INSTRUCTION-ITS CHARACTER AND RELATIONS TO EDUCATION.*

1. The Fundamental Character of Instruction.-Education has for its function to raise the reason which is not cultivated at all, or less cultivated, to the position of that which is cultivated, and has therefore principally to do with the mind or subject. The objects which act on the mind have also a training power; in fact, at last all training is limited by what is external, though not less so, and indeed much more so, by the nature of the mind itself. But one and the same thing can train in different degrees in different relations. What is important for objective training, may be unimportant for subjective, or even may have a detrimental influence; and what, on the other hand, is less important for the comprehension and acquisition of external elements, may have a deep influence on the formation of the mind.

In contrast, therefore, with education, the function of instruction is to impart that which is objective. All its peculiarities can be inferred from this: its having to do more with single operations; the circumstance that these operations are so marked that they can begin and cease at a definite time; its capa bility of exhausting what lies within a limited region; of its proceeding from a single object with more determined intention; and of its being communicated to a greater number at once.

This definition gives the most general limits of instruction. Its principal objects are, according to this, representations and external capabilities. The external capabilities, such as walking, dancing and writing, are included, because it is through representations that they can be learned fully. For instance, writing is teachable on account of the perceptions which the pupil can make of the teacher's writing and of his own.

In regard to representations, it is external objects which first form the objects of instruction. They form for us the first objects. Along with them we comprehend the connections and other relations which exist amongst them; such as those of space and time; the relations of continual juxtaposition; of cause and effect; of number; as well as the more abstract relations of degree; of size; &c.; and in consequence of these being able to be apprehended along with external objects, they also can become the objects of instruction. And this does not exhaust the province of instruction even in regard to external objects, for it embraces also the working up, not merely of single representations, but of their combinations and relations to knowledges of every kind. And it goes beyond the immediate apprehensions of objects into logical combinations, for while we are in a position to produce similar combinations in others with a kind of compulsion, there can be no doubt that such can become the objects of instruction.

This leads into another and very wide province, which instruction 'rules at least in part. Our inner being can become an object to us. This takes place through a peculiar formation of notions which, introduced by the similarity of the qualities and relations and modes of growth of the mind, brings forth in special acts what is universal in these relations for our consciousness. Through these acts, that is, notions relating to mental qualities, relations, and modes of growth, is formed what is commonly called our inner sense, but which would

* Erziehungs-und- Unterrichtslehre.

be better called our inner senses, by means of which we are in a position to comprehend acts of a similar nature. In consequence of them, therefore, all evolutions of our inner being, whatever form they may have originally, assume the form of representation, or become objects for us, and thus they can be drawn into the province of instruction.

The whole inner world, it is true, does not lie within the province of instruction, but only so far as the individual element can be struck out and a universal representation gained in consequence of the power of forming notions already mentioned, and only so far is a communication of it possible; nay, only so far as the person to be instructed has in himself the elementary preparations for that which we are to impart to him. Above all, then, the universal predetermined laws, which are the same in all men, such as those of logic, æsthetics, morality, and religion, &c., can be evolved notionally, and thus become objects of instruction: and so also can even other mental phenomena, which take different forms in different individuals, even feelings and conations, But it is evident that the province of instruction in this respect is much more limited than that of education. Take, for instance, the branch where it has the widest reach, namely æsthetic instruction, such as can be imparted through the reading and exposition of poetical works, through instruction in music, as well as through pictures and statues. The apprehension of these takes place in a similar manner in all, so far as the objective is concerned, yet not with equal perfection, delicacy, freshness, liveliness, and spirituality. And without doubt the communication of these would be more valuable, and more important in regard to the real training of the mind. But for these a certain equality of inborn talents (not communicable therefore by one to another) is requisite, and a certain equality in the previous circumstances of training; two equalities, therefore, which, even where a possibility of communicating them exists, would fall, not to the province of instruction, but to that of education. Still more decidedly is this the case in regard to morality and religion. Instruction can venture here only to form, combine, and apply the notions or representations which relate to both. And although these are assuredly of some value in themselves, yet it is unquestionably not these that are to be considered as most valuable, nor as the most important for the training of youth, nor as the peculiar end of education in these two departments; but it is the lively moral feelings and impulses, the disposition which arises in conse quence of these, and the deep religious tone of the soul. From these feelings indeed there lies a plain and open way to the notions or representations, but from the notions or representations there is no road to the feelings. For the lively and the fresh must come before the notions, according to the fundamental relations of mental evolution. The particular evolutions can be melted and formed into notions by abstraction, but the reverse process, that of dissolving notions into particular evolutions, and into particular evolutions of the requisite freshness, force, and completeness, has not yet been discovered by any one, however much the possibility of it has been presupposed in pedagogic theories. For establishing lively feelings, impulses, dispositions, therefore, there lie before us, so long as we are in the province of instruction, not only difficulties, but an absolute impossibility. What is aimed at can be attained only through education, by placing the pupils in those relations of life which are the necessary conditions, more or less, of the required evolutions from the com

