in 1798, he was appointed inspector-general-a trust which did not prevent the practice of his profession, which he continued until his death, which occurred in a duel with Aaron Burr, on the twelfth of July, 1804. The particulars of this event are too familiar for repetition in this place.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

ecuted them so far as answered their particular convenience or advantage. Hence there have ever been thirteen different bodies to judge of the measures of Congress-and the operations of government have been distracted by their taking different courses. Those which were to be benefited, have complied with the requisi-hazard a civil war? Suppose Massachusetts, tions; others have totally disregarded them. Have not all of us been witnesses to the unhappy embarrassments which resulted from these proceedings? Even during the late war, while the pressure of common danger connected strongly the bond of our Union, and incited to vigorous exertions, we felt many distressing effects of the impotent system. How have we seen this State, though most exposed to the calamities of the war, complying, in an unexampled manner, with the federal requisitions, and compelled by the delinquency of others to bear most unusual burdens. Of this truth, we have the most solemn proof on our records. In 1779 and 1780, when the State, from the ravages of war, and from her great exertions to resist them, became weak, distressed, and forlorn, every man avowed the principle which we now contend for; that our misfortunes, in a great degree, proceeded from the want of But can we believe that one State will ever vigor in the continental government. These suffer itself to be used as an instrument of cowere our sentiments when we did not specu-ercion? The thing is a dream-it is imposlate, but feel. We saw our weakness, and found ourselves its victims. Let us reflect that this may again, in all probability, be our situation. | This is a weak State; and its relative station is dangerous. Your capital is accessible by land, and by sea is exposed to every daring invader; and on the north-west, you are open to the inroads of a powerful foreign nation. Indeed, this State, from its situation, will, in time of war, probably be the theatre of its operations.

and they are not complied with, what is to be done? It has been well observed, that to coerce the States is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised. A failure of compliance will never be confined to a single State. This being the case, can we suppose it wise to

or any large State, should refuse, and Congress should attempt to compel them; would they not have influence to procure assistance, especially from those States who are in the same situation as themselves? What picture does this idea present to our view? A complying State at war with a non-complying State: Congress marching the troops of one State into the bosom of another: this State collecting auxiliaries and forming perhaps a majority against its federal head. Here is a nation at war with itself. Can any reasonable man be well disposed towards a government which makes war and carnage the only means of supporting itself-a government that can exist only by the sword? Every such war must involve the innocent with the guilty. This single consideration should be sufficient to dispose every peaceable citizen against such a government.

Gentlemen have said that the non-compliance of the States has been occasioned by their sufferings. This may in part be true. But has this State been delinquent? Amidst all our distresses, we have fully complied. If New York could comply wholly with the requisitions, is it not to be supposed that the other States could in part comply? Certainly every State in the Union might have executed them in some degree. But New Hampshire, who has not suffered at all, is totally delinquent: North Carolina is totally delinquent. Many others have contributed in a very small proportion; and Pennsylvania and New York are the only States which have perfectly discharged their federal duty.

From the delinquency of those States who have suffered little by the war, we naturally conclude, that they have made no efforts; and a knowledge of human nature will teach us that their ease and security have been a principal cause of their want of exertion. "While danger is distant, its impression is weak, and while it affects only our neighbors, we have few motives to provide against it. Sir, if we have national objects to pursue, we must have national revenues. If you make requisitions

sible-then we are brought to this dilemma: either a federal standing army is to enforce the requisitions, or the federal treasury is left without supplies, and the government without support. What, sir, is the cure for this great evil? Nothing, but to enable the national laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as those of the States do. This is the true reasoning of the subject, sir. The gentlemen appear to acknowledge its force; and yet while they yield to the principle, they seem to fear its application to the government.

