into the sea. For, I ask of the men of knowledge of the world, whether they would not hold him for a blockhead, that should hope to prevail in an argument, whose scope and object is to mortify the self-love of the expected proselyte? I ask further, when such attempts have been made, have they not failed of success? The indignant heart repels a conviction that is believed to debase it. The self-love of an individual is not warmer in its sense, nor more constant in its action, than what is called in French, l'esprit du corps, or the self-love of an assembly; that jealous affection which a body of men is always found to bear towards its own prerogatives and power. I will not condemn this passion. Why should we urge an unmeaning censure, or yield to groundless fears that truth and duty will be abandoned, because men in a public assembly are still men, and feel that esprit du corps which is one of the laws of their nature? Still less should we despond or complain, if we reflect, that this very spirit is a guardian instinct, that watches over the life of this assembly. It cherishes the principle of self-preservation, and without its existence, and its existence with all the strength we see it possess, the privileges of the representatives of the people, and mediately the liberties of the people, would not be guarded, as they are, with a vigilance that never sleeps, and an unrelaxing constancy and courage. If the consequences, most unfairly attributed to the vote in the affirmative, were not chimerical, and worse, for they are deceptive, I should think it a reproach to be found even moderate in my zeal, to assert the constitutional powers of this assembly; