able minds have differed, and still differ. many The very learned and exhaustive essay of Prof. Dwight on "the legality of trusts," published in the "Political Science Quarterly" in December, 1888, contains a masterly refutation of this idea. NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. INJUNCTION WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT the grievances of which he complains be consumma- TRIAL-EVIDENCE-VIEW BY JURY-EMINENT DOMAIN.-The authorities upon the subject of "view by jury" are well collected in Springer v. City of Chicago, 26 N. E. Rep. 514, by the Supreme Court of Illinois, wherein it is held that Rev. St. Ill., c. 47, § 9, which requires the court in condemnation proceed the request of either party, does not by implication deprive the courts of their discretionary power to allow such views in other actions. The case here presented was an action for damages caused to property in the construction of a viaduct. Craig, J., says: STOCK OF MERCHANDISE DAMAGES.-One point in the case of North v. Peters, 11 S. C. Rep. 346, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, is especially novel, and will prove of interest to many practitioners famil-ings to allow the jury to view the premises at iar with the hardships incident to the remedy by attachment. In that case it was held that where the property of plaintiff, which the sheriff has taken under attachments against a third person, is a stock of merchandise, which, in connection with his business, constitutes the whole of plaintiff's resources, trespass or replevin is not an adequate remedy, as damages are recoverable therein only for the value of the goods, and not for the destruction of plaintiff's business; and hence injunction will lie against the closing of plaintiff's store, and the sale of the goods under the attachments. Mr. Justice Lamar says: The main ground relied on by the appellant is that the relief sought should be refused, because the appellee had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law; to-wit, either the action of trespass or replevin. The answer to this is that the measure of damages in an action of trespass could not have exceeded the value of the property seized, with interest thereon from the date of the seizure; and that the only remedy in an action of replevin would have been limited to a recovery of the property, and damages for its detention, with costs. It does not need argument to show that neither of these actions would afford as complete, prompt, and efficient a remedy for the destruction of the business which, with the goods levied upon, constituted the appellee's entire estate and pecuniary resources, as would be furnished by a court of equity in preventing such an injury. The case of Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74, 78, 79, is, in its material facts, similar to this case. In that case a bill was filed by one Sutherland to enjoin the further prosecution of certain writs of fieri facias levied by the sheriff, Watson, on a lot of goods claimed to belong exclusively to the plaintiff, so as to prevent what the plaintiff alleged to be an irreparable injury; to-wit the ruin of his business as a merchant. The defense set up was, as in this case, that the injunction should have been refused, because the action of trespass furnished a complete and adequate remedy at law. In answer the court, Mr. Justice Davis delivering the opinion, said: "How could Sutherland be compenated at law, for the injuries he would suffer, should The rule seems to be well established that evidence of the value of the property before and after the time when the damages are alleged to have been sustained is admissible, and the time within which such evidence shall be enforced is a matter in the sound discretion of the trial court. Roberts v. Boston, 149 Mass. 347, 21 N. E. Rep. 668. If the parties had the right to prove by oral testimony the condition of the property at the time of the trial (and upon this point we think there can be no doubt), upon what principle can it be said the court could not allow the jury in person to view the premises, and thus ascertain the condition thereof for themselves. The premises in view may be regarded, as it is termed in the books, "real evidence," and oral testimony in reference to the premises could not be as satisfactory in its character as the real evidence. In 1 Best Ev. (Morgan's Ed.) §197, it is said: "Real evidence is either immediate or reported. Immediate real evidence is where the thing which is the source of evidence is present to the senses of the tribunal." See also, Tayl. Ev. (8th. Ed.) § 554; 1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed.) § 345. It is a common practice in the trial of causes in the circuit court to permit parties to produce things before the jury for their inspection, and that practice has been approved. Thus, in Iron Works v. Weber, 129 Ill. 535, 21 N. E. Rep. 1078, which was an action to recover for a personal injury, we held that the torn clothing which plaintiff was wearing when injured might properly be shown to the jury. In Express Co. v. Spellman, 90 Ill. 455 -an action against a carrier for the loss of a can