What then shall we do? Shall we take the old confederation as the basis of a new system? Can this be the object of the gentlemen? Certainly not. Will any man who entertains a wish for the safety of his country, trust the sword and the purse with a single assembly organized on principles so defective-so rotten? Though we might give to such a government certain powers, with safety, yet to give them the full and unlimited powers of taxation and the national forces, would be to establish a despotism; the definition of which is, a government in which all power is concentrated in a single body. To take the old confederation, and fashion it upon these principles, would be establishing a power which would destroy the liberties of the people. These considerations show clearly, that a government totally different must be instituted. They had weight in the convention which formed the new system. It was seen, that the necessary powers were too great to be trusted to a single body: they therefore formed two branches, and divided the powers, that each might be a check upon the other. This was the result of their wisdom;

and I presume that every reasonable man will agree to it. The more this subject is explained, the more clear and convincing it will appear to every member of this body. The fundamental principle of the old confederation is defective we must totally eradicate and discard this principle before we can expect an efficient government. The gentlemen who have spoken to-day, have taken up the subject of the ancient confederacies; but their view of them has been extremely partial and erroneous. The fact is, the same false and impracticable principle ran through most of the ancient governments. The first of these governments that we read of, was the Amphictyonic confederacy. The council which managed the affairs of this league, possessed powers of a similar complexion to those of our present Congress. The same feeble mode of legislation in the head, and the same power of resistance in the members, prevailed. When a requisition was made, it rarely met a compliance; and a civil war was the consequence. Those which were attacked, called in foreign aid to protect them; and the ambitious Philip, under the mask of an ally to one, invaded the liberties of each, and finally subverted the whole.

The operation of this principle appears in the same light in the Dutch republics. They have been obliged to levy taxes by an armed force. In this confederacy, one large province, by its superior wealth and influence, is commonly a match for all the rest; and when they do not comply, the province of Holland is obliged to compel them. It is observed, that the United Provinces have existed a long time; but they have been constantly the sport of their neighbors, and have been supported only by the external pressure of the surrounding powers. The policy of Europe, not the policy of their government, has saved them from dissolution. Besides, the powers of the Stadtholder have served to give an energy to the operations of this government, which is not to be found in ours. This prince has a vast personal influence: he has independent revenues: he commands an army of forty thousand men.

the destruction of the government. But I think observations of this kind might have been spared. Had they not been entered into by others, I should not have taken up so much of the time of the committee. No inference can be drawn from these examples, that republics cannot exist: we only contend that they have hitherto been founded on false principles. We have shown how they have been conducted, and how they have been destroyed. Weakness in the head has produced resistance in the members: this has been the immediate parent of civil war: auxiliary force has been invited; and a foreign power has annihilated their liberties and their name. Thus Philip subverted the Amphictyonic, and Rome the Achæan republic.

We shall do well, sir, not to deceive ourselves with the favorable events of the late war. Common danger prevented the operation of the ruinous principle, in its full extent: but, since the peace, we have experienced the evils; we have felt the poison of the system in its unmingled purity.

I

Without dwelling any longer on this subject, shall proceed to the question immediately

before the committee.

In order that the committee may understand clearly the principles on which the general convention acted, I think it necessary to explain some preliminary circumstances.

Sir, the natural situation of this country seems to divide its interests into different classes. There are navigating and non-navigating States-the northern are properly the navigating States: the southern appear to possess neither the means nor the spirit of navigation. This difference of situation naturally produces a dissimilarity of interests and views respecting foreign commerce. It was the interest of the northern States, that there should be no restraints on their navigation, and that they should have full power, by a majority in Congress, to make commercial regulations in favor of their own, and in restraint of the navigation of foreigners. The southern States wished to impose a restraint on the northern, by requiring that two-thirds in Congress should be requisite, to pass an act in regulation of commerce: they were apprehensive that the restraints of a navigation law would discourage foreigners, and by obliging them to employ the shipping of the northern States, would probably enhance their freight. This being the case, they insisted strenuously on having this provision engrafted in the constitution; and the northern States were as anxious in opposing it. On the other hand, the small States, seeing themselves embraced by the confederation upon equal terms, Is this a desirable govern-wished to retain the advantages which they already possessed: the large States, on the contrary, thought it improper that Rhode Island and Delaware should enjoy an equal suffrage with themselves: from these sources a delicate and difficult contest arose. It became necessary, therefore, to compromise; or the conven

The German confederacy has also been a perpetual source of wars. They have a diet, like our Congress, who have authority to call for supplies: these calls are never obeyed; and in time of war, the imperial army never takes the field till the enemy are returning from it. The emperor's Austrian dominions, in which he is an absolute prince, alone enable him to make head against the common foe. The members of this confederacy are ever divided and opposed to each other. The king of Prussia is a member; yet he has been constantly in opposition to the emperor. ment?

I might go more particularly into the discussion of examples, and show that, wherever this fatal principle has prevailed, even as far back as the Lycian and Achæan leagues, as well as the Amphictyonic confederacy, it has proved

The rule we have been speaking of is a general rule, and applies to all the States. Now, you have a great number of people in your State which are not represented at all, and have no voice in your government; these will be included in the enumeration-not two-fifths nor

the advantages of the plan are not confined to the southern States, but extend to other parts of the Union.

tion must have dissolved without effecting any | thing. Would it have been wise and prudent in that body, in this critical situation, to have deserted their country? No. Every man who hears me--every wise man in the United States, would have condemned them. The convention were obliged to appoint a committee for accom-three-fifths, but the whole. This proves that modation. In this committee the arrrangement was formed as it now stands; and their report was accepted. It was a delicate point; and it was necessary that all parties should be indulged. Gentlemen will see, that if there had not been unanimity, nothing could have been done for the convention had no power to establish, but only to recommend a government. Any other system would have been impracticable. Let a convention be called to-morrow-power of Congress to reduce the number. I let them meet twenty times; nay, twenty thousand times they will have the same difficulties to encounter; the same clashing interests to reconcile.

But, dismissing these reflections, let us consider how far the arrangement is in itself entitled to the approbation of this body. We will examine it upon its own merits.

I now proceed to consider the objection with regard to the number of representatives, as it now stands; I am persuaded the system, in this respect, stands on a better footing than the gentlemen imagine.

It has been asserted that it will be in the

acknowledge that there are no direct words of prohibition. But I contend that the true and genuine construction of the clause gives Congress no power whatever to reduce the representation below the number, as it now stands. Although they may limit, they can never diminish the number. One representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants is fixed as The first thing objected to is that clause the standard of increase, till, by the natural which allows a representation for three-fifths course of population, it shall become necessary of the negroes. Much has been said of the im- to limit the ratio. Probably, at present, were propriety of representing men who have no will this standard to be immediately applied, the of their own. Whether this be reasoning or representation would considerably exceed sixtydeclamation I will not presume to say. It is five. In three years it would exceed one hunthe unfortunate situation of the southern States dred. If I understand the gentleman, they to have a great part of their population, as well contend that the number may be enlarged, or as property, in blacks. The regulation com- may not. I admit that this is in the discretion plained of was one result of the spirit of accom- of Congress, and I submit to the committee, modation which governed the convention, and whether it be not necessary and proper. Still, without this indulgence no union could possibly I insist that an immediate limitation is not have been formed. But, sir, considering some probable, nor was it in the contemplation of peculiar advantages which we derive from the convention. But, sir, who will presume to them, it is entirely just that they should be say to what precise point the representation gratified. The southern States possess certain ought to be increased? This is a matter of staples, tobacco, rice, indigo, &c., which must opinion, and opinions are vastly different upon be capital objects in treaties of commerce with the subject. A proof of this is drawn from the foreign nations, and the advantage which they representations in the State legislatures. In necessarily procure in these treaties will be Massachusetts the assembly consists of about felt throughout all the States. But the justice three hundred; in South Carolina, of nearly of this plan will appear in another view. The one hundred; in New York there are sixtybest writers on government have held that five. It is observed generally, that the number representation should be compounded of per- ought to be large; let the gentlemen produce sons and property. This rule has been adopted, their criterion. I confess it is difficult for me as far as it could be, in the constitution of New to say what number may be said to be suffiYork. It will, however, by no means be ad- ciently large. On one hand it ought to be conmitted, that the slaves are considered alto-sidered that a small number will act with more gether as property. They are men, though degraded to the condition of slavery. They are persons known to the municipal laws of the States which they inhabit, as well as to the laws of nature. But representation and taxation go together, and one uniform rule ought to apply to both. Would it be just to compute these slaves in the assessment of taxes, and discard them from the estimate in the apportionment of representatives? Would it be just to impose a singular burden without conferring some adequate advantage?

