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App. Div.]

SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1899.

the State of New York is a voluntary, unin- | corporated association, which was formed prior to the year 1879, of and among the officers of the said Eleventh Regiment, and which has been continued to this date. It consists of more than seven members, and the plaintiff is the president and presiding member thereof. In or about the year 1879 a fund was raised by said board of officers and their friends for the purpose of being used for the relief of sick and destitute members of said regiment who had not neglected their duties for the six months prior to their sickness, or, in case of their death, of their families. The said fund was known as the "relief fund" of said regiment. One Frederick D. Umbekant, who was the colonel of the regiment and the president and presiding officer of said board of officers, in or about the year 1879, was elected by said board of officers the trustee of said fund, to hold the same and pay out the same pursuant to the directions of said board of officers, and from that time the said fund was administered under the direction of said board of officers for the said charitable purposes for which it was created, and payments were made by said trustee and by his successor on the votes and orders of said board of officers. Frederick D. Umbekant died and Albert P. Stewart, who succeeded him as colonel of the regiment, in or about the year 1885, was elected to succeed him as trustee of said trust, and payments therefrom were made by him on the votes and orders of said board of officers. In January, 1889, said Eleventh Regiment of the National Guard of the State of New York was disbanded by the Commander-in-chief. At that time there were between 400 and 500 privates and non-commissioned officers, and over 20 commissioned officers, connected with said regiment. Albert P. Stewart died on May 11, 1893, being then in possession of said fund, the whole or part of which was deposited in the United States Trust Company, in the city of New York, to the credit of Albert P. Stewart, trustee. On June 10, 1893, said board of officers of the said Eleventh Regi ment elected the defendant, Charles H. Collins, who was then a member of said board of officers, a trustee of said fund to succeed said Albert P. Stewart. Thereafter said Charles H. Collins applied to this court upon a verified petition, and upon notice to Emily Stewart, the administratrix of the estate of said Stewart, for an order that said fund be paid over to him as such trustee. In his said petition he stated the fact of his appointment as such trustee by said board of officers, together with other facts. Upon this petition an order was made by this court, at a Special Term thereof, held at Chambers, at the court house in the city of New York, on the 28th day of June, 1893, by which it was "ordered that said Emily Stewart forthwith surrender unto said Charles H. Collins, said petitioner and trustee, the United States Trust Company's certificate No. A68,718 for three thousand two hundred and thirty-four 20/100 dollars ($3,234.20); and it is further ordered that upon the surrender of said certificates unto said trust company by said Charles H. Collins, the United States Trust Company of New York city, after deducting from the amount of said certificate the sum of four hundred and sixty ($460.00) dollars, paid to Albert P. Stewart, as mentioned in petition herein, pay over forthwith to said Charles H. Collins the sum of two thousand seven hundred and seventyfour 25/100 ($2,774.25) dollars, and the interest due thereon, to be held by said Charles H. Collins as trustee of said Eleventh Regi