mencement. Instruction can merely, while circling round the shrines of morality and religion, describe and glorify their treasures; the pupil can be made a partaker of them only through that more lively and more penetrating activity which constitutes education.

2. Education through instruction.—Through the investigations of the previous paragraph, we are now in a position to give a definite answer to the question if instruction can educate, and how far. Of all the evolutions of our mind there remain behind traces, and these traces are powers, and so far, therefore, there is through all instruction an inner or subjective shaping of the mind produced, the very thing at which education aims. But the question then occurs, Whether this inner shaping, this formation of the subjective, is important and joyful; whether the traces which remain behind, have the adequate strength, liveliness, and intensity which make them desirable developments of the inner mental being; whether they mingle and work together with one another in relations promotive of progress; and whether in this way all kinds of inner progress which education aims at, are to be attained?

In order to gain perfect exactness in the determination of these questions, we must distinguish three things: the education which is attached to instruction immediately and essentially; the education which comes alongside of the instruction, or takes place through that which the teacher says or does in addition to what properly belongs to his duties as an instructor; and, finally, we have the results that may arise from special arrangements which are made for instruction, such, for instance, as are made in instruction in schools.

Of these three elements, we can take no notice of the last. The second is seen at the first glance to be entirely different in different circumstances. It depends on the individuality of the teacher whether it appears at all, and in what way and to what extent; and it also depends, on the other hand, not less on the individuality of the scholar. To take a nearer view of this matter, we can bring the influences that bear on it under four general heads.

First, an educating influence can be exercised on the scholars in immediate connection with the objects of instruction by the zeal of the teacher, by the liveliness and continuity which he displays, and by the scientific spirit which informs his instructions, for these qualities are transferred to the scholars, sometimes unconsciously and instinctively, and sometimes in more conscious representation and feeling. While he has these qualities of his teacher continually before him, he forms them in himself along with the objects of instruction, by means of that which he possesses in an elementary state similar to these; and the traces which remain behind of these, become gradually in him permanent qualities. It is plain from this that this training may be often of greater importance than the subject matter which the instruction communicates. Hereby there is introduced into the scholar a special power of estimating the moral worth of things, which, according to the measure of its strength, its purity, its liveliness, and its harmonious agreement with other motives, may exercise an exceedingly important moral influence for the whole of life.

But, secondly, the teacher, besides what he may introduce immediately into his teaching from his inner being, is something more. He has a character, an individuality, and these can manifest themselves during instruction in the most manifold ways, and can also be reflected in the scholars where the preparatory capabilities exist. It is these that principally determine the tone of the teacher;

the expression of the united intellectual and moral individuality and disposition of the teacher. It is well known that teachers differ much from each other in this respect. While many, during instruction, simply let the object speak through itself, others continually are mingling up with it themselves or their personality more or less, relating the circumstances of their lives, their adventures, their feelings, and their doings. Where the special subject of instruction has little, or perhaps nothing to do with this, we must unquestionably consider this as a mistake, according to strict didactic rule; and it may take place, to a degree where it becomes a mistake which can in no way be excused. But in many circumstances the advantage preponderates. Through the foreign admixtures, more is gained in respect of moral tone and character than is lost in respect of instruction, where there exist in the scholars the preparations. Even didactically it can sometimes have a beneficial influence, by breaking the uniformity of the instruction, and giving more spirit and life to it, which is a decided necessity for some individualities.

