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XII of the constitution to make it a perfectly valid transaction.
(Id.) 12. "BONUS" STOCK GIVEN AS INDUCEMENT FOR LOANS.-Even if the
stock issued to the plaintiff may be said to have constituted a "bonus,” still, it having been given as an inducement to the loan it cannot be held to be void or even voidable for the reason that the word "bonus" may in its natural import be said to imply a gift or gratuity. "Bonus stock” technically and perhaps correctly speaking is stock issued to purchasers of bonds as an inducement to them
to purchase bonds or loan money to the corporation. (Id.) 13. ESTOPPEL OF PLAINTIFF TO URGE ULTRA VIRES.—It is not possible
that the corporation plaintiff, may through an ultra vires transaction of its own making, receive something beneficial or advantageous to its corporate purposes, and then escape the burden of the obligations to which such transaction bound it, upon the plea of ultra vires. (Id.)
See Conversion; Landlord and Tenant, 11-14; Penalty.
COSTS. 1. APPEAL—EXPENSE OF PRINTING BRIEFS NOT TAXABLE.—The expense
of printing briefs on appeal is not allowable as costs to the prevailing party, in view of rule XIII of the supreme court, allowing only the expense of printing transcripts or other papers constituting the record in original proceedings, required by its rules to be printed, to be taxed in bills of costs in the usual mode, notwithstanding briefs are required to be printed under subdivision 4 of rule II
of that court. (Bond v. United Railroads of San Francisco, 124.) 2. CONSTRUCTION OF CODE SECTIONS "DISBURSEMENTS” — “Costs"
ON APPEAL.—The term “disbursements” used in sections 1021 and 1033 of the Code of Civil Procedure, adds no strength to the statute except possibly its use may justify the court in construing the term "costs” used therein more liberally than it might otherwise do. But section 1034 of that code which relates to "costs” upon appeal makes no mention of "disbursements” but is confined by its terms to "costs" and must be construed in the light of rule XIII of the supreme court. Until that rule is amended, the costs of printing briefs cannot be taxed or allowed either as "costs” or
as "disbursements" to the prevailing party. (Id.) 3. COSTS IN SUPERIOR COURT-DISCRETION OF TRIAL JUDGE-REVIEW
UPON APPEAL.-Since the legislature has failed to specifically enact what shall constitute recoverable costs in an action in the superior court, it has been held by the supreme court that "the allowance or disallowance of items for expense and disbursement incurred upon the trial of the action must be left, in nearly
every instance, to the discretion of the judge where the cause was tried,” subject to review upon appeal. The same principle applies to its retaxation of costs upon appeal, its ruling being sub
ject to review upon appeal. (Id.) 4. APPEAL-EXPENSE OF PRINTING BRIEFS NOT RECOVERABLE.—The
expense of printing briefs to be used in the appellate court is not an expense intended to be considered as costs which the successful party shall be allowed to recover. (Blair v. Brownstone Oil & Re
fining Company, 316.) 5. PROVINCE OF APPELLATE COURT-DISCRETION.—The appellate courts
have discretion to determine what are the necessary costs incurred upon the appeal, notwithstanding the memorandum of costs claimed
upon the appeal is filed in the lower court. (Id.) 6. NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION OF RULE.—By rule XIII of the supreme
court, the matter of costs incurred for printing pa pers to be used on appeal is thus regulated: “The expense of printing transcripts on appeal in civil causes and pleadings, affidavits, or other papers constituting the record upon which the case is heard, required by these rules to be printed shall be allowed as costs, and taxed in bills of costs in the usual mode." By necessary construction it follows that other printing charges not included within the specifi. cations of the rule, such as for the printing of briefs, are not to be deemed as proper costs or disbursements which the successful
party is entitled to collect. (Id.) 7. Costs INCIDENT TO TRIAL-DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT CASH
PAID OFFICIAL REPORTER TO TRANSCRIBE EVIDENCE-ORDER NOT PROCURED PROPER DISALLOWANCE.—The trial court has discretion in determining what expenses and disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the course of the trial. Where no application appears to have been made to the superior judge, directing the reporter to transcribe the evidence agreeable to the provisions of section 274 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party paying cash to the official reporter to procure a transcript of the evidence, is not entitled to recover the same as costs against the adverse party, and the court did not err in disallowing the same. (Id.)
