own knowledge, or upon information imparted to him. by reliable and credible third persons, provided there are no circumstances known to the officer sufficient to materially impeach the information received." The same rule is set forth in 11 R. C. L. 801, and it was adopted by this court in the comparatively recent case of Grau v. Forge, 183 Ky. 521. In the Grau case the officer had been told by an apparently intelligent boy that the person arrested had attempted to rob him and he pointed out the would be robber to the officer who made the arrest without a warrant. We held in that case that, there being nothing to indicate that the sheriff's informant was either mistaken or wilfully misrepresenting the facts, the information furnished by him and which possessed the earmarks of truth was sufficient to constitute reasonable grounds to authorize the officer to make the arrest without a warrant. And that ruling, as will be seen, is not only supported by the text from Corpus Juris and R. C. L., supra, but is likewise adopted by a great number of the courts in this country, as will be seen from the notes thereto. Without taking the time to analyze or apply the facts which were in the possession of the sheriff at the time he made the arrest in this case, we unhesitatingly say that at that time he had reasonable grounds to believe, either that a burglary had been committed by the appellee and his companion in the buggy, or that they expected to commit one with the tools they had in their possession; in either of which events he was authorized to make the arrest, although according to the case, supra, no felony in fact had been committed.

(2) From the foregoing it results that neither the principles announced in the Youman case, nor in the Gouled case apply, since the essence of those opinions is that the search resulting in the development of the contested evidence must be either a forcible one involving some coercion on the part of the officer, or it must be made after admission gained to the searched premises through stealth and deception so that the search would be against the will or consent of the defendant. Such was the holding in the Gouled case and we so interpreted the Youman case in the later ones of Banks v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 330, and Turner v. Commonwealth, 191 Ky. 825. All the books and all the cases agree, including the Youman case, that evidence found by searching the defendant when he is lawfully arrested may be used

against him and that such evidence does not come within the constitutional inhibitions against "unlawful search and seizure" of either one's premises or his person. Additional authorities for this proposition to those above referred to are, 5 Corpus Juris, 434; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383; Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 219, and Wallace v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 775.

3. Disposing of the possible ground (3) as one influencing the court in sustaining appellee's motion for a peremptory instruction for the jury to acquit him, we have only to say that the tools or implements and other things in the possession of the defendant, in this character of prosecution, need not be articles specially manufactured and designed for the use of burglars alone, but they may be any tools, implements or things which in the language of the statute are "used by burglars for housebreaking, forcing doors, windows, locks, or buildings," etc., although they may be such as are adapted for use in the accomplishment of lawful and legitimate purposes. If the language of the statute should be construed so as to require that such tools, etc., should be specially manufactured and designed for burglarious purposes, we doubt if any defendant could ever be convicted under the statute, not only because, as we surmise, that there is no such manufacturing establishment, but also because of the great difficulty which the Commonwealth would encounter in proving that fact, to say nothing about the strained construction of the statute which that interpretation would require. If the tools are such that they may be used to commit burglary, and the circumstances be such as to lead a reasonably prudent man to believe beyond doubt that the intention of their possessor was to use them for that purpose, the offense is complete. We feel that this interpretation of the statute is so plain as to need no fortification of authorities. But all the courts before which the question has been presented, so far as we are able to learn, have adopted the same view, as will be seen from an extended note to the case of State of Wisconsin v. Boliski, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 825. In that note it is stated that "It is not necessary to prove that all the implements mentioned in an indictment be adapted to effect the objects charged," and that "If they are suitable for the purpose, so that they can be used to break and enter burglariously, it is wholly immaterial that they were also designed and

adapted for honest and lawful uses. A chisel or centerbit, though a tool in common use for ordinary purposes, is quite as efficacious in the hands of a burglar to carry out his felonious intent, as a jimmy or a lockpicker, which is made for the sole purpose of being used to break and enter buildings." Further along in the note it is shown that none of the tools found in the possession of the defendant need be adapted to the commission of the offense of burglary only, and that where the defendant had in his possession a hammer, a cold chisel and a file, and there was further evidence to prove an intent on his part to use them burglariously, a conviction would be authorized. The same note contains cases holding that the purpose of defendant in having in his possession ordinarily useful tools may be shown by other articles which he had in his possession, and which other articles were suitable and adapted to the harvesting of the fruits of a burglary or a particular kind of burglary. Just as in this case the empty cans, bottles and jugs found in the possession of the appellee by the officer who arrested him might not in any sense be considered as burglar's tools, but they are articles and implements suitable for the full purpose of, and ordinarily used by, those who commit burglary upon a whiskey warehouse.

