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The widow's share in property other than the homestead should bear its proportion of mortgage in debtedness to which she has assented by joining in the execution of the mortgage, and she can only claim, in such case, her distributive share of the proceeds of the property, after the mortgage indebtedness has been satisfied therefrom: Trowbridge v. Sypher, 55-352; McGlothlen v. Hite, 55-392; but when the portion set off to the widow for dower includes the homestead, such homestead is not to be subjected to the payment of a mortgage covering it together with other property, though the widow joined in such mortgage, until such other property is exhausted: Wilson 1. Hardesty, 48-515; McGlothlen v. Hite, supra; Wells v. Wells, 57410.

Lucas v. Sawyer. 17-517, followed: Parker v. Smail, 55-732.

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§ 2455, become entitled to a one-half interest in property of her husband, the excess over one-third is not dower interest, and may be defeated by will, by debts, &c.: See notes to that section.

A wife who obtains a divorce from her husband thereupon loses all claim to a share in his property should she survive him: Martin v. Marvin, 59-699; Boyles v. Latham, 61-174.

Where a man against whom a decree of divorce had previously been rendered at the suit of a woman claiming to be his wife, made an exchange of land with another who knew the fact of such divorce and be lieved that the party against whom it was rendered was therefore un married, and the transaction of exchange was effected through a son, by a former marriage, of the party against whom the divorce was ren dered, such son and agent remaining silent as to the fact that his mother was yet living; held, that such son was estopped from claiming against the party with whom the exchange of property was made, that his moth

The statute of limitations does not run against an unrelinquished right of dower, before it becomes vested by death of the husband or wife: Hurleman v. Hazlett, 55-256. The doctrine of Robertson v. Robertson, 25-350, that a relinquisher was living in another state at the ment of dower in an agreement to separate is binding, is changed by § 2203. Such a relinquishment is no longer valid: Linton v Crosby, 54478.

The widow's dower interest is only one-third. Though she may, under

time that such exchange was made, and that she survived his father and became entitled to a dower interest in such property which descended to him as her surviving heir: Williams v. Wells, 16 N. W. Rep., 513.

A sale of real property by an as

signee under an assignment for the benefit of creditors is a judicial sale within the terms of this section, and bars any contingent right of dower in the property: Stidger v. Erans, 19 N. W. Rep., 850.

If a widow, entitled to dower, fails to have her interest defined and set apart in her lifetime her heirs may recover the same after death: Potter v. Worley, 57-66.

Where the wife voluntarily unites in the conveyance of real property and the proceeds are invested by the husband in other property, title of which is taken in the name of a third person, the wife has no cause of action against her husband for the pro

SEC. 2452.

The widow's consent must be made of record within the six months. She will not be bound or estopped by a writing not so made of record: Baldozier v. Haynes, 57-683.

The provisions of a will considered, and held subject to the same construction as in Cain v. Cain, 23-31; Van Guilder v. Justice, 56-669.

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tection of her dower right: Beck v. Beck, 19 N. W. Rep., 876.

Where mechanics' liens and taxes on decedent's real property have been paid with money provided from the personal estate, such liens and taxes should not be deducted from the widow's share of the real estate: Conger v. Cook, 57-49; Linton v. Crosby, 61-293.

The widow's share in real property is subject to a pro rata liability for mortgages upon the whole of the property in which she joined. In case of a homestead her share therein should only be subjected to a pro rata liability for the mortgages upon it alone: Conger v. Cook, 57-49.

656..

This provision applies as well to a will executed before marriage as to one executed after marriage: Ward v. Wolf, 56-465.

The "widow's share" here referred to, means her "distributive share,' as referred to in § 2437 and § 2441, and applies to her portion of personal property, as well as of real property; and this section prohibits a disposition by will of either personal or real property which operates to deprive the widow of her share therein (Overruling Estate of Davis, 3624): Ibid.

It is only the widow's one-third, and not the whole of the one-half wich she may be entitled to as distributive share under § 2455, that cannot be affected by will. See note

SEC. 2454.

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to that section,

It is not proper for a court upon proof that the surviving husband or wife had knowledge of the will from the first, and that it was in accordance with his wishes, to enter an order more than six months after the death of the party whose consent is thus established to take under the will. After the expiration of six months, consent alone does not defeat the party's rights. It cannot be claimed that if no notice be given, the consent may be entered at any time: Houston v. Lane, 17 N. W. Rep., 514.

Under the corresponding section in the revision, held that the acceptance of the provisions of a will would not bar a widow's right to dower where the provisions of the will are not inconsistent with her dower right: Potter v. Worley, 57-66.

Where a husband devises his real estate to his widow during her natural life such devise is not inconsistent with the dower right of the widow in the land devised: Blair v. Wilson, 57-177.

657.

Where by a special act of another state, the adoption of a child was authorized, and it was declared that such child should inherit from the adopting parents, or either of them, as if she were their legitimate child, held, that such adopted child did not thereby become entitled by virtue of

this section to inherit property situated in this state, left by the father of her adopting father, dying in this state after having survived such adopting parents: The Estate of Sunderland, 60–730.

Where at the time of decedent's death, his son was already deceased,

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