ment Relief Fund." On the footing of said order and in pursuance of the same, said defendant, Charles H. Collins, obtained and received from said United States Trust Company the sum of two thousand eight hundred and nineteen ($2,819) dollars, as follows, to wit: On July 20, 1893, the sum of two thousand ($2,000) dollars, and on September 19, 1893, the further sum of eight hundred and nineteen (3819) dollars. Said payments were made to the said Charles H. Collins by the checks of said United States Trust Company on the Bank of the Manhattan Company, and were payable to his order as trustee, and they were indorsed by him as trustee and also as an individual, and were thereupon deposited by him in his own bank and to his own personal credit. The fact that he had collected and received these sums of money was not made known by the said Charles H. Collins to the said board of officers until more than one year after the last of said payments to wit, on December 22, 1894, on which date a meeting of said board of officers was held, at which he was present, and at which certain of the members of the association stated that they had heard that the money had been collected, and inquired of him in relation thereto. At this time the defendant made various false statements as constitut ing reasons why the fund in his hands must remain with him; and he further stated that the entire fund had been invested by him on a mortgage upon real estate in the county of Westchester, payable in sixty days and secured by the bond of responsible parties. At this meeting, after the defendant had made his statement with regard to the fund and its investment, the said board of officers elected Gustav Junker and Harold B. Christensen as trustees to act with said defendant with relation to said trust, and authorized them to procure a full accounting from the defendant with relation to the said trust. Shortly thereafter, and in the early part of January, 1895, Messrs. Junker and Christensen, the trustees appointed by said board of officers, called upon the defendant and requested to be shown the securities in which the fund had been invested by him. then stated that these securities were not then at his office, and appointed another day when they could call and when they would be shown the securities of which he had spoken. Pursuant to this appointment, and on January 22, 1895, Messrs. Junker and Christensen again called at the office of the defendant, when they were shown by him a paper which he said was a mortgage representing the investment of the entire fund received by him. This mortgage was taken into the possession of Messrs. Junker and Christensen by them contrary to the active protest and resistance of the defendant, and was produced in evidence before me. mortgage purports to have been made by Samuel C. Searson, of the town of New Rochelle, county of Westchester and State of New York, and Agnes W., his wife, to Charles H. Collins, as trustee of the Eleventh Regiment Relief Fund, to secure the sum of two thousand eight hundred ($2,800) dollars on November 1, 1894, with interest from September 11, 1894. It purports to mortgage a block of land in the town of Williamsbridge, county of Westchester and State of New York, bounded by Bridge street, Pier street, Hawthorne avenue and Fern place. It bears date September 11, 1894, and purports to have been acknowledged on that day before Robert J. Roby, Jr., a notary public, and to have been recorded in the office of the register of the county of West. chester, in the City of White Plains," in

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This

SECOND DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY TERM, 1899.

liber 1121 of Mortgages, page 505. It was fully proved and conceded before me that the said mortgage was a fabrication; that the mortgagors were fictitious persons; that it had been executed in their imagined names, either by the defendant in person, or by some other person, pursuant to his authority and direction; that no person had ever acknowledged the instrument; that the property secured was imaginary and fictitious; that it had never been recorded in any office, and that the signature purporting to be that of the register to the certificate of record had also been placed upon the paper by the defendant, or pursuant to his direction. The paper did, however, conform to the description of the mortgage which the defendant had represented to his associates in the board of officers as being the security in which he had invested the funds received by him as trustee of the relief fund of the regiment, in this, that it stated the amount of the fund correctly to within nineteen ($19) dollars; that it did purport to be upon Westchester county property, and that it did purport to be payable within sixty days from its date. A sum of money, amounting to about twelve hundred and fifty ($1,250) dollars, was invested by the defendant on a mortgage assigned to himself personally, upon property in the State of New Jersey, but this investment was not made pursuant to any authority given to him by the board of officers, was not made as trustee of this fund, or as trustee for any other purpose, and was without legal authority. Since the discovery by the board of officers of the Eleventh Regiment Relief Fund of the fact that the defendant had received this fund into his possession, he has repudiated the authority of the board of officers over it, and has resisted every effort on their part to have any control over said fund, and has violated his duty as trustee with relation thereto. I, therefore, decide that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment that the said defendant, Charles H. Collins, be removed as trustee of the Eleventh Regiment Relief Fund, and that he account for all of the moneys belonging to said fund heretofore received by him before Edward L. Patterson, Esq., of the city of New York, counselor at law, appointed a referee to take such accounting; that on such accounting he be charged with the sum of two thousand eight hundred and nineteen ($2,819) dollars, with interest on two thousand ($2,000) dollars thereof, from July 20, 1893, and on eight hundred and nineteen ($819) dollars thereof, from September 19, 1893; that he be credited with the reasonable costs and charges of making the motion in this court, upon which the order was obtained directing the payment of said money by the United States Trust Company, and with any payments made by him by the authority of the board of officers of the Eleventh Regiment for the charitable purposes for which said trust was created, or which may be ratified or approved by them or by the attorney for the plaintiff in this action, but that no allowance should be made to him on such accounting for commissions as trustee or for counsel fees or disbursements incurred in resisting the claims of the plaintiff in this action. That said referee also take proof and report with respect to any other disbursements made by said Collins in the administration of his trust, and that he take proof and report upon Collins' claim for compensation out of the fund for services rendered by him before he was appointed trustee in the action of Walton v. Stewart, for the recovery of the fund. That said referee also take proof and report

