or deliveries, accompanied with an announcement of intention not to perform the contract upon the agreed terms, the other party may treat the contract as being at an end. Ibid.

4. Where the buyer under such contract, on demand being made for payment after delivery of the first installment, by letter replies: "In regards to remitting, we will not remit for this lot until we get enough of the balance of the contract in our hands to know that we will receive the amount we have purchased. We will therefore thank you to rush forward the whole contract with the class of iron that is now here, and which will be satisfactory,"-such letter evinces an intention to repudiate the contract, justifying a rescission by the sellers. Ibid.

5. The interpretation and effect of such letter were questions of law for the Court. Ibid.

See CONTRACT.

RESERVOIR.-See WATER COMMISSIONERS OF WILMINGTON.

RESPONDEAT OUSTER.

I.

The judgment on a plea in abatement determined against the defendant is one of respondeat ouster. State vs. Reiman, 73.

2. Judgment of respondeat ouster entered. 159.

See PLEADING.

REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT.-See JUDGMENT.

REVERSION.

Hatton vs. Wil. City Ry. Co.,

1. Where the allegations of plaintiff's declaration, in an action for damages to real estate, go to the damage of the person in possession of the premises only, and the evidence shows the plaintiff not to be in possession of any part of the premises, there is a fatal variance between the proof and the allegations in the narr, which should have alleged damage to the reversionary right of plaintiff. Aspin vs. Cornell, 33.

RISK.-See MASTER AND SERVANT.

RULES FOR EMPLOYEES.

I. It is the duty of the master to make and promulgate proper rules for the government of his servants and business whenever it is so large or complicated as to make his personal supervision impracticable. And this is especially so if the business is also hazardous. Giordano vs. Brandywine Granite Co., 423.

2. The rule stated touching the duty of the master to give instruction and warning to the servant as to the character of new employment; and also the rule respecting the assumption of risk by the servant. Ibid.

See MASTER AND SERVANT.

RULE OF COURT.

1. Under the rule of court six witnessess only can be put upon the stand to speak upon any particularr point on each side. Giordano vs. Brandywine Granite Co., 423.

2. The return of the sheriff in an action of ejectment, as to service, can only be attacked under Chapter 102, Section 3, page 775, Rev. Code; and under Rule of Court 9, Section 17, an application to take off a judgment because of want of notice or knowledge of the suit, must be made on or before the last day of the term next after such judgment. Woolley vs. Corbit, 501.

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE.

1. Upon an application to open a judgment the practice is to take a rule on the defendant to show cause why the judgment should not be opened. In re Levy, 5.

2. On a rule to show cause why a judgment should not be set aside because the transcript of the judgment filed in Prothonotary's office does not show that the service of summons was verified, the rule will be discharged. The petitioner has his remedy of certiorari. Wood vs. Dickerson, 23.

3. In an application to change the venue in a criminal cause a rule to show cause is not necessary, because the State, being represented, takes notice of the motion. And it is the same with respect to an application to quash the indictment. State vs. Lynn, 316.

SAFE APPLIANCES.-See Master and Servant.

SALE.

I. Where a special contract for the sale and delivery of goods have been fully performed on the part of the seller, and nothing remains to be done by him, and the contract price is due and unpaid, he may sue for the price of the goods, either upon the special contract, or upon the common count for goods sold and delivered. (See Hurlock vs. Murphy et. al., 2 Houst., 556) Pusey & Jones Co. vs. Dodge, 63.

2.

When the property in the goods has passed by sale to the buyer, but there has been no actual delivery to him, the plaintiff may recover the price under a count for goods bargained and sold. Ibid.

3. After a contract has been made for the sale of goods, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the vendor is entitled to retain possession of the goods until the price is paid. On the other hand, the buyer is not bound to pay or tender the price until the goods are ready for delivery to him unless there is an agreement to the contrary. Ibid.

4.

Where goods are sold at a specific price, and delivered under an agreement that they shall be of a certain quality, there is an implied warranty that they are of such quality, which goes with the goods. If they prove to be inferior in quality, it is a breach of the warranty, and the buyer, even after acceptance,

SALE-Continued.

where the goods have not been paid for, may plead the breach of the warranty in reduction of damages, in an action brought by the vendor for goods sold and delivered; and he would be entitled to a reduction of the price agreed upon to the extent of the damage he may have sustained by reason of the delivery of such inferior goods. The measure of the plaintiff's damage in such case would be the market value of the goods at the time and place where they were sold and delivered. Leonard & Co., vs. J. Forge Co., 104.

