a possibility of such evils, they ought to be guarded against. There are to be a number of places fitted out for arsenals and dock-yards in the different States. Unless you sell to Congress such places as are proper for these, within your State, you will not be consistent after adoption; it results therefore clearly that you are to give into their hands, all such places as are fit for strongholds. When you have these fortifications and garrisons within your State, your legislature will have no power over them, though they see the most dangerous insults offered to the people daily. They are also to have magazines in each State; these depositories for arms, though within the State, will be free from the control of its legislature. Are we at last brought to such a humiliating and debasing degradation, that we cannot be trusted with arms for our own defence? There is a wide difference between having our arms in our own possession and under our own direction, and having them under the management of Congress. If our defence be the real object of having those arms, in whose hands can they be trusted with more propriety, or equal safety to us, as in our own? If our legislature be unworthy of legislating for every foot in this State, they are unworthy of saying another word. The clause which says that Congress shall "provide for arming, organizing and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers," seemed to put the States in the power of Congress. I wished to be informed, if Congress neglected to discipline them, whether the States were not precluded from doing it. Not being favored with a particular answer, I am confirmed in my opinion, that the States have not the power of disciplining them, without recurring to the doctrine of constructive, implied powers. If by implication the States may discipline them, by implication also Congress may officer them; because, in a partition of power, each has a right to come in for part; and because implication is to operate in favor of Congress on all occasions, where their object is the extension of power, as well as in favor of the States. We have not one-fourth of the arms that would be sufficient to defend ourselves. The power of arming the militia, and the means of purchasing arms, are taken from the States by the paramount powers of Congress. If Congress will not arm them, they will not be armed at all. There have been no instances shown of a voluntary cession of power, sufficient to induce me to grant the most dangerous powers: a possibility of their future relinquishment will not persuade me to yield such powers. Congress, by the power of taxation, by that of raising an army, and by their control over the militia, have the sword in one hand and the purse in the other. Shall we be safe without either? Congress have an unlimited power over both: they are entirely given up by us. Let him candidly tell me, where and when did freedom exist, when the sword and purse were given up by the people? Unless a miracle in human affairs interposed, no nation ever retained its liberty after the loss of the sword and purse. Can you prove by any argumentative deduction, that it is possible to be safe without retaining one of these? If you give them up, you are gone. Give us at least a plausible apology why Congress should keep their proceedings in secret. They have the power of keeping them secret as long as they please; for the provision for a periodical publication is too inexplicit and ambiguous to avail any thing. The expression, from time to time, as I have more than once observed, admits of any extension. They may carry on the most wicked and pernicious of schemes under the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a people never were nor ever will be secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them. The most iniquitous plots may be carried on against their liberty and happiness. I am not an advocate for divulging indiscriminately all the operations of government, though the practice of our ancestors in some degree justifies it. Such transactions as relate to military operations, or affairs of great consequence, the immediate promulgation of which might defeat the interests of the community, I would not wish to be published, till the end which required their secrecy should have been effected." But to cover, with the veil of secrecy, the common routine of business, is an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man, and every friend to his country. [Mr. Henry then, in a very animated manner, expatiated on the evil and pernicious tendency of keeping secret the common proceedings of government, and said, that it was contrary to the practice of other free nations. The people of England, he asserted, had gained immortal honor, by the manly boldness wherewith they divulged to all the world their political disquisitions and operations; and that such a conduct inspired other nations with respect. He illustrated his arguments by several quotations.] He then continued:: I appeal to this convention, if it would not be better for America to take off the veil of secrecy. Look at us-hear our transactions. If this had been the language of the federal convention, what would have been the result? Such a constitution would not have come out to your utter astonishment, conceding such dangerous powers, and recommending secrecy in the future transactions of government. I believe it would have given more general satisfaction, if the proceedings of that convention had not been concealed from the public eye. This constitution authorizes the same conduct. There is not an English feature in it. The transactions of Congress may be concealed a century from the public consistently with the constitution. This, sir, is a laudable imitation of the transactions of the Spanish treaty. We case. A republic has this advantage over a have not forgotten with what a thick veil of secrecy those transactions were covered. monarchy, that its wars are generally founded on more just grounds. A republic can never enter into a war, unless it be a national war, unless it be approved of, or desired by the whole community. Did ever a republic fail to use the utmost resources of the community when a war was necessary? I call for an example. I call also for an example, when a republic has been engaged in a war contrary to the wishes of its people. There are thousands of examples where the ambition of its prince has precipitated a nation into the most destructive war. No nation ever withheld power when its object was just and right. I will hazard an observation: I find fault with the paper before you, because the same power that declares war, has the ability to carry it on. Is it so in England? The king declares war: the house of commons gives the means of carrying it on. This is a strong check on the king. He will enter into no war that is unnecessary; for the commons, having the power of withholding the means, will exercise that power, unless the object of the war be for the interest of the nation. How is it here? The Congress can both declare war and carry it on, and levy your money as long as you have a shilling to We are told that this government, collectively taken, is without an example; that it is national in this part, and federal in that part, &c. We may be amused, if we please, by a treatise of political anatomy. In the brain it is national: the stamina are federal-some limbs are federal, others national. The senators are voted for by the State legislatures; so far it is federal. Individuals choose the members of the first branch; here it is national. It is federal in conferring general powers, but national in retaining them. It is not to be supported by the States the pockets of individuals are to be searched for its maintenance. What signifies it to me, that you have the most curious anatomical description of it in its creation? To all the common purposes of legislation it is a great consolidation of government. You are not to have the right to legislate in any but trivial cases: you are not to touch private contracts: you are not to have the right of having arms in your own defence: you cannot be trusted with dealing out justice between man and man. What shall the States have to do?-Take care of the poor, repair and make highways, erect bridges, and so on and so on. Abolish the pay. State legislatures at once. What purposes I shall now speak a little of the colonial conshould they be continued for? Our legislature federacy which was proposed at Albany. Maswill indeed be a ludicrous spectacle-one hun-sachusetts did not give her consent to the prodred and eighty men marching in solemn, ject at Albany so as to consolidate with the farcical procession, exhibiting a mournful proof of the lost liberty of their country, without the power of restoring it. But, sir, we have the consolation, that it is a mixed government; that is, it may work sorely on your neck, but you will have some comfort by saying, that it was a federal government in its origin. other colonies. Had there been a consolidation at Albany, where would have been their charter? Would that confederacy have preserved their charter from Britain? The strength and energy of the then designed government would have crushed American opposition. The American revolution took its origin from the comparative weakness of the British government, not being concentred into one point. A concentration of the strength and interest of the British government in one point, would have rendered opposition to its tyrannies fruitless. For want of that consolidation do we now enjoy liberty, and the privilege of debating at this moment. I am pleased with the colonial establishment. The example which the to depart from our present confederacy, rivets me to my former opinion, and convinces me that consolidation must end in the destruction of our liberties. I beg gentlemen to consider; lay aside your prejudices-is this a federal government? Is it not a consolidated government for every purpose almost? Is the government of Virginia a State government, after this government is adopted? I grant that it is a republican government; but for what purposes? For such trivial, domestic considerations, as render it unworthy the name of a legislature. I shall take leave of this political anatomy by observ-honorable member has produced to persuade us ing, that it is the most extraordinary that ever entered into the imagination of man. If our political diseases demand a cure, this is an unheard of medicine. The honorable member, I am convinced, wanted a name for it. Were your health in danger, would you take new medicine? I need not make use of these exclamations; for every member in this committee must be alarmed at making new and unusual experiments in government. Let us have national credit and a national treasury in case of war. You never can want national resources in time of war, if the war be a national one, if it be necessary, and this necessity be obvious to the meanest capacity. The utmost exertions will be used by the people of America in that The honorable gentleman has told us of our ingratitude to France. She does not intend to take payment by force. Ingratitude shall not be laid to my charge. I wish to see the friendship between this country and that magnanimous ally perpetuated. Requisitions will enable us to pay the debts we owe to France and other countries. She does not desire us to go from our beloved republican government. The change is inconsistent with our engagements with those nations. It is cried out, that those in opposition wish disunion. This is not true. They are the most strenuous friends to | now, depressed by the