In abating a nuisance, no act which is unnecessary to the abatement is allowed,21 but it does not follow that no abatement is allowed which is not made necessary by the nuisance. An abatement never can become necessary in any proper sense of the term. The cases which fail to make this distinction do but confuse the manner and limits of the exercise of a right, with the right itself. One who is not injured by, and cannot sue for, a private nuisance, cannot abate it, for the obvious reason that as to him it is not a nuisance. Indeed, a private nuisance has no existence except when maintained against the will of the person affected by it, and no other person will be heard to say what that will is. A public nuisance, on the contrary, does not depend for its existence upon the will of any person or number of persons adversely adversely affected by it. It is erected and maintained in open violation of law. It has been constantly assumed by those who hold the special injury theory, that in abating a public nuisance where there is no special injury, the property of the wrongdoer is destroyed. We have already attempted to show that if property is ndeed destroyed by the abatement of public nuisancès, the special injury can afford no justi21 Roberts v. Rose, 4 Hurl & C. 102; Rex v. Pappineau, 1 Str. 688; Baten's Case, 9 Co. 53; Arundel v. v. McCulloch, 10 Mass. 70; Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. 332; State v. Moffett, 1 Gr. 247; Finley v. Hershey, 41 Iowa, 389; Moffett v. Brewer, 1 Gr. 348; Gates v. Blincoe, 2 Dana, 158; Gray v. Ayres, 7 Dana, 375; Philber v. Matson, 14 Pa. St. 306; Austria v. Day, 3 DeGex, F. & J. 217; Hicks v. Dorn, 42 N. Y. 47. Where any excess of a right may be abated without interference with the right, such interference cannot be justified. Greensdale v. Halliday, 6 Bing. 379; Dyer v. Depui, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 584; Shepard v. People, 40 Mich. 487. But where one in exercising a right, transforms it so as to make it include a right not granted, in such a manner that the wrongful part cannot be abated without abating the rightful part, the whole may be abated. As where one has a right to flow clean water over the land of another, and flows dirty water, the entire flow of water may be stopped. Crossland v. Borough of Pottsville, 126 Pa. St. 511; Cawkwell v. Russell, 26 L. J. Ex. 34; Beard v. Murphy, 37 Vt. 101; Sutclife v. Surveyora, 32 L. J. Q. B. 136. Harm flowing naturally from the abatement constitutes no ground of complaint. Hawk. P. C. 695, § 12; Lodie v. Arnold, Salk. 458; Indianapolis v. Miller, 27 Ind. 394; Northrup v. Burrows, 10 Abb. Pr. 365. In Coe v. Schultz, 48 Barb. 67, the court says: "It seems, however, to have been held in a plea justifying such abatement or removal it was not necessary to show that the defendant did as little damage as might be, and this clearly shows the favor with which the common law regarded this summary process of abating a public nuisance." fication or palliation for the act. But the assumption is false. In instances of great and common jeopardy of property, a part may indeed be destroyed to prevent the loss of all. A public nuisance, however, is not property, and any act which puts an end to it or destroys it can injure nobody, any more than the act of confining or subduing dan-, gerous elements can be the cause of complaint. If a nuisance is erected under contract, the contract is void.22 Every act of the person erecting it is a violation of the law. Any structure erected wholly within a highway is unlawful ab initio, and the law which it openly violates can never be invoked for its protection.23 To say that a person abating it must be specially injured by it, is to higgle about nothing, and incorporate into the law elements which it does not possess. Where the structure is partly within the highway and partly outside of it, and room enough is left to pass, complications affecting the question whether it is or not a nuisance, with which it is not the purpose of this article to deal, arise; but in no case can the existence or non-existence of special injury throw any light upon the subject, and given the fact of nuisance, the person who abates and does not go beyond the nuisance itself in his abatement, is not liable. The right to abate does not depend upon the right to sue. A private person can only sue for an injury to him in his private capacity. 