of yeast-it was held to be proper to allow plaintiff to put in evidence a can similar to the one in which the yeast was shipped for the examination of the jury. In Jupitz v. People, 34 Ill. 416, when defendant was on trial for receiving stolen brass couplings, a brass coupling similar to those alleged to have been received was allowed to be submitted to the jury. In other States numerous cases may be found where the same rule of evidence has been adopted. Thus, in an accident case, it is held to be within the discretion of the court to allow the plaintiff to exhibit to the jury his injured limb or body. Barker v. Town of Perry, 67 Iowa, 146, 25 N. W. Rep. 100; Railroad Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 548, 549, 14 N. E. Rep. 572, and 16 N. E. Rep. 197; Mulhado v. Railroad Co., 30 N. Y. 370; Hatfield v. Railroad Co., 33 Minn. 130, 22 N. W. Rep. 176. The clothes of the accused were held admissible in People v. Gonzalez, 35 N. Y. 49, and Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 413; the weapon used by the accused, in Wynne v. State, 56 Ga. 113; surgical instruments on a trial under an indictment for illegal operations on a woman, Com. v. Brown, 121 Mass. 69; the stick with which a burglar struck the prosecutor in a trial on charge of burglary, State v. Mordecai, 68 N. C. 207; tools used, where a burglary has been committed, People v. Larned, 7 N. Y. 445. In State v. Woodruff, 67 N. C. 89, it was held in a bastardy case, that the mother of a bastard child might hold it up for the inspection of the jury. It was also held in Hatfield v. Railroad Co., 33 Minn. 130, 22 N. W. Rep. 176, on the trial of an accident case, the trial court had the power to require the plaintiff to walk across the court-room in the presence of the jary, in order that the jury might see how he had been affected by the injury. It is there said: "As the object of all judicial investigations is, if possible, to do exact justice, and obtain the truth in its entire fullness, we have no doubt of the power of court, in a proper case, to require the party to perform a physical act before the jury that will illustrate or demonstrate the extent and character of his injuries. This is in accordance with analogous cases in other branches of the law. When a view of real estate will aid the jury in reaching a conclusion, it is within the discretion of the court to permit it. When an inspection of an article of personal property will aid them, it is not infrequent to cause the article to be brought into court for the same purpose. Line v. Taylor, 3 Fost. & F. 731; Lewis v. Hartley, 7 Car. & P. 403. The practice in patent and in certain equity cases, of allowing tests to be applied before the court, is somewhat analogous in principle. So is the practice of divorce courts, of ordering an examination of the person of the party in certain cases. It is a common practice to allow plaintiffs, in actions for personal injuries, to exhibit to the jury their wounds, in order to show their extent, or to enable a surgeon to demonstrate their nature and character. This has been held proper. Mulhado v. Railroad Co., 30 N. Y. 370. If, for these purposes, a plaintiff may exhibit his injuries, there would seem to be no reason why, under proper circumstances, he may not be required to do the same thing for a like purpose upon request of the defendant." See, also, 1 Whart. Ev. (3d Ed.) § 345. In Nutter v. Ricketts, 6 Iowa, 92, where there was a controversy in regard to two horses, and the trial court allowed the jury to go in the court-house yard and inspect the horses, the action of the court was sustained. It is there said: "There is no objection, in principle, to a jury seeing an object which is the subject of testimony. By this means they may obtain clearer views, and be able to form a better opinion." See, also, 1 Hale, P. C. 635. In Cozzens v. Higgins, 42 N. Y. 206, in an action of trespass quare clausum, the court of appeals held that it was not error to permit the plaintiff to put in evidence a photographic view of the plaintiff's cellar after the trespass. In School v. City of Dubuque, 64 Iowa, 736, 17 N. W. Rep. 153, a stereoscopic view of property injured by water was held admissible evidence. Other cases might be cited where the same doctrine is laid down, but we have referred to enough to establish the rule that on a trial, in a proper case, things may be exhibited to the jury. And, if evidence that character may be brought before the jury, upon the same principle we perceive no good reason why a jury may not, under proper regulations established by the court, go upon and view premises which are the subject-matter of the litigation. CARRIERS-LOSS OF BAGGAGE-PICTURESLIMITING LIABILITY-NOTICE.--The decision in the case of Wheeler v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 26 N. E. Rep. 248, by the New York Court of Appeals, is in spirit, if not in substance, opposed to the doctrine of the Missouri Supreme Court in Witting v. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co., which we took occasion to criticise in a recent number (pages 97, 99). The New York case holds that Rev. St. U. S. § 4281, providing that if any shipper of "pictures" shall lade them as freight or baggage on any vessel without then giving notice to its owner, master, or agent of the character and value of the property shipped, and having it entered on the bill of lading, the master and owner of such vessel shall not be liable "as carriers thereof in any form or manner," does not relieve the ship owner from liability for loss of pictures shipped as baggage, without the required notice, caused by his own and his employee's negligence, and that non-delivery at the port of destination is presumptive evidence of negligence. Finch, J., says: The liability of the carrier as such was well understood by the framers of the statute. It had long been settled so that no one could mistake it. By force of his public employment he became an insurer of the property intrusted to his care and liable for its loss, irrespective of the cause, unless from the act of God or the public enemy. But involved in this greater liability and absorbed by it was a lesser liability as bailee for hire; of no consequence while the greater liability existed, but surviving the destruction of that, so that when the carrier ceased to be liable as carrier he yet remained liable as bailee. In Dorr v. Navigation Co., 4 Sandf. 145, the doctrine was thus expressed: "A common carrier has in truth two distinct liabilities, the one, for losses by accident or mistake, where he is liable by the custom of the realm or the common law as an insurer; the other, for losses by default or negligence, where he is answerable as an ordinary bailee;"-and the language was cited by the federal court in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 363, and the doctrine approved in Dorr v. Navigation Co., 11 N. Y. 485, where it was held that the carrier might by special agreement strip himself of that character, and so become, as to the particular transaction, an ordinary bailee and private carrier for hire. In Lamb v. Railroad Co., 46 N. Y. 278, Grover, J., said: "In considering this question, it must be borne in mind that it has already been determined that the defendant was exonerated from all liability as carrier for a loss caused by the destruction of the cotton by fire by an express provision of the contract in pursuance of which it transported the cotton. Relieved of this responsibility, it was liable only, in case it was destroyed, as bailee for hire; and it is undisputed that such a bailee is liable for the loss of the property only in cases where the loss is the result of his negligence." These cases show that the liability for negligence as bailee survives even when by special contract the carrier has thrown off his liability as such; and the courts of this State have exhibited a very decided purpose to retain and enforce that liability wherever it is possible. Even that may be thrown off by force of a special agreement, but we have refused to permit any general words to accomplish such result, and have insisted that, where the carrier seeks to contract against the consequences of his own negli. gence, he must say so openly and plainly, so as not to be in the slightest degree misunderstood, and is not at liberty to hide the stipulation away under any form of words, however broad or formidable. Nicholas v. Railroad Co., 89 N. Y. 372. But what the carrier and his customer might accomplish by special agreement, congress could effect by statute in the absence of such agreement, but must necessarily leave the lesser liability of bailee unaffected if it merely removes the liability as carrier, and does not by clear and definite language indicate its purpose to go further. So much and no more than that the section under consideration accomplished, for it distinctly removes the liability as carrier, without touching that as bailee. We are bound to assume that the word "carrier" was used in its recognized legal sense, and not in some loose or careless and merely colloquial way; and that, especially, because it occurs in connection with the idea of liability, and the phrase "liable as carrier can only mean the liability attached by law to that public employment. Nor is this construction effected by the added words, "in any form or manner." They are not used disjunctively, and so as to constitute a separate command, but qualify the expression "shall not be liable as carrier thereof:" the full force of the words being that the liability as carrier shall not exist in any form of action, or by any manner of procedure. In Insurance Co. v. McLoon, 48 Barb. 28, it was held that the carrier's liability assumed two different forms, and that he might be proceeded against either in tort for a violation of his public duty, or on contract for a breach of his implied agreement to carry and deliver safely. And so the statute deemed it prudent, in relieving the carrier from liability, to add "in any form or manner;" that is, by any form or mode of action or proceeding whatever. We are further referred to the case of Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 646, in which it was held under a similar statute (1 Wm. IV., ch. 68) that the carrier could not be held liable even for gross negligence; but that decision was founded upon an enactment from which the words "liable ..s carrier" were conspicuously absent. That act freed the ship owner from any liability for the loss: and, even under such provision, where the property was not lost, but merely delayed in its transit, damages for the consequent injury resulting from negligence could probably be recovered. It follows that the nonsuit in this case was erroneous. The plaintiff, in her complaint, alleged negligence, and the facts which she proved prima facie established it. The non-delivery at the port of destination is presumptive evidence of such negligence. Canfield v. Railroad Co., 93 N. Y. 538. GUARDIAN AND WARD-DEPOSIT OF WARD'S MONEY IN GUARDIAN'S NAME.