most intolerable slavery, it. This government will clearly operate disunion. If it be heard on the other side of the Atlantic, that you are going to disunite and dissolve the confederacy, what says France? Will she be indifferent to an event that will so radically affect her treaties with us? Our treaty with her is founded on the confederation-we are bound to her as thirteen States confederated. What will become of the treaty? It is said that treaties will be on a better footing. How so? Will the President, Senate, and House of Representatives be parties to them? I cannot conceive how the treaties can be as binding, if the confederacy is dissolved, as they are now. Those nations will not continue their friendship then; they will become our enemies. I look on the treaties as the greatest pillars of safety. If the house of Bourbon keeps us, we are safe. Dissolve that confederacy-who has you? The British. Federalism will not protect you from the British. Is a connection with that country more desirable? I was amazed when gentlemen forgot the friends of America. I hope that this dangerous change will not be effected. It is safe for the French and Spaniards, that we should continue to be thirteen States; but it is not so, that we should be consolidated into one government. They have settlements in America; will they like schemes of popular ambition? Will they not have some serious reflections? You may tell them you have not changed your situation; but they will not believe you. If there be a real check intended to be left on Congress, it must be left in the State governments. There will be some check, as long as the judges are incorrupt. As long as they are upright, you may preserve your liberty. But what will the judges determine when the State and federal authority come to be contrasted? Will your liberty then be secure, when the congressional laws are declared paramount to the laws of your State, and the judges are sworn to support them? in the different parts of the world; because the strong hand of power has bolted them in the dungeon of despotism. Review the present situation of the nations of Europe, which is pretended to be the freest quarter of the globe. Cast your eyes on the countries called free there. Look at the country from which we are descended, I beseech you; and although we are separated by everlasting, insuperable partitions, yet there are some virtuous people there who are friends to human nature and liberty. Look at Britain; see there the bolts and bars of power; see bribery and corruption defiling the fairest fabric that ever human nature reared. Can a gentleman, who is an Englishman, or who is acquainted with the English history, desire to prove these evils? See the efforts of a man descended from a friend of America; see the efforts of that man, assisted even by the king, to make reforms. But you find the faults too strong to be amended. Nothing but bloody war can alter them. See Ireland: that country groaning from century to century, without getting their government amended. Previous adoption was the fashion there. They sent for amendments from time to time, but never obtained them, though pressed by the severest oppression, till eighty thousand volunteers demanded them sword in hand-till the power of Britain was prostrate; when the American resistance was crowned with success. Shall we do so? If you judge by the experience of Ireland, you must obtain the amendments as early as possible. But, I ask you again, where is the example that a government was amended by those who instituted it? Where is the instance of the errors of a government rectified by those who adopted them? I shall make a few observations to prove that the power over elections, which is given to Congress, is contrived by the federal government; that the people may be deprived of their proper influence in the government, by destroying the I am constrained to make a few remarks on force and effect of their suffrages. Congress is the absurdity of adopting this system, and re- to have a discretionary control over the time, lying on the chance of getting it amended af- place and manner of elections. The representterwards. When it is confessed to be replete atives are to be elected consequently when and with defects, is it not offering to insult your where they please. As to the time and place, understandings, to attempt to reason you out of gentlemen have attempted to obviate the obthe propriety of rejecting it, till it be amended? jection, by saying that the time is to happen Does it not insult your judgments to tell you- once in two years, and that the place is to be adopt first, and then amend? Is your rage for within a particular district, or in the respective novelty so great, that you are first to sign and counties. But how will they obviate the danseal, and then to retract? Is it possible to con-ger of referring the manner of election to Conceive a greater solecism? I am at a loss what to say. You agree to bind yourselves hand and foot for the sake of what? Of being unbound. You go into a dungeon-for what? To get out. Is there no danger when you go in, that the bolts of federal authority shall shut you in? Human nature never will part from power. Look for an example of a voluntary relinquishment of power, from one end of the globe to another-you will find none. Ninetenths of our fellow-men have been, and are gress? Those illumined genii may see that this may not endanger the rights of the people; but to my unenlightened understanding, it appears plain and clear, that it will impair the popular weight of the government. Look at the Roman history. They had two ways of voting: the one by tribes, and the other by centuries. By the former, numbers prevailed: in the lat ter, riches preponderated. According to the mode prescribed, Congress may tell you, that they have