29. An act establishing a house of refuge properly embraces, in its title, a section by which sale of certain lands is authorized; M'Caslin v. State, 44-151.

30. "An act concerning promissory notes etc." is void as to so much as refers to "other instruments", not embraced in the title; Mewherter v. Price, 11-199.

31. Though some of the sections found in the liquor law, of 1859, may be civil and others penal, in their character, yet, the statute can not be said to embrace more than one subject matter; Thompson v. State, 15-449.

32. Dubitatur, whether surplusage in the title of a statute may be rejected, in the same manner as matter improperly introduced into the body of the statute; Dronberger v. Reed, 11-420.

33. "An act to provide compensation to the owners of animals killed or injured by the cars, locomotives or other carriages of any rail road company in this state." (Stat., 1853); is not void for inconsistency with its title. The immediate purpose is expressed in the title, and, the exception, in section 4031, as to railroads that are fenced, is so properly connected with the subject matter of the act, designated in the title, as, rightly, to appear in it, under the title; M. & I. R. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8-217.

34. Crimes may be defined, by an act which does not designate them by their particular names; Peachee v. State, 63-399.

35. "An act providing for the election and qualification of justices of the peace and their jurisdiction, powers and duties, in civil cases which provides that no constable shall purchase a judgment on the docket of any justice, in the township of which he is a constable, is void, as to that provision, it not being embraced in the title of the act nor, properly, connected with the subject of the justice of peace act; Spaugh v. Huffer, 14-305.

36. "An act authorizing the construction of pike, macadamized and gravel roads", properly expresses the matter of the organization of corporations, for the purpose of constructing such roads; Johnson v. W. & M. etc. Co., 16-389.

37. An act authorizing the construction of plank etc. roads includes in its title, provision as to frauds upon the company; Hunter v. Burnesville T. Co., 56–213. 38. "An act concerning husband and wife" (April 16, 1881) sufficiently expresses, in its title, the subject matter thereof; Barnett v. Harshberger, 105-411.

39. So much of an act for the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors as requires the applicant for license to give bond, to the state, conditioned, inter alia, that he will pay all fines and costs that may be assessed against him, for any violations of the provisions of the said act, is matter properly connected with the subject of the act, and is valid; State etc. v. Board etc., 26-522; M'Caslin v. State, 44-15; State etc. v. Tucker, 46-355; Fletcher v. State, 54-462; O'Kane v. State etc., 69-183; Shipley v. City T. H., 74-297; cited in Kane v. State etc., 78-106.

40. Insertion in an act to regulate the liquor traffic of a section conferring, on particular courts, jurisdiction of cases prosecuted, for its violation (I G. & H. p. 615, sect. 14), is not in violation of this section; it is matter properly connected with the subject of the act; Hingle v. State, 24-28; Reams v. State, 23-111; re-af. Thomasson v. State, 15-449 and over'g Lauer v. State, 22-461.

41. The first section of an act, of 1852, "for the more uniform mode of doing township business", provides for the organization of townships. There is no inconsistency between the statute and its title in this; Clinton T. v. Draper, 14-295.

42. An act "for the more uniform mode of doing township business" properly embraces a provision to establish the boundaries of existing counties, as well as others, for the formation of new counties; Haggard v. Hawkins, 14-299.

43. "An act to provide for the assessment and collection of taxes, on the shares of stock owned in banks and banking associations, doing business in this state", sufficiently embraces provisions that "nothing in this, or any other, act shall authorize the taxation of stock . . in any national bank, for municipal purposes"; City Evansv. v. Bayard, 39-450.

14. Fees of a county treasurer, charged by law with the collection of taxes, are matters properly connected with the subject of an act "concerning taxation"; Warren v. Britton, 84-22.

117. Acts, how amended. This section was borrowed from article 119, of the constitution of Louisiana, of 1846, the words set forth" being substituted for the word "re-enacted" in the latter. The section was reported to the convention and passed in the language of said article 119, of Louisiana, and the substitution was made, by the committee on revision, as a mere verbal alteration and the change was sanctioned, by the convention. The construction given to said article 119, by the legislature

(with few exceptions) and by the judiciary, of that state, has been that the act revised, or the section amended, should be set forth and published, at full length, in the act amending or revising it; Langdon v. Applegate, 5-327.