[Vol. 38.

with respect to the amount which shoul! be
paid for the compensation and disburse-
ments of the attorney and counsel for the
prosecution of this action, and for any pro-
ceeding against the defendant herein with
relation to said fund and obtaining security
therefor. That on the coming in and con-
firmation of the report of said referee on
said accounting the said defendant pag to
the Knickerbocker Trust Company of the
city of New York, the trustee hereby ap
pointed of said Eleventh Regiment Relief
Fund in the place and stead of Charles
H. Collins, the amount so reported due, and
that he pay to the plaintiff in this action the
costs and disbursements thereof, together
with such additional allowance as may here-
after be granted. That the said Knicker-
bocker Trust Company, as trustee, pay out
and dispose of said fund on the orders of the
board of officers of the Eleventh Regiment of
the National Guard of the State of New
York, for the charitable purposes for which
said fund was created, as above set forth, to
wit, for the relief of sick and destitute mem-
bers of said regiment who had not neglected
their duties for the six months prior to the
disbandment of such regiment, or, in case of
their death, to their families, and that said
trustee pay from said fund the reasonable
compensation and disbursements, as deter-
mined by the final judgment herein, of at-
torney and counsel for prosecution of this
action, and for any proceeding against the
defendant herein with relation to said fund,
and obtaining security therefor, and that
the order of said board of officers subscribed
by the secretary and treasurer of said board
of officers, and by any other two persons
who may be nominated and appointed by
said board of officers to certify to such
orders, shall be a full justification of, and
protection for, said trust company for
making such payments, and said trust com-
pany, as trustee as aforesaid, shall not be
required to inquire as to the propriety of
said orders. And I hereby direct judgment
to be entered accordingly.

In the Matter of the Application of Samuel
Evans Maires for Admission to Practice as
Attorney and Counselor at Law in all the
Courts of the State of New York.-Appli-
cation granted.

George A. Miller, Respondent, v. Erie Railroad
Company, Appellant. - Motion for leave to
appeal to the Court of Appeals denied. Pro-
ceedings on the part of the respondent stayed
twenty days from the date of this decision.
John Bartnik, an Infant, by Francis Gottsber-
ger, his Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v.
Erie Railroad Company, Appellant.- Motion
for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals
denied. Proceedings on the part of the re-
spondent stayed twenty days from the date
of this decision.

William N. Dykman, as Receiver, etc., Appellant, v. Seth L. Keeney and Others, Respondents.-Motion for reargument denied.

The Staten Island Midland Railroad Company,
Respondent. v. Staten Island Electric Rail-
road Company, Appellant.-Motion for re-
argument denied.

Joanna Hickman, Respondent, v. Nassau Elec-
tric Railroad Company, Appellant.- Motion
for reargument denied.
Stephen Ryder, Plaintiff, v. The Brooklyn Ele-
vated Railroad Company, Defendant.-No-
tice must be given of this application.
Ann Brown, Respondent, v. The Manhattan
Railway Company, Appellant.-Judgment
affirmed, with costs. No opinion. All con-
curred.

Ernst F. Bliss, Respondent, v. The Metropoli| ton Elevated Railway Company and An

App. Div.]

FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1899.

other, Appellants.-Judgment affirmed, with | costs. No opinion. All concurred. Donald Sutherland, Respondent, v. Union Railway Company of New York City, Appellant. -Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. No opinion. John P. Schmenger, Respondent, v. The New York Elevated Railroad Company and The Manhattan Railway Company, Appellants.

- Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion. All concurred.

William N. Henke and Amelia Henke, Respondents, v. The New York Elevated Railroad Company and The Manhattan Railway Company, Appellants.- Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion. All concurred. Sarah E. House, Respondent, v. Erie Railroad Company, Appellant.-- Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. No opinion.

The People of the State of New York, Respond-
ent, v. Christian Muller, Appellant.- Appeal
dismissed on argument.