22 Bishop on Cont. (2d ed.) §§ 471 and 549; Moore v. Jackson, 2 Abb. N. C. 211. In Moore v. Jackson the court says: "There can be no doubt but what the occupation of the stream by the plaintiff or by his license was illegal and unauthorized. He can found no right on, and no claim can accrue to him from such a perversion of the natural and common privileges of all men. He might as well seek to recover for the use of the free air above his farm. The law will imply no obligation to pay him a price for such consideration, and even an express agreement should be considered as void, as being illegal and against public policy." This was an action for use of plaintiff's shore on a navigable stream for mooring a raft in the navigable portion of the stream without authority. 23 Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 9; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend. 397; Lord v. Chadbourne, 42 Me. 429; Sherman v. Fall River, I. W. Co. 5 Allen, 213; Underhill v. Manchester, 45 N. H. 214; Field v. Stonely, 99 Pa. St. 306; Harvey v. DeWoody, 18 Ark. 252; Davis v. Williams, 16 Ad. & El. N. S. 546; Jones v. Williams, 11 M. & W. 176; Burling v. Read, 11 Q. B. 904. It is conceived that a structure whose erection is prohibited, and whose construction is unlawful ab initio does not occupy a more favorable position than one which was lawful at first but subsequently by neglect or otherwise becomes unlawful. 24 The following authorities are to the effect that an encroachment upon a highway amounting to a public nuisance may be abated by any one: Hart v. Mayor, 9 Wend. 589; Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend. 250; Lancaster T. Co. v. Rogers, 2 Pa. St. 114; Selman v. Wolfe, 27 Tex. 68; Burnham v. Hotchkiss 14 Conn. 311; Gates v. Blincoe, 2 Dana, 158; Griffin v. Mayor, 9 N. Y. 462; Peckham v. Henderson, 27 Barb. 211; Gunter v. Geary, 1 Cal. 462; Strickland v. Woodworth, 3 Thomp. & Co. 286; McLean v. Matthews, 7 Ill. App. 599; Arundel v. McCulloch, 10 Mass. 70; Low v. Knowlton, 26 Me. 128; Renwick v. Morris, 3 Hill, 623; Graves v. Shattuck, 35 N. H. 257; State v. Dibble, 4 Jones, 107; State v. Parrott, 71 N. C. 311; Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143; Dimmett v. Eskridge, 6 Mansf. 308; Harrington v. Edwards, 17 Wis. 586; Childs v. Nelson, 69 Wis. 125. The case of Childs v. Nelson decides that a structure willfully and intentionally erected so as to encroach on a public street, may be removed summarily by the officers of the city, though the structure be permanent and valuable. Dimmett v. Eskridge decides that a partial obstruction of a highway is an abatable nuisance. It has often been said that the question was not decided in Hart v. Mayor, but Sutherland, J., in that case says: "The real question in this case is not whether the ordinance in question, considered as a legislative act, is valid, but whether the corporation had power upon any principle whatever to do the act authorized to be done." And further, "It seems to be sufficient to show that the obstruction was illegal, and that the party removing it, either as one of the community at large in the case of a public highway, or by special grant in the case of a private way, had a right to an unobstructed passage there. Every citizen has a right to an unobstructed passage over the navigable waters and public highways of the State, and I apprehend he may remove any obstruction to his passage, and that it will not be neccessary for him to aver that he was specially impeded by it." Edmonds, Senator, said: "Any person may abate a common nuisance. Such I understand to be the language of the cases. These cases contain no limitation of the power of abating nuisances to those prejudiced by them." The following authorities allow an abatement by any person, the nuisance being an obnoxious or dangerous house or factory. Harvey v. DeWoody, 18 Ark. 252; Meeker v. Van Rensselear, 15 Wend. 397; Manhattan Mf'g Co. v. Van Keuren, 23 N. Y. Eq. 251; Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 67. In Coe v. Schultz, the court says: "The defendants have justified or undertaken to justify under the metropolitan sanitary act; but if the business or manufacturing process of plaintiff was a public quisance, how can I, deciding this motion, disregard the common law rights of defendants as citizens to abate the nuisance. I see no principle upon which I can." See also Bishop Non-Cont. Law, § 430. TRADE-MARK-INFRINGEMENT-INJUNCTION. LIGGETT & MEYERS TOBACCO CO. V. SAM REID TOBACCO