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which confer special powers on certain designated officers. It would not do to substitute other officers or persons to exercise such special powers, by judicial construction, when the statutes have not done so. The case of Fairfield v. King, 41 Vt. 611, seems to be closely in point, and supported by irrefragable reasoning and authority. The other cases cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error bear strongly to support the principle, that when a statute designates a particular officer to whom the process may be delivered, and with whom it may be left, as service upon the corporation, no other officer or person can be substituted in his place. Charleston v. Lunenburgh, 21 Vt. 488; Morrill v. Mining Co., 10 Nev. 137; Chambers v. Bridge Co., 16 Kans. 270; Sacramento v. Fowle, 21 Wall. 119; Alexandria v. Fairfax, 95 U. S. 774; Conimissioners v. Burtis, 103 N. Y. 136; Bennet v. U. S., 2 Wash. T. 179. The designation of one particular officer upon whom service may be made excludes all others. Conroe v. Bull, 7 Wis. 408; Crawford v. Hastings, 10 id. 525; North v. Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 548; Weil v. County, 69 Mo. 281; Dewey v. Car Co., 42 Mich. 399; 4 N. W. Rep. 179. The temporary inconvenience arising from a vacancy in the office of mayor affords no good reason for a substitution of some other officer in his place, upon whom service could be made, by unwarrantable construction not contemplated by the statute. Van Rensselaer v. Palmatier, 2 How. Pr. 24, and Van Rensselaer v. Petrie, id. 94; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107; Perkins v. Watertown, 5 Biss. 320; Insurance Co. v. Fuller, 81 Penn. St. 398. Wis. Sup. Ct., Sept. 20, 1887. City of Watertown v. Robinson. Opinion by Orton, J.

SEWER NUISANCE-DAMAGE.- (1) It is not denied that the city constructed a sewer through the plaintiff's lot, and the fact is established beyond question that the contents of the sewer were discharged from its mouth within about seventy-five feet of the plaintiff's house, and that the effect of such discharge was to create a stench in and about the house, of which the plaintiff might justly complain. It is claimed however that the plaintiff has no ground of complaint, be. cause the sewer was constructed through the plain- | tiff's premises with his consent. It is true that the plaintiff consented that the excavation might be made through the lot, and the sewer constructed; but the jury were warranted in finding from the evidence, that the consent was to construct a mere overflow sewer, and not one to be used for the constant discharge of sewage. As we understand, the system adopted by the city is such, that by the use of catchbasins, surface water is carried off by the sewers, and the plaintiff's claim is that the consent given by him was for a sewer through his lot for an overflow at times when there would be an unusual discharge of water through the sewers. This claim finds sufficient support in the evidence to authorize a finding to that effect, and we may say that the objection that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages cannot be sustained. The questions in the case which demand consideration pertain to certain rulings of the court as to the measure of damage, and as to the exclusion of certain evidence offered and introduced by the defendant. (2) It is claimed by counsel for appellant that the true rule of damages is the difference in the rental value of the property, and that all damages arising from sickness in the family are too remote to authorize a recovery therefor. It will be observed thas the instruction under consideration does not authorize damages for sickness as such; that is, the jury were not authorized to assess damages for the pain and suffering caused by the alleged sickness. It is only such damages as are capable of accurate estimation, to-wit, for loss of time and expense incurred by reason of such sickness. In our opinion the rule

adopted by the court was correct, It appears that the nuisance complained of no longer exists. The sewer was closed and sealed up before the trial in the court below. In such cases the general rule is the difference in the rental value of the property for the time the nuisance existed. But this does not exclude the recovery of such special damages as the plaintiff may show he suffered by the existence of the nuisance: and we can see no reason why a party may not in such a case recover the actual expenses incurred by reason of the nuisance. Ellis v. Railroad Co., 63 Mo. 131; Story v. Hammond, 4 Ohio, 376; Kearney v. Farrell, 28 Conn. 317. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 8, 1887. Loughran v. City of Des Moines. Opinion by Rothrock, J.

ORDINANCE REASONABLENESS.- Under a statute, cities are expressly authorized by the Legislature, in the exercise of an unrestricted right, to establish wharves and docks, to regulate landing-places, and to fix the rates of wharfage, dockage, and landing; and an ordinance adopted in pursuance thereof cannot be declared unreasonable by the courts. As has been shown by so much of the thirty-fourth subdivision of section 3106 as we have set out as above, cities are expressly authorized, not only to establish and construct wharves, docks, piers and basins, and to regulate landing-places, but also to fix the rates of wharfage and dockage, as well as of landing. No question is made upon the power of the Legislature to confer such authority upon the cities of the State, and none could be successfully made, since the precedents for the exercise of such a power are both numerous and of long standing. While the reasonableness of an ordinance is a question of law for the decision of the court, an ordinance cannot be held to be unreasonable which is expressly authorized by the Legislature. The power of a court to declare an ordinance unreasonable, and therefore void, is practically restricted to cases in which the Legislature has enacted nothing on the subject-matter of the ordinance, and consequently to cases in which the ordinance was passed under the supposed incidental power of the corporation merely. On that subject, see also Dill. Mun. Corp. above cited, §§ 319, 328. At section 357, Dillon says: "Charters not unfrequently confer upon the corporation the power to license and regulate," or to "license, regulate and tax," certain avocations and employments, and to "tax and restrain" or prohibit "exhibitions, shows, places of amusement, and the like, and unless there is some specific limitation on the authority of the Legislature in this respect, such provisions are constitutional." The general principle thus announced is well sustained both by precedent and authority; and as there is no such limitation upon the authority of the Legislature in this State, the city of Jeffersonville is and long has been in full possession of the power to fix the rates of wharfage, as well as of landing at its wharves. This fixing of rates is only the exercise of the power of taxation in a particular form, and is hence a power which the Legislature was and still is authorized to confer. It follows that the city of Jeffersonville was expressly authorized to adopt the ordinance in question, and that having adopted it, no question as to its reasonableness is involved at the present hearing. Ang. & A. Corp., § 357. Ind. Sup. Ct., Sept. 30, 1887. A Coal Float v. City of Jeffersonville. Opinion by Niblack, J.

NOTICE TO LAWYERS.

Lawyers may procure valuable assistance with photographs for jury purposes. Machinery accident cases-legal papers accurately copied.

PACH BROTHERS,

841 Broadway, New York.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 26, 1887.

THERE

CURRENT TOPICS.

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action for damages. It is amazing that any lawyer can write that "the justices of the Illinois Supreme Court have abolished liberty of speech and assemblage." That is not what they have abolished. What they have abolished is the claim of right in public assemblages, to counsel murder, arson and robbery, in excited and inflammatory harangues, such as the following: "Revenge!" "To arms!" Destroy the hideous monster that seeks to destroy you." "Avenge the atrocious murder!" (The killing of rioters by the police.) "Annihilation to the beasts in human form who call themselves rulers!" "The day is not far distant when we will resort to hanging these men." (Capitalists.) "You have nothing more to do with the law except to lay hands upon it and throttle it until it makes its last kick. * * * Throttle it. Kill it. Stab it. Do every thing you can to wound it, to impede its progress.' (The language of Fielden on the night and a moment before the Haymarket massacre, and for which sentiments, we suppose, he was singled out as an object of mercy.) Now is there any man or any lawyer, except an anarchist, who will pretend that the right of "free speech" gives citizens the right to assemble in the streets or anywhere else, with arms or without, and utter such atrocious sentiments as these, and that the police have not the right to break up such assemblages? Perhaps it is hardly worth while to argue this matter so gravely to lawyers, but as a

