1. Excusing from the panel jurors who stood up when the Court asked if any were in defendant's employ held in the discretion of the Court. Yarborough v. Co- lumbia Ry., Gas and Electric Co., 84 S. E. 308, 100 S. C. 33. 2. Under Civil Code 1912, sec.
4023, where a sheriff served all those named in a venire who could be found, Court, after the panel was exhausted, held war- ranted in directing the issuance of a venire for additional ju- rors. State v. Tidwell, 84 S. E. 778, 100 S. C. 248.
3. Under Criminal Code 1912, sec. 82, Civil Code 1912, secs. 4018, 4023, and Circuit Court rule 25, held that it was error to call one of additional jurors with- out waiting until all had a rea- sonable time to appear and with-
1. A tenant by the month with the privilege of substitution is liable for the rent for the en- tire month, where the landlord objected to the substituted ten- ant, and no tender was made of the rent due after the substitu-- tion. Walker v. Spartanburg Realty Co., 84 S. E. 869, 100 S. C. 308.
2. Property may be distrained for rent when possession can be peaceably acquired, and, when so acquired, the tenant cannot forceably retake the property. McCraw v. Killian, 84 S. E. 868, 100 S. C. 320.
3. Where a lessor reserved a rent lien und before the rent was due the land was sold under fore- closure, the rent lien passed to the purchaser. Ex parte Owens, 81 S. E. 875, 100 S. C. 324. 4. Where before rent became due, the land was sold under fore- closure, the purchaser became entitled to the entire rent re- served. Id.
5. In an action by a mill employee for wrongful dispossession from a millhouse, testimony by the employee as to the reason for his discharge held not objection- able. Williams V. Columbia Mills Co., 85 S. E. 160, 100 S. C. 363.
6. In an action for wrongfu! eviction of a tenant, testimony
by arother that she paid the rent for plaintiff is admissible if proof of the payment of rent was competent. Id.
7. In an action for wrongful eviction of a mill employee from a mil.house, evidence that other families which furnished only on hand occupied similar houses held admissible to contradict evidence of a company rule to the contrary. Id.
8. Under Civil Code 1912, sec. 3509, giving a tenant wrongfully discharged an action for dam- ages against a landlord, puni- tive damages may be allowed. Id.
9. A purchaser of lands at a judi- cial sale acquires the rights to all rents maturing, and becom- ing due after the purchase. Ex parte Owens, 84 S. E. 875, 100 S. C. 324.
10. Where a landlord instituted proceedings under Civil Code 1912, sec. 4166, to seize certain cotton, as subject to his land- lord's lien for rent, and this claim being denied by a sub- tenant, the question whether or not the landlord had waived his lien on half of the crop in favor of the subtenant, was submit- ted to a jury, and a verdict ren- dered in favor of the landlord for only one-half of the crop; this was in effect a verdict in favor of the subtenant, the pre- vailing party, for the other half of the crop. Baird v. Weather- ford, 85 S. E. 59, 100 S. C. 490. LARCENY AFTER BREACH OF TRUST.
1. Evidence held sufficient to take to the jury the question whether a partnership existed between defendant and prosecutor which would be a defense to the prose- cution. State v. Grumbles, 84 S. E. 783, 100 S. C. 238.
LAW OF CASE.
1. A judgment on a prior appeal is the law of the case and, where the facts on the second trial are the same, is conclusive.
Mims v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 85 S. E. 372, 100 S. C. 375. LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS.
1. Resolutions in Senate Journal held, in effect, to declare that record of previous day was a mistake, and to correct such mistake, and hence the journal did not show confirmation of appointment. State v. Tollison. 84 S. E. 819, 100 S. C. 165. 2. In determining from its jour- nal what was or was not done by the Senate, the journal must be considered as a whole, as any other record would be. Id.
1. Where an employee of con- signee engaged in unloading cars of coal placed by a rail- road company on a spur track at an industrial plant is injured in an accident occasioned by the cars from some unexplained cause becoming uncoupled and running off the end of the track, and the testimony does not tend to support the allegations that the defendant either negligently provided defective stop block on the track, negligently failed to have the cars on engine pushing same equipped with proper brakes, or negligently operated the cars on the track or did anything which caused the un- coupling of the cars, a nonsuit was properly granted. Burford v. S. A. L. Ry., 84 S. E. 712, 100 S. C. 177.