CO. Supreme Court of Missouri. March 23, 1891. For many years the plaintiff has made a tobacco, to each plug of which it attached six five-pointed stars made of tin, with a hole in the center. After the "Star" tobacco had become well known, the defendant put on the market "Buzz-Saw" tobacco, to which is attached a tin symbol of the same size as the plaintiff's with eight points slightly inclined to the right, a hole in the center, and the words "Buzz" dimly impressed on the surface. It is attached to the plug the same as the star of the plaintiff. Held, that the "Buzz-Saw" symbol was an infringement of the plaintiff's trade-mark, and that its use should be enjoined. BLACK, J.: This suit was instituted in the Buchanan circuit court to enjoin the defendant from manufacturing, selling, or offering for sale, plug tobacco having affixed thereto the mark of a star or a mark resembling a star, in imitation of plaintiff's trade-mark. On final hearing of the cause, the circuit court dissolved the temporary injunction, gave judgment for defendant, and also assessed damages on the injunction bond, and gave judgment therefor in favor of the defendant. From the proofs and admissions made at the hearing it appears the firm of Liggett & Myers had been for many years prior to January, 1878, engaged in the manufacture and sale of plug tobacco at the city of St. Louis, in this State. The plaintiff corporation was organized under the laws of this State at the last-mentioned date, and became the successor of the firm of Liggett & Myers, and as such successor acquired the business, goodwill, and trade-marks of the old firm. The firm of Liggett & Myers was the first to adopt a star as a trade-mark. It is a symbol in the form of a five-pointed star made of tin, with a circular hole cut through the center. Six of these stars are attached to each plug of tobacco. This brand. manufactured by the plaintiff, is well and favorably known, and has a large sale throughout the United States, and is called the "Star Tobacco." The defendant, a corporation organized under the laws of this State, began the manufacture of plug tobacco at St. Joseph in December, 1888, long after the plaintiff's trade-mark had become well known to the trade. The defendant adopted a device as a trade-mark, of which complaint is made. It is a symbol of the same size as that of the plaintiff, made on tin, with eight points slightly inclined to the right, with a hole in the center, and has the word "Buzz" dimly impressed upon the surface. It is attached to the plugs the same as the star of the plaintiff. The defendant placed its tobacco upon the market, calling it the “BuzzSaw," at a few cents per pound less than the price at which plaintiff sold its brand “Star," and as a result there was a very great depreciation in sales made by plaintiff for five or six months. While experts in the tobacco business would readily detect the difference between the two brands, still it is apparent, from an inspection of the tags, that an ordinary consumer would not notice the differ ence. Indeed there is a vast amount of evidence in the case showing that this "Buzz-Saw" was often sold as "Star Tobacco," and in many instances the consumer purchased and paid for the defendant's brand, supposing and believing at the time that he got what he called for, namely, "Star Tobacco." The general principles of the law concerning trade-marks are well settled. A person has a right to the exclusive use of marks, forms, or symbols appropriated by him for the purpose of pointing out the true origin or ownership of the article manufactured by him. The limitation upon this right is that such designs or words may not be used for the simple purpose of naming or describing the quality of the goods; for to permit that would be to foster a monopoly, while the great purpose of the law of trade-marks is to protect the owner in the exclusive use of his device which distinguishes his product from other similar articles, and to protect the public against fraud and deception. Any contrivance, design, device, name, or symbol may be used as a trade-mark for the purpose of pointing out the true source and origin of the goods to which it is affixed. Under some circumstances, the name of a place may be used as a trade-mark. The law is also well settled that one who has appropriated a trade-mark to distinguish his goods from other similar goods has a property right in it,-a right that will be protected by injunction against