14. Failure to qualify instruction to find for plaintiff if injured by defendant's ngligence, so as to preclude a recovery if plaintiff's negligence contributed to the injury, held cured by another instruction. Watkins V. South Carolina W. Ry., 85 S. E. 377, 100 S. C. 458.

15. In action for negligence and wilfulness, error in limiting defense that injury was due to plaintiff's own fault, to cause of action for negligence, held not cured by subsequent correct instruction. Id.

16. A refusal to charge "that where a structure is placed upon land not to promote the convenient use of the land, but to be used for some temporary purpose, external to the land, and the land is used only as a foundation, because some foundation

is necessary for the business, then the structure and its belongings are not fixtures," is error. Saye v. Hill, 84 S. E. 307, 100 S. C. 21.

17. A charge that "if machinery in question were a part of, fixed or attached to house, a or the house was built around the machinery, or for the purpose of putting the machinery in it, and the machinery was placed in the house and attached securely and firmly to the soil, then it became "fixture;" held,

erroneous, as

ignoring other circumstances which should be considered in determining whether or not the house and machinery were fixtures. Id.

18. When so requested it became the duty of the Court to construe a deed in evidence, and charge the jury, whether or not certain articles upon the land, thereby conveyed, were not fixtures, passed with the land to the grantee. Id.

19. Where the Court through mere oversight omits to charge the jury upon a proposition of law,

and the appellant fails to call his attention to the omission, he waives it. Williams v. Weekley, 84 S. E. 299, 100 S. C. 28. 20. Where a policy of insurance stated, as required by Civil Code 1912, section 2718, the value of the property insured and amount of insurance to be carried thereon, and contained a stipulation that the policy should be void if the insured then had, or should thereafter procure, other insurance on same property, a charge that procuring additional further insurance in excess of amount stated in the policy and agreed upon by the insured and insurer without the consent of the insurer would avoid the policy, unless the insurer waived the forfeiture, approved. Wynn v. Calidonian Ins. Co., 84 S. E. 306, 100 S. C. 47.

or

21. The statement to the jury as to the rules which have been laid down by the Court for the guidance of juries in determining disputed boundaries, is not a charge upon the facts, and a refusal to give such charge, when prejudicial, is reversible error. Holden v. Cantrell, 84 S. E. 826, 100 S. C. 265.

22. It is the duty of counsel to listen to the charge and when called upon by the Court for further suggestions, to call its attention to any inconsistent instructions inadvertently given therein. Medlin v. Adams Grain & Provision Co., 84 S. E. 864, 100 S. C. 359.

23. The reading of extracts from the opinion of the Supreme Court on a former appeal reversing an order of nonsuit in refusing a renewal of such motion on a second trial was not a part of his charge, nor prejudicial to defendant. Mims v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 85 S. E. 372, 100 S. C. 375.

24. A charge to the jury need not submit all issues raised under the information, affidavit, warrant or indictment, where it submits all such issues as are necessary to sustain a conviction.

State v. Byrnes, 84 S. E. 822,
100 S. C. 230.

25. On trial of a defendant charged
with disorderly conduct the
Court need not submit all the
allegations of the warrant or in-
dictment to jury, if the allega-
tions submitted to them are suffi-
cient, if proven, to sustain a con-
viction. Id.

CHATTEL MORTAGAGES.

1. A crop mortgage, which merely
gave the name of the mortgagor
and the acreage, held valid under
Civ. Code 1912, sec. 4106, as
mentioning the property. Liv-
ingston v. Seaboard Air Line R.
Co., 84 S. E. 303, 100 S. C. 17.
2. Under Civ. Code 1912, sec. 4106,
recorded mortgage of crops, in-
sufficiently describing the land,
held to vest no right in mort-
gagee as against bona fide pur-
chaser for value of such crops.
E. W. Kimbrell Co. v. Mills &
Young Co., 84 S. E. 996, 100 S.
C. 443.

