We think refusal to permit the requested nonsuit was error and for that reason the judgment below must be reversed. This makes it unnecessary to consider the other point.

The Act of June 1, 1872,-The Conformity Act―(Rev. Stats., §914; c. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197) provides: "The practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the circuit and district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding."

Construing the statute in Nudd v. Burrows (1875), 91 U. S. 426, 441, 442, this court said: "The purpose of the provision is apparent upon its face. No analysis is necessary to reach it. It was to bring about uniformity in the law of procedure in the Federal and State courts of the same locality. It had its origin in the codeenactments of many of the States. While in the Federal tribunals the common-law pleadings, forms, and practice were adhered to, in the State courts of the same district the simpler forms of the local code prevailed. This involved the necessity on the part of the bar of studying two distinct systems of remedial law, and of practicing according to the wholly dissimilar requirements of both. The inconvenience of such a state of things is obvious. The evil was a serious one. It was the aim of the provision in question to remove it. This was done by bringing about the conformity in the courts of the United States which it prescribes. The remedy was complete. The personal administration by the judge of his duties while sitting upon the bench was not complained of. The personal conduct and administration of the judge in the discharge of his separate functions, is, in our judgment,

neither practice, pleading, nor a form nor mode of proceeding within the meaning of those terms as found in the context." See also Indianapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, 300.

"It is now a settled rule in the courts of the United States that whenever, in the trial of a civil case, it is clear that the state of the evidence is such as not to warrant a verdict for a party, and that if such a verdict were rendered the other party would be entitled to a new trial, it is the right and duty of the judge to direct the jury to find according to the views of the court. Such is the constant practice, and it is a convenient one. It saves time and expense. It gives scientific certainty to the law in its application to the facts and promotes the ends of justice." Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16, 18; Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 122; Oscanyan v. Arms Company, 103 U. S. 261, 265; Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 109 U. S. 478, 482; District of Columbia v. Moulton, 182 U. S. 576, 582; Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 113. And this rule is not subject to modification by state statutes or constitutions. Indianapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Horst, supra; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. v. Vickers, 122 U. S. 360, 363; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436, 442.

At the common law, as generally understood and applied, a nonsuit could be taken freely at any time before verdict if not indeed before judgment. Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 457; Derick v. Taylor, 171 Massachusetts, 444, 445; Bac. Abr. Nonsuit (D). And see Pleasants v. Fant, supra, 122. The right is substantial. When and how it may be asserted we think are questions relating directly to practice and mode of proceeding within intendment of the Conformity Act.

Section 3387, Virginia Code (1904), provides: "A party shall not be allowed to suffer a non-suit, unless he do so before the jury retire from the bar." Prior to this provision, a plaintiff there had the absolute right to take a

voluntary nonsuit at any time before verdict. Harrison v. Clemens, 112 Virginia, 371, 373. Chapter 27, Va. Acts, 1912, directs "That in no action tried before a jury shall the trial judge give to the jury a peremptory instruction directing what verdict the jury shall render." And c. 42, Idem, provides: "In all suits or motions hereafter. when the evidence is concluded before the court and jury, the party tendering the demurrer to evidence shall state in writing specifically the grounds of demurrer relied on, and the demurree shall not be forced to join in the said demurrer until the specific grounds upon which the demurrant relies are stated in writing; nor shall any grounds of demurrer not thus specifically stated be considered, except that the court may, in its discretion, allow the demurrant to withdraw the demurrer; may allow the joinder in demurrer to be withdrawn by the demurree, and new evidence admitted, or a non-suit to be taken until the jury retire from the bar."

Citing Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 362, 373, and Richardson v. Boston, 19 How. 263, (see also Schuchardt v. Allens, 1 Wall. 359, 370), petitioner maintains that in the federal courts the practice of directing verdicts has superseded the demurrer to evidence and should be controlled by the same general principles. Therefore, it is said, the statutory rule which gives the judge discretion to allow or refuse a nonsuit after joinder in such a demurrer applies when there is a motion for directed verdict.

Obviously the laws of Virginia recognize a marked distinction between demurrer to evidence and direction of a verdict the former is permitted, the latter is expressly prohibited. And the different nature and effect of the two things has been pointed out in Oscanyan v. Arms Company, supra, 264; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 39; and Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U. S. 364, 388. The conclusion announced in Parks v. Southern Ry. Co., 143

Fed. Rep. 276, 277, that because federal courts may in proper cases direct verdicts, therefore, in the exercise of sound discretion they may deny an application for leave to take a nonsuit and direct verdict for defendant is not well founded.

Under the Virginia statute, in the absence of a demurrer to the evidence and joinder therein, the plaintiff may take a nonsuit at any time before submission of the case to the jury and their retirement. The Conformity Statute gives the same right in federal courts. This conclusion accords with opinions by the Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits. Knight v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 180 Fed. Rep. 368; Meyer v. National Biscuit Co., 168 Fed. Rep. 906; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Metalstaff, 101 Fed. Rep. 769.

The judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court with direction to set aside the judgment in favor of respondent and sustain motion to enter a nonsuit. Knight v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., supra, 374; Harrison v. Clemens, supra, 374, 375.

Reversed.

TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY ET AL. v. LEATHERWOOD.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, SECOND SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT, OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.

No. 249. Submitted March 19, 1919.-Decided June 9, 1919.

Under the Carmack Amendment, connecting carriers, by requiring a shipper to sign new bills of lading for a shipment billed over their lines by the initial carrier, are not estopped to avail themselves of a provision of the original bill limiting the time for bringing actions

478.

Opinion of BRANDEIS, J.

for damages, (p. 481), where the new bills were not acquiesced in by the shipper. P. 483.

A stipulation in a bill of lading limiting to six months the time within which the shipper may sue for damages is not unreasonable and, before the Act of March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196, was valid under the Carmack Amendment. P. 481.

Where matter clearly not required for a proper presentation of the questions submitted is incorporated into the transcript, the court may, under Rule 8, § 1, require that the whole of the clerk's fees for supervising the printing and the cost of printing the record be borne by the offending party. P. 482.

Reversed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. George Thompson and Mr. J. H. Barwise, Jr., for petitioners.

Mr. D. T. Bomar for respondent. Mr. J. E. Garland was on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS announced the judgment of the court, and delivered the following opinion:

Leatherwood made, in 1913, a shipment of horses from Watrous, New Mexico, to Waco, Texas, over four connecting railroads. The initial carrier gave him a through bill of lading which contained a provision barring any action for damages unless suit was brought within six months after the loss occurred. When the horses reached the lines of the Texas & Pacific Railway and of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, each of these companies insisted, as a condition of carrying them further, that Leatherwood accept and sign a new bill of lading covering the shipment over its line, and he did so.

In 1915 he brought suit in a state court of Texas for injury to the horses while in transit on the lines of those two companies. The bills of lading issued by them did