Henri Strasbourger, Plaintiff, v. Herman Fal-
kenberg, Defendant.- Judgment for plain-
tiff on agreed statement of facts, on the
ground that the defendant's title is so doubt-
ful, by reason of the existence of the auc-
tioneer's bond, that the court would not be
justified in compelling plaintiff to accept it.
All concurred.

John Schreyer, Respondent, v. Thorndike
Saunders, Appellant, Impleaded with Oth-
ers.-- Judgment affirmed, with costs. No
opinion All concurred.

The People of the State of New York ex rel.
John J. Joyce, Appellant, v. Gerard B. Van
Wart, Respondent.- Motion to resettle order
granted.

38g 627

a165a637

FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1899.

Catherine F. Wetmore, as Executrix, etc., of Richard Carman Combes, Deceased, Appellant and Respondent, v. Indiana V. Stromeyer, Respondent and Appellant, Impleaded with Others.- Judgment affirmed, with costs. Appeal from a judgment entered on the report of a referee.

VAN BRUNT, P. J.: This action was brought by the plaintiff's testator to have his accounts in respect to the enterprise hereinafter mentioned passed, and for such other equitable relief as might be proper. The case was tried before a referee, who rendered a judg ment, from which both parties appealed, but the only question presented to this court upon the argument was on the appeal of the defendant Indiana V. Stromeyer, she claiming that certain acts performed by the plaintiff's testator Combes, as trustee, were unauthorized, improper and in violation of his duty as such trustee. It appeared before the referee that the Stromeyer interest belonged to the defendant Indiana V. Stromeyer, who was represented by her husband, Frederick A. Stromeyer, in all these transactions, who had full authority to act for and on her behalf, it not being developed until near the close of these transactions to the other parties in interest that Frederick A. Stromeyer was not the one who really owned the interest which he represented. The facts as established before the referee seem to be briefly as follows: A railroad corporation, known as "The Pennsylvania and Western Railroad Company," incorporated under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, existed prior and up to March, 1877. In March, 1877, a new corporation, bearing the same name, was organized and incorporated as a successor thereto. On and after September 1, 1879, the plaintiff's testator, Combes, and three others, among whom was this appellant, each owned a one-quarter interest in said Pennsylvania and Western Railroad Company. This appellant is, in some places in the case, confused with her husband, Frederick A. Stromeyer, who, however, acted at all times as her agent, and had full power and authority to bind her by any of his acts. On or about June 3, 1880, this appellant, as well as all the owners of the stock of said railroad company, other than Combes, delivered her stock therein to Combes as trustee. Thereafter Combes uniformly acted as trustee for all the cther owners with their consent. On May 2. 1882, this appellant and the other cestuis que trustent instructed

Combes in writing to sell out their in-
terest in the said railroad company, as
well as in a concern called "The Franklin
Improvement Company," a construction
company identified with the railroad com-
pany. On or about May 8, 1882, said Combes
personally (as to his own interest), and as
trustee for the said cestuis que trustent. by
an agreement, in writing, sold the said rail-
road company to one S. R. Peale. This
agreement was satisfactory to, and approved
by, all the cestuis que trustent. In and by
said agreement, said Peale agreed to pay
$8,500 to Combes as soon as Peale's coun-
sel should have found that said Combes
was in a position to perform his part of the
agreement, to pay, within four years, the
further sum of $15,000, and on the comple-
tion of the construction of ten miles of rail-
road, to deliver to said Combes $150,000 worth
of first mortgage bonds of said railroad
company, or, at the option of said Peale, in
lieu of such bonds, seventy-five per cent of
$150,000 in cash. On or before June 11, 1882,
said Peale paid to said Combes the said sum
of $8.500. On August 7, 1882, an additional
agreement (hereinafter called the supple-
mental agreement) was made between said
Combes and said Peale, varying and render-
ing virtually nugatory the aforementioned
agreement of May 8, 1882. Said supplemental
agreement recites that, whereas Peale's
counsel has doubts about the authority of
the Pennsylvania and Western Railroad
Company to locate and construct its rail-
road through Clinton, Centre and Clearfield
counties, Pa., and it being desired to judi
cially determine that question," and then
provides that Peale should be allowed to use
another railroad company, established under
another charter referred to as belonging to
Peale and those jointly interested with him,
to contest the right of the Pennsylvania and
Western Railroad Company to build over a
certain portion of its claimed roadway, and
that if the question so raised should be de-
termined against the said Pennsylvania and
Western Railroad Company, then the $8,500
already paid was to constitute the whole
compensation of Combes and his cestuis que
trustent for the property conveyed by the
agreement of May 8, 1882. The defendant
appellant or her agent, Frederick A. Stro-
meyer, had knowledge of the execution of
this agreement the day following. After the
execution of said supplemental agreement,
said Peale and others organized "The Beach

FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1899.

Creek, Clearfield and Southwestern Railroad Company," which thereupon began to build a railroad upon part of the location of the Pennsylvania and Western Railroad Company. The Pennsylvania and Western Railroad Company began to build its road, but was enjoined therefrom in an action brought against it by the said Beach Creek, etc., Company, since which time no work whatever has been done on the construction of the Pennsylvania and Western Railroad Company. In 1883 an action of quo warranto was brought against the Pennsylvania and Western Railroad Company, at the instigation of Peale, which resulted in a judgment of ouster being given against said railroad company from a place called "Beach Creek Gap," a portion of its claimed roadway. An appeal was taken by the said Pennsylvania and Western Railroad Company from said judgment of ouster, which continued pending until the claims of Combes and his cestuis que trustent against Peele were settled long afterwards. On or about July 13, 1885, Combes and all the cestuis que trustent joined in an agreement with Simon Sterne, Esq., of the New York bar, whereby the latter undertook to prosecute their claims against Peale and others, by which agreement Combes and his associates agreed to pay out of the proceeds of whatever might be recovered, either at the end of the litigation or as the result of a settlement, first, the costs and expenses of any litigation which might be conducted, and out of the remainder to pay to Mr. Sterne twenty-five per cent thereof for his services in the conduct of the litigation, and seventy-five per cent to be the property of the associates, all charges for counsel fees for the conduct of proceedings in Pennsylvania to be at the expense of Mr. Sterne, who was to have the sole determination as to the proceedings there to be instituted and whom to employ. In pursuance of the authority conferred by this agreement, Mr. Sterne commenced two actions in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, neither of which were brought to trial. The complaint in the last action was verified by Frederick Stromeyer on the 28th of May, 1886, as one of the plaintiffs and parties in interest. No mention was made therein of the defendant Indiana V. Stromeyer, or of any interest claimed by her in the company or its property. In the complaint thus sworn to by Frederick Stromeyer is the following allegation: "That said Combes and Berthoud, being fully persuaded that the said action was for the advantage of the Pennsylvania & Western Railroad Company, and was honestly undertaken in its interest, sanctioned, aided and seconded all the acts and proceedings of said Peale, and surrendered the surveys and rights of way of the Pennsylvania & Western Railroad Company to the said Peale, and under the advice of one William A. Wallace, the attorney of said Peale, and who was the confidential adviser of and largely interested with the said Peale, and who was believed by said Combes and Berthoud to be acting for the common benefit of the parties to the said contract of May 8th, 1882, the said Combes and Berthoud, on their part, on or about August 7th, 1882, signed a supplementary agreement." Thereafter, Mr. Sterne, with the approval of all concerned, realized certain sums in settlement of the claims placed in his hands, and, after deducting his fees, paid over to Mr. Combes the balance, which was the principal asset accounted for by Combes herein. The Stromeyers having assigned a certain proportion of their claim in this action to one Richard Meyer, the referee found that the Stromeyer

[Vol. 38.