3. A chattel mortgage, when duly
filed, is constructive notice to all
the world. Brown v. Rankin,
84 S. E. 1001, 100 S. C. 371.
4. Where there was testimony tend-
ing to show agency of a third
party to receive payments due
a mortgagee, receipts given by
such party for such payments
are relevant in action against
the assignee of the mortgagee.
Williams v. Weekley, 84 S. E.
299, 100 S. C. 28.

5. An assignee after maturity of a
negotiable note, and chattel
mortgage securing

same, ac-

quires only the rights of his as-
signor, and cannot claim to be
an innocent purchaser for value
without notice of payments there-
tofore made to the mortgagee or
his agent. Williams v. Weekley,
84 S. E. 299, 100 S. C. 28.

CLAIMS.

1. Claims against a county for sal-
aries, expenses, and supplies re-
quired by statute are not debts
contracted in violation of the
statute forbidding the making of
contracts in excess of funds.

Farrish-Stafford Co. v. Lexing-
ton County, 84 S. E. 1002, 100
S. C. 311.

2. the legislature can compel a
county to levy an assessment to
meet claims for services rendered
of which the county received the
benefit, though orders were is-
sued in payment for such serv-
ices, which were invalid for lack
of funds. Farrish-Stafford Co.
v. Lexington County, 84 S. E.
1002, 100 S. C. 311.

3. The Supply Act of March 1,
1913, authorizes the payment of
claims against a county for serv-
ices rendered, though orders for
such payment were void for lack
of funds. Farrish-Stafford Co.
v. Lexington County, 84 S. E.
1002, 100 S. C. 311.

4. Under act March 1, 1913 (28

St. at Large, p. 245), relating to
payment of outstanding county
claims, held that county's dis-
count of note, and its credit of
the proceeds to private banker,
who was to purchase certain
claims, was not a payment of
such claims, and that the plain-
tiff to whom the banker had
pledged the claims might re-
cover thereon. Palmetto Nat.
Bank v. Lexington County, 84
S. E. 1006, 100 S. C. 452.

5. In an action on claims against
a county, evidence held not suffi-
cient to show that the orders
for the payment of claims were
approved by the supervisors
when there were no funds on
hand with which to pay them.
Farrish-Stafford Co. v. Lexington
County, 84 S. E. 1002, 100 S. C.
311.

CIRCUIT SOLICITOR.

1. Under Const., art. V, sec. 29,
and Civ. Code, secs. 682, 683,
694, 695 and 722, held, that the
Governor had no power to ap-
point a Circuit solicitor for a
time beyond the first general elec-
tion after a vacancy in the office.
State v. Singleton, 84 S. E. 989,
100 S. C. 465.

2. Const., art. V, sec. 29, and Civ.
Code, secs. 682, 683, 694, 695,
and 722, if construed to em-

power the Governor to appoint
a Circuit solicitor for the full
unexpired term when a vacancy
arises would be invalid. Id.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY.

1. In claim and delivery for a
mule, where defendant claimed
as assignee of a chattel mort-
gage of the mule to B, signed
by plaintiff and C, evidence that
plaintiff got the mule of C was
admissible. Williams v. Week-
ley, 84 S. E. 299, 100 S. C. 27.
2. In claim and delivery, admis-
sion of plaintiff's evidence that
money to discharge a chattel
mortgage to B, under which
defendant claimed, had
gone
through hands of C, held not
erroneous. Id.

3. In claim and delivery, it was
within the Court's discretion, on
the matter of punitive damages,
to allow plaintiff to prove cir-
cumstances that led up to tak-
ing by defendant. Id.

4. The statute providing that,
where a bond is given in claim
and delivery, no punitive dam-
ages can be recovered there-
after, applies only while the suit
is pending. Williams v. Week-
ley, 84 S. E. 299, 100 S. C. 27.
5. In a suit to recover goods which
plaintiff asserted he was entitled
to by virtue of a distress, the
question whether the distress
warrant was properly served
held for the jury. McCraw v.
Killian, 84 S. E. 868, 100 S. C.
320.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Criminal Law; Searches and
Seizures.

