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sideration, after discarding the false description arising from the name of the county, is this, and no more: "A small farm in Iowa, near Missouri line." There is not one word in the will directing inquiry to any source which may aid in discovering the locality of the farm. Without such aid, it would be in vain to search near the Missouri line, for 240 miles, for the small farm. In our opinion, the doctrine of Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick controls the disposition of this case. Counsel for defendant think as the ten-acre tract is appurtenant to the large tract, and is in Wayne county, this will serve to identify the land in controversy. But there is nothing in the will showing the connection of the two tracts of land as constituting one farm. It surely will not do to say that a ten-acre tract of land is a part of a farm six miles away. It is doubtful indeed, whether the ten-acre tract is sufficiently identified by the description of the will declaring it to be in Wayne county. But if we assume that it is, it cannot be claimed that its description will aid the description of the other tract, in the absence of any thing directing inquiry thereto. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 13, 1887. Christy v. Badger. Opinion by Beck, J.

MR. JUSTICE MILLER ON JURY TRIAL. [Extracts from the American Law Review.]

I must confess that my practice in the courts before I came to the bench had left upon my mind the impression that as regards contests in the courts in civil suits, the jury system is one of doubtful utility; and if I had then been called upon as a legislator to provide for a system of trial in that class of actions, I should have preferred a court constituted of three or more judges, so selected from different parts of the district or circuit in which they presided as to preveut, so far as possible, any preconcerted action or agreement of interest or opinion, to decide all the questions of law and fact in the case, rather than the present jury system. * * This impression upon me, growing out of my practice, I have since come to think however was largely due to the fact, that owing to popular and frequent elections of the State judges and insufficient salaries, the judges of those courts in which I mainly practiced were neither very competent as to their learning, nor sufficiently assured of their position to exercise that control over the proceedings in a jury case, and especially in instructing the jury upon the law applicable to it, which is essential to a right result in a jury trial. It may as well be stated here that a case submitted to the unregulated discretion of a jury, without that careful discrimination between matters of fact and matters of law, which it is the duty of the court to lay before them, is but little better than a popular trial before a town meeting. * *An experience of twenty-five years on the bench, and an observation during that time of cases which came from all the courts of the United States to the Supreme Court for review, as well as of cases tried before me at nisi prius, have satisfied me that when the principles above stated (principles upon which judges should instruct) are faithfully applied by the court in a jury trial, and the jury is a fair one, as a method of ascertaining the truth in regard to disputed questions of fact, a jury is in the main as valuable as an equal number of judges would be, or any less number. And I must say, that in my experience in the conference room of the Supreme Court of the United States, which consists of nine judges, I have been surprised to find how readily those judges come to an agreement upon questions of law, and how often they disagree in regard to questions of fact which apparently are as clear as the law. ** * I am therefore of the opinion that the system of trial by jury would be much more valuable, much shorn of many

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of its evils, and much more entitled to the confidence of the public as well as of the legal and judicial minds of the country, if some number less than the whole should be authorized to render a verdict. I would not myself be willing that a bare majority should be permitted to do this. There could be little difference in the confidence which would be reposed by the court, the public, or the parties, in the opinion of five men or of seven. It should be something more then than a bare majority. If the jury is to consist of twelve men, I certainly would not be willing that its verdict should represent less than eight, which is two-thirds, or probably nine, which is three-fourths. Many of what are called mistrials, produced by a failure of the jury to render a verdict, would be avoided if the power were given to nine or eight to render a verdict instead of requiring them all to unite in it, and such a verdict would be entitled to as much confidence as if it were unanimous. In respect to civil actions, where the question at issue is the right to specific property, or to damages for failure to fulfill a contract, or torts against the person or property of the plaintiff, this approach to perfect justice is perhaps as near as the fallibility of human nature permits, and the cha", removes the most serious objection to the system trial by jury, the one which stands out as almost without support in reason or experience.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

POMEROY'S RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

A Treatise on the Law of Riparian Rights as the same is formulated and applied in the Pacific States, including the doctrine of Appropriation. By John Norton Pomeroy. Revised and edited by W. Campbell Black. St Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1887. Pp. xx, 307.

This treatise was substantially published in the form of papers in the West Coast Reporter, during Prof. Pomeroy's editorial charge of that periodical. They were intended as a study with a view to affecting and effecting legislation, or as Prof. Pomeroy put it, "a code of rules," and in this respect he paid a tribute to the usefulness of codification. The doctrine of such rights in most of the Pacific States is quite different from the common law rule prevailing in most of the States east of the Mississippi, and the work therefore is of principal interest to the residents of the western slope, the decisions of which region are chiefly examined and relied on. Mr. Black has discreetly edited the original papers, citing and commenting on the ́ later decisions, and adding appropriate matter. Th book is well printed.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

THE following decisions were handed down Friday, Dec. 23, 1887:

Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-John Lilly, appellant, v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad, respondent.-Judg. ment affirmed with costs-Jane Greer et al., respondents, v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad, appellant; William H. Kimball, respondent, v. Mary Leonard et al., appellants; Edward M. Ross, respondent, v. John H. Ross, appellant; Julia H. Halpin, appellant, v. Thomas C. Townsend, respondent; Daniel Savin, respondent, v. Ferdinand A. Duckwitz, appellant; Anna Maria Howell et al., respondents, v. Long Island Railroad Company, appellant.-Motion to dismiss denied, with $10 costs-Ellen T. Mayes, respondent, v. Charles J. Nowise, Jr., appellant.

It was ordered that a term of this court for 1888 be held at the Capitol, commencing Monday, the 16th day of January, at 10 o'clock A. M., then to proceed with the present calendar. Tuesdays, January 17 and 31, will be motion days.

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