interest should be paid to Meyer, and that nothing remained due to either of the Stromeyers. The appellant Stromeyer claims that the agreement of August 7, 1882, was executed without their knowledge, and that their subsequent ratification of the agree ment is not binding upon them because such ratification was made under duress of poverty. We are unable to see upon what theory the appellant Stromeyer can avoid the effect of the subsequent ratification of the agreement of August 7, 1882. There is no pretense but that such ratification was made with full knowledge of all the facts, and that they joined in all the attempts to secure as much as possible out of the enterprise in which they were interested. They joined in the agreement with Sterne. Frederick Stromeyer swore to a complaint in which he avers the honesty of Combes in entering into the supplemental agreement, and when a compromise was made they distinctly approved and they participated in the benefits arising therefrom. The fact that, in consequence of their pecuniary condition the nimble sixpence was of much more importance to them than the slow shilling, in no way constituted duress; nor would it relieve them from their repeated ratification of an act which was sworn by them to be honestly done and in the interest of the cestuis que trustent. It would be introducing a new and dangerous element into the principles of equity to hold that the pecuniary condition of parties to an agreement could avoid its binding effect. While there may possibly be cases where the fraudulent use of such condition by a party in order to secure an unconscionable advantage may be availed of to obtain relief from agreements so entered into, the case at bar is entirely barren of any proof that the plaintiff's testator used any unfair means in order to bring about the ratification which they freely made. We are of opinion, therefore, that the referee was correct in the judgment rendered so far as presented on this appeal, and it should be affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff. Barrett, Rumsey, O'Brien and Ingraham, JJ., concurred.

John W. Queen and Thomas F. Donnelly, as Receivers of the Weaver Cycle Material Company. Appellants, v. Joseph A. Weaver, Respondent.- Judgment reversed, new trialordered, costs to appellants to abide event.Appeal from a judgment entered after a trial at Special Term.

VAN BRUNT, P. J.: The plaintiffs in this action, as receivers of the Weaver Cycle Material Company, brought this action to set aside a bill of sale made by said company to the defendant, and also an assignment of certain book accounts, the consideration of the bill of sale being money which had theretofore been loaned by the defendant to the company, and the consideration for the assignment being the contingent liability of the defendant as indorser of the notes of the company. The ground upon which the plaintiffs proceeded was that these transfers were made by the company either when it was insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency. Upon the argument of this appeal considerable stress was laid upon the question as to whether the laws of New York in respect to the transfer of property by corporations, or the laws of New Jersey, applied to the transfers above mentioned. It seems to us that it is immaterial, in view of the facts developed upon the trial of this action, whether we apply the laws of the State of New York or the laws of the State of New Jersey to these transfers. They were clearly made in contemplation of insol

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App. Div.]

FIRST DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1899.

vency, and consequently are void as against
creditors under the laws of either State. It
appears from the evidence that the defend-
ant was a stockholder and director of the
corporation; that certain notes, upon which
it was indorser, had been protested, and that
the defendant was advised to secure himself.
He thereupon took a bill of sale of the per-
sonal property and the assignment of the
book accounts above mentioned. Upon this
bill of sale he took possession, substantially,
of all the merchandise with which the cor-
poration was doing business in the State of
New York, and he understood that it could
In
not go on in business after the transfer.
fact the company abandoned the property
contained in its place of business, never went
there again, and did no business whatever
after these transfers. The learned court
below held that, because evidence was intro-
duced tending to show that the corporation
had property enough, at its cost price, to pay
its debts, it was, therefore, solvent and the
transfers were not made when the corpora-
tion was insolvent and so within the inhibition
of the statute. But it did not find that the
transfers were not made in contemplation of
insolvency, which is as distinctly prohibited
as a transfer when insolvent. It is clear from
the evidence in this case that the transfers in
question were made in contemplation of in-
solvency. The defendant resigned as director
in order to get rid of that trust relation; he
remained as a stockholder; he then took a
large part of the personal property of the
corporation in payment of advances he had
theretofore made as he himself says, know-
ing it would close up their business. He also
took an assignment of a large proportion of
its book accounts as security for his indorse-
ments. It is apparent that he was not a bona
fide purchaser for value, and it is equally cer-
tain that it was because of the approaching
critical condition of the company that he
sought to secure himself. He must have
known when these transfers took place that
the business of the company would neces
sarily be suspended and that it would be un-
able to meet its current obligations. The
transfers were manifestly made in contem-
plation of insolvency, and even by the stat-
utes of New Jersey were void as against
creditors. The judgment appealed from
should be reversed and a new trial ordered,
with costs to the appellants to abide the
and
event. Barrett, Rumsey, O'Brien
Ingraham, JJ., concurred.