Thirdly, there is the attention which the teacher can pay to the moral individuality of the scholar. Also in this respect we come upon a similar diversity. Many teachers do not trouble themselves about this matter. They give their lessons, they take care that there be quiet and attention during these, and that the necessary preparations and work be done for them. Every thing beyond this, they imagine, is of no concern to them. Others, on the contrary, regard the moral effect on the scholars as the principal matter. While they give intense attention to the scholars in this respect continually, they take the opportunity presented of something faulty occurring either in the regulation of the instruction, or in conduct, to introduce, with great earnestness, representations and admonitions, which, in consequence of the way in which they proceed from them, receive a penetrating character; and what they have once begun in this way, they follow out with systematic zeal.

and

To these educating agents have to be added, in the fourth place, those which are determined by the relations, and especially the likes and dislikes which arise between teacher and scholar. Love begets love, confidence elevates and strengthens; on the other hand, cold repulsive behavior on the part of the teacher chills the pupil, creates ill-will, and may inspire even hatred. The results in this case are often of great importance for the whole education; unquestionably special consideration is to be given in the selection of a teacher, not merely to the amount and kind of knowledge he may possess, but to the circumstances now named, and more especially to the many relations of agreement or of opposition which can bring the scholar to willing association; or, on the other hand, to an often invincible repulsion.

We have yet to discuss the first of those points suggested in the beginning, -the educating power immediately and essentially attached to the instruction. With regard to it, we expect that there will be more certainty in carrying it out, because it is conditioned by its more close connection with instruction; and a full examination confirms this expectation. We can have no doubt as to its nature in general. The traces which remain behind from the comprehension of the instruction, give rise to powers for the comprehension of that which lies in the same direction with it,-powers of perception and observation, of memory, understanding, and judgment of the most manifold kind, as well as the habits of attention, of diligence, and of perseverance. It is plain, at the

first glance, that this training will be the more valuable, the greater the liveliness and intensity with which these traces are collected, provided only the mind do not be wearied out.

And then to these are attached further workings out of that which has been already comprehended. To these belong, especially in an objective point of view, the regulating laws, which not unfrequently extend their operations beyond the special circumstances in connection with which they were first formed; and subjectively, there is the elevating and bracing feeling of power in one's self which urges on the scholar, and later the youth and the man, from one intellectual height to another, and gives him the energy requisite to the attainment of his aims.

The truth of this remark will become exceedingly evident if we look at it, as it were, through a magnifying-glass, in that education which the previous ages give to those that follow. Let us take, for instance, the influences which proceed from our more recent speculative philosophies. It has often been be lieved, that even although thesę brought no advantage in respect of the matter which they supply to the mind, inasmuch as they establish no knowledge that promises to last, yet they deserve the highest praise in a formal point of view, or in respect of the mental, gymnastic, and intellectual exertion and strengthening which they guarantee. But exactly the reverse is unquestionably the result; for since these speculative systems move in distorted, often purely fanciful forms, the formation of the mind, or the education which is produced by them, must bear a distorted and perverted character. They impress on the mind fanciful laws of knowledge, they set up pictures of a progress in which there can be no real progress, but merely the fancy that there is progress. And since these pictures and laws work as misdirecting powers, the intellectual training must necessarily be radically corrupt. And so also the moral training. On the one side, they establish presumption and superciliousness in reference to* that worthless and perverted acquisition. On the other hand, they depress and unnerve, where they ought to give courage and spirit, namely, in striving after knowledges which, established in the right way, possess sufficient tenacity to remain truth for all time.

This, then, is the full extent to which instruction can and ought to act with an educating power, independently of special arrangements which may be added for the purpose. Most decided is its action in that which is immediately attached to it; and then in that which lies near to it, at least so far as a special individuality is not presupposed for it. Every thing else is in and for itself, not in its power, but can be drawn into it only so far as already a mental preparation has been made for it through the immediate action of the relations of life. The relation to the teacher is assuredly a relation of life, but only a single and limited one. On this account it can have an educating power (in an elementary way) fresh and lively, but only so far as it affects the mind in this character. And this statement already furnishes us with the answer to the question, in what way schools are fitted to extend this influence. It is plain, without further investigation, that they are in a position to do this so far, but only so far as they can introduce new relations of life which shall act immediately on the inner development of the scholar.