child to whom such decedent, for not less than ten years prior to such transfer, stood in the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent." In other words, the relation must be mutually acknowledged, that is, it must be acknowledged as a fact both by the decedent and by the child. What is meant by acknowledging the relation? The statute leaves no room for erroneous interpretation. The words, "Or any lineal issue of such adopted or mutually acknowledged child," make it plain that to acknowledge the relation is to acknowledge the child. What is meant by acknowledging a child? Whether we consult general literature or the law books, we shall find that the word "acknowledge," as applied to a child has always had a definite and fixed meaning understood alike by all. To acknowledge a child is to admit or declare that you are its parent, or to recognize it as your own. In King Lear, which was written more than 300 years ago, we find the following:

"Kent. Is not this your son, my lord?

"Glou. His breeding, sir, hath been at my charge; I have so often blushed to acknowledge him that now I am brazed to it."

Indeed, the words "acknowledge" and "recognize,' when applied to a child, are used interchangeably. Section 1398, Kentucky Statutes, provides that if a man, having had a child by a woman, shall afterwards marry her, such child or its descendants, if recognized by him before or after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate, and the word "recognize" has been construed as meaning "acknowledge."

In 5 Cyc. 633, we find the following:

"Recognition or Acknowledgment-a. In General. In some states a child may be legitimated by the recognition or acknowledgment of it by the putative father as his own. The usual requirement of such legitimation is that the recognition or acknowledgment be general and notorious or in writing."

See also 7 C. J. 948 and 3 R. C. L. 741. Not only does the word "acknowledge," when applied to a child, naturally mean a recognition of the child as one's own, but the period of time prescribed by the statute, during which the decedent must have stood in the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent, leaves no room for any other construction. If the legislature had intended that fatherly care and devotion would be sufficient, there would be no reason for discriminating between a child who had

received such attention for five years, and one who had received such attention for ten years. The reason why the decedent was required to stand to the child in the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent for a period of ten years was to make the acknowledgment so long continued and notorious as to remove all doubt as to the existence of the relationship. Since to acknowledge a child is to recognize him as your own, it necessarily follows that kind and considerate treatment, though evidence of an acknowledgment, can never supply the place of an acknowledgment. Though one may acknowledge a child of doubtful parentage, it is a plain contradiction in terms to say that one may acknowledge a child whom he concedes to be the child of another. As plaintiff was the stepchild of decedent, it necessarily follows that the decedent never stood to her in the mutually acknowledged relation of a parent. On the contrary, he was her stepfather in fact, and this fact being known and admitted by both, it was never possible for them to acknowledge a different relationship. I am therefore of the opinion that plaintiff falls in class E as "a stranger in blood," and not in class A.

I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Hurt concurs in this dissent.

W. D. Chambers v. Murphy.

Murphy v. Lily Chambers.

(Decided November 22, 1921.)

Appeals from Nelson Circuit Court.

1. Frauds, Statute of-Sale of Land-Contract-Sufficiency of Description. Where in a written contract for the sale of land between A. R. M and W. D. C., the land was described as "his land," with the further provision, "the said A. R. M. to remain on said premises or farm sold to the said W. D. C. within six months from date hereof," the description was sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.

2.

Frauds, Statute of-Promise to Pay Debt of Another-Vendor and Purchaser.-Assumption of Lien Debt.-An agreement to discharge a lien as part of the consideration for the purchase of land is not a promise to pay the debt of another within the statute of frauds.

3. Frauds, Statute of-Sale of Land-Signature By Agent-Parol Evidence of Agency.-An undisclosed principal may, upon his disclosure, be held to a contract made in his behalf by a duly authorized agent, and the agency may be established by parol testimony, notwithstanding the fact that the agent may have contracted in his own name without disclosing his agency or the name of his principal, and this rule has not been changed by the statute of frauds.

4.

Principal and Agent-Evidence of Agency-Sufficiency.-In an action to hold a wife on a written contract for the purchase of land signed by her husband, evidence held insufficient to show that the husband acted as the authorized agent of his wife.

KELLEY & KELLEY for A. R. Murphy.

C. T. ATKINSON and C. D. MINOR for W. D. Chambers and Lily Chambers.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE CLAY-Affirming in each case.

Alleging in substance that, by written contract hereinafter set out, he had sold his farm to Lily Chambers and her husband, W. D. Chambers, who, in signing the contract, acted for himself and as the authorized agent of his wife, plaintiff, A. R. Murphy, brought this suit to recover the consideration agreed to be paid, and asked that the land be sold and the proceeds, after paying certain lien indebtedness, be applied on the purchase price. On final hearing the relief asked was granted against W. D. Chambers, but denied as to Lily Chambers. W. D. Chambers appeals, and from the judgment dismissing the petition as to Lily Chambers, plaintiff prosecutes a separate appeal.