1. Where a landlord instituted proceedings under Civil Code 1912, sec. 4166, to seize certain cotton, as subject to his land- lord's lien for rent, and this claim being denied by a sub- tenant, the question whether or not the landlord had waived his lien on half of the crop in favor of the subtenant, was sub- mitted to a jury, and a verdict rendered in favor of the land- lord for only one-half of the crop; this was in effect a verdict in favor of the subtenant, the
prevailing party, for the other half of the Baird V. crop. Weatherford, 85 S. E. 59, 100 S. C. 490.
2. The prevailing party in pro- ceedings for the enforcement of agricultural liens is entitled to recover costs, which are to be paid out of the funds in Court, before the net proceeds are ap- plied to payment of the amounts found due the parties. Baird v. Weatherford, 85 S. E. 59, 100 S. C. 490.
3. Under Civil Code 1912, secs. 3062-3064, providing for fore- closure of agricultural liens and requiring the clerk to issue his warrant and the sheriff to seize the crop and sell it for cash and pay over the net proceeds in ex- tinguishment of amount due, the officers should be paid for their services out of the proceeds and the balance applied to the debt due. Id.
4. In equity and under Code Civil Proc. 1902, sec. 326, a defendant, in a proceeding to foreclose an agricultural lien, who claims one-half of the crops free from the lien and makes out his case and shows that he was without fault in bringing about the liti- gation, was entitled to his costs. Id.
1. A deed conveying land to A for his uses and benefits, and for the maintenance and support of his children (he having no chil- dren at the date of the deed) during the term of his natural life, and to said children imme- diately after the death of A, to have and to hold to the said children, their heirs and assigns forever, conveys the land therein described to A for life, for his own use and partially in trust for the maintenance, support and benefit of his after-born children, with a contingent re- mainder in fee to his after-born children, if any, as purchasers. Folk v. Hughes, 84 S. E. 713, 100 S. C. 220.
1. In a boundary suit, testimony of plaintiff's surveyor that, if the boundary line claimed by defendant were projected, it would cut off property conced- edly belonging to plaintiff, is ad- missible. Holden v. Cantrell, 84 S. E. 826, 100 S. C. 265. 2. Where, in a boundary suit, plaintiff testifies as to physical objects outside the land in dis- pute, which was in form a tri- angle, to show the true boundary line, and a plat agreed upon by the surveyors as correctly rep- resenting the lines as claimed by the respective parties, and showing the physical objects tes- tified to by plaintiff, testimony of the surveyors as to the loca- tion of the physical objects was properly received. Id.
3. Though quantity, as a matter of description, is ordinarily one of the lowest in the scale of im- portance, there may be circum- stances in which it would be controlling. Id.
4. In an action involving the boundary line of two tracts of land, which were part of an original tract containing three tracts, testimony as to the acre- age of the three tracts is not error. Id.
5. In a boundary case, admission of testimony of surveyor that he could not run a straight line 52 chains long through hilly wood- land without aid of an instru- ment is not error, as it was a fact which needed no testimony to prove it. Id.
MAGISTRATES.
1. Mandamus will not issue to compel a county superintendent to honor a claim by the trustees of a school district of another county for the support of a joint school, since there is an adequate remedy by appeal to the State board of education. Rouse v. Benton, 84 S. E. 533, 100 S. C. 150.
2. Mandamus will not issue to
compel a county superintendent to approve a warrant, where it does not appear that the county treasurer had sufficient funds to pay it. Rouse v. Benton, 84 S. E. 533, 100 S. C. 150.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. A complaint alleging that plain- tiff worked with a bridge force as bridge carpenter on an inter- state railroad states a cause of action, under Federal Employ- ers' Liability Act. Camp v. At- lanta &C. A. L. Ry. Co., 84 S. E. 825, 100 S. C. 294. 2. In an action by an employee for injuries, evidence held to re- quire submission to the jury of the issue of employer's negli- gence. Camp v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 84 S. E. 825, 100 S. C. 294.
3. Where the issue was whether the work at the time of injury to a railroad employee, was in- terstate or intrastate commerce, the Court must charge the law as to both. Camp v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 84 S. E. 825, 100 S. C. 294.
4. In an action for injuries to an employee by the fall of a tele- phone pole on which he was working, evidence held not to show wilful misconduct of the
employer. Bridgman v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 84 S. E. 711, 100 S. C. 204. 5. In an action for injuries to an employee, a charge on the law of fellow servant held authorized by pleadings and evidence. Bridgman V. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 84 S. E. 711, 100 S. C. 204.
