commissioners of Massachusetts and Connecticut, attended by an armed guard, he could not use the persuasions which had proved effectual with the Narragansetts in their fathers' days, and there was now no Canonicus to give effect to his words. The Narragansetts were, and had been, for weeks or months' in daily communication with Philip, and it seemed (June 27, 1675) that Philip durst not have proceeded so far, without assurances of their aid. But they were for the moment overawed by the firm bearing of the commissioners of Massachusetts and Connecticut,—denied that they had sent men to Philip, promised that they never would, and gave assurances of fidelity and peace. But with all their fair promises, Williams was not deceived. The lawless conduct of their tribesmen gave him occasion to suspect that all the fine words from the Indian Sachems to us, were but words of policy, falsehood and treachery." He feared that it was useless, but he made a last and painful effort for the people to whom he had dedicated his life." While he was yet endeavouring to persuade the Narragansetts, the work of destruction had been begun by the Wampanoags, (June 24), and his labour was at an end.

It has been of late, somewhat usual to overrate the ability displayed by Philip of Mount Hope, in his warfare upon civilisation. The facts scarcely warrant the commendation. He possessed none of the coolness, shrewdness and self-restraint of old Canonicus, or of many Indian leaders of later days, and had none of his discernment of the power of civilisation. His own social system-the only one he knew-without union among its tribes, or loyalty, or good faith among its people, had not enabled him to appreciate the tenacity of purpose of a race of a higher moral level, who had faith in one another, and a government behind them which trusted them, and which they could

(1)Narr. Club Pub., VI. 370.

(2) Ibid., p. 367.

(3) Letter of June, 27, 1675, Ibid., p. 369. "Sir, my old bones and eyes are weary with travel and writing to the Governors of Massachusetts and Rhode Island and now to yourselves," etc.

trust, in return. He knew that the Wampanoags had abandoned the Narragansetts, on the first inducements from the colony of Plymouth. Could he hope for anything better, in any ill fortune to himself? Had the scattered English no support from beyond the sea? What hope of escape had he, in the event of failure? Such thoughts have occurred to abler chiefs than Philip. His sole and absorbing purpose was the immediate gratification of revenge for insults to himself.

The uprising of the Indians was hopeless from the beginning. The English were now too numerous for their assaults, and their only hope was in the aid of the King of France. But Louis XIV showed no zeal in behalf of his brother sovereigns of the Narragansetts and Wampanoags. It was a time of peace, and French officers from Canada could give aid only by stealthy supplies of powder, but not by any active service or command. If Philip had possessed the sagacity of some of his race in later days, he would have chosen the opportunity afforded by a war with France. He would then have received active assistance of the most formidable character, and in the event of failure, he and his people would have been included in a treaty of peace. It was fortunate for New England that he had not patience. The superiority of the English navy was not then established. A few battalions led by officers who had learned soldiership in the campaigns of Turenne or Luxembourg, aided by engineers of the school of Vauban, and a few men of war in the harbour of Boston,-while the Indians ravaged the interior,- might, we may apprehend, have been an overmatch for Major General Gookin, and the Boston trainbands. In the end we cannot doubt that England would have vindicated her sovereignty. But if a war could have been protracted until Massachusetts was exhausted and the territory had been reconquered by English troops, her political organisation would never have been reconstructed upon the old foundations. The Puritan rule had gone by in England, and the counsellors of Charles II would have built up another New

England, upon a new Plymouth rock. A second New England would have been after the model of Virginia or New York.

It was well that Philip of Pokanoket could not form such a combination as this. It would not be fair to judge him by a comparison with chiefs of the Sioux or Dacotahs of recent times. Some of these have received a tincture of education from French missionary priests, and know the white man's character and policy, and have learned a strategy troublesome even to a great nation. Philip had few of these advantages. His military ideas had been learned from the English in his neighbourhood, and in his day, they had but little of such teaching to impart.' He should be contrasted with the enemies of civilisation nearer to his own day. The American colonies have encountered foes like Pontiac or Brant far more able and dangerous than he. These were for a time, more successful, having calmness and self-command, both to plan and to execute, and the forecast not to close behind them, in the event of failure, the door of advantageous retreat and submission. Philip like others, could choose his time, and in choosing it, he took no account of the work before him, or of his possible allies, but seems to have been urged onward by mere rage and hatred. He must have known that Boston was the citadel of New England, and that he had done little until she was overcome, and Boston he could not venture to attack. He knew that the Mohegans were living quietly under the rule of Connecticut, and that her whole force was available against him. Did he look for a retreat, behind him there was no inaccessible wilderness, in which he could take refuge until he could renew the contest. In his rear was Sir Edmund Andros, with the