See Appeal, 1; Bankruptcy, 6.
COUNTY. See Intoxicating Liquors; Lunacy Commission,
COUNTY.—Where a majority of the judges of the superior court of Los Angeles County joined in making an order for the holding of an extra session of said court and in a request that the same be presided over by the judge of the superior court of Madera County,
their joint action was a sufficient compliance with section 8 of article VI of the constitution providing that “a judge of any superior court may hold a superior court in any county, at the request of a judge of the superior court thereof,” and authorized the judge called in to hear and determine a particular case assigned for trial before him. (Williams v. Hawkins, 161.)
See Justices' Court.
COVENANT. See Landlord and Tenant, 3.
CRIMINAL LAW. 1. FAILURE TO GIVE STATUTORY NOTICE-FAILURE TO FILE POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES OR TO APPEAL-ABSENCE OF ERROR-AFFIRMANCE OF JUDGMENT.–Where the record upon appeal fails to disclose that notice has ben given as required by section 1247 of the Penal Code, under the provisions of which the appeal was ineffectual, and where no points and authorities have been filed, and there was no appear. ance for argument, and upon examination of the record no prejudicial error appears therein, the judgment will be affirmed. (People
v. Measor, 406.) 2. APPEAL-TRANSCRIPT_DUTY OF EXAMINATION NOT IMPOSED UPON
APPELLATE COURT-NEGLECT OF DUTY OF ATTORNEYS TO CLIENTAFFIRMANCE OF JUDGMENT.—Though the law provides that in criminal appeals the reporter, upon demand, shall prepare a transcript, the duty of certifying which is imposed upon the trial judge, and when so certified, the clerk is required to file the same; yet the code does not impose upon the appellate court the duty of examining the record in search for prejudicial error, and will not assume such labor, but where attorneys neglect their duty, and in violation of their obligation abandon the interest of a client, that court will assume that no ground of reversal exists, and will affirm the judgment as authorized by section 1253 of the Penal Code.
(People v. Measor, 339.) 3. CRIMINAL APPEAL PERFECTED-NEGLECT TO FILE POINTS AND AU.
THORITIES OR APPEAR AT HEARING—AFFIRMANCE UNDER CODE PROVISION.—Where an appeal in a criminal case is perfected under section 1247 of the Penal Code, as amended, and the defendant appealing neglects to file points and authorities within the time prescribed therefor, or within such further time as the appella te court may designate, and likewise fails to appear at the time when the appeal is regularly called for hearing, the appellate court, in the absence of any sufficient showing for relief, will deem such neglect and want of action sufficient ground for affirming the judgment in accordance with the provisions of section 1253 of the Penal Code. (10.)
CRIMINAL LAW (Continued). 4. DEPRIVATION OF HEARING-SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL AP
PEALS.-Although in some cases, defendants may, by reason of the enforcement of such rule, be deprived of a hearing on appeal; yet, nevertheless, the proper and efficient administration of the penal laws of the state, due regard being had to established procedure, demands a speedy disposition of all appeals taken in criminal cases.