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THERE is no shibboleth more absurd than the cry "free speech!" Beneath its banner bad men under all governments have frequently counselled the worst crimes against society and individuals, and incited the basest elements of that society to violence and bloodshed. There is really no such thing tolerated under the most lenient government as "free speech," construing that term literally. No man No man has a right to slander another. has a right to seduce a woman by flattering lies. No man has a right to make false pretenses to the injury of another. Every man abusing the privilege of "free speech " is held responsible― responsible for his slanders, his seductions, his false pretenses. One who counsels and incites another to commit a crime is or should be responsible under the criminal law as much as the instrument of his wicked purpose. We are led to this line of reflection by a communication by "A Member of the Chicago Bar" to the Legal Adviser, who says: "The violation of law or private right in so doing subjects the party to arrest, but the right of expression is inviolate." Is it so? Suppose a police-lawyer has been permitted to advocate such assemman overhears one man counselling and directing another to commit a burglary, or a murder, or a rape? Has he not a right tỏ arrest him as in the commission of the felony itself? May not a policeman arrest a drunken man who sings or shouts in the street late at night? May he not arrest one who curses publicly? Is he bound to stand by till the singer, or shouter, or curser finishes, and not | arrest him until then? This lawyer himself has not the right of "free speech" in summing up a cause; he may not abuse, vilify and slander the opposite party or his witnesses, and if he tries to do it the court may order him to desist, and may put him in jail for refusing to obey. A man has the right to resist an unlawful attack on his person, even to the taking of life; but he has no right to resist a policeman in the act of arresting him under color of authority. So he has no right to counsel the killing of citizens and of the police and the militia, and the authorities are not bound to stand by until his counsels are put in action, but may break up seditious counsels before they are effectuated. Is it not the commonest thing in the world for municipal authorities to refuse to license objectionable exhibitions, lectures, addresses, and the like? What right have citizens to obstruct the streets and squares even for peaceable assemblies? May not obscene literature be suppressed? This lawyer says that a court of chancery will never enjoin against the publication of a libel. That is true; but why? Because the party has an ample remedy at law in an VOL. 36-No. 22.

blages in the columns of a law journal, it is not out of place to protest against such dangerous views. In conclusion we subjoin some remarks from the Daily Register on the Chicago lawyer's communication: "If we mistake not, the writer of the communication is in error upon a point on which the opinion of every lawyer ought to be as clear as a bell, and in tune with that of every other. Liberty does not mean irresponsibility. Freedom to come and go does not mean exemption from responsibility for trespass. The right of self-defense does not mean the right of resistance to officers. Freedom of speech does not mean immunity from liability to damages for defamation, nor from liability to punishment for crimes instigated by speech. As yet, we believe, the law has not infringed upon the freedom of speech, and we do not believe that any provocation which the enemies of civil order and peace may give will induce it to do so; but on the other hand, it is equally safe to predict that the law will hold men justly responsible for the consequences of what they may say or write. A physician might just as well justify himself in deliberately poisoning a patient by insisting on his freedom to write the fatal prescription as an anarchist justify the death of the officers of the law, the killing of whom he had advised by the freedom of speech. The blackmailer, when sued for damages, or when complained against criminally, can just as well justify the column of scandal which he offers for sale in the newspaper offices by claiming the freedom of the press."

The publishers of this journal have undertaken a very important enterprise in republishing the reports of the New York Court of Appeals in a cheap and convenient form. The one hundred and four official volumes are now controlled by two independent publishers, and cost about two hundred dollars. It is now proposed to publish them five volumes in one at five dollars for each of the new volumes, or about half the ordinary price. The new volumes are handsomely printed in good type on excellent paper, in double columns, and make about one thousand pages each. The opinions are given in full, but the arguments of counsel are omitted. The cases are supplied with ample references, so that the history of every case can be readily traced, and in important leading cases references to citations in other States are given. The work has been in preparation for two years, under the charge of several able and experienced lawyers, who have revised and rewritten the head-notes and statements. The first three volumes are now ready, and the fourth will be ready in a week. The remainder will be put out rapidly. This is a good opportunity to obtain the most important series of State reports at a very low price, and from our examination we have no hesitation in pronouncing the editorial work of the best grade, and the edition as good as possible in every way.

From an interesting article entitled "Suicide as a Crime," in the Scotch Journal of Jurisprudence, we extract the following: "Punishment will prevent some actual suicides, but much more will it prevent attempts by those who are so weak and infirm of purpose that they cannot successfully accomplish the act. That suicides are amenable to the argument of punishment, is evident from some wellestablished facts. In the first place, they are in general fastidious as to their mode of death. In cold countries and in cold weather death by drowning is avoided (Morselli, 324). Women avoid public places when they wish to destroy themselves. Among military men firearms are chosen as an honorable means of compassing their death. In the second place, fashion has an overwhelming influence, both in causing suicide and in determining the mode of death. If the State, by a well-defined | and strictly enforced law, can to some extent counteract this influence, it will have accomplished a great end. But there must be a large class of cases where the interposition of society by an emphatic prohibition, and the imposition of a penalty on the delinquent himself, could counteract the forces which impel weak-minded persons to lay violent hands on themselves. The punishment would be reformatory of the delinquent himself, and the example in his person would deter others from a similar course, while a mawkish sympathy might impel them to follow his example. But while a more stringent criminal law might prevent some attempts at suicide, if it did not prevent some successful acts, there is something to be said for the paternal

