his sanctioning the order was indispensable not only to his remaining in command of the Army, but to his continuing in the military service. He testified, as the reader will remember, before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, that the President told him that his order of dismissal was right, but that before acting upon it, he must consult his advisers, and that by persuasion he induced the witness to relinquish his purpose to leave the service. The result, and as it is to be supposed of his consultation with his cabinet, was that not only were none of the officers who were to be dismissed by the order dismissed, but, on the contrary, that General Hooker, one of the number, was put in the chief command.

Here again criticisms showing, if unexplained, "contempt" for the skill of a Commander-in-Chief may be so explained as to be held innocent, and may even place, notwithstanding his own example of insurbordination, one of the critics in the place of the chief.

IV. Another strong instance must be in the recollection of all. General CHARLES P. STONE, more than a year since, for alleged disloyalty and insinuated charge of treason, was taken from his then command and for many weary months imprisoned in Fort Lafayette. Futile were his and his friends efforts to ascertain what were the specific acts of disloyalty, or the grounds of imputed treason. No explanation was given or could be obtained. And when his case was made a matter of inquiry in the Senate of the United States, the Chairman of the Military Committee of that body, who was also Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, stated, in substance, that the evidence before the latter committee fully justified the imprisonment,—and the President afterwards, in replying to a call of the Senate, virtually said the same thing. But now what a change. No Court Martial or inquiry was ordered, though frequently solicited by Stone. No specification or other definition of the charges ever given him, and yet but the other day he was ordered into service in the Army of the Gulf, and is now at the head of the command which recently so distinguished itself under the head of the gallant SHERMAN. Porter's case then, though of the same character of those named, is the only one which, in the opinion of the authorities, it has been deemed necessary to inquire into, much less to punish. He is the only officer who, upon such grounds, has been held unfit for a service, which he has so adorned, and not to be relied upon to aid the country, which, during the present war, he has so signally served and so fondly loves.

But to return to the evidence, it is said by the Judge Advocate, that neither the character of the night, nor the state of the road, nor the condition of his command excused Porter, for his failure literally to comply with the order to start at 1 A. M.

These objections will be considered in their order.

I. AS TO THE NIGHT.

Its darkness had been given as a reason for not starting at 1 A. M. The Judge Advocate answers this as he does every part of the case by giving but detached and partial statements of the evidence of a few of the witnesses, and omitting altogether what was proved by those who were clearly the most to be relied upon. The parts of the testimony that he does give, are from the evidence of Captain Duryea, Major Barstow, Lieutenant Colonel Myers, General Pope, and General Roberts. What was proved by Generals Morell, Griffin, Sykes, Butterfield, and Reynolds, Colonel Cleary, Lieutenant Colonel Locke, Captains Fifield, an Monteith, and Lieut. Weld, all present when the order was received, or was being executed, is not given at all, and the reader will ask why? And can he give a satisfactory answer. This obviously unfair omission will now be supplied.

1. Morell says: "It was a very dark night. It was cloudy, threatening to rain, and did rain before morning." (P. 145.)

2. Griffin. "The night of the 27th, and the morning of the 28th was very dark," I "know that at three o'clock, it was very dark, so dark that I used candles with my leading regiments to get through a little piece of woods which we left, in which we had been encamped." (Pp. 160-63.)

3. Sykes. "The night was unusually dark." "Before I directed the advance to be sounded, I sent an aid-de-camp to find the road, so as to lead the column upon it. He returned in a short time, and told me that the darkness was so great, that he could not distinguish the road. He also told me that he was assisted in that search by several soldiers." (Pp. 176, 177.)

4. Butterfield, after stating, as before mentioned, what occurred in Porter's tent, when the order was received, and Porter's answer to the objections of his Generals to his marching at 1 A. M, added: "When we got outside, the darkness was so apparent, (to use such an expression,) and it seemed such a matter of impossibility to move, that General Porter said, in consideration of all the circumstances, I will fix the hour at three o'clock instead of one. You will be ready to move promptly." He also stated that De Kay, who was sent by Pope with the order, said "that it would be very difficult in getting back. That he would have hard work to find the way." (Pp. 185, 186.)

5. Reynolds, (alas now of our illustrious dead.) "It was a very dark night, as was the succeeding night. I recollect both of them distinctly

from having been about a good deal, until after 12 o'clock on each night." (P. 169.)

6. Cleary."It was dark, cloudy." (P. 121.)

7. Locke.-The night was extremely dark." "I received a very severe injury, groping about in the darkness." (P. 134.)

8. Fifield."The early part of the night was an ordinary star light night of summer, without any moon. About half past 11 o'clock, it commenced overcasting, and threatened rain. Very black clouds came up, and it did sprinkle a little. It was very dark from that time till towards morning."

"It was very dark," "everything so obscure from the extreme darkness of the night, that it would be very difficult for me to give anything like a reasonable answer, in regard to that matter." (The matter was as to the extent and density of the wood along the road.) He also said "the night was very dark, and it was like a man groping his way in the darkness, without being able to see his hand before him, much of the way through the wood. (Pp. 122-125.)

This witness testified also that he was on duty from half past 10 o'clock, the entire balance of the night.