Another circumstance ought to be considered.

facility, system, and decision; on the other, that a large one may enhance the difficulty of corruption. The Congress is to consist, at first, of ninety-one members. This, to a reasonable man, may appear to be as near the proper medium as any number whatever; at least, for the present. There is one source of increase, also, which does not depend upon any constructions of the constitution; it is the creation of new States. Vermont, Kentucky, and Franklin will probably become independent: new members of the Union will also be formed from the unsettled tracts of western territory. These

must be represented, and will all contribute to | circumstances. It is impossible, in the first swell the federal legislature. If the whole instance, to be precise and exact with regard to number in the United States be, at present, the number, and it is equally impossible to dethree millions, as is commonly supposed, ac- termine to what point it may be proper in fucording to the ratio of one for thirty thousand, ture to increase it. On this ground I am diswe shall have, on the first census, a hundred posed to acquiesce. In my reasonings on the subrepresentatives. In ten years thirty more will ject of government I rely more on the interests be added, and in twenty-five years the number and opinions of men than on any speculative will double; then, sir, we shall have two hun- parchment provisions whatever. I have found dred, if the increase goes on in the same pro- that constitutions are more or less excellent as portion. The convention of Massachusetts, they are more or less agreeable to the natural who made the same objection, have fixed upon operation of things. I am therefore disposed this number as the point at which they chose not to dwell long on curious speculations, or to limit the representation. But can we pro-pay much attention to modes or forms, but to nounce with certainty that it will not be expedient to go beyond this number? We cannot. Experience alone must determine. This matter may, with more safety, be left to the discretion of the legislature, as it will be the interest of the large and increasing States of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, &c., to augment the representation. Only Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Maryland, can be interested in limiting it. We may, therefore, safely calculate upon a growing representation, according to the advance of population and the circumstances of the country.

adopt a system whose principles have been sanctioned by experience, adapt it to the real state of our country, and depend on probable reasonings for its operation and result. I contend that sixty-five and twenty-six in two bodies afford perfect security in the present state of things, and that the regular progressive enlargement, which was in the contemplation of the general convention, will not leave an apprehension of danger in the most timid and suspicious mind. It will be the interest of the large States to increase the representation. This will be the standing instruction to their The State governments possess inherent ad- delegates. But, say the gentlemen, the memvantages which will ever give them an influence bers of Congress will be interested not to inand ascendency over the national government, crease the number, as it will diminish their and will for ever preclude the possibility of relative influence. In all their reasoning upon federal encroachments. That their liberties in- the subject, there seems to be this fallacy: they deed can be subverted by the federal head is suppose that the representative will have no repugnant to every rule of political calculation. motive of action on the one side, but a sense of Is not this arrangement then, sir, a most wise duty; or on the other, but corruption. They and prudent one? Is not the present repre- do not reflect that he is to return to the comsentation fully adequate to our present exigen-munity; that he is dependent on the will of cies, and sufficient to answer all the purposes of the Union? I am persuaded that an examination of the objects of the federal government will afford a conclusive answer.

Many other observations might be made on this subject, but I cannot now pursue them, for I feel myself not a little exhausted; I beg leave, therefore, to waive for the present the further discussion of the question.

On the 21st Mr. Hamilton continued his remarks as follows:

the people, and that it cannot be his interest to oppose their wishes. Sir, the genral sense of the people will regulate the conduct of their representatives. I admit that there are exceptions to this rule; there are certain conjunctures when it may be necessary and proper to disregard the opinions which the majority of the people have formed. But in the general course of things, the popular views, and even prejudices, will direct the actions of the rulers.

All governments, even the most despotic, depend, in a great degree, on opinion. In free republics, it is most peculiarly the case. In When I had the honor to address the com- these, the will of the people makes the essential mittee yesterday, I gave a history of the cir- principle of the government; and the laws cumstances which attended the convention, which control the community, receive their when forming the plan before you. I endeav-tone and spirit from the public wishes. It is ored to point out to you the principles of accommodation on which this arrangement was made, and to show that the contending interests of the States led them to establish the representation as it now stands. In the second place, I attempted to prove, that in point of number, the representation would be perfectly secure. Sir, no man agrees more perfectly than myself to the main principle for which the gentlemen contend. I agree that there should be a broad Democratic branch in the national legislature. But this matter, sir, depends on

the fortunate situation of our country, that the minds of the people are exceedingly enlightened and refined. Here then we may expect the laws to be proportionably agreeable to the standard of perfect policy; and the wisdom of public measures to consist with the most intimate conformity between the views of the representative and his constituent. If the general voice of the people be for an increase, it undoubtedly must take place. They have it in their power to instruct their representatives; and the State legislatures, which appoint the