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mode of dealing with suicides which now prevails in Scotland. The causes which lead up to this crime are generally social, and legal and political remedies will effect only a partial cure. In the struggle for existence the weakest must succumb, and when they give up the fight their defeat assumes different shapes. It may be drunkenness or other vicious indulgence; it may be vagrancy, as in this country and the Eastern States of America; or it may be suicide. These various forms of defeat may be morally the same, and the particular one chosen will be determined by previous history and surrounding circumstances. And existence in different parts of the world means utterly different things. Contrast existence in the east or south of Ireland with existence in Paris. There, though the struggle is severe, it is for mere life and with nature itself, and the conscious failures are few. Here, men set themselves false, absurd and exaggerated ideals as the aim of life, and the failures are many. If we could change the Parisian conception of life we might make the suicide rate lower than the Irish, and what is true of Paris is true of our own country. We cannot however help feeling that even though the French Legislature were to pass a stringent law against suicide it would be inoperative, since in the present condition of French society it would come to the people in a foreign guise. The true remedies are economical, social, moral and religious. No alteration of the law, and no stringency in its administration, will enable us to dispense with the efforts of the christian philanthropist."

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defendants, as accommodation depositaries, a sum of money, which was sealed up in an envelope and placed in their safe, and took a receipt therefor. In an action to recover the sum, the trial court, in enumerating the matters which would amount to gross negligence so as to make the defendants liable, stated that if the money was abstracted out of the safe by any one of their employees who were occasionally sent to the safe, the defendants would be liable. Held, that as the question was whether defendants exercised ordinary care in reference to the deposit, this was to be determined by what was their business habit in regard to entering their safe, and the question should have been left to the jury. The court said: "We agree entirely with the announcement here made of the general principle that naked depositaries are only liable for gross negligence or a lack of ordinary care. But we think that in enumerating the matters which would amount to gross negligence, the rule, as applied to employees sent to the safe, was stated somewhat too positively and broadly. In the connection here, the question was not whether a principal is responsible for the criminal act of his servant, or if so, to what extent; but it was simply whether the de

fendants exercised ordinary care in reference to the deposit, which, as it seems to us, was to be determined by what was their business habit in regard to entering their safe. When the plaintiff voluntarily made the defendants his accommodation depositaries for a day or two, he must be taken to have done so with reference to the fact that they had a safe, and to their known habits of business in regard to it. If it was the habit of the defendants occasionally, as found necessary or convenient, to send a trusty clerk to the safe with a key, we can hardly suppose that by accepting the deposit they bound themselves to a higher degree of care than they habitually exercised in their own business, and in reference to their own cash. The very question was as to ordinary care whether the occasional sending of a trusty clerk to the safe was, under the circumstances, less than ordinary care, and necessarily gross negligence. 'When the bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailor the law requires only slight diligence on the part of bailee, and of course makes him answerable only for gross neglect.' Story Bailm., § 23. 'If goods deposited are stolen by the servants of a private depositary, without gross negligence on his own part, he is not chargeable any more than he would be if the theft were by a stranger.' Story Bailm., § 88; Foster v. Bank, 17 Mass. 479. "The fidelity which the depositary ought to apply to the care of the thing confided to him should be the same which he applies to the care of his own.' Story Bailm., § 65. In any view that can be taken, it seems to us that the question was not one purely of law, but to a large extent at least one of fact, and should have been left to the jury." McIver, J., dissented.