5. If under the usage and custom of the particular trade there is a class or kind of "skins" known to the trade as "Russian goatskins," in such case the term would designate the kind of skins so known to the trade, and would not be merely a geographical description relating to the place of growth or shipment. The seller would have to tender such kind of skins or the buyer would not be bound to accept them. Harper vs. Baird's admrs., 110.

6. A contract for the sale and delivery of a specific quantity of iron, requiring payment in installments on the delivery of each 100 tons is a contract of sale which is entire on one side and apportionable on the other. Johnson Forge Co. vs. Leonard & Co., 342.

7. When goods are sold by sample, the purchaser has a right to examine, inspect and make a thorough test as they are delivered and to take such possession thereof as may be necessary to ascertain whether they are according to contract. Love vs. Barnesville Mfg. Co., 152.

8. If goods sold are not according to sample, the buyer at his option, may return the goods to the seller; or may notify the seller of non-acceptance, and that the goods are held subject to his order. Every sale by sample carries with it an implied warranty that the goods when delivered shall be according to sample; and that they are fit for the use for which they were sold. A buyer may accept such goods as are according to sample, and reject such as are not. Ibid.

9. During the continuance of a contract, the unqualified acceptance by the seller of payments after the time stated in the contract, is a waiver as to time. Ibid.

So.

IO.

When by reason of the non-delivery of goods according to contract, the buyer is obliged to go into the open market and purchase goods to replace those not so delivered; such purchaser is entitled to a reasonable length of time to do Where the contract expresses the time, the question is one of construction, and therefore one of law for the Court, and not for the jury. But the question of what is a reasonable time is often a question of fact for the jury, under all the circumstances of the case. Ibid; Barnesville Manufacturing Co. vs. Love, 569. See CONTRACT; DAMAGES.

SAMPLE.-See SALES.

SEAL OF OFFICE.-See NOTARY PUBLIC.

SEAL OF CORPORATION.-See CORPORATION.

SECURITY FOR COSTS.-See COSTS.

SECURITY IN APPEAL.

* * *

Where the security taken in an appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace provided that " any judgment rendered against A B shall be satisfied," held to be not in compliance with the statute, which provides that the security must be for any judgment rendered against A B, his executors or administrators. Wilson vs. State, 305.

See APPEAL.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS.-See JUDGMENT; SHERIFF'S RETURN.
SET-OFF.

Under the statute (Rev. Code 754), a defendant has no right to take an appeal where the judgment against him is for the sum of five dollars, unless his counter claim or set-off, or a part thereof exceeding five dollars, has been disallowed by the justice. Armstrong vs. Brockson, 587.

See APPEAL.

SEXUAL INTERCOURSE.-See USING FEMALE Child for.
SCHOOL LAWS.

I. The power to build a school house and to raise by taxation the funds necessary therefor are amply provided for by sections 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the act entitled "An Act Concerning the Establishment of a General System of Free Public Schools," passed at Dover, May 12, 1898. Husbands vs. Talley, 88. 2. The said act of 1898 was designed to provide a complete general system for the government and administration of the free public schools of the State, and was intended to be a complete revision of the prior general free public school laws, and a consolidation and codification of them with such new provisions as were deemed advantageous, in a single act designed to cover the whole subject in all respects, and to be a substitute for all antecedent general free school legislation not incorporated therein, or continued in force thereby as essential to its effective operation. Ibid.

3. Section 3, Chapter 70, Vol. 12, Laws of Delaware (Rev. Code, 328, Sec. 3), limiting the amount which may be raised by tax for the purpose of building or repairing a school house to the sum of $500, has been repealed. Ibid.

See CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

SCIRE FACIAS.

Under the statute (Rev. Code, 820), providing for the service of a scire facias upon a mechanic's lien, service must be made upon the defendant, also copy left with some person residing in the building if occupied as a place of residence; and if not so occupied it shall be affixed upon the door or other front part of such building. Carswell vs. Patzowski, 593.

See JUDGMENT; PRACTICE, 16.

SHERIFF'S FEES.-See DOLLARAGE.
SHERIFF'S RETURN.

I. The return of the sheriff in an action of ejectment, as to service, can only
be attacked under Chapter 102, Section 3, page 775, Rev. Code; and under Rule
of Court 9, Section 17, an application to take off a judgment because of want of
notice or knowledge of the suit, must be made on or before the last day of the
term next after such judgment. Woolley vs. Corbit, 501.

2. Under the statute (Rev. Code, 820) providing for the service of a scire facias upon a mechanic's lien, service must be made upon the defendant, also copy left with some person residing in the building if occupied as a place of residence; and if not so occupied it shall be affixed upon the door or other front part of such building. Carswell vs. Patzowski, 593.

See EXECUTION.

SLANDER.-See LIBEL.

SPECIAL CONTRACT.-See CONTRACT.