the infringing party. To entitle the plaintiff to a perpetual injunction, the imitation need not be exact or perfect. To constitute an infringement, it will be sufficient to show that the imitation is such as would be likely to mislead one in the ordinary course of purchasing the goods, and lead him to suppose or believe that he was purchasing the genuine article. It is not necessary to show that any one has in point of fact been deceived, nor is it, at this day, necessary to show intentional fraud. The following cases, and many others, assert some one or all of the foregoing principles of law: Filley v. Fassett, 44 Mo. 168; Manufactuaing Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51; Newman v. Alvord, 51 N. Y. 189; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; McCartney v. Garnhart, 45 Mo. 593; Hostetter v. Vowinkle, 1 Dill. 330; Shaver v. Shaver, 54 Iowa, 208, 6 N. W. Rep. 188. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the case in hand, there can be no doubt but the defendant should be perpetually enjoined from using the so-called "Buzz Saw" device. There is, it is true, some difference between that symbol and the plaintiff's star, but the difference is slight, and consists in eight instead of five points, and the eight points incline slightly to the right. At a distance of a few feet they would be readily taken to be one and the same mark. The difference is colorable only, so much so as to indicate even guilty knowledge and a deceptive purpose. Besides this, the proof is clear that con sumers have been and are often deceived and led to believe that this so-called "Buzz -Saw" is genuine "Star." The defendant's device is but an evasive effort to cover up a wrongful use of the plaintiff's trade-mark. This trade-mark has become of great value to the plaintiff by reason of its long use, and the continued excellence of the article to which it is affixed, and the plaintiff is entitled to the exclusive use of it. The defendant has made no appearance in this court, and we are at a loss to know upon what ground the court refused the relief prayed for. The judgment is reversed, and a perpetual injunction will be entered here to the full extent of the relief prayed for in the petition. All concur. NOTE.-A trade-mark is defined to be a mark by which one's wares are known in trade. Anderson Dict. Law, 1044. In one case it was said that a trademark is a word, mark or device adopted by a manu. facturer or vendor, to distinguish his production from other productions of the same article. Hostetter v. Fries, 17 Fed. Rep. 622. A trade-mark, it is said, in the American trade-mark cases, page 555, is an arbitrary character or characters without special meaning, adopted by persons or corporations for the purpose of identifying the goods manufactured by them, or of which they have the sale. Persons have the right to adopt any device or form of word, possessing these characteristics as their trade-marks, so long as public property is not violated. And see Burke v. Cassin, 45 Cal. 467; Newman v. Alvord, 51 N. Y. 189. A name alone is not a trade-mark where it is applied to designate not the article of a particular maker or seller, but the kind or description of the thing sold. Leclanche Battery Co. v. Western Electric Company, 23 Fed. Rep. 276; 4 Lawson's Rights and Remedies, § 1633. The right of a person to a trade-mark is acquired by a priority of adoption and use. Walton v. Crowley, 3 Blatchf. 448; Stokes v. Landgraff, 17 Barb. 608. And no particular length of time is required for the perfection of title. The avowal of intention to adopt, registration of the mark, and notice to the world, do not constitute adoption. But upon the application of the mark to the articles for sale, eo instanti, the act is complete. Glenn, etc. Manufacturing Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226; Meresole v. Tynberg, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 410. If the name or symbol has ever been used before, as applicable to a like article, it cannot be exclusively appropriated. Van Biel v. Prescott, 82 N. Y. 630; Stackelberg v. Ponce, 128 U. S. 686. But see Estes v. Worthington, 31 Fed. Rep. 154. The trade-mark must be actually used. The mere declaration of a person that he claims property in a word as his trade-mark is of no validity. Candee v. Deere, 54 Ill. 439; St. Louis Piano Co. v. Merkel, 1 Mo. App. 305. The ground upon which a court of equity interferes to prevent the infringement of a trade-mark is that the public is being deceived by the false use made of it. Therefore, many cases hold that there is no property in a trade mark as such. Collins Co. v. Brown, 3 Kay & J. 423. And that it is only when it appears that there is some misrepresentation on the part of the infringer calculated to mislead or deceive the public as to what the article really is, that there is a jurisdiction in the court to interfere. Williams v. Johnston, 2 Bosw. 1; Coffeen v. Brurton, 4 McLean, 516; Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. 