dictory with its terms. Pope is presumed to have known of the sixtysecond Article of War. If by that article, McDowell, as "the officer highest in rank," would have the right to "command the whole," then, at least, in the absence of any direction from himself to the contrary, Pope is to be assumed to have so intended.

The different view taken by the Judge Advocate serves to deprive Porter of the defence to this specification, that in what he is charged to have done, or to have omitted, in supposed violation of this order, he acted under the command of General McDowell, his senior in rank. The very fact that such a view is taken by the Judge Advocate, satisfactorily shows, that he thought the opposite one would, upon the evidence, be a full answer to the specification. He seeks also to maintain his interpretation upon the further ground, that the article "excludes the idea of the presence of an officer superior in rank to those commanding the different corps of which it speaks." Certainly, it does. But was Pope present when he gave the order? when it was received? or was being executed? The Judge Advocate does not say he was, but does say he was absent but a few miles." How many miles, he does not inform the President, or how many miles would, in his opinion, constitute absence and not presence. As the fact in this connection was material, he should have stated, if he knew, and he ought to have known, the evidence being before him, how far off Pope was, that the President might judge, as he gave no opinion of his own to guide him, whether such distance was absence or not. Pope was at Centreville, a distance of twelve miles. To say then that he was present would seem to be. absurd. The Article looks to present and immediate joint duty.

It was such duty that the order embraced. The two commands were to act together. The officers were told to "move forward with your joint command towards Gainesville. It contemplated its union with the forces of Heintzelman, Sigel and Reno, and that that occurring, "the whole force should halt." They were also told, "that the troops (that is, all of them,) must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning." In the forward movement of the two corps, who was to command? Who to give the order to halt? Who to decide upon the position to be held to enable the command to reach Bull Run that night or morning?

The Article contemplates this very state of things, and provides for it. "If on marches," or doing "duty together," different corps of the army shall happen to join, the officer highest in rank of the line of the army, "shall command the whole, and give orders for what is needful to the service." No matter how the junction is brought about, when it exists, the Article embraces it, and establishes a positive rule, that "the officer highest in rank in the line of the army" is to command the whole, with the single exception that it shall be "otherwise specially directed by the

President of the United States."

To hold that, under the circumstances of this joint command, what was to be done in executing the joint order, was to be done by Pope, who was twelve miles distant, upon the theory that he was, notwithstanding, to be considered present, every one will see is wholly untenable. How was he to judge when to move the command? when to halt, or what position to take with a view to retire to Bull Run that night or the next morning? These two corps were placed by the order and the sixty-second Article under the command of McDowell. No one but the President had the authority to take the command out of the operation of that Article. And even if Pope thought that he had the power, he did not attempt to exert it by the joint order.

II. The specification does not state in what particular the order was disobeyed. It only alleges that Porter, "did then and there disobey."

We are to look, then, to the evidence, and review, for the information. The finding of the Court, merely finds disobedience in fact, without stating in what it consisted.

The President therefore had no knowledge upon the point, except as he obtained it from the Review. That told him that, "the Court concluded and justly, that his, (Porter's) falling back under the circumstances, and for the purpose mentioned in his note to Generals McDowell and King, was a violation of the joint order to himself and McDowell." (P. 308.)

As this is the only information we have of what was considered by the Court disobedience, it would be sufficient to confine these remarks to that point. But, as the Judge Advocate has suggested many things, tending to disparage Porter in other particulars, these will be first noticed.

I. It is said, that when the two corps were together, and the front of Porter's column, (his corps being in advance,) "had reached some three miles beyond Bethlehem Church," "General McDowell, then rode forward to the head of the column of the accused, when an interview and conference took place between them. They discussed the joint order, and General McDowell determined, for himself, that there were considerable advantages to be gained by departing from it," and by moving with his forces along the Dudley Springs road towards the field of a battle, then being fought by the main army of General Pope, at the distance of three or four miles. His purpose was to throw himself on the enemy's centre, and he wished the accused to attack his right flank. He then said to Porter, "you put your forces in here, and I will take mine up the Dudley Springs road on the left of troops engaged at that point with the enemy." (P. 307.)

From this statement, the reader would suppose that McDowell considered himself entitled to direct Porter's movement. The Judge Advocate should at least be consistent with himself. If upon the theory that Pope was to be considered as present, Porter was not under McDowell's command, then the latter had no right to direct his movements. Of these Porter had the sole control, subject only to Pope.

If they were to "act independently of each other," (and the Judge Advocate says they were to do so,) and that such was Pope's "intention,” then if McDowell's alleged direction to Porter was given authoritatively, it was but intrusive. If on the contrary, as in this part of his review, the Judge Advocate implies, a different opinion of their relation towards each other, is the correct one, Porter was under the command of McDowell, then, it is most important to ascertain what order, if any, was given by the latter to Porter. If he was subject to McDowell's command, (as it is confidently believed, and as in this part of his argument, is conceded by the Judge Advocate,) then his duty in the execution of the joint order was to act in subordination to that officer. And if in doing so, the joint order was disobeyed, the offender was McDowell, not Porter. Where was McDowell, when he gave the order to Porter, and what was that order?

I. He was present with the joint command, and had the control of it. His leaving it afterwards, and going with his own corps to another part of the field, in no way impairs the validity or effect of his prior order. Whatever that was, Porter was bound to obey it.