2. No section of an act can be amended without setting forth and publishing, at full length, the whole of such section, into however many clauses it may be divided; but, the old act, or section, need not be set forth in full; Town Martinsville v. Frieze, 33507; Town etc. v. Hackney, 54-83; Town etc. v. Kress, 55-14; Niblack v. Goodman, 67–174; Draper v. Falley, 33-465; Greencastle etc. Co. v. State, 28-382, over'g Wilkins 2. Miller, 9-100; Langdon . Applegate, 5-327; Littler v. Smiley, 9-116; Rogers v. State, 6-31; Armstrong v. Berreman, 13-422.

3. An amendatory statute must state, in its title, what act or section of act it proposes to amend and the section as amended must be set forth and published at full length; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50–194.

4. This section requires that, in the amendment of a statute, (1) the title of the act to be amended, shall be referred to, and, (2) the act, as revised, or the section, as amended shall be set forth and published, at full length; Feibleman v. State, 98-521. 5. When a section in an existing statute is amended it ceases to exist. The section as amended supersedes such original section and constitutes a part of the original act; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50-194.

6. Act of March 14, 1867, in reference to the incorporation of a city, repeals the act of December 20, 1865, although the former act refers to the latter as of date 1863, by mistake, the act correctly reciting the title; M'Nulty v. Connew, 50-569; Shoemaker v. Smith, 37-122.

7. The substitution in a repealing act of the word "while", instead of the words "as long as", in attempting to recite a section of the statute to be repealed, does not affect the validity of the act; Draper v. Falley, 33-465.

8. Identification, of any kind, of the statute to be repealed, in repealing it, is sufficient; Leard v. Leard, 30-171.

9. The intention to amend several prior statutes upon the same subject will be defeated, if such intention has not been expressed in the manner prescribed by the fundamental law; Dodd v. State, 18-56. Such an amendatory act can not have effect, simply because it is inconsistent with the statutes it is intended to change; Dodd v. State, 18-56.

10. The repeal of a statute, on a given subject, is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute as to the same subject; although the repeal of the former statute be not mentioned in the title of the new enactment; Gabbert v. Jeff. R. R. Co., 11-365.

II. A statute may be repealed by implication. Such repeal is not within this sec tion; Branham v. Lange, 16-497.

12. Act, of March 2, 1855, amendatory of section 22 of act, of June 11, 1852, providing for the incorporation of towns, is unconstitutional; the full section as amended not being set forth; Cowley v. Town Rushville, 60–327.

13. Where a statute is amended it ceases to exist and is superseded by the section as amended. An act of the legislature which attempts to amend a section of a statute which has already been amended is void; Draper v. Falley, 33-465; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50-194; Ford v. Booker, 53-395; Cowley v. Town, 60-327; Niblack v. Goodman, 67-174; Clave v. State, 68-17; Brocaw v. Board, 73-543; Lawson v. De Bolt, 78-563; M'Intyre v. Marine, 93-193; Feibleman v. State, 98-518.

118. Local laws forbidden. A special law, within this section, is such an act as, at common law, courts would not notice unless specially pleaded and proved; T. L. B. R. R. Co. v. Nordyke, 27-95; Hinkle v. State, 24-28.

2. This section does not prohibit the legislature from passing special laws creating courts of inferior jurisdiction; Vickery v. Chase, 50-461; Clem v. State, 33-418.

3. The legislature is the exclusive judge whether a statute on any subject, not enumerated in this section, can be made general and applicable to the whole state (Thomas v. Board etc., 5-4 over'd); Vickery v. Chase, 50-461; Gentile v. State, 29–409; Longworth v. Com. Council, 32-322; Johnson v. Board etc., 107–24.