The People of the State of New York ex rel.
Denis J. Mahoney, Respondent, v. Charles
F. MacLean and Others, as Police Commis-
sioners of the City of New York, Constitut-
ing the Board of Police of the Police Depart-
ment of the City of New York, Appellants.--
Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and
disbursements, and motion denied, with ten
dollars costs. Appeal from an order grant-
ing relator's motion to compel the defendants
to withdraw a notice of exception to the
sufficiency of sureties on an undertaking.-
VAN BRUNT, P. J. There is only one ques-
tion which it seems to be necessary to con-
sider in determining this appeal. There does
not appear to have been any right upon the
part of the court to direct the defendants to
withdraw their exceptions. They certainly
did not stipulate so to do, and whatever
arrangements may have been made in re-
spect to justification, they were not thereby
deprived of the right to have their excep-
tions remain of record. In this connection
it may not be improper to call attention to
rule 11 of the General Rules of Practice,
which provides that no private agreement
or consent between the parties or their at-

torneys, in respect to the proceedings in a
cause, shall be binding, unless the same shall
have been reduced to the form of an order
by consent and entered, or unless the evi-
dence thereof shall be in writing, subscribed
by the party against whom the same shall
be alleged, or by his attorney or counsel.
This salutary provision seems to have been
wholly disregarded in this proceeding. All
stipulations or agreements entered into be-
tween counsel which are sought to be en-
forced by the court must comply with the
rule above stated. We think, therefore, that
the order appealed from should be reversed,
with ten dollars costs and disbursements,
and the motion denied, with ten dollars
costs. Patterson, O'Brien. Ingraham and
McLaughlin, JJ., concurred.

Harry B. Hollins and Others, Partners Doing
Business as H. B. Hollins & Co., Appellants,
v. Samuel T. Hubbard and Others, Partners
Doing Business as Hubbard, Price & Co., Re-
spondents.- Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Appeal from a judgment entered upon a
verdict directed in favor of the defendants.-
VAN BRUNT, P. J.: Notwithstanding the
claim upon the part of the appellants that
there are differences in the facts presented
to the court upon the present appeal which
make the decision of this case upon the pre-
vious appeal inapplicable, we are not able to
see that there has been any change such as
affects the principles upon which the pre-
(91 Hun, 375.)
vious decision was founded.

The form of the letter which is claimed to be a delivery order, was not the point upon which the decision turned, as an examination of that case would show. And even if it were, as far as the legal aspects of the case are concerned, the facts remain precisely the same as they were with the exception that there was affirmative evidence that the letter from C. Green's Son & Co. to the defendants was not a delivery order in the usual form in use among merchants; there being no evidence whatever in the present case upon that subject, consequently, there is nothing to indicate to the court that it was such delivery order. The further point that there is no evidence now contained in the record that the defendants had no knowledge or notice that Hollins & Co. would take any action relying upon this letter in no way makes any material difference, because in order to create an estoppel the evidence must establish the facts upon We think the which such estoppel rests. judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs, upon the opinion on the previous appeal. Barrett. Rumsey and Patterson, JJ., concurred; Ingraham, J., dissented. Henry H. Lyman, as State Commissioner of Excise of the State of New York, Appellant, v. The True Friends Social and Literary Circle, Defendant, and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Respondent.- Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted, with ten dollars costs.- Appeal in this action from an order denying plaintiff's motion for a retaxation of

costs.

PER CURIAM: The question presented on the appeal from the order in this action is the same as the question presented and determined in Lyman v. Young Men's Cosmopol itan Club (ante, p. 220), and for the reasons there stated the order must be reversed and a new taxation directed before the clerk, with leave to either party to use upon said new taxation such further affidavits or papers as may be necessary and proper. The order should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion Presentgranted, with ten dollars costs.

38b 629 a165a534

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