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employs defendant at a specified salary per month,
to be paid at the end of each month, and the sum-
mons is served August 28th, he is not liable to
plaintiff for defendant's salary during the month of
August, the salary for that month being neither
"then due" nor "to become due." The court
said: "It seems to us evident that under the testi-
timony given in this case, had Phillips brought his
action for his salary for August, 1885, on the day
the garnishee summons was served, viz., 28th of
August, his action would have been prematurely
brought, and he must have failed in his action.
There certainly was nothing due to Phillips on the
28th of August, 1885.
The only other
question in the case therefore is whether there
was any thing to become due' from the garnishee
to Phillips on the 28th of August, when he was
served with the garnishce summons, within the
meaning of the statute above quoted. We think
this question has been answered by this court
against the claim of the appellant. In Bishop v.
Young, 17 Wis. 46-53, the present chief justice, in
speaking of the construction to be given to the lan-
guage of the statute above quoted, says: 'And the
debts due or to become due evidently relate to such
as the garnishee owes absolutely, though payable
in the future. We have no idea the statute in-
tended to include in the language 'to become due'
a debt which might possibly become due upon a
performance of a contract by the defendant in at-
tachment. * *
There was nothing absolutely

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due to him at the time of service of garnishee process upon the respondent. And whether any thing would become due depended upon a contingency.' See also Smith v. Davis, 1 Wis. 447; Huntley v. Stone, 4 id. 491. Under the evidence in the case at bar there was nothing due absolutely from the garnishee to Phillips when he was served with the garnishee summons. The evidence clearly shows a hiring by the month for a salary to be paid at the end of the month, and according to the decisions of this court the contract is an entirety. Phillips could not recover any part of his wages unless he worked the whole month. If Phillips had quit work on the 29th he could not have recovered any part of his wages for the month. The debt therefore would only become due upon the contingency that Phillips continued to work for the garnishee for the entire month. See Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355; Lee v. Merrick, 8 id. 229; Jennings v. Lyons, 39 id. 553; Diefenback v. Stark, 56 id. 462; Koplitz v. Powell, id. 671. It can make no difference as to his liability whether the summons was served on the 28th day of the month or on the 2d. In either case whether any thing would become due depended upon Phillips working the entire month; and if the garnishee is liable when served on the 28th, he would be equally liable if he had been served on the 2d, if it appeared on the trial that Phillips had worked the entire month. See also upon this subject, Hancock v. Colyer, 99 In Foster v. Singer, Wisconsin Supreme Court, Mass. 187; Knight v. Bowley, 117 id. 551; Wood v. Oct. 11, 1887, it was held that where the garnishee | Partridge, 11 id. 488; Wyman v. Hichborn, 6 Cush.

In Coleman v. Jenkins, Georgia Supreme Court, April 18, 1887, Bleckley, C. J., said: "Now, there is high authority for saying that 'he that is robbed, not knowing what is stolen, let him not know it, and he's not robbed at all.' This, though good dramatic law, would perhaps not hold in real life. But another less poetic proposition is both sound and applicable to business: He that thinks he is robbed, but having in his own purse what he thought was stolen, is not robbed at all. When one gets his due ignorantly, if he is not hurt by his ignorance, it is the same as if he acted with knowledge. Thus, where a negotiable promissory note was transferred before maturity as collateral, and was afterward paid off in property, not to the holder but to the payee, who collected without authority, and who, after converting the property into money, transmitted the proceeds to the holder as his own money, and the holder applied the same to the secured debt only, not applying it also to the collateral, and not knowing that he was dealing with a fund derived from tho collateral, this was a discharge of the collateral debt, notwithstanding such ignorance on the part of the holder."

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M. H. Stanford, for appellee.

Dwight N. Lowell, for appellant.

