It is singular that so much has been said about public respect. Counsel have some slight excuse, the conduct of attorneys at the bar, and so little about their conduct after they are seated on the bench. Probably it has been assumed that a lawyer will not be placed upon the bench until he has acquired experience, good sense and the proper dignity, and that there is, therefore, no need to advise him after he has reached that point in his career. If you will remember, the first duty required by the Genevan oath, after that of allegiance, is "never to depart from the respect due to the tribunals and authorities." This evidently means that the lawyer should speak respectfully of the judiciary and of the lawfully-constituted authorities, and in the trial of causes, and in all his dealings with the court, he should demean himself towards it with deference and respect; but, on the other hand, he has a right to expect from the court the same demeanor towards himself. The court and the bar are alike necessary to the administration of justice; each is alike useless without the other. The bar owes to itself, and to the public, the duty of assuming and maintaining a high professional standard. And by a high professional standard I mean, not only good moral character, and a competent knowledge of law, procedure and practice, but also a high standard of courtesy and dignity. The lawyer should not only accord to his brethren, and to the court, and all with whom he may come in contact, that courteous demeanor which makes it easier to transact business, and makes the world a pleasanter place in which to live, but he should exact such courteous treatment from them towards himself. And his failure so to do is a surrender of his rights and a breach of his duty to the bar of which he is a member. It has been truly said that "a good bar makes a good bench," and its correlative must also be true that a weak bar makes a weak bench. The bar can strengthen the bench, the bench can do little to strengthen the bar. The reasons are obvious. The stream cannot rise above its source. The judges are drawn from the bar; they are not always selected because of their special fitness. It, no doubt, sometimes happens that political and other considerations are paramount. And when the lawyer takes his seat as judge there is no magical transformation. He still has the same character, the same nature and the same attainments as he had before. If he approaches the ideal, he will be courteous, affable, even-tempered, patient, conscientious, learned in the law, and be possessed of sound sense and judgment and an impartial mind. In so far as he is deficient in these, he is deficient as a judge. Breaches of courtesy and exhibitions of ill-temper or impatience, either on the part of judge or counsel, are liable to prevent a thorough discussion of the question before the court, and may result in a miscarriage of justice. Further than that, the one guilty of such misconduct thereby suffers a loss of because they are intensely interested, and zeal for their client's cause may carry them, sometimes, beyond proper bounds. But the judge has no such excuse. He is presumed to have no interest in the cause whatever, and oftentimes his breach of good manners works a positive injury, either to one of the litigants or to counsel. Where counsel are cut off in argument, or spoken to, or about, in a slighting or ill-tempered manner, their clients are apt to infer that they have made a mistake in their choice of attorneys, and the next time they have a cause to litigate, will endeavor to find counsel who appear to stand better before the court. Judges wish to be right and to do right, and the corruption of a judge of our higher courts is extremely rare, but its possibility under a corrupt political regime should be recognized. For example, it was possible under the Tweed regime in New York. And under that regime it was the bar association that purged the bench. The province of the judge and that of the advocate are distinct, but they are interdependent, and the administration of justice would be a sorry spectacle without the advocate's assistance. It is unfortunate for the cause of justice when the judge forgets his dependence on the bar and forgets to pay it the deference and respect which is its due. Judge Thompson, of the Supreme Court of Iowa, speaking of the bar in an address before the Iowa State Bar Association, said: "You never hear of a great judge without thinking of some great lawyer behind him. You never think of Marshall, Story or Shaw without remembering Pinckney, Wirt, Webster, Choate, Mason and other great advocates. These great judges would never have gained renown without the assistance of lawyers. Some one has said that the court shines by a sort of reflected light. Did you ever stop to think of it, gentlemen, that it is absolutely impossible for the Supreme Court of Iowa to consider any case that may come before it without the help of counsel? An independent investigation would be utterly impossible, consequently we must rely upon the help of counsel and give voice to what they have said in their printed briefs." Justice, in the language of Webster, "is the greatest interest of man on earth. It is the ligament which holds civilized nations together. Wherever her temple stands, and as long as it is duly honored, there is a foundation for social security, general happiness, and the improvement and the progress of our race. And whoever labors on this edifice with usefulness and distinction, whoever clears its foundations, strengthens its pillars, adorns its entablatures or contributes to raise its august dome still higher in the skies, connects himself in name, and fame, and character with that