589; Ginger Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 24 Weekly Reporter, 1023; Osgood v. Allen, 1 Holmes, 185; Liggett, etc. Tobacco Co. v. Hynes, 19 Cent. L. J. 109; Wolfe v. Barnet, 24 La. Ann. 97. But in others the right in a trade-mark is spoken of as property. Gilman v. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 148. As to instances of what may be a trade-mark in general, see 4 Lawson's Rights and Remedies, §§ 1635, 1636. It has been held repeatedly that a trade-mark to infringe another need not be a fac-simile of it. The imitation of the original one need not be exact or perfect, and may be limited and partial. Filley v. Fasset, 45 Mo. 168; Trask Fish Co. v. Wooster, 28 Mo. App. 408; McCann v. Anthony, 21 Mo. App. 83; Shaver v. Shaver, 54 Iowa, 208; Coleman v. Crump, 70 N. Y. 573; Clark v. Clark, 25 Barb. 75; Liggett, etc. Tobacco Co. v. Hynes, 19 Cent. L. J. 109; Avery v. Meikle, 85 Ky. 435. Nor is it necessary to prove intentional fraud. If the court sees that the plaintiff's trade-marks are simulated in such a manner as probably to deceive customers of his trade or business, the piracy should be checked at once by injunction. Filley v. Fasset, 45 Mo. 168; Saunders v. Jacobs, 20 Mo. App. 96; Coffeen v. Brunton, 4 McLean, 519. The legal test is not whether a wary or cautious man, or one skilled in that particular business would be likely to be misled by the imitation. But it is sufficient if the resemblance is such as to be apt to deceive an ordinary purchaser giving such attention to the same as a purchaser usually gives, and to cause him to purchase the one, believing he was purchasing the other. Gorham Co. v. Wallace, 14 Wall. 511; Manufacturing Co. v. Trainor, 101 U. S. 64; Bradley v. Norton, 33 Conn. 157; Glenny v. Smith, 11 Jur. N. S. 964; Manufacturing Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 94; Witherspoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 519; Blackwell v. Wright, 73 N. C. 310; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Coleman v. Crump, 70 N. Y. 578; Leidersdorf v. Flint, 50 Wis. 401; Clark v. Clark, 25 Barb. 79; Walton v. Crowley, 3 Blatchf. 440. Nor is the test whether, seen side by side, the two symbols would deceive the ordinary purchaser into mistaking the one for the other, but whether the one might probably be mistaken by purchasers for the other. Glenncove Manufacturing Co. v. Ludeling, 22 Fed. Rep. 823; Walton v. Crowley, 3 Blatchf. 440; Cook v. Starkweather, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392; Manufacturing Co. v. Trainor, 101 U. S. 64. And where the two are so alike that it would require a close inspection to distinguish the difference, this will be regarded as an infringement. Fetridge v. Wells, 4 Abb. Pr. 144; McCartney v. Garnhart, 49 Mo. 593; Blackwell v. Wright, 73 N. C. 310; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Pratt's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 401; McCann v. Anthony, 21 Mo. App. 83. Though a trade-mark will not be protected which is intended to deceive, or has a tendency to deceive the public (Leather Cloth Co. v. Am. L. C. Co., 11 H. L. Cas. 543; Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Dorflinger, 2 Cent. L. J. 720; Connell v. Reed, 128 Mass. 477; Laird v. Wilder, 9 Bush. 131; Buckland v. Rice, 40 Ohio St. 526), the test is not whether the offending party intended to commit the fraud to deceive, but it consists in actual deception or the creation of a possibility of deception independent of any actual fraudulent intent. Delaware v. Clark, 7 Blatchf. 