6. Where contract relations exist between an active corporation and a passive corporation, and where both have servants, the two corporations may not contract to relieve active corporation from responsibility for injury from its negligence to servants of passive corporation. Carter v. Southern Rwy.-Carolina Di- vision, 84 S. E. 999, 100 S. C. 403.
7. Contract of Pullman employee ratifying contracts of Pullman company with defendant road and agreeing to hold road harm- less for any damages it might have to pay him for injury, held invalid, so that for injury from road's negligence employee might recover. Id.
8. Evidence, in action for services under contract to buy cotton seed oil at instructed prices, held to make rescission of con- tract question for jury. Moore v. Marion Cotton Oil Co., 85 S. E. 52, 100 S. C. 499.
9. In action for services under contract to buy cotton seed oil at instructed prices, evidence held to make plaintiff's excuse for nonperformance question for jury. Id.
10. Where plaintiff alleged con- tract for services, and defendant alleged rescission, burden was upon defendant to show rescis- sion, and, if he failed, verdict should be for plaintiff. Id. 11. In action for services under contract to buy cotton seed oil at instructed prices, it was only necessary, to enable plaintiff to recover, for him to show sub- stantial performance. Id. 12. When the pleadings show facts bringing an action within the Federal Employers' Liability Act, it must be tried under that
Line R. Co., 85 S. E. 372, 100 S. C. 375.
13. On the second trial of a death action, defendant cannot, after the close of plaintiff's evidence, show, without amending, that deceased was engaged in inter- state commerce at his death, so that the Federal Employers' Liability Act was applicable. Mims v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 85 S. E. 372, 100 S. C. 375. 14. Testimony of a servant that he quit his master's work to at- tend to his personal enterprise is not prejudicial to the master. Williams v. Columbia Mills Co., 85 S. E. 160, 100 S. C. 363. See Evidence. Smith v. Union- Buffalo Mills Co., 84 S. E. 422, 100 S. C. 115.
1. The Court will reform an in- strument where there is a mu- tual mistake as to the facts on which it is based, or as to the stipulations therein, or where one of the parties acted under a mistake induced by the fraud, deceit, or imposition of the other. Forrester v. Moon, 84 S. E. 532, 100 S. C. 157.
2. Where only one of the parties to an instrument was under a mistake as to the facts or stipu- lations in the instrument, equity will not reform it except under very strong and extraordinary circumstances showing imbecility or something which would make it a wrong to enforce the agree- ment. Forrester v. Moon, 84 S. E. 532, 100 S. C. 157. 3. Where a grantee bargained for the land actually conveyed by the grantor and the grantee acted in good faith and was in no way responsible for an error of the grantor who possessed capacity, equity would not re- form the deed at the suit of the grantor. Forrester v. Moon, 84 S. E. 532, 100 S. C. 157. 4. A telegraph company is liable for damages growing out of its mistake which occurred in trans- mitting a message, or out of an
erroneous publication of the message by an unauthorized person to whom the company en- trusted it for delivery to ad- dressee. Painter v. W. U. Tel. Co., 84 S. E. 293, 100 S. C. 65. MORTGAGES.
See Chattel Mortgages. 1. Where a note secured by a mortgage bore eight per cent. interest, it was error to compute interest at that rate after matu- rity in a suit to foreclose. Gibbes Machinery Co. v. Ham- ilton, 84 S. E. 296, 100 S. C. 57. 2. Where a lessor reserved a rent lien and before the rent was due the land was sold under fore- closure, the rent lien passed to the purchaser. Ex parte Owens, 84 S. F. 875, 100 S. C. 324. 3. Where before rent became due, the land was sold under fore- closure, the purchaser became entitled to the entire rent re- served. Id.
4. A conveyance intended as a se- curity for a debt is a "mort- gage," whatever may be its form. Bryan v. Boyd, 84 S. E.
992, 100 S. C. 397.
5. A conveyance absolute in form is presumed to be an absolute conveyance, and, to establish its character as a mortgage, the evidence must be clear, unequivo- cal, and convincing. Bryan v. Boyd, 84 S. E. 992, 100 S. C. 397.
6. Evidence, in a mortgagor's action to redeem land purchased by a mortgagee on foreclosure, held not sufficient to show that the sheriff's deed was a mort- gage, so that plaintiff might re- deem. Bryan v. Boyd, 84 S. E. 992, 100 S. C. 397.
7. A written agreement reciting a purchase of preferred stock and agreement by the corpora- tion to pay interest to the holder on the purchase money; and providing that at a time named, either party might, after thirty days' notice, terminate the contract, and thereupon the purchase money shou'd be re- paid holder on surrender of the
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