-The doctrine of the case of Booth v. Wilkinson, 47 N. W. Rep. 1128, involving a guardian's liability for money of ward deposited in bank, will apply as well to general trustees of funds. It is there held that a guardian who takes a certificate of deposit for his wards' money in his own name, though he does it with entire good faith, intending to remit the money in a few days to the wards, is liable for the loss of the money occasioned by the bank's failure. Orton, J., says: The rule may be technical and arbitrary to some extent, but it is based upon the soundest principles of business economy and integrity, and approved by the highest courts of this country and of England with such a unanimity of judgment as to make it an established principle of law, that, if a guardian deposits the money in his hands belonging to the heirs in a bank in his own name, and to his own credit, without any ear-marks or indicia to distinguish it as the money of the heirs, or of the estate or trust funds, and the bank fails, it will be held to be his own personal loss, and not that of the heirs. No circumstances will justify it if such is the character of the deposit. It is not a question of good faith or of integrity—it is a question of naked fact-which determines its legal character. The reason of the rule is obvious. The following extract from the opinion of Judge Porter in McAllister v. Com., 30 Pa. St. 536, expresses, once for all, the rule, and some of the reasons of it: "If he [the trustee] undertakes to make a deposit in a banking institution, the entry must go down on the books of the institution, in such terms as not to be misunderstood, that they are the funds of the specific trust to which they belong. He cannot so enter them as to call them his own to-day, if they are good, and tomorrow, if bad, ascribe them to the estate, or shift them in an emergency from one estate to another, or by the deposit secure the discount of his own note, and have the deposit snatched at by the bank, if the note be not paid, or attached by a creditor as the depositor's individual property. No matter what he intends to do, or what the cashier or clerk may think he is doing, the deposit must wear the impress of the trust, or he cannot, when brought to account, call it trust property." This was the exact condition of this fund, and all the reasons of the rule are applicable to it as the personal and individual deposit of the respondent. The rule is inflexible, and there is not in this case a single circumstance which makes the rule inapplicable to it. This is all that need be said in this case, for this court has sanctioned the rule in a recent case, where the depositor informed the teller of the bank, who gave the certificate of deposit, that they were trust funds, and did not belong to him. In Williams v. Williams, 55 Wis. 300, 12 N. W. Rep. 465, and 13 N. W. Rep. 274, Mr. Justice Cassoday marshaled and passed in review the leading authorities of this country and of England, and sanctioned the rule in a case that rules this in all essential particulars. tentional nor the result of negligence. In that case the defendant, who was one of a shooting party, fired at a pheasant. One of the pellets from his gun glanced off the bough of a tree and accidentally wounded the plaintiff, who was engaged in carrying cartridges and game for the party. The jury found that the defendant was not guilty of any negligence in firing as he did, and that he was not liable. The Journal above referred to thus comments on the American cases on the subject: The learned judge did not quote the American cases which are referred to by Sir Frederick Pollock, and which generally support the conclusion reached in the present case. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292, was a case in which a man, defending himself against some dogs, raised a stick over his shoulder and hit the plaintiff, who was behind him. The court held him not liable, and said: "If in the prosecution of a lawful act, a casualty purely accidental arises, no action can be supported for an injury arising therefrom." In Harvey v. Dunlap, N. Y. Sup. Court, Lalor, 193, the defendant thew a stone which put out the plaintiff's eye, but it appeared that the injury was accidental. Nelson, J., in denying a motion for a new trial, said no principle can be found, or if found, can be maintained, subjecting an individual to liability for an act done without fault on his part. This was approved by the U. S. Supreme Court in the Nitroglycerine case, Parrot v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 15 Wall. 524, in which an express company broke open with a chisel a box of nitro-glycerine which had been packed to look like sweet oil and was leaking. The company was held not liable for the destruction of all the buildings in the neighborhood. See also Morris v. Platt, 82 Com. 75. There is a case in New York apparently on the other side of this question. It was an action against a colonel of a regiment for an injury from a gun fired by his command. The gun must have contained a bullet, although it was supposed that all were loaded with blank cartridges. Castle v. Duryea, 2 Keyes 169, (1865). (See also S. C. in the court below, 32 Barb. 480). The chief judge said that as the act was done by the defendant's express command negligence was immaterial, but it did appear in the case that ball cartridges had been in use a short time before and the colonel can hardly be said to be free from fault, considering his position and the dangerous character of the weapons he was using. In New Jersey the subject was discussed by Chief Justice Beasley in Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. L. (9 Vr.) 338, the case of the bursting of a steam boiler. It was not the case of direct trespass and the precise question was not involved, but the chief justice said he approved the rule laid down in 1 Addison on Torts 3, viz: "A man may however sustain grievous damage at the hands of another, and yet if it be the result of inevitable accident, or a lawful act done in a lawful manner, without carelessness or negligence, there is no legal injury and no tort giving rise to an action for damages." If, however, the act is illegal, as for example, setting off fire works in the street, any person injured has a right to action. Jenne v. Sutton, 43 N. J. L. (14 Vr.) 257. The cases cited by Denman, J., in Stanley v. Powell are the following: Year Book, 21 Hen. 7, 28A; Leame v. Bray, 3 East. 593; Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Gibbons v. Pepper, 4 Mod. 404; Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 213; Hall v. Fearnley, 3 Q. B. 919; Underwood v. Hewson, 1 Str. 596; Buller N. P. 16; Day v. Edwards, 57 R. 648; Holmes v. Mather, L. R. 10 Ex. 261. It is to be observed that a different rule prevails in regard to injury to property. The interference with property, real or personal, is the subject of an action without regard to the intention of the defendant. Every man is bound at his peril to know whether goods are his own or his neighbor's, and an innocent purchaser for value may be held liable in an action of trespass or trover. See Pollock on Torts 15. INJUNCTION-VIOLATION-CONTEMPT-PUNISHMENT.-The New Jersey Court of Chancery, in Thompson v. Penn. Ry. Co., 21 Atl. Rep. 182, thus state the law governing proceedings in contempt for violation of injunction: The third point opens a wider field for discussion. Proceedings in contempt are of two classes, namely: First. Those instituted solely for the purpose of vindicating the dignity and preserving the power of the court. These are criminal and punitive In their nature, and are usually instituted by the court in the interest of the general public, and not of any particular individual or suitor. Second. Those instituted by private individuals for the purpose, mainly, if not wholly, of protecting or enforcing private rights, and in which the public have no special interest. These are remedial or civil in their nature, rather than criminal or punitive. Dodd v. Una, 40 N. J. Eq. 672, at page 714, 5 Atl. Rep. 155, per Depue, J.; People v. Oyer and Terminer, 101 N. Y. 245, 4 N. E. Rep. 259; Rap. Contempts, § 21. At the same time the contempt which is the foundation of this latter class of proceedings may be of such a character as to induce the court to deal with it as a matter affecting the dignity and power of the court, as well as an infringement of a private right. The proceeding here belongs to the second class, and the question is whether in such a case the court is warranted in taking any action in personam, ir the absence of a willful intention to contemn its dignity and authority, and to disregard its order. I think, upon principle, that the answer must be in the affirmative, provided, of course, the person acting contrary to the order of the court, or failing to act in accordance therewith, as the case may be, is conscious of the quality of his act or non-action in that respect. For instance, if A be ordered to pay a sum of money to B, and, being able so to do, fails to make the payment, of what consequence is it to B what may have been the motive which induced the failure, or what may have been the state of A's mind towards the court? And if B brings the breach of its order to the attention of the court, and asks that its process do issue against A therefor, must his application be refused if A can satisfy the court that he entertained no disregard for the court, and did not mean to set its order at defiance? So in the case of a nuisance, if A be enjoined from so using a dam on his land as to flood B's land, and fails to observe the injunction, and