112; Meserole v. Tynberg, 36 How. Pr. 14; McCann v. Anthony, 21 Mo. App. 90; Eddleston v. Wick, 11 Hare, 78; Coffeen v. Brunton, 4 McLean, 516; Hall v. Barrows, 33 L. R. Ch. 204. When there is a similitude to the substantial parts of a trade-mark there is an infringement, and all evasive attempts to hide the similarity or a colorable explanation which appears to be made for the purpose of escaping the effects of a wrongful use of the trade-mark will not defeat the owner's right to an injunction. It makes no difference, however unmeaning the mark or symbol may be in itself, if applied to distinguish a particular class of goods, it is still a lawful trade-mark, and any imitations with only colorable difference in some details will be restrained. Keller v. Goodrich, Ind. 19 N. E. Rep. 195; Menendez v. Holt, 128 U. S. 514. CORRESPONDENCE. RATS AS AN EXCEPTION IN THE LAW OF TORTS. To the Editor of the Central Law Journal: In your issue of the 8th inst. appears a paragraph copied from the New Jersey Law Journal stating that a student at a law school, being asked what were the exceptions to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, answered: "The act of God, the public enemy and rats." The inquiry is added: "Can any one tell us what decision he had vaguely in his mind when he said rats?" He undoubtedly had in mind Carstairs v. Taylor, L. R. 6 Ex. 217, in which Rylands v. Fletcher, relied upon by plaintiff, was distinguished. The syllabus is as follows: "The plaintiff hired of the defendant the ground-floor of a warehouse, the upper part of which was occupied by the defendant himself. The water from the roof was collected by gutters into a box, from which it was discharged by a pipe into the drain. A hole was made in the box by a rat, through which the water entered the warehouse and wetted the plaintiff's goods. The defendant had used reasonable care in examining and seeing to the security of the gutters and the box. In an action by the plaintiff against the defendant for the damage so caused: Held, that the defendant was not liable, either on the ground of implied contract, or on the ground that he had brought the water to the place from which it entered the warehouse." Cincinnati, May 12, 1891. RECENT PUBLICATIONS. ROGERS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY. G. H. W. The first edition of this work, which appeared in 1883, was received with great favor by the profession,, to whom it furnished a more extended presentation of the law relating to the testimony of experts than the treatises on evidence afforded. The hearty reception accorded it, and its very rapid sale, justified the belief of the author that the law on this important subject should be set forth more in detail than it had been found practicable to do in the general treatises on the law of evidence. Writers on the general subject had made no adequate attempt to bring together the numerous cases relating to the testimony of experts, and as the subject was one of great and growing importance, it was deemed wise that a work on expert testimony should be prepared to supply what seemed to be an evident want. In the present edition of 550 pages, nearly twice the size of the first edition, the author has entirely rewritten the work, and an additional and valuable chapter on the "weight of expert testimony" has been added. A large number of additional cases have also been added, and all the recent decisions on the subject have been cited and reviewed. The author says that while he entitles the work "Law of Expert Testimony," the reader "will find that the treatment of the subject necessitates a statement of the rules of law governing opinion evidence generally." Chapter I treats of the admissibility in evidence of opinions of ordinary and expert witnesses. Chapter II, The competency of expert witnesses. Chapter III, The examination of expert witnesses. Chapter IV, Expert testimony in medicine, surgery and chemistry. Chapter V, Expert testimony in the science of law. Chapter VI, Expert testimony in the trades and arts. Chapter VII, Expert testimony in handwriting. Chapter VIII, Expert and opinion testimony on questions of value. Chapter IX, The relation of scientificbooks to expert testimony. Chapter X, Compensation of experts. Chapter XI, The weight of expert testimony. The reputation of the author as a student of law and as one of the faculty of the Michigan University Law School will readily lead one to believe in his eminent qualifications for the task imposed in the preparation of this work. He is not only a man of bright intellect, but a careful, searching and painstaking collector of material, all of which qualities are observable throughout the work. The book is not only a digest of the arbitrary rules governing the admission of expert testimony, but contains