4. The salary act, of March 10, 1873, section 3, fixing the salaries of judges of criminal courts, at $2000, but, containing a proviso, "that in all counties having cities with a population of 40,000, the salary of said criminal court judges shall be $2500, to be paid quarterly out of said county treasury as aforesaid ", is constitutional and valid in all its provisions; not being local within the meaning of the constitution; State v. Reitz, 62–159.

5. A provision, of a city charter, that every sale, to satisfy an assessment for street improvements, shall be by public auction and upon, or near the premises, or in the city court room of said city is not unconstitutional, as special legislation; Brookbank v. City Jeff'ville, 41-406.

6. "An act to provide compensation to the owners of animals killed or injured by the cars, locomotives or other carriages of any rail road company in this state" is not invalid, as being special legislation; M. & I. R. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8-217.

7. An act (1871) providing for fees and salaries of sheriffs etc. is unconstitutional as it makes the salaries of sheriffs non uniform, in violation of this section. The sheriff is not a salaried officer; Fulk v. Board etc., 46-150.

8. Act of March 12, 1875, giving an increased compensation to county auditors, in counties of which the population exceeds 15,000 is not unconstitutional, as being local or special legislation; Hanlon v. Board etc., 53-123.

118-9. Local laws. Laws must be general. These sections were designed to remedy the evil of local and special legislation, which had grown up under the old system; Maize v. State, 4-342.

2. These sections are to be construed as operating prospectively. Local statutes which were in existence, at the time the constitution took effect, and not inconsistent, were expressly continued in force (sect. 235, cl. 1); State v. Barbee, 3-258; Davidson v. Koehler, 76–412.

3. The legislature has no authority to enact a local, or special, statute when a general law can be made applicable; Thomas v. Board etc., 5-4.

4. Courts can inquire whether a general law can be made applicable to the subject matter of a local or special law; Thomas v. Board etc., 5-4, overruled in Gentile v. State, 29-409.

5. Except where the case falls within the cases enumerated, in section IIS, the legislature is the sole judge as to whether, or not, a general law can be made applicable; and, when, in such case, the legislative judgment is expressed that special legislation is required and a special curative or retrospective statute is, under such circumstances, enacted it will be upheld; Johnson v. Board etc., 107-24.

6. It is for the legislature, alone, to judge whether a law, on any given subject, not enumerated in section 118, can be made applicable to the whole state; Kelly v. State etc., 92-239; Gentile v. State, 29-409, app'd and foll'd, State v. Boone, 30-225; Longworth v. Com. Council, 32-322; Clem v. State, 33-418; State etc. v. Tucker, 46-355, and over'g Thomas v. Board etc., 5-4.

7. It is not unconstitutional to provide for a criminal court in all counties of 10,000 voters or more (stat. Dec. 20, 1865); Combs v. State, 26-98; Anderson v. State, 28-22; Guetig v. State, 66–94.

8. Act (March 6, 1873) to divide the state into circuits, for judicial purposes etc., so far as it authorizes the election of prosecuting attorneys in October, 1873, is constitutional (provision obsolete, see sect. 5861); State v. Tucker, 46-355.

9. The fish law, by making an exception of the Ohio and St. Joseph rivers, is not thereby made local and unconstitutional; Gentile v. State, 29-409.

10. Act authorizing the donation by a county, which donation is to be raised by a county tax, is not prohibited, by sections 97, 118-9; Marks v. Trustees, 37-155.

II. Taxes may be assessed, in a county, to liquidate a debt contracted, by the county, in securing the location of a state institution in the county, and not contravene sections 97, 418-9; Marks v. Trustees, 37-155.

12. These section do not prohibit local taxation for objects in themselves local. They require a general uniform levy, for state purposes, but do not forbid local taxation under a general statute; Anderson v. Kerns Drain. Co., 14-199; Goodrich v. W. &D. Turnp. Co., 26-119;

thus, taxes (March 6, 1865) for turnpike purposes are permitted; Goodrich v. W. & D. Turnp. Co., 26-119;

and, assessments on lands for benefits thereto (June 12, 1852), for purposes of drainage, to promote the public health; Anderson v. Kerns D. Co., 14-199;

and, assessments for street improvements, under a statute for the incorporation of cities; Palmer v. Stumph, 29-329.