B's land is flooded thereby. In any and all such cases it seems to me that it is no answer to the complaint of the injured party to say that the party inflicting the injury meant no disrespect to the court. The injury suffered by the complaining party is neither increased nor diminished nor in any way affected by the state of mind towards the court of the party inflicting the injury, and the breach of the in junction consists in doing the forbidden thing, and not in the intention with which it is done. It seems to me that this result follows necessarily upon the classification of these proceedings before mentioned, and an examination of the cases shows that such has been the rule practically, though in many cases tacitly, observed by the courts, citing Quackenbush v. Van Riper, 3 N. J. Eq. 350; McClure v. Gulick, 17 N. J. L. 240; Spokes v. Board, L. R. 1 Eq. 42. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES. It is an admitted general rule, that a criminal offense must be tried at the place where the crime is committed. But it happens not infrequently that unlawful acts performed in one State or country produce injurious results in another, or that a crime begun in one jurisdiction is continued and consummated in another, or that an agent or confederate perpetrates an offense instigated from abroad. In such circumstances, it is sometimes a matter of difficulty to determine what sovereignty, or what county within a State, has power to try and punish the offender. The ascertainment of the territorial jurisdiction, in cases of this sort, will form the subject-matter of the present article. In the first place, the series of acts constituting the crime may be performed in two or more jurisdictions consecutively. And here, according to some of the authorities, the venue for the trial may be in either of the places where a material element of the crime transpired. Thus, where a person is seized and bound in one county, in pursuance of a conspiracy and purpose to kill there formed, and taken into another county, where the murder is consummated, it is said that either county has jurisdiction to punish the crime.1 This doctrine may well be accepted where it rests upon a local statute (as in the case cited), but as between different States or countries, it is undoubtedly the better rule that the completed act, or the consummation of the series of acts involved, alone confers jurisdiction.2 There are cases, however, where the acts performed in each State may constitute a separate crime, punishable by the laws thereof, though all the acts are connected by an ultimate criminal purpose. 1 Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426. 2 State v. Shaeffer, 80 Mo. 271. Such, according to one of the decisions, is the case of theft continued from one State to another, or the felonious intent indicated in both, or a burglary in one State being a larceny in another, where the property was removed but no house broken into. So, if one fires a gun in one State which kills an individual in another State, there may be the offense of using a deadly weapon in the first State, and the offense of murder by the killing in the second State.3 In the next place, acts performed or agencies set in motion in one jurisdiction, may reach their ultimate and injurious consequences in another, without the corporeal presence of the perpetrator in the latter place. "It is not necessary in all cases," says the court in Arkansas, "that a man should be actually present in this State to make him amenable to our laws for a crime committed here. If the crime is the immediate result of his act, he may be made to answer for it in our courts, though actually absent from the State at the time he does the act, because he is constructively present, or present in contemplation of law.”4 In the case of death resulting in one State or county from a blow inflicted or other fatal agency employed in another, the common law rule appears to have been that the jurisdiction to try the offender was in the county where the act was committed which caused the death, and, sometimes, to obviate any possible doubt, the body of the victim was taken into that county. But the modern tendency is to regard the completion of the crime as localizing the jurisdiction. And the best authorities hold (although there is some conflict of opinion), that the death is a necessary part of the crime of murder, and not merely a consequence of it, since, unless death results within a year and a day, the offense cannot be murder. Hence it follows that the power to try the accused resides in the local jurisdiction where the victim dies.7 It must be admitted, however, that this view was denied in a recent celebrated case, where it was held that murder is committed within 3 Stillman v. White Rock Manuf. Co., 3 Woodb. & M. 538, 546. 4 State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561; Cooley Const. Lim. *128. 5 Riley v. State, 9 Humph. 657; Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426; Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1. 6 Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426. 7 Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 319. |