1. Cr. Code 1912, sec. 699, provid-
ing for the forfeiture of goods
exposed for sale on Sunday, does
not violate Const., art. I, sec.
4, declaring that the General
Assembly shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of re-
ligion. State v. Hondros, 84 S.
E. 781, 100 S. C. 242.

2. Const. U. S., amend. 5, and
Const., art. I, sec. 5, providing
for due process of law, held not
violated by Cr. Code 1912, sec.

699, et seq., providing for the
forfeiture of goods exposed for
sale on Sunday. State v. Hon-
dros, 84 S. E. 781, 100 S. C. 242.
3. In determining whether a gen-
eral law can be made applicable,
the Court will indulge every rea-
sonable presumption and solve
every reasonable doubt in favor
of its validity. Thomas v. Spar-
tanburg Ry., Gas & Electric Co.,
85 S. E. 50, 100 S. C. 478.
4. While it is primarily for the
legislature to decide whether a
general law can be made ap-
plicable, it is ultimately a judi-
cial question. Thomas v. Spar-
tanburg Ry., Gas & Electric Co.,
85 S. E. 50, 100 S. C. 478.
5. The classification made by a
statute need not be one of mathe-
matical precision, nor need it re
sult in perfect equality; it be-
ing sufficient if it is reasonable
in its main features. Thomas v.
Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Elec-
tric Co., 85 S. E. 50, 100 S. C.
478.

6. Civ. Code 1912, sec. 3950, re-
quiring certain cars to be
equipped with fenders, is not
unconstitutional as a denial of
the equal protection of the laws.
Thomas v. Spartanburg Ry.,
Gas & Electric Co., 85 S. E. 50,
100 S. C. 478.

CONTINUANCE.

1. Court held not to have abused
discretion in refusing to continue
trial until the next day because
of the absence of a witness,
where plaintiff admitted the
statement of defendant's coun-
sel as to what he would testify
to, which was read to jury.
Watkins v. South Carolina W.
Ry., 85 S. E. 377, 100 S. C. 458.

CONTRACTS.

1. Where a written contract is am-
biguous, acts of the parties
thereunder may be shown to
prove the contemporaneous con-
struction. Herndon v. Ward-
lare, 84 S. E. 112, 100 S. C. 1.
2. Where two parties make a con-
tract and rescind it and make
new contract, party who would

avail himself of any benefit
therefrom must rely on the new
contract. Moore v. Marion Cot-
ton Oil Co., 85 S. E. 52, 100 S.
C. 499.

3. That contract of sale stipulated
that purchaser should not have
exclusive right to sell held im-
material, where purchaser relied
on deceptive representations that
he would have such exclusive
right. McKinley Music Co. v.
Glymph, 84 S. E. 715, 100 S. C.

200.

4. Where contract relations exist
between an active corporation
and a passive corporation, and
where both have servants, the
two corporations may not con-
tract to relieve active corpora-
tion from responsibility for in-
jury from its negligence to
servants of passive corporation.
Carter v. Southern Ry.-Caro-
lina Division, 84 S. E. 999, 100
S. C. 403.

5. Contract of Pullman employee
ratifying contracts of Pullman
Company with defendant road
and agreeing to hold road harm
less for any damages it might
have to pay him for injury, held
invalid, so that for injury from
road's negligence employee might
recover. Id.

6. To establish a contract for the

making of mutual wills by par-
ties, one of whom is deceased,
the evidence must be definite,
certain, clear and convincing.
Dicks v. Cassels, 84 S. E. 878,
100 S. C. 341.

7. The testimony of the survivor is
incompetent under Code Civil
Proc., sec. 438, to establish
against a decedent, an alleged
contract between them, to make
mutual wills in favor of each
other. Id.

See, also, Insurance; Sales.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-

GENCE.

1. A person being suddenly con-
fronted with a situation which
he honestly believed to be one
of extreme peril, and the ap-
pearances such as to justify a
person of ordinary prudence and

reason in reaching that conclu-
sion, he would not be guilty of
negligence in acting on such ap-
pearances. Fitzgerald v. Case
Threshing Machine Co., 84 S.
E. 991, 100 S. C. 435.