119. Laws must be general. It was not intended that the operation of laws throughout the state shall be uniform in any other sense than that their operation shall be the same in all parts of the state, under the same circumstances and conditions; Groesch v. State, 42-547.

2. The provisions of a statute having a uniform operation throughout the state and applying to all alike, under similar circumstances, the statute can not be, rightfully, classified as special legislation; Elder v. State, 96-164; Heanley v. State, 74-99.

3. This section implies that, in many cases, local statutes are necessary, for the reason that general laws can not be made applicable; Gentile v. State, 29-409.

4. The section does not inhibit a local, or special, statute when the subject of the act is local; Marks v. Trustees, 37-155; Cash v. Auditor, 7-227.

5. A statute conferring power on the cominon council of a city to pass an ordi vance requiring the procurement of a license to retail liquors within the city is not void, for want of uniformity, because some cities do not require a license to be taken out; Wiley v. Owens, 39-429.

121. Passage of bills. A joint resolution is, here, recognized as a means by which some acts may be authoritatively performed, by the legislature; State v. Bailey, 16-46. 2. The legislature has power, by joint resolution, to direct the secretary of state, as to the proper discharge of his duty; State v. Bailey, 16-46.

3. A joint resolution is not a bill. Laws for the appropriation of money, for public purposes or the payment of private claims, can not be enacted by joint resolution; nor can the auditor of state issue a warrant for money so appropriated; May v. Rice, 91-551.

4. Issues of fact can not be formed to investigate the mode of procedure of the executive and legislative branches of government. Judicial investigation stops with an examination of the title and contents of a statute and the evidence of its due attestation, by the signatures of the speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate, and its acceptance and filing, as an act of the legislature, by the secretary of state. Courts can not look beyond the statute, to the legislative proceedings; Board etc. . Burford, 93-384, foll'g Evans v. Browne, 30-514, followed in Bender v. State, 53-245 and approved in Eager v. Board etc., 70–331.

124. Publication of statutes. In this section the words "published" and circulated" are used synonymously; Jones v. Cavins, 4-305.

2. A distribution of such acts, in a bound volume, by the secretary of state, through his proper agents, is a publication and circulation of the statutes by authority; State v. Bailey, 16-46.

3. A statute, without an emergency declared therein, does not take effect until published and the legislature has no power to make it of effect sooner by another act; Cain v. Goda, 84-211.

4. An emergency clause in an act (June 14, 1852) declared the statute to be in force from and after its being filed with the clerks of the circuit courts, in the respective counties. The legislative intention was that the act should be in force so soon as it could be distributed to the several counties and although there be no express direction to the secretary of state to distribute, the emergency clause implies such a direction; State v. Dunning, 9-20.

5. The execution law of 1843, amendatory of the statute of 1842, was approved February II and published, at Indianapolis, on the 14th day of the same month. By statute, it was made the duty of the secretary of state to forward, immediately after its publication, a copy to the clerk's office of each county in the state and, upon its being filed in any one of those offices, the act became the law of the county, in which such office was. In such case, it must be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the law, of 1843, became effective February 28; Doe v. Collins, I-23.

6. Provisions of a statute as to the form of binding, character and color of materials, divisions into volumes and the like matters are merely directory; State v. Bailey, 16-46.

7. When a statute became effective and in force is a judicial question, for the courts; State v. Bailey, 16–46.

8 The declaration of emergency, contemplated by this section, can not be taken by implication; but, must be expressly declared, in substantial conformity to the requirement of the section. A declaration, by the legislature that a statute shall be in force, or take effect, on a future day specified is not, per se, a declaration of an emergency; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7-13.

9. The publication and circulation of a statute, unless done by authority, can not affect the period of its taking effect; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7-13.