II. If McDowell gave an order, what was it?

The Judge Advocate would have us believe, that it was that Porter should attack “the enemy's right flank," should put his "force in here," meaning, in front of the then locality of the two corps. He does not intimate even, that a word was uttered by McDowell contrary to this alleged order, and yet the proof is clear, (McDowell to the contrary, notwithstanding) that there was an order, and not only that, but that the one alleged was not given at all.

1. Lieut. Colonel Locke, Chief of Porter's staff, and his assistant Adjutant General. He saw McDowell on the 29th, "on the ground where we had taken up our position in the direction of Gainesville, and near the Manassas Railroad," "where Porter was forming his corps in line of battle." "He had made considerable progress in th disposition of his troops, a battery was in position, and the troops were being deployed. Skirmishers were being thrown out in frou.."

On seeing it, McDowell said, "Porter, you are out too far already, this is no place to fight a battle." (P. 135.)

If this evidence is to be relied upon, (and this will soon be examined,) Porter was preparing for battle. He was not then certainly providing for "the personal safety of (himself) and staff," as the reviewer most charitably suggests, was his motive subsequently in another asserted movement on the same day.

2. Captain C. P. Martin, a Captain in the third Massachusetts battery, Commanding "division Artillery of General Morell's division" He saw a meeting between McDowell and Porter, about 11 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, "on the road leading from Manassas Junction to Gainesville," and "at the head of the column," (Porter's.) Heard McDowell say to Porter: "PORTER, THIS IS NO PLACE TO FIGHT A BATTLE, YOU ARE OUT TOO FAR." Colonel Locke, he said was present, and within hearing at the time. Porter "had sent out skirmishers to the front, and the troops were moving, closing up apparently en masse, as I supposed, preparing to form a line of battle, which was afterwards done. These movements, were continued The brigade that was leading were being disposed off, on the hill near where the conversation referred to, had taken place-one brigade, and one battery moved off to the right shortly after, evidently preparing to form on the right of the brigade on the hill. I went with the battery that moved to the right to see the position. One battery was placed where the conversation was held, about that time." (P. 144.)

Both of these witnesses were unimpeached by evidence as to character or otherwise, and in their cross-examination, the Judge Advocate made no attempt to weaken their testimony. Not a question was propounded, suggesting even a possibility that they could be mistaken. And when McDowell was recalled for the purpose in part of rebutting this evidence, he was only asked by the Judge Advocate, if he had or not, “recollection of having said to Porter," at his interview with him on the 29 h, (he had admitted the fact of the interview.) what was sworn to by Locke and Martin, and his answer was, "I cannot recollect precisely what occurred, or what conversation, and what words passed between us at that time. 、annot say what language I used, or how it may have been understood, whilst talking on that point," (the joint order) (Pp. 217, 218.)

He stated also, that he thought the conversation related chiefly to Pope's joint order. It is then, but a failure to remember whether he did or not tell Porter what Locke and Martin positively testified. Non me recordo In using this phrase, a classic one, since the trial of England's former Queen, it is not intended to intimate, that it was the purpose of

McDowell to conceal what he did know, but merely to show that his evidence rebutted nothing, but merely proved, a want of memory, as to the fact that he was called to rebut. Every lawyer, every man of sense, knows, that such evidence has not a feather's weight against positive proof. Intelligent experience ever discards it as wholly unreliable. If, in this instance, influence was given to it, it is but another proof of the weakness to which prejudice had reduced the minds of the Court.

The state of things then existing at 11 A. M., on the 29th was:

I. That Porter was preparing for battle at the point where McDowell and he met. That his corps were all placed by his order, or were being placed in position for that purpose.

II. That he was told by McDowell, that he was not to fight there, the place not being proper one for a battle, and that "he was too far advanced." McDowell supposed he was too far forward, that his position was an unfit one, and of course a dangerous one, for a conflict, and yet it is insinuated by the Judge Advocate, that he retreated an hour or two only afterwards, on the same day, for the degrading and cowardly purpose of securing "the personal safety of (himself) and staff." (P. 308.)

Was ever a party dealt with so unjustly? Could it have been thought possible, that a gallant officer, who in the many battles through which he had passed, was always in the front, or where danger was greatest-devoting his energies, and periling his life for the honor and existence of his country, whilst the Judge Advocate was safely seated in his office, where no danger could come, or if it did, could readily be escaped from, would be arraigned by that officer, before the President and the public, as having abandoned his duty, and cravingly fled from the foe for the vile and disgraceful purpose of "personal safety." Is all generosity gone? Is no magnanimity left? Is all gratitude fled? It is of the many dreadful evils of this war, that suspicion takes the place of confidence, prejudice of impartiality, the darkest passions of the highest virtues. Porter a coward! Let him who charges it, go to the noble troops he has so often led to battle, and ask of them if the charge is not true. He would soon be found, if not himself wholly regardless of danger, looking to his "personal safety." Go to the officers who have been with him in battle, and never saw his eye dimmed, except when he discovered his comrades wounded and dying around him, and see with what surprise and scorn the charge would be received. Go to the troops and the officers constituting his corps on the 29th, and listen to the contempt with which the imputation would be regarded. The enlightened public will never sanction such an accusation by whom soever made. They are ever grateful to such a public servant as they know Porter to have been. Individuals may be

found wanting in that virtue. But such a public, never.

Ingratitude,