(1) See Hutchinson's Hist. Mass. I. 281. The fact that the "Praying Indians" at Natick had military officers of their own seems to have been known to Philip in 1676. He then said: "Praying Indians were subjects to Massachusetts and had officers and magistrates appointed; -they (i. e. the Wampanoags) had no such thing with them and therefore were not subject."

(2) Governor of New York in 1675-6. Hutchinson's Coll., p. 490. Same in

Mohawks, friendly to the English, and ready to fall upon the confederates of the Wampanoags. Craft, dissimulation, power to watch opportunity or to wait events were exhibited by chiefs who have undertaken like enterprises, but they were wanting in Philip of Mount Hope. And so ended his career, involving in a common ruin all who had joined him in his desperate undertakings with a haste and passion which did not suffer them to estimate the probabilities of success, or the certain consequences of failure.

To this reckless leader, the Narragansetts listened with no appearance of dissent. The times were strangely altered, with this new generation. Old Canonicus would never have suffered the inferior, and once subject Wampanoags to dictate the policy of his tribe. There was none like him now, and they went headlong to destruction, with their young Sachem Canonchet. It is not probable that he had philosophy enough to determine whether it were preferable to risk a sudden destruction, or to waste away in servitude to a superior race.

In anticipation of what was coming, the force of the Narragansetts had been anxiously estimated, during their later years. In the absence of statistics or of trustworthy contemporary evidence, it seems probable that the tribe had been steadily diminishing, during the thirty years before. The fighting men had slowly wasted away. Not more than a thousand

Prince Society's Collections. 2d Vol. of Hutchinson papers, p. 225-26. E. Randolph's Narrative, 1676.

"The governor of New York hath proved very serviceable to the Massachusetts in this warre, and had the magistrates of Boston either conferred with, or hearkened to the advice of Colonel Andross, the Indian warre had either been diverted or proved less destructive, for he offered, and would have engaged the Mohawks and Maquot Indians to have fallen upon the Sachem Philip and his confederates, but his friendly advice and offers, were slighted, nevertheless Colonel Andros, out of his dutie to his Majestie, kept the aforesaid Indians from taking any part with the Sachim Philip."

See Prince Society's Collection, Andros tracts, Vol. I. preface, pp. xvi, xvii. "New England Faction discovered," by E. Randolph, II. No. 14, p. 16-17.

can be shown to have perished in 1675-6, of whom as many Yet with the loss of them the force There was no power of recovery.

died by cold as by battle. of the nation was gone.

To preserve this last remnant, Williams made a last effort among the Narragansetts. But he had now grown old, and Canonicus had left no successor. He told the young Sachem and his men that Philip was his looking-glass." This appeal to his pride failing, Williams forewarned him of the future. "He was deaf to all advice, and now was overset. He catched at every part of the country, to save himself but he shall never get "I told him that if he were false to his engagements, we would pursue them into a winter's war, when they should not as musketoes and rattlesnakes in warm weather bite us." With this forecast of the future, ended the last words of Williams to the Narragansetts.

ashore."

Early in the summer of 1675, the alarm had overspread New England. There was ample cause for it, for with the exception of Boston and its neighborhood-New Haven and Hartford, there were few towns in New England able to repel attack. There could now be no adequate preparation. We know not at present, whether to wonder most at the hardihood or the inexperience of the settlers, of the upper Connecticut valley. Beyond the reach of military support, from Boston, and unable to assist each other, they had built upon an Indian frontier, as if it were a place of rest and peace, and so it was with nearly the whole of New England. Excepting the clearings, around the villages, nearly the whole country was forest and wilderness, and an enemy could approach unperceived to the very doors. A sufficient number of men could not be detailed, for outpost service, and there was no field artillery or any adequate supply of munitions of war. If such were the situation of Massachusetts, Rhode Island differed only for the worse. Newport felt

(1)Gen. Gookin, the most competent judge of military affairs at that time says "all that people cannot make above one thousand able men," Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1st series, I. 148.