127. Governor. The executive power is vested, solely, in the governor. Any power or authority vested, by the legislature, in the governor and others, in which

such others are to have an equal voice and authority with the governor, can not be executive. Duty imposed can not be executive and mandamus will lie to compel such others to perform; Gray v. State, 72-567.

130. Manner of voting. Courts have no jurisdiction of an action to enjoin the secretary of state from delivering to the speaker of the house of representatives the sealed returns, alleged to be wrongful and illegal, of an election for lieutenant governor, which are directed to the speaker, as required by law, in care of the secretary of state and which are to be delivered by the latter; Smith v. Myers, 109-5.

2. Courts take judicial cognizance of the accession to office of the chief executive of the nation and the state; Hizer v. State, 12-330.

131. Plurality elects. One who claims the office of lieutenant governor can not maintain an information, in the nature of quo warranto, to settle the title to that office. This section vests exclusive jurisdiction of such controversy in the general assembly; Robertson v. State etc., 109-85.

133. Qualifications. A declaration to become a citizen of the United States, with the requisite residence in the state, not only confers, upon male persons of foreign birth, the elective franchise, but renders them eligible to any office, in the state, except governor, lieutenant governor, senator and representative in the legislature; M'Donel v. State, 90-323; see M'Carthy v. Froelke, 63-507.

140. Bills signed or vetoed. An act, permitting parties to be competent witnesses, was filed, in the office of the secretary of state, March 11, 1861, at 5 o'clock, p. m, without the approval of the governor and without objections thereto being filed. The adjournment of the legislature, sine die, was on the same day, at an earlier hour. As the act contained an emergency clause, it became law from the time of such filing; Tarlton v. Peggs, 18-24.

As

143. Pardons and reprieves. Pardon is the exercise of executive clemency. an accused person is entitled to an impartial trial such trial can not be denied him on the ground that the governor may pardon him, in case such governor becomes satisfied that the conviction was not just; Sanders v. State, 85-322.

2. This section confers on the governor the exclusive power to remit fines and forfeitures and to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons; Butler v. State, 97-3753. This section, investing in the governor power to remit fines and forfeitures has reference to fines and forfeitures which have been adjudged. Section 1718 relates to the discharge of liability before judgment; State v. Rowe, 103-120.

4. Power to set aside a forfeiture of recognizance for appearance, of defendant, to answer to an indictment, is, by this section, in the proper court as well as in the governor; State v. Shideler, 51-64; the statute, however, authorizes the courts to remit judgments, on forfeited recognizances, only upon cause shown; State v. Speck,

20-211.

5. Under this section, the governor's power, to remit fines and penalties, can be exercised, only, pursuant to legislative direction; State v. Dunning, 9-20.

6. Pardon, by the governor, of one convicted of a crime does not discharge the party from the costs of the prosecution. The governor is without authority to remit costs in such a case; State v. Farley, 8 B., 229.

7. When it may be reasonably inferred, from the language of a pardon or remission of sentence, that the executive was deceived or imposed on by one who procures it, by false statements, or an omission to state relevant facts, the pardon or remission is void; State v. Leak, 5-359.

144. Governor may fill vacancies. It is the duty of the governor, on receiving a resignation, creating a vacancy in a judicial office, to appoint a successor. This is the only notice he is required to give of the existence of the vacancy. Should the governor communicate knowledge of such resignation to the public, his communication will not be such lawful notice of the fact as to make it the duty of clerks of the several counties, to give notice of an election; Biddle v. Willard, 10-62.

152. Terms of county officers. The phrase "eligible to office", in this section, has reference to the qualification to hold the office; not to the election; Smith v. Moore, 90-304; Carson v. M'Phetridge, 15-327.

2. The disabling provision, in this section, which ordains that "no person shall be eligible to the office of clerk, recorder or auditor more than eight years in any period of twelve years", literally applies to periods of time, under the constitution, and not to terms of office. Time served under the present constitution, pursuant to an election under the old constitution, must be regarded as part of the eight years, to which a clerk is limited under the new constitution; Carson v. M'Phetridge, 15-327.