throughout learned discussions of principles. The practitioner will find here that which will save him much labor and time, and that, too, frequently in the heat of trial when questions suddenly and unexpectedly arise which must be determined quickly and without opportunity for extended search. One thing that will, at a glance, impress favorably the examiner of this work is the remarkably clear, large type and the printing generally. The index also is very full and complete. MCQUILLIN'S MISSOURI DIGEST This digest embraces the Supreme Court Reports, Vols. 90 to 101, and Missouri Appeal Reports, Vols. 24 to 41, all inclusive, with an addendum containing all the cases in Vol. 42 Missouri Appeal, that were ob tainable at the time of binding the book, together with some cases in Vols. 101 and 41 that were published after the topics to which they belonged were finally arranged and given to the printer. The compiler, Mr. McQuillin, who is favorably known by his many valuable contributions to the leading law journals, and by his work in the preparation of the new edition of "Murfree on Sheriffs," is undoubtedly qualified for the task which he has here undertaken. The digest follows very much the general plan and system of titles of former Missouri digests, but the division and subdivision of titles in many instances have been with good results departed from, and the cross-references seem to be more full and complete than in any former Missouri digest. A careful examination convinces us that the book has been conscientiously prepared and there is no necessity of commenting upon its value as a ready reference to the volumes of reports which it includes. The printing and binding is very good, and in some regards an improvement upon previous digests. AMERICAN STATE REPORTS, Vol. 17. This volume contains many valuable cases. Pittsburgh Min. Co. v. Spooner (Wis.), on the subject of promoters of corporations and their relations thereto, has a very exhaustive note. So, also, Marshall v. Farmers', etc. Savings Bank (Va.), wherein is discussed the liability of directors of corporations for negligence. The case of People's Bank v. Franklin Bank (Tenn.), is instructive on the subject of liability of bank for negligently cashing a forged check, and has appended a long note. The privilege of physicians and surgeons as witnesses is exhaustively treated in note to Thompson v. Ish (Mo.). The case of Walker v. Vicksburg, etc. R. R. Co. (La.), on the duty of carriers of passengers to stop at depot is interesting. BOOKS RECEIVED. COMPANY LAW, Commentaries on the Law of Private Corporations, Whether with or without Capital Stock, also of Joint Stock Companies, and of all the Various Voluntary Unincorporated Associa tions Organized for Pecuniary Profit or Mutual Benefit. By Charles Fisk Beach, Jr., of the New York Bar, Author of "Contributory Negligence," "Commentaries on the Law of Receivers," "The Law of Wills" and "The Modern Law of Railways." Editor of "The American Probate Reports," and "Beach's Railway Digest," and lately Editor of "The Railway and Corporation Law Journal." In Two Volumes. Vols. I and II. Chicago: T. H. Flood & Co. 1891. AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, Compiled under the Editorial Supervision of John Houston Merrill, Late Editor of the American and English Railroad Cases, and the American and English Corporation Cases. Vol. XV. Northport, Long Island, N. Y.: Edward Thompson, Law Publisher. 1891. POETRY OF THE LAW. THE LAWYER'S LULLABY. Prevail while we're consulting inter nos. Was that a little pain in medias res? Too bad! too bad! we'll have no more of these. Who knows how to eject the pain and stay the hurt. HUMORS OF THE LAW. IN a town up north an ex-judge is cashier of a bank. One day recently he refused to cash a check offered by a stranger. "The check is all right," he said, "but the evidence you offer in identifying your self as the person to whose order it is drawn is scarcely sufficient." "I have known you to hang a man on less evidence, judge," was the stranger's response. "Quite likely," replied the ex-judge, "but when it comes to letting go of cold cash we have to be careful." SEVEN of the supposed-to-be sharpest and wisest lawyers in the country have made wills, passed away, and the said wills have been broken all to flinders by heirs and other lawyers. An ignorant Missouri farmer wrote his will in four lines on a slate, and it stood three law suits and ten lawyers.—Chicago Mail. |