which is, and must be, as durable as the frame of human society." Justice can only be attained by the active, cordial co-operation of the bench and bar; and that co-operation requires natural forbearance, mutual courtesy, deference and respect. Whatever tends to discord between bench and bar, tends to defeat the ends of justice; and to defeat the ends of justice tends to anarchy and barbarism. Washington said of the judicial department "that it was the keystone of the whole political fabric." Defeat the ends of justice, and you shatter the keystone and the fabric falls. It is a reflection upon the bar that it has not taken an active part in the selection of the judges of our higher courts. That it should put forward candidates for the bench, I believe to be unwise, but that it should scan and criticise those who become candidates, no matter how, I believe to be its duty. And it should earnestly and actively protest against the appointment of those who, in the general estimation of the bar, are unsuitable for the bench. The bar knows its members better than it is possible for the public to know them. It knows their characteristics, temperaments and attainments. A lawyer may be highly respectable and respected as a lawyer. He may have great legal learning nd a wide experience, and for all that, by reason of moral or other disqualifications, be unfit for the bench. Though an efficient lawyer, he may lack what is commonly termed the judicial mind; the judicial quality; that quality which listens patiently, weighs the evidence and arguments carefully, and decides conscientiously and impartially. As I have said before, the qualities desirable in a judge are courtesy, affability, even temper, patience, conscientiousness, legal learning, sound sense and judgment, the moral courage to meet an issue squarely, and an impartial mind. The bar knows better than any other body of men which of its members come nearest to possessing these desirable qualities and which are lacking in them, and it is its duty to do all its power to prevent the election of a judge who does not possess these qualities to a reasonable degree. The bar should never permit political considerations to outweigh judicial fitness in selecting material for the bench. An organized bar possesses vast power and influActively and rightly wielded, it can overcome any obstacle and can accomplish any legitimate result. The possession of such power and influence by the bar renders each individual member personally responsible for the character of the judiciary. ence. The lawyer has no right to say, as an individual, that whatever happens outside of his private practice is no affair of his, and that no responsibility for it rests on him. His education and training specially fit him to direct the affairs of State. It is his duty to give to the State a portion of his time and labor. It is his duty to take an active part in shaping the laws enacted by the legislature, and an active interest in seeing that they are construed and enforced by tribunals made up of the best judicial talent obtainable. As a sample of the rules of ethics recently adopted by several of the bar associations in this country, I will quote two or three sections from the Virginia Code: "It is a bad practice for an attorney to communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of his cause." "Assertions, sometimes made by counsel in argument, of a personal belief of the client's innocence, or of the justice of his cause, are to be discouraged." "Communications and confidence between client and attorney are the property and secrets of the client, and cannot be divulged, except at his instance; even the death of the client does not absolve the attorney from obligation of secrecy." Other sections of the code are of a similar nature to these. As I said before, codes of ethics are of little practical value. Every lawyer knows that his duty requires him to observe the precepts laid down in these rules, and the same could be said of all the other code rules. To an upright lawyer they are unnecessary; and formal adoption of them, by way of a code, will not prevent their infraction by a lawyer who is not upright. A rule of practice recently adopted by our Supreme Court appears to me to be liable to require a violation, on the part of counsel, of the duty of secrecy required by the last section quoted from the Virginia Code. It is said to be the policy of the law to discourage contention. It is also said that courts never move, unless somebody moves them. This is as it should be. It is the duty of counsel to do what they can to bring about a peaceable settlement of their cases, rather than to fire the blood of parties by a legal battle. In order to further or protect the interests of his client counsel must resort to legal tactics. He may consider it advisable to carry his client's cause into court, even when he has no intention of forcing it to a trial. After the cause is in court he may adopt a course of action with a view to coercing the adverse party into a proper consideration of the subject of the controversy. In short, he must manage his case and manage it according to his own best judgment. Now, assume that the court moves in the matter of its own volition, may it not thereby force the parties into a trial which neither of them desire, and which, therefore, causes them and the State needless expense, and also causes, it may be, a needless arousing of passion and resentment in the breasts of the parties? It is of the first consequence that the people should respect their judicial tribunals, and the respect of the people depends on the respect of the bar. Senator Hoar once said, in an address to the bar: "That respect and confidence