Omitting the caption and the signatures of A. R. Murphy and W. D. Chambers, the contract is as follows: "In matter of contract by and between A. R. Murphy, of Boston, Nelson county, Kentucky, and W. D. Chambers, of Perryville, Boyle county, Kentucky, which is as follows, the said A. R. Murphy, in consideration of eighteen thousand dollars for his land, of which one hundred dollars cash in hand paid, and the understanding as to the deferred payments between the parties hereto and the following conditions, the said A. R. Murphy to remain on said premises or farm sold to the said W. D. Chambers within six months from the date hereof, but the said Murphy to have thirty days' notice prior to the surrender of said premises. It is understood by the

parties hereto that the said W. D. Chambers to have the crops now growing or may be grown upon said land the present year. The said Murphy to take the same care of said lands as is necessary to protect said land and crops. The said Chambers to pay the expense necessary to making and saving said crops.

"Witness our hands this May 6th, 1919."

The first question presented is whether the description meets the requirements of the statute of frauds. It is the rule that the contract or memorandum must itself furnish the means of identifying the land, and unless it does, the contract is within the statute. McCulloch v. McCombs Producing and Refining Co., 191 Ky. 518, 230 S. W. 917; Bates v. Harris, 144 Ky. 399, 138 S. W. 276, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 154. Clearly if the contract had described the farm as the home place of the grantor, or the place on which he resided, it would have been sufficient. Campbell v. Preece, 133 Ky. 572, 118 S. W. 373. Doubtless, if the contract contained no other description than "his land," the description would not have been sufficient, but the contract does not stop there. It contains the further provision, "A. R. Murphy to remain on said premises or farm sold to said W. D. Chambers within six months from the date hereof, but the said Murphy to have thirty days' notice prior to the surrender of said premises." The words, "remain on," carry with them the idea that Murphy, the vendor, was on the premises or farm sold. That being true, the words, "his land," coupled with the provision that he was to remain on the premises, were equivalent to the words, "the farm on which he resides."" With these elements of identification any one could locate the property sold, which, as a matter of fact, was the farm on which Murphy resided and the only farm which he owned. We therefore conclude that the description was sufficient to take the case out of the statute of frauds.

But it is insisted that, as Chambers assumed a lien debt on the premises for several thousand dollars, it was an oral promise on his part to answer for the debt of another, and was therefore unenforcible under the statute of frauds. Chambers' agreement to discharge the lien debt was not a mere collateral undertaking to answer for the debt of another. On the contrary, the assumption of the debt was a part of the consideration which he agreed to pay for the land, and there being a new and sufficient consideration for the promise, the debt became

his own, and the statute does not apply. Jennings v. Crider, 2 Bush 322; Hodgkins v. Jackson, 7 Bush 342; Mudd v. Carico, Exr., 104 Ky. 719, 47 S. W. 1080.

It follows that the chancellor did not err in holding W. D. Chambers liable on the contract.

It remains to determine whether Mrs. Chambers is liable. The statute requires the contract to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his authorized agent. Section 470, Kentucky Statutes. It has long been the settled rule that an undisclosed principal may be held to a contract made in his behalf by a duly authorized agent, and this rule was never changed by the statute of frauds. Moreover, the agency may be established by parol testimony, notwithstanding the fact that the agent may have contracted in his own name without disclosing his agency or the name of his principal. Walker v. Hafer, 95 C. C. A. 311, 170 Fed. 37, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 315. Hence, if the evidence be sufficient to show that W. D. Chambers, in making the purchase, acted not only for himself, but as the authorized agent of his wife, she, too, is liable on the contract. It appears that Mr. and Mrs. Chambers visited the farm on the day of the purchase. After remaining there for a while, they went to the home of Mat Lewis for dinner. After dinner Mr. Chambers returned to the farm, where he and Murphy agreed on the terms. Murphy says that when he proposed having the contract reduced to writing, Chambers said that his wife was putting up most of the money, but this statement was denied by Chambers and James and Mat Lewis, who were also present. James Lewis testified that when Chambers left his wife after dinner to go back to the farm, she told him to buy the place if he wanted to. Mat Lewis says that he heard Mrs. Chambers tell her husband to close the trade if it suited him. It further appears that after the purchase Mrs. Chambers advertised her farm and personal property for sale, and though the farm was sold, the purchaser failed to take it. Murphy says that when he called to see Mrs. Chambers for the purpose of finding out why they did not take his farm, Mrs. Chambers was seated on the front porch and gave as a reason for not taking the place that they were not able to sell their own place. Frank Newman, who was with Mr. Murphy, says that Mrs. Chambers merely said, "We can't take the place," but gave no reason. Mr. Arnold, a railroad agent, testified that after the contract was drawn up he saw Mrs. Cham