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4. Because his Honor erred in ruling out the letter of J. L. Gibson and E. M. Robinson to the Carolina Machinery and Manufacturing Company, dated the 13th day of July, 1912. It is respectfully submitted that the said letter was competent evidence to show bad faith on the part of the transferor of the said note.
5. Because his Honor erred in ruling out the letter of H. T: Edens to E. M. Robinson and J. L. Gibson, dated November 13, 1912, and offered in evidence by the defendants, as the said letter was competent as tending to show that the said note was not transferred to the plaintiff in good faith.
6. Because his Honor erred in ruling out the letter of the Carolina Machinery and Manufacturing Company to the defendants, bearing date November 8, 1912, as the said letter was competent to show the purpose for which the plaintiff held the said note.
7. Because his Honor erred in ruling and holding that the defendants could not introduce any evidence as to the consideration of the said note.
8. Because his Honor erred in holding that there was no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had not acquired the note in the usual course of business and in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
9. Because his Honor erred in holding that the letter, dated November 13, 1912, written by plaintiff to defendant, when considered in the light of plaintiff's testimony, constituted no evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, or of guilty knowledge on his part.
of bad faith on the part of plaintiff in the purchase of the note could have been drawn.
12. Because his Honor erred in directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the reason that the evidence shows facts, when considered collectively or singly, which impute bad faith on the part of the plaintiff.
14. Because his Honor erred in holding that the evidence admitted and the evidence offered, was susceptible of only one legal inference, to wit, that the plaintiff was the bona fide purchaser for value of the note in the usual course of business and without knowledge of any defect in title in his transferor.
Messrs. Raysor & Summers, E. B. Friday and A. J. Hydrick, for appellants, submit: Evidence as to payee's bad faith admissible: 36 Mich. 371; 100 Iowa 481; 49 N. W. 539; 97 N. Y. Supp. 360; 49 Misc. Rep. 257; 15 S. D. 444; 90 N. W. 856; 16 S. D. 360; 92 N. W. 1066; 91 S. C. 455; 74 S. E. 977; 75 S. C. 127; 91 S. C. 305; 74 S. E. 648. Questions for jury: 163 N. C. 199; 79 S. E. 498; 135 Pac. 373; 160 S. W. 126; 142 N. Y. Supp. 380; 54 N. Y. Supp. 685; 34 S. E. 695; 56 S. C. 409; 196 Fed. 640; 116 C. C. A. 314; 196 Fed. 773; 132 N. W. 168.
Mr. Adam H. Moss, for respondent, cites: 91 S. C. 455; 97 S. C. 52, and 98 S. C. 220.
March 1, 1915.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by MR. JUSTICI: WATTS.
This was an action on a note brought by the plaintiff against the defendants. The complaint alleges that the defendants made and delivered their promissory note, dated June 26, 1912, to the Carolina Machinery and Manu
11. November 11
cent. per annum until paid, together with the costs of collection and attorney's fees; and that before maturity, for a valuable consideration, the Carolina Machinery and Manufacturing Company sold and delivered the said note to the plaintiff and that he is the lawful owner and holder thereof, and that the full amount is due thereon with interest, etc., as provided in said note. The defendants by their answer deny the allegations of the complaint and set up a failure of consideration of the note, alleging the facts in detail, and allege when plaintiff purchased the note and when it was transferred to him he had knowledge of these facts, and that the note was transferred to him after maturity of the note, and that he was not an innocent purchaser of the same for value before maturity. The case came on for trial before Judge Moore and a jury, and at the conclusion of the testimony his Honor held there was no testimony to go to the jury and he directed a verdict for the plaintiff. After judgment was entered the defendants appealed, and by fourteen exceptions allege error on the part of his Honor. At the hearing of the case in this Court the fifth exception was withdrawn and abandoned.
Exceptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 complain of error in excluding certain letters of the Carolina Machinery and Manufacturing Company of date of July 3, 1912, and November 8,
1912, and letter of plaintiff to defendants, dated 1 November 13, 1912, and ledger sheet showing
account of plaintiff with the Carolina Machinery and Manufacturing Company, and stub of check book of the Carolina Machinery and Manufacturing Company, dated November 13, 1912. Plaintiff testified that he
sold the note; this would not be competent to affect plaintiff's rights who purchased after that time, unless it was brought home to him that he had knowledge of the contents of the letters and nothing of that sort is developed in the testimony, and his Honor was clearly right in excluding these letters.
In excluding the ledger sheet and stub of check book his Honor was following the law as laid down by this Court in Wells v. Hays, 93 S. C. 170, 76 S. E. 195, 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 727, and cases therein cited by Mr. Justice 2,3 Hydrick, who wrote the opinion of the Court. It
does not matter if the party who transferred the note acted in bad faith, if the party who purchased it acted in good faith and was an innocent purchaser for value before maturity, then he would be entitled to recover. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff had notice of any defect before purchase by him. There was no proof of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, who was the holder of the note, or proof of such facts that would put a prudent man on inquiry. .
The other exceptions complain of error on the part of his Honor in directing a verdict. We have held that he was correct in excluding the evidence attempted to be intro
duced by the defendants and with that excluded 4 There was nothing left in the case to make out the
attempted defense, and the Court was correct in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. Bank v. Stackhouse, 91 S. C. 455, 74 S. E. 977, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454; Bank v. Il’allace, 97 S. C. 52, 80 S. E. 460; Bank v. Grimes, 98
1. EVIDENCE—TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS.—Where a corporation is called
up over the telephone at its place of business, and some one answers showing familiarity with the matter about which inquiry is made, and stating he was one of the corporation, the conversation is admissible in evidence, especially where it is not denied, explained or con
tradicted when the corporation offered testimony. 2. SALES-FAILURE TO DELIVER-DAMAGES.—For breach of a contract to
sell and deliver goods, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time of the breach of contract.
3. TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS-ERROR CURED.-In an action for failure to
deliver hay contracted for, where the Court erroneously charged that the measure of damages was the difference between the contract price and the highest market price of the same article at the time the suit was brought, the error was harmless, when corrected in other portions of the charge, stating that the measure of damages was the difference in the value of the article furnished and the article purchased at the time and place agreed upon for delivery, and where the verdict of the jury showed that they were not misled by the error; their judgment being greatly less than it would have been,
had they fixed the damages under the Court's erroneous charge. 4. CHARGE—Trial.-It is the duty of counsel to listen to the charge and
when called upon by the Court for further suggestions, to call its attention to any inconsistent instructions inadvertently given therein.
Before Gary, J., Bennettsville, Fall term, 1914. Affirmed.
Action by J. T. Medlin against Adams Grain and Provision Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.