of the people (for and in their tribunals) must, in my judgment, depend upon the influence of the legal profession. A court which has their support will endure. A exclusive possession of any part of the premises court which fails of their support will perish." So you see, gentlemen, that the character of our courts, the thorough and impartial administration of justice, the respect and confidence of the people for and in the judiciary and the stability of our institutions depend upon the character, learning, integrity, independence and moral courage of the bar. The bar is estopped to complain of evils that may exist, for they exist on account of its own negligence and supineness. It has the power to correct evils, and it is its duty to exert that power. Mr. Morgan was frequently applauded, and it was evident that his words had made a deep impression. Col. Frank S. Arnold moved that he be given a vote of thanks. He also moved that the address be printed in full and copies of it distributed to the bar and communicated to the bench. Judge Sweetland suggested an amendment, in effect, that all but the thanks in the motion be eliminated. Col. Arnold demurred vigorously, saying that the remarks of Mr. Morgan were admirable and that they dealt with a subject which was in need of discussion. He thought that there were things in the practice of law that were discreditable and the address would serve an excellent purpose along that line. Col. Daniel R. Ballou moved in amendment that the address be printed in the records of the association. Col. Arnold again remonstrated. He said he was willing to go on record as saying that he disapproved of the attitude of members of the court toward him at times, and he suggested that the court ought to read the address, as it contained matters that would be beneficial. The association passed Col. Ballou's amendment. A discussion, precipitated by Harry C. Curtis, followed on questions relating to divorce legislation. Thomas Z. Lee, Amasa M. Eaton, Edwin C. Pierce and others spoke upon the subject, and, on motion of Mr. Pierce, it was voted to be the sense of the association that no legislation on divorce be carried out till the January session. COVENANTS AGAINST ASSIGNMENT AND UNDERLETTING. to an under-tenant, though it does not prohibit a letting of lodgings where the lessee obtains possession (Doe v. Laming, 4 Camp. 77). But while the operation of the words "assign" and "underlease" are (subject to the doubt suggested by Gentler v. Faulkner [supra]) clear, a difficulty frequently arises in consequence of the use of words which may be appropriate either to assigning or underletting, and in this respect the recent Irish decision of Re Doyle and O'Hara's Contract (1899, 1 Ir. R. 113) is interesting. The general principle of construction is that words which prohibit only the alienation of the premises for the entire residue of the term forbid assignment, while if the prohibition extends to a disposition of the premises for a part of the term this is aimed at underletting also. In Crusoe v. Bugby (2 W. Bl. 706), the covenant was not to assign, transfer, or set over, or otherwise do or put away with the lease or the demised premises, and it was held that these words did not prohibit an underlease for a part of the term. The courts, it was said, have always held a firm hand over these conditions for defeating leases, and, since the lessor had used words which were words of assignment, and had not introduced words aimed specifically at a change of occupancy, he was restricted to the more natural meaning of the covenant. So, too, it was pointed out by Lord Eldon, C., in Church v. Brown (15 Ves., p. 265), that covenants restraining alienation had always been construed with the utmost jealousy to prevent the restraint from going beyond the express stipulation, and hence a covenant against assigning would not be construed as to prevent an underletting. Where, however, the covenant was not to assign or otherwise part with the premises for the whole or any part of the term it was held in Doe v. Worsley (1 Camp. 20), that this was broken by an underlease as well as assignment. And, similarly, where there was a proviso for re-entry if the lessee did any act whereby the premises became vested for the whole or any part of the term in any person other than the lessee, it was held that the right of re-entry accrued upon a subletting from year to year (Dymock v. Showell's Brewery Co., 79 L. T. 329). an In the two cases last referred to, words which The operation of a covenant against assigning or prima facie contemplated assignment were extended underletting the premises included in a lease is a to underletting by reason of their express applicamatter of familiar practice. The covenant against tion to disposition for a part only of the term. In assigning is broken if there is an alienation of the the same way words which are naturally approprilegal estate in the residue of the term, though hith-ate to underletting may have their scope widened erto no dealing with the premises short of a con- if they are intended to be applicable to an alienaveyance of the legal estate has been allowed to have that effect. It has been held, however, recently by Ridley, J., in Gentle v. Faulkner (68 L. J., Q. B. 848), that under section 24 (4) of the Judicature Act, 1873, a declaration of trust operates as an assignment of the term, and is in consequence a breach of covenant. The covenant against underletting is broken whenever the lessee parts with the tion for the entire residue of the term. In Greenaway v. Adams (12 Ves. 395), the lease contained a covenant not to "let, set, or demise" the premises or any part for all or any part of the term. The reference here