a right to make the vote of one gen tleman go as far as the votes of one hundred poor men. The power over the manner admits of the most dangerous latitude. They may modify it as they please. They may regulate the number of votes by the quantity of property, without involving any repugnancy to the constitution. I should not have thought of this trick or contrivance, had I not seen how the public liberty of Rome was trifled with by the mode of voting by centuries, whereby one rich man had as many votes as a multitude of poor men. The plebeians were trampled on till they resisted. The patricians trampled on the liberties of the plebeians, till the latter had spirit to assert their right to freedom and equality. The result of the American mode of election may be similar. | Perhaps I shall be told, that I have gone through the regions of fancy; that I deal in noisy exclamations, and mighty professions of patriotism. Gentlemen may retain their opinions; but I look on that paper as the most fatal plan that could possibly be conceived to enslave a free people. If such be your rage for novelty, take it and welcome, but you never shall have | my consent. My sentiments may appear extravagant, but I can tell you, that a number of my fellow-citizens have kindred sentiments; and I am anxious, if my country should come into the hands of tyranny, to exculpate myself from being in any degree the cause; and to exert my faculties to the utmost to extricate her. Whether I am gratified or not in my beloved form of government, I consider that the more she is plunged into distress, the more it is my duty to relieve her. Whatever may be the result, I shall wait with patience till the day may come when an opportunity shall offer to exert myself in her cause. But I should be led to take that man for a lunatic, who should tell me to run into the adoption of a government avowedly defective, in hopes of having it amended afterwards. Were I about to give away the meanest particle of my own property, I should act with more prudence and discretion. My anxiety and fears are great, lest America, by the adoption of this system, should be cast into a fathomless abyss. RICHARD HENRY LEE. THE name of Lee occupies a prominent and honorable position in the political, religious and domestic history of the American colonies. Richard, the great-grandfather of Richard Henry Lee, removed from England to Virginia, during the reign of Charles the First, and after making several voyages to his native country, finally settled in the county of Northumberland, between the valleys of the Rappahannock and Potomac rivers. During the civil war between Charles the First and the British Parliament, this Richard Lee, and Governor Sir William Berkeley, conducted, on the part of Virginia, the negotiations consequent upon her resistance to the armed ships and troops of Cromwell, which had been sent to reduce her to an allegiance. Unable to defend the colony against this force, but refusing fidelity to the Protector, they consummated a treaty, in which Virginia was styled an "independent dominion." On the death of Cromwell, Lee, with the assistance of Sir William Berkeley, procured a declaration, proclaiming Charles the Second "King of England, France, Scotland, Ireland and Virginia," two years previous to his restoration. For this manifestation of loyalty, Charles, after he was restored to his throne, ordered the arms of Virginia to be added to those of England, France, Scotland and Ireland, with the motto "En dat Virginia quintam." After the union of England and Scotland, the arms of Virginia were quartered with those of England, &c., with the motto "En dat Virginia quartam;" and from these circumstances Virginia derived her title of "Ancient Dominion." In gratitude for the eminent services of Mr. Lee, Richard, his second son, was appointed to an honorable and influential seat in the king's council of Virginia. This office was transmitted to Thomas, the third son of the last mentioned Richard Lee, and the father of Richard Henry, the subject of the present sketch. Richard Henry Lee was born on the twentieth day of January, 1732, in Westmoreland county, Virginia. At this period there were very few seminaries of learning in the colonies, at which the higher branches of education were taught, therefore young Lee, after passing a few years under the care of a private tutor, was sent to England to complete his studies. At the age of nineteen, two years after the death of his father, in 1750, he returned to his native country, and for some time resided with his brother. Although at this time he passed his days in ease and pleasure, he was never idle. The extensive library his father had collected was his resort, and among the books he found abundant resources to improve his intellect. He studied with profound admiration the classic histories of Greece and Rome, and from the story of their patriotic and republican ages, he derived that extensive fund of political knowledge which he so successfully used in the service of the colonies, in after life. Thus prepared, Mr. Lee entered upon the field of public action. At the time England sent troops to protect the frontiers of the colonies from the predatory incursions of the Indians, who were employed by France to carry on the 'seven years war" in America, Mr. Lee, on their arrival, marched at the head of a volunteer company to Alexandria, or Belhaven, on the Potomac, and tendered his services to the unfortunate General Braddock, who had command of the regulars. The general deeming the services of the provincials of little importance, declined to take them under his command, and Mr. Lee returned to his home. This occurred in 1755. In 1757 Mr. Lee was appointed a justice of the peace, and upon a petition from the other magistrates to the governor, he was made president |