CHAMPLIN, J. Complainant files a bill in Midland Circuit, setting forth that, January 14, 1884, John J. Ryan and Ethelbert J. Brewster, of Midland, were doing business as John J. Ryan & Co.; that on that date they made an assignment to complainant, for the benefit of their creditors, of all their property and rights not exempt from execution, without preference; that complainant accepted the trust, and qualified as such assignee; that he proceeded to carry out the trust as such assignee: that January 4, without his knowledge or the knowledge or consent of Brewster, Ryan, in the firm name, gave a chattel mortgage to defendant Brabb for $1,928.67, covering twenty buggies, and with the usual conditions; that the mortgage was given to take up certain notes previously given, and that they never were given up; that the mortgaged property was left in the possesson of Ryan & Co.; that when the mortgage was given it was agreed between Ryan and Brabb that the mortgage should be left with the township clerk, with instructions not to file unless some other mortgage on the same property should be presented for filing, and that the clerk was so instructed; that January 21, Brabb caused said mortgage to be filed in the township clerk's office; that Brabb demanded the property covered by the mortgage of complainant, which was refused, and that Brabb still claims property in said mortgage; that he claims said mortgage to be void as to him and the creditors of Ryan & Co.; that he believed Brabb would surrender said mortgage, or test its validity, until Brabb informed him that he would not discharge it, but insist upon the lien; that the value is over $100; that he has converted the assets into money, and that he will soon be ready to distribute to the creditors; that Brabb refuses to bring suit, and insists that he shall hold complainant liable for the value of the property converted; that he cannot distribute until the mortgage is canceled; and the fear of suits by Brabb to enforce his claim at law. The prayer for relief is to cancel the mortgage, and to restrain defendant from bringing suit, of any name or nature, against complainant, to recover the mortgage debt, and for general relief. December 12, 1885, complainant amended his bill, setting up that the debts of Ryan & Co. were $17,000, and the nominal assets $18,000, and the true value $5,000.

The defendant answers, and admits the copartnership, and denies their insolvency; neither admits nor denies the assignment, but leaves complainant to proof

of the same; denies that it can be material whether the mortgage of Ryan & Co. was made without the knowledge of complainant; denies that it was made without the knowledge or consent of Brewster; aud avers that Ryan & Co. were indebted, January 4, to the Rome Carriage Company and to the defendant in the sum of $2,428.67, and giving the items and dates; that January 4, such statement was taken by defendant to both partners, who asseuted to it, and agreed to give the chattel mortgage in question as security, which was given in pursuance of the agreement and assent of each; that Brewster, being obliged to leave by cars, assented to and directed Ryan to execute the chattel mortgage for the firm in part security, and that it was done in accordance with such agreement and direction; that in making the adjustment Ryan & Co. agreed to give the chattel mortgage, and a realestate mortgage on property mentioned, and to pay $500 in cash; that in consequence of Brewster being obliged to leave, the real-estate mortgage was not completed, nor the money paid, but that Ryan and wife executed the real-estate mortgage, and were only awaiting Brewster's return, when defendant was to deliver up the notes, and receipt for his claim and the carriage company's claim, and rely entirely on the security, but that Ryan & Co. never completed the realestate mortgage or paid the $500; that the chattel mortgage was given absolutely as part security for $1,928.67, the real-estate mortgage was to be the additional security, and the $500 was the balance; that on said date Ryan & Co. executed two notes aggregating $1,928.67, to the credit of defendant, and what was owing to him, and sets out the terms of the notes. and the making of the mortgage to secure the same; that it was a bona fide indebtedness from Ryan & Co. to defendant, and was credited upon the account as shown Ryan & Co., leaving only the $500 due the carriage company; that complainant knew this, and that both he and Ryan & Co. have been aware of this from the first, and until the filing of the bill never claimed differently; that defendant is entitled to said mortgage lien and the avails of the property in complainaut's hands, and that upon the payment of the $500, he has been at all times ready to deliver up the old account, and receipt to Ryan & Co. in full, save as to his mortgage rights; denies there was any other agreement, or that the notes were to be delivered up, save upon the completion of the agreement, and that it was understood that the notes of $1,928.67 were to be a credit upon the old notes and account; that defendant has been wrongfully dispossessed of the chattel mortgage property; that complainant has sold and converted the same to his own use, and is liable to defendant for the value of the same; denies that any arrangement was made to deliver the mortgage to the town clerk as stated; that defendant took the mortgage immediately to the clerk, delivered it for filing, directed it to be filed, and paid said clerk his legal fees for filing, and did all he could to file the same; and that if it was not filed then, it was not his fault; that that he subsequently learned it had not been filed, and he again directed its filing, and denies that the failure to file was by reason of any agreement; neither admits nor denies the possession of complainant, but leaves him to his proofs, save that he avers that complainant has disposed of said property; that the lien was a subsisting lien to secure the $1,928.67, and defendant claims a decree for an accounting by complainant for the avails of said property, and to pay to defendant the sum in satisfaction of such lien; denies that the mortgage was in fraud of the creditors of Ryan & Co., or any other person; claims the security, and avers knowledge of the same by complainant at the date of the assignment, and claims the affirmative relief for a decree to turn over the property, or ac

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