9. Montieth. The night was "very dark." (P. 126.)

10. Weld. The night "was very dark indeed." (P. 129.)

With all this evidence before him, the Judge Advocate advises the President, that the night was not so dark before 11 o'clock, at least, if at any hour as to have made it impossible for Porter, "to obey the order," to move at 1 A. M., and that it was a noticeable fact, "that the determination not to move at that hour, was not occasioned by this extreme darkness, (the admission that the darkness was extreme, thus leaked out,) but had been taken before Captain De Kay laid down, which was at 11 o'clock." And this is told to the President, though the Judge Advocate knew, or should have known, that General Butterfield had before testified positively, that Porter, and that, too, unwillingly, only agreed to postpone the time of marching from 1 to 3 A. M., when he, with his Generals, got outside of his tent and saw, "the darkness so apparent," that it "seemed to be such a matter of impossibility to move." It was then, and not before that Porter yielded to the advice and remonstrance of his three Generals, saying, "in consideration of all the circumstances I will fix the hour at three o'clock, instead of one." Why was the fact represented otherwise, and without even an intimation, that there was proof to

the contrary? And especially, why was the President not informed of this evidence of Butterfield? It cannot be necessary to say more on this head.

II. THE CONDITION OF THE ROAD.

That, says the Judge Advocate, afforded no excuse for failing to march at 1 A. M. However dark the night was-whatever may have been the condition of his men-however worn down by immediately preceding day and night marches-however deprived of rest and food, there was nothing in the condition of the roads, that offered even an apology for not moving. But to the fact. What was the condition of the road?

The witnesses who were on the road that night, Major Cleary and Captain Fifield proved beyond all cavil, the existence of serious obstructions.

1. Cleary." At 10 o'clock that night, I received a note from General Porter to move the trains east of the railroad beyond, and east of Cedar Run, towards Bristow Station. I gave the order to the proper persons connected with the trains, and they commenced immediately to move," "the removal of the trains occupied me from 10 o'clock, till two o'clock in the morning, at which time, or perhaps a little later, I myself left that point for Bristow Station." "The road for some three miles, I think, was occupied by wagons, and was obstructed so as to render it very difficult for me and my party to pass along." (P. 121.) He testified also that his party consisted of ten or twelve persons only, that he travelled on horseback, and that they did not get to Bristow Station that night.

2. Fifield. He testified that he received through Colonel Cleary, an order from General Porter on the evening of the 27th of August, "to have the trains moved from Warrenton Junction down as far as possible in the neighborhood of Bristow Station." He said that he proceeded to execute it, and that it was not fully effected till about four o'clock in the morning, because it could not have been sooner done, and added, "that the moving of the trains during the night, would have prevented the possibility of moving troops on the Railroad track." He also said, that between "three and four miles" of the road, (not the Railroad,) was occupied by wagons, and in reply to inquiries of the Judge Advocate, stated, "I know of no road except on one side, (that is on one side of the Railroad,) and that the wagons on that, were very much jammed and remaining stationary. I found a great deal of difficulty even in getting through them on horseback." (Pp. 122-124.)

III. THE CONDITION OF THE TROOPS.

1. Morell." They were very much exhausted from their previous marching. They had marched all the way from James River, except from Fortress Monroe to Aquia Creek." "They had marched (laboriously) and as fast as possible," "and sometimes at night." On being told by Porter of the order, he said, that he, and Sykes and Butterfield, "immediately spoke of the condition of our troops, they being so much fatigued," as well as of "the darkness of the night, and told him that we did not believe we could make any better progress by attempting to start at that hour, (1 A. M.,) than if we waited till daylight." (Pp. 144, 145.)

2. Sykes. I told Porter, on his informing me of the order to march at one, A. M., my reasons for his not attempting it, "That a night march is always exceedingly fatiguing and injurious to troops. That my command had already marched from 12 to 14 miles that day," &c. (P. 176.)

3. Butterfield.-My men "were very much fatigued. They had marched from Kelly's Ford to Bealton, and from there up to Warrenton Junction, almost all the way without water, in the dust. It was very warm, and it was with great difficulty that we got them along.” (P. 186.)

No portion of this testimony was the President advised of, and yet its materiality is most apparent. Why did the Judge Advocate omit it, in executing an order, which directed him to report "fully" upon the bearing of all the testimony? Why select a part? Can these enquiries possibly be met satisfactorily? What fair mind will say they can ?

The darkness of the night, then, the state of the road, the condition of the troops, rendered it, in the opinion of his three Generals, not only inadvisable, but impossible, to execute literally as to time, the order of the 27th of August. Did the President, when he approved the sentence, know these facts? For the sake of his own character, of his sense of justice, his duty to the country, it is hoped, and believed, that he did not. Did he know, could he have known, that Porter's decision was based not on his own experience merely, but, as proved by Sykes, "upon the opinions of the three General officers in his corps next in rank to himself," (p. 176,) and that each one of them, in his testimony before the Court, maintained the same opinion.

Did he know, that all concurred in saying that "nothing whatever" would have been gained by a different decision? And, finally, did he know, what they all also stated, (as did Pope,) that the "military necessity for the movement to be at one o'clock, A. M., on the 28th, so as to