in the projêt of the treaty you were instructed to offer to the Russian Government, and having directed me to make a report thereon for the consideration of the cabinet, a paper, of which the enclosed is a copy was submitted to him, and after having the opinion of the heads of Departments, he directed me to amend your instructions so as to omit the proviso in the first article, and the subsequent stipulation that the neutral property of either of the parties in enemies' ships should be good prize,-it being his determination to recur to the principles which governed our first treaties in this respect, so far as to stipulate that free ships shall make free goods, as between the parties, without any condition-but not to carry out the principle* that the flag shall give its character to the cargo, so far as to make the property of either of the parties being neutral and the other belligerent, good prize if found in an enemy's ship. This, being decided after solemn deliberation, may now, if it receives the sanction of the Senate, be considered as the settled policy of the Government. The first principle will not probably be contested by Russia, as it is in exact accordance with that of the armed neutrality, which originated with that power; but they may possibly insist on the further provision that neutral property shall be good prize if shipped after a knowledge of the war in an enemy's vessel. This, it may be observed, is a decided alteration of the existing law of Nations, and although, theoretically considered, it is a consequence from the principle that the flag gives its character to the cargo, yet it may be fairly argued that it is a false theory, founded on a misconstruction of the principal rule. That the neutral flag shall protect all the property on board, is not established from any fanciful idea that the cargo is supposed to be neutral, because it is covered by a neutral flag. No such fiction is admitted, even in argument. That hostile property is found in neutral ships is supposed by the rule, and it is protected, not because the flag is supposed to change it into neutral property, but for the extension of commerce,—for avoiding some of the evils of war,—and, principally, for the purpose of protecting the merchant ships of the parties from vexatious visits, seizures, and arrests. The rule would be more correctly expressed by saying the neutral flag shall protect hostile property, than by the phrase free ships make free goodsfigurative expression, which, considered in a literal sense, has given rise to the false deduction we are considering. a The reasoning is-if free ships make free goods, then the goods derive their character from the vessel-then, if a neutral bottom makes the cargo neutral, though it belong to an enemy, by the same * As established by the fifth article of the projêt. [Footnote in file copy.] rule a belligerent bottom must make the cargo hostile property though it belong to a friend. It will rarely happen that, as a neutral nation, we shall ever find it convenient to use the vessels of a belligerent as our carriers: But it is our interest to give every possible extension and freedom to commerce therefore, although you are to endeavor to procure the last mentioned modification, yet you are not to make it a point in your negotiation should the principle, in its full extent, that the neutral flag shall protect hostile property, be admitted,—and that, on the contrary, neutral property found in an enemy's ship shall be safe. Then it will be well to make a positive stipulation of both parts of the rule *—because, although by the acknowledged law of Nations, neutral property in a hostile bottom is protected, yet, in a case arising between two Powers who had acknowledged the principle that free ships make free goods, by treaty, the same process of erroneous reasoning I have pointed out might perhaps be employed to show that, as between them, the false consequence should follow, of making neutral property good prize in an enemy's ship. Although you are instructed to press for the adoption of the rule, simply, without the proviso that it shall not protect the property of Nations which do not acknowledge the principle, yet, if you find that the proviso is made a condition without which you cannot conclude a treaty, you are to yield the point, it being considered as of some advantage even in that modified form. I am [etc.] EDW: LIVINGSTON 89 The Secretary of State (McLane) to the Appointed Minister to Russia (Dickerson)1 WASHINGTON, June 26, 1834. SIR: The letter from the Department to Mr John Randolph, dated the 18th June, 1830, is particularly instructive in its historical reference to the general character of the previous relations between the United States and Russia; and, as modified by the instructions given to Mr Buchanan on the 31st March, 1832, may prove a useful guide in * As is done in all our treaties with the Barbary Powers. [Footnote in file copy.] 1 MS., Instructions, Russia, vol. xiv, pp. 15–19. Mr. Dickerson was immediately appointed Secretary of the Navy and did not go to Russia. A copy of these instructions was given to his successor. the specific point in our negotiation yet unsettled, to which it is my duty briefly to advert. From the commencement of their intercourse with Russia, the United States have, specifically and prominently, had in view, 1. The negotiation of a treaty or convention of commerce and navigation upon those principles of liberal reciprocity which we have been so anxious to establish with all other Nations; and 2. The establishment, by similar conventional stipulations of rules for regulating the rights of the respective parties, in the following relations: First, where the one is at war, and the other neutral; Secondly, where both are at war with the same Power; Thirdly, where they are unfortunately at war with each other. For a considerable time our desire in regard to both of these