2. There being evidence that an
electric car was moving very
slowly when a passenger stepped
on the running board to alight,
the question of her contributory
negligence is for the jury, and
not one of law. Yarborough v.
Columbia Ry., Gas & El. Co., 84
S. E. 308, 100 S. C. 33.
CONVICTS.

2. The word "interest," as used in
a contract by which a corpora-
tion obtained money on an is-
sue of stock, held synonymous
with "dividends," but indicative
of a loan. Id.

3. A contract which on its face
indicates a sale of corporate
stock may be shown by parol to
evidence a loan of money. Hern-
don v. Wardlaw, 84 S. E. 112,
100 S. C. 1.

4. V here a contract was made for
a corporation by its president,
the fact that it was signed “W.,
President," or "Pt.," did not
make it the personal contract
of the president. Herndon v.
Wardlaw, 84 S. E. 112, 100 S.
C. 1.

5. Under Code Civ. Proc. 1912, sec.
207, the verification of a com-
plaint of a corporation by the
assistant district manager held
sufficient. Southern Cotton Oil

Co. v. Lightsey, 84 S. E. 301,
100 S. C. 40.

COSTS.

1. Defendant in foreclosure of
agricultural lien establishing his
claim to half of the crops free
from lien held entitled in equity
and under Code, sec. 3026, to
his costs. Baird v. Weather-
ford, 85 S. E. 59, 100 S. C. 490.
2. Costs in equity cases are to be
awarded in the discretion of the

Court. Ex parte Owens, 84 S.
E. 875, 100 S. C. 324.

COUNTERCLAIMS.

1. Judgment should not be ren-
dered by default upon a coun-
terclaim in the absence of proof
to sustain it. Gibbes v. Hamil-
ton, 84 S. E. 296, 100 S. C. 59.

COUNTIES.

See Estoppel; Highways; Munici-
pal Corporations.

1. Claims against a county for sal-
aries, expenses, and supplies re-
quired by statute are not debts
contracted in violation of the
statute forbidding the making of
contracts in excess of funds.
Farrish-Stafford Co. v. Lexing-
ton County, 84 S. E. 1002, 100
S. C. 311.

2. Assignee of nonnegotiable coun-
ty warrants without notice of
any agreement between county
and assignor held subject only
to equities existing between the
county as the original obligor
and the payees or obligees. Pal-
metto Nat. Bank v. Lexington
County, 84 S. E. 1006, 100 S. C.
452.

3. The legislature can compel a
county to levy an assessment to
meet claims for services ren-
dered of which the county re-
ceived the benefit, though orders
were issued in payment for such
services, which were invalid for
lack of funds. Farrish-Stafford
Co. v. Lexington County, 84 S.
E. 1002, 100 S. C. 311.

4. The Supply Act of March 1,
1913, authorizes the payment of
claims against a county for serv- |

ices rendered, though orders for
such payment were void for
lack of funds. Farrish-Stafford
Co. v. Lexington County, 84 S.
E. 1002, 100 S. C. 311.

5. Under act March 1, 1913 (28
St. at Large, p. 245), relating
to payment of outstanding coun-
ty claims, held that county's dis-
count of note, and its credit of
the proceeds to private banker,
who was to purchase certain
claims, was not a payment of
such claims, and that the plain-
tiff to whom the banker had
pledged the claims might re-
cover thereon. Palmetto Nat.
Bank v. Lexington County, 84
S. E. 1006, 100 S. C. 452.
6. In an action on claims against
a county, evidence held not suffi-
cient to show that the orders
for the payment of claims were
approved by the supervisors
when there were no funds on
hand with which to pay them.
Farrish-Stafford Co. v. Lexing-
ton County, 84 S. E. 1002, 100
S. C. 311.

7. A navigable stream, within Civ.
Code 1912, sec. 2132, is not a
highway, within section 1972,
authorizing an action for in-
juries caused by defects in a
highway. Speights v. Colleton
County, 84 S. E. 873, 100 S. C.