(Id.) 5. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER-FAILURE OF TRIAL WITHIN
Sixty Days—CONSENT TO CONTINUANCES-PROPER DENIAL OF MoTION TO DISMISS.-A defendant charged with an assault with intent to commit murder, who was not brought to trial within the sixty days prescribed by section 1382 of the Penal Code, cannot maintain a motion to dismiss the information because of a delay of seventy-eight days after the filing of the information, where the record shows that he consented to thirty-five days continuances out of said seventy-eight days leaving only an unexplained delay
of forty-three days. (People v. Peter, 151.) 6. CONTINUANCES NOT OBJECTED TO—PRESUMPTION OF CONSENT UPON
APPEAL.—Where the record on appeal does not show that further continuances were objected to by the defendant, or were ordered without his consent, it will be presumed upon appeal that he con
sented to them. (Id.) 7. REBUTTAL EVIDENCE-WAIVER OF OBJECTION.—It is held that evi.
dence offered in rebuttal was properly admitted as such; but that, conceding it inadmissible, the defendant, having failed to object to it upon that ground at the time it was offered, cannot be heard
to complain thereof upon appeal. (Id.) 8. SUPPORT OF VERDICT-ABSENCE OF ERROR.—It is held that the
evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of the crime
charged, and that no error appears in the record. (Id.) 9. ROBBERY — APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDER DENYING New
TRIAL/REVIEW UPON APPEAL-ABSENCE OF BRIEF OR TRANSCRIPTAFFIRMANCE.—Where an appeal is taken both from a judgment of conviction of robbery and from an order denying a new trial, and no
brief or argument is submitted for the appellant, and the case has been ordered to be submitted for decision, where it appears that no reporter's transcript has been filed, and that the time for such filing under section 1247 of the Penal Code, or any extension thereof which could be granted under section 1247d 0the same code, has long since elapsed, the appeal from the ordedenying the motion for a new trial cannot be considered and where no error appears upon the judgment-roll, the judgment and orde:
must be affirmed. (People v. Wilson, 40.) 10. GOOD CHARACTER OF DEFENDANT-REFUSAL OF REQUESTED INSTRUO
TION—PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN REQUEST GIVEN.-A requested in
CRIMINAL LAW (Continued).
struction, in a criminal case, “that if the defendant be proved of good character as to truth, veracity, honesty, morality and integrity, such good character may be sufficient to create and generate a reasonable doubt of his guilt, although no such doubt would have existed but for such good character” was properly refused, where the principle involved was fully covered in another instruction given at defendant's request, "that good character is of importance to a person charged with crime; and you have a right to consider whether the person of good character would be less liable to be guilty of crime than a person of bad habits and character. The good character of the defendant, when proven, is itself a fact in the case; it is a circumstance tending in a greater or lesser degree to establish his innocence, and it is not to be put aside by a jury in order to ascertain if the other facts and circumstances, considered by themselves, do not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Silva, 120.) 11. INTERRUPTION OF TRIAL BY BYSTANDER-IMPROPER REMARKS AS TO
IDENTITY OF GIRL INVOLVED-REMOVAL FROM COURT-ADMONITION TO JURY-PRESUMPTION.—Where a bystander interrupted the progress of the trial by improper remarks as to the identity of a girl involved in the case, “that they have got the wrong girl," the court properly ordered him from the court room, and admonished the jury that: “The case must be decided upon lawful evidence adduced upon the witness stand, and nothing else”; and that they must reject the statements of this man as evidence, “discard them from your mind; act as though you had never heard them.” It must be presumed
that the jurors heeded the admonition of the court. (Id.) 12. WITNESS TO GOOD REPUTATION OF DEFENDANT—CROSS-EXAMINATION
-REFLECTION UPON MORAL CHARACTER.—Where a witness had testified as to the good reputation of the defendant, he was properly allowed to be questioned on cross-examination for the purpose of reflecting upon his moral character, where no objection was made as to the form of the questions. But where the answers were favorable to the defendant, he cannot complain of such cross-examination.
(Id.) 13. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE-CORRECT REQUEST.—The court prop
erly instructed the jury at defendant's request: “that the defendant, at the outset of the trial is presumed to be innocent. He is not required to prove himself innocent, or to put in any evidence at all upon the subject. In considering the testimony in the case, you must look at all of the testimony, and view it in the light of that presumption, and it is a presumption that abides with him through. out the trial of the case, until the evidence convinces you to the contrary beyond all reasonable doubt. It is your duty, if possible, to reconcile the evidence with this presumption.” (Id.)