to "all the term " made it possible to construe the words, which were primarily applicable to an underletting, as extending to an assignment, and this construction was assisted by the consideration that it was very improbable that the lessor would mean to restrain an underletting without at the same time restraining an assignment. It was held, accordingly, that the words prohibited the lessee from assigning the demised premises for the residue of the term. The recent case of Re Doyle and O'Hara's Contract (supra) shows how far Greenaway v. Adams is operative. Here the covenant forbade the lessee to "set or let" the premises, but it did not contain the words "for the whole or any part of the term." Porter, M. R., held that the omission of these words was not enough to distinguish the two cases, and, since the words "let" and set" were common to each, the covenant in the case before him restrained assigning as in Greenaway v. Adams. In the Court of Appeal (Lord Ashbourne, C., Fitz-Gibbon, Walker and Holmes, L. JJ.), however, the variation in the language of the two covenants was allowed greater weight. Whatever the primary meaning of "let" and "set" a disposition for the whole term must necessarily amount to an assignment, and in Greenaway v. Adams such a disposition was expressly contemplated. In Re Doyle and O'Hara's Contract, on the other hand, since there was no reference to a disposition for the whole residue of the term, it was proper to restrict the words actually used to their natural meaning. "Set" is indefinite, and does not really carry the covenant further than "let." The covenant consequently forbade an underletting only, and it was held that the consent of the lessor was not required to enable the lessee to make a title on an assignment of the term. Solicitors' Journal. in Manila harbor May 1, 1899; that such was their status then, and that the subsequent action of the navy department in raising and repairing them did not affect or change that status in other words, that the vessels were not captured but destroyed, and it was insisted that the libelant was not entitled to have an adjudication in prize, but only to bounty under the provisions of the law. Judge Bradley, however, holds to the contrary, saying that the facts that the vessels were raised and repaired and are now in the service of the United States would seem to prove that they were not destroyed but captured. As above stated, Judge Bradley holds that property captured on land was not intended to be made maritime prize, but is excluded by the terms of the act from which the right is sought to be derived; and that, therefore, the libelant is not entitled to an adjudication in prize of the value of such property appropriated by the United States. The right of the libelant to an adjudication in prize of the value of property taken from vessels sunk or otherwise destroyed was also denied by the United States, and it was urged that inasmuch as the libelant had received bounty for the destruction of the vessels he was not entitled as prize for property taken from them—that bounty is "substitute for the prize itself," something given in lieu of it. The right of the libelant is sustained by Judge Bradley, who holds that bounty is not an equivalent for prize, and that there is nothing in the statute to prohibit the condemnation as prize of property taken from ships sunk or destroyed, in addition to bounty paid for the destruction of the ship. It is held, however, that neither cascoes nor floating derricks are vessels in the sense in which these terms are used in the act of 1864. We hope at an early day to report the de DECISION BY MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY IN cision in full.- Washington Law Reporter. Mr. Justice Bradley, on Thursday, June 27, 1901, announced his decision in the Manila bay and Santiago prize causes, recently heard by him. The decision involved a number of interesting questions, some of them quite novel, and is most elaborate. The result reached is in favor of the claimants as to vessels captured and as to property taken from vessels captured, and against them as regard property captured ashore. In the case of Admiral Sampson, his officers and crew, prize money was claimed for the capture of the Spanish cruiser Maria Teresa and other cruisers, and also for guns, naval stores and other property captured with Cervera's fleet. It was held that, although the Maria Teresa was lost at sea after being raised at Santiago, it still constituted prize property, as did the other vessels captured with the property aboard of them; and that the captors were entitled to a sum equal to one-half the value of such vessels and property. As respects the claim of Admiral Dewey, his officers and crew, it was contended by the United States that the vessels for which claim was made were sunk PROPOSED REMEDY FOR THE LAWS' DELAY. Attorney Alexander Rosenthal, of New York, who secured the passage of the law compelling the registration of attorneys in this State, has sent a communication to the New York Chamber of Commerce in which he asks the support of that body for a bill he is drafting, and which he proposes to present to the legislature, embodying a remedy for the time now consumed in the various steps in the practice of the civil courts. Mr. Rosenthal says: One of the most prolific causes in fomenting unnecessary litigation is the antiquated system that still prevails, with reference to the time required for the various steps in the practice of the civil courts of New York. Thus, the time for defendant merely to put in his "notice of appearance" in an action in the Supreme Court is twenty days after service of summons. The plaintiff then has twenty days' time thereafter to serve his complaint, whereupon the defendant has again twenty days thereafter to serve his answer, and still an additional twenty days within which to amend that answer, thus making eighty days to which he is entitled as a matter of right. In addition thereto, he may, upon his attorney filing affidavit to the effect that he has other professional engagements, etc., procure an additional twenty days' time. Besides all this, it occurs very commonly that the attorneys, inured to this enforced procrastination, fall into the habit of extending courtesies" and granting further extensions; so that it is an ordinary occurrence that from the time of the service of the plaintiff's summons until the receipt of the defendant's amended answer, 100 days or more elapse, 80 days of which, as shown above, are obtained as an absolute legal right and in consequence of statutory provisions to that effect. 66 Now, it should be observed that the summons and "notice of appearance" are documents a few lines in length, of a prescribed statutory form, and can be prepared within a few minutes. What good purpose can be subserved by allowing such length of time to intervene between them? In ordinary commercial causes, it seems to be wholly without reason, and there is little, if any, reason therefor in any cause. It is largely due to the existence of this condition of affairs that the payment of just demands is resisted and that after all the procrastination possible has been resorted to, flimsy answers are interposed only for the purpose of still further delay. Unnecessary litigation is thus promoted. That is to say, a fraudulent debtor unwilling to pay that which is justly due, knows or speedily learns that he can very readily secure from ten to twelve weeks' time to pay the demand or to put his creditor to still further trouble and expense in litigating the matter before the creditor can finally secure, what in all probability will ultimately turn out to be a worthless judgment against him. tem of pleading prevail in all courts alike, and why should no sworn answers be required within the shortest time practicable? Another prolific factor in encouraging unnecessary litigation exists in the time to appeal. While the right of appeal is one of inestimable benefit and should be preserved, yet why should the defeated party be allowed thirty days after judgment within which to file his notice of appeal to the Appellate Division (the preparation of such notice requiring at the utmost not more than a few minutes of time), and forty days thereafter within which to prepare the other papers on appeal. Quite often, also, the trial court allows, by custom, sixty days' time within which to prepare such papers. Thereupon, should the defeated party be again routed at the Appellate Division, the law provides that he may have one year thereafter within which to appeal to the Court of Appeals, and again forty days to prepare and serve his papers. It is due to this fact that great corporations simply scoff at verdicts rendered against them at the Trial Term, knowing as they do full well that by merely filing a bond they can stave off the successful party for several years. It requires no argument to show the advantage this gives them, since, by that time, if by any chance the verdict should be upset, and a new trial ordered, their opponent will not in all probability be in as good position as before. By this time they know exactly who his witnesses are and what they will testify, and can prepare and act accordingly, and besides this, the witnesses against them may die or disappear. These are but a few of the evils which still persist, and but for the limits of space in such a communication as the present, I would be pleased to point out the same. It seems to me that by advocating the adoption of the necessary remedy in this respect, reducing the prescribed time to limits within the bounds of reason, you would be accomplishing a great good to the community. ADMIRALTY. Such conditions very properly bring the law into disrepute, tend to deprive it of any terror to the evil-doer, and make of it a laughing stock in his sight. They are certainly without reason in these days of printing and typewriting. There is no reason at all why the system of "Notice of Appearance" should not be abolished as useless or in any event limited, say, to two days after service of the summons, and why thereafter the time for the service LIBEL FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE SWELLS OF A of pleadings (the complaint and answer) should not be limited to five or six days at the utmost. To guard against hardship the court might in extraordinary cases for good cause shown extend the time a few days further. PASSING STEAMER. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT NEW YORK. In passing, it may be observed that the anomalous GEORGE W. DUNBAR, Libelant, v. THE STEAMER differences which prevail in various courts would simply amaze the lay reader. Thus in the City Court (where the jurisdiction is limited only to $2,000) the time to answer the complaint is six days, whereas if a non-resident plaintiff sues a resident defendant, the latter must serve his answer within two days. In the Municipal Court, again, if the complaint is sworn to, the answer must be filed immediately upon the return day. Why should not one uniform sys The rule that the navigation of rivers is open to all craft so that each must exercise due care having regard to the ordinary conditions known to mariners, restated. Obligations of steam vessels and canal boats are reciprocal. A steamer has no right to proceed at a dangerous rate of speed, but, on the other hand, boats which, from their size, shape or unseaworthy condi |