principal points was frustrated by the Russian Government uniformly declining to treat upon the subjects involved in them. The main points here adverted to, however, were not necessarily connected; and in the year 1832, Mr Buchanan, who arrived at St Petersburg in the month of June of that year, perceiving the Russian Government not unfavorable to the first object of his mission, promptly entered upon the negotiation of a commercial treaty, with a degree of zeal and ability which happily crowned his efforts with success, and finally resulted in the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and Russia on the 18th December, 1832. The treaty was ratified by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the 8th April, 1833, the ratifications were exchanged at Washington on the eleventh day of May following; and by this instrument thus finally concluded, the first principal point I have already adverted to, may be considered as entirely disposed of, and as requiring no further attention on your part. M Buchanan applied himself with equal promptitude to the second point of his mission; but the Imperial Government declining, at that time, to entertain any propositions relative to the conclusion of a treaty upon this subject, he returned, with the leave of the President, to the United States. It is understood that, since the departure of Mr Buchanan the proposition to treat upon the subject of maritime rights, has not been renewed. The second principal point, as herein presented, therefore, is now open in our relations, and remains for your attention, to be settled upon such terms as may be consistent with the objects and policy of the United States. A conventional arrangement with Russia, regulating the conduct, rights, and duties of the respective parties, in the event of either being engaged in war with a third power, and the other remaining neutral, or both at war with the same power, or where, unfortunately, they are at war with each other, is of the greatest importance, and will require your early attention and constant exertions. It is the direction of the President, therefore, that as soon after you have been presented to His Majesty the Emperor as your situation will permit, you will bring this subject to the notice of the Russian Government, and in such manner as will be most likely to insure it a respectful consideration, and bring it to a successful conclusion. Upon this point the instructions to Mr Randolph, dated the 18th day of June, 1830, and those to Mr. Buchanan of the 31st March, 1832, will be your guide in all respects, as if they were here repeated; and the same latitude as is allowed in the last paragraph of the instructions to M Buchanan is now intended to be given to you. In these two sets of instructions all the considerations by which the object the United States have in view is recommended to the Russian Government, are succinctly but clearly presented; and it may be hoped will enable you fully to accomplish the President's wishes. I am [etc.] 90 LOUIS MCLANE The Secretary of the Navy (Bancroft) to the Commander of the Naval Forces in the Pacific (Sloat)1 WASHINGTON, June 24, 1845. SIR: Your attention is still particularly directed to the present aspect of the relations between this country and Mexico. It is the earnest desire of the President to pursue the policy of peace, and he is anxious that you and every part of your squadron should be assiduously careful to avoid any act, which could be construed as an act of aggression. Should Mexico, however, be resolutely bent on hostilities, you will be mindful to protect the persons and interests of citizens of the United States near your station; and should you ascertain beyond a doubt, that the Mexican Government has declared war against us, you will at once employ the force under your command to the best advantage. The Mexican ports on the Pacific are said to be open and defenceless. If you ascertain with certainty, that Mexico has declared war against the United States, you will at once possess 1MS., Navy Department, Record of Confidential Letters, No. 1, p. 141. yourself of the port of San Francisco, and blockade or occupy such other ports as your force may permit. Very respectfully [etc.] GEORGE BANCROFT 91 The Secretary of the Navy (Bancroft) to the Commander of the Naval Forces in the Pacific (Sloat)1 WASHINGTON, May 13, 1846. COMMODORE: The state of things alluded to in my letter of June 24, 1845, has occurred. You will therefore now be governed by the instructions therein contained, and carry into effect the orders then communicated, with energy and promptitude and adopt such other measures for .the protection of the persons and interests, the rights and the commerce of the citizens of the United States, as your sound judgment may deem to be required. When you establish a blockade, you will allow neutrals twenty days to leave the blockaded ports and you will render your blockade absolute except against armed vessels of neutral nations. Commending you and your ships companies to Divine Providence, 92 The Secretary of the Navy (Bancroft) to the Commander of the Home Squadron (Connor)2 WASHINGTON, May 13, 1846. COMMODORE: Congress having declared that a state of war exists between the United States and the Republic of Mexico, you will exercise all the rights that belong to you as Commander-in-Chief of a belligerent Squadron. Your own intimate acquaintance with the condition of Mexico will instruct you best what measures to pursue in the conduct of hostilities, in addition to those suggested by the Department. You will declare and enforce a blockade of as many of the ports of Mexico as your force will enable you to do effectually, and you will inform the Department as speedily as possible of those which you blockade. You will duly notify neutrals of your declaration, 1 MS., Navy Department, Record of Confidential Letters, No. 1, p. 171. 2 Ibid., pp. 173–175. |