That the intention of appellee and his co-defendant to so use those articles and the tools found in their possession there can be but little doubt in our minds. from the testimony of appellee's co-defendant, Miller, which is corroborated by other testimony in the case but which we deem unnecessary to point out. As was to be expected he was a most reluctant witness for the Commonwealth and on every hand tried to shield the appellee by the suppression of any guilty fact against him, and it was only after a most rigid examination that he was made to tell about the future plans of himself and the appellee with reference to entering the warehouse with the tools which he claimed to have found the evening before in a clump of bushes nearby it. He also tried hard to conceal the fact of appellee's knowledge of the arrangement with the watchman Husbands, and in parts of his testimony he made the unbelievable statement that appellee's act in accompanying him that night was no more culpable than to see if whiskey was contained in the oil cans and other receptacles alleged to have been hidden in the bushes. Under such circumstances one

wonders why appellee consented to carry those tools and implements, which were shown not to belong to him, from the place where they were alleged to have been found to his home. The jury had the right to consider the extraordinary and unnatural features of the witness's testimony and his evident purpose to conceal, as much so as they had the right to consider his express statements affecting the guilt of appellee. But whether or not there was evidence sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of appellee's guilt, there was certainly sufficient evidence to authorize a submission of the case to it under proper instructions and the court erred in directing an acquittal of the defendant.

Wherefore, this opinion is certified as the law of the

case.

Wills.

Rice, et al. v. Fields, et al.

(Decided June 24, 1921.)

Appeal from Daviess Circuit Court.

A devise to a wife of property to be held and controlled by her for any purpose she may see fit during her natural life, and at her death to be distributed among devisor's heirs, did not invest her with power to convey the fee, but only with power to use the property during her life.

G. H. CARY and T. F. BIRKHEAD for appellants.

LOUIS I. IGLEHEART for appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE SAMPSON-Reversing. George Smith, of McLean county, made his last will in 1904 and died in 1911, leaving a widow and four children. His will, which was duly probated, reads as follows:

"I, George Smith, of Livermore, McLean county, Ky., being of sound mind do hereby make my last will and testament in manner and form as follows:

"First. I desire to bequeath to my wife Amanda Smith (after my funeral expenses and all other just obligations are paid) all of my property both personal and real of whatever kind to be held and controlled by her and used by her for any purpose that she may see fit, during her natural lifetime, after her death, I desire that

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whatever may remain of my estate to be distributed equally among my heirs.

"Lastly. I do hereby constitute and appoint my wife, Amanda Smith, my executrix without bond by this my last will and testament.

"In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand, this the 10th day of November, 1904.

"W. E. RENDER,

"C. W. THOMASON."

"GEORGE SMITH.

He owned a lot or parcel of land which the widow, Amanda Smith, claiming to be the owner in fee under the will, undertook to convey by deed to appellee, J. B. Fields, in February, 1916. Soon thereafter Amanda Smith died and the heirs of George Smith brought this action against Fields to recover the lot which the widow sold and conveyed Fields on the grounds that she had only a life estate in the real property of George Smith under the will and not a fee.

The chancellor denied the relief sought by the Smith heirs and dismissed the petition, and they appeal. Did the widow Amanda Smith take a fee to the real property belonging to the estate of George Smith deceased, under and by virtue of the terms of the will of George Smith, or did she take only a life estate therein with the right to hold, control and use same? If she took a fee then appellee Fields has a perfect title to the lot under her deed and the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed, but if she took only a life estate, as contended by appellants, the judgment must be reversed; she could not convey a greater estate than she received.

What did the testator George Smith mean by that part of the first clause of his will in which he said: "I desire to bequeath to my wife Amanda Smith all my property both personal and real of whatsoever kind to be held and controlled by her and used by her for any purpose she may see fit, during her natural lifetime, and after her death I desire that whatever may remain of my estate be distributed equally among my heirs?" The last part of this clause, "whatsoever may remain of my estate," would seem to indicate that the testator intended the widow to consume or dispose of a part or all of the estate; but this no doubt had reference to the personal property which was susceptible of destruction by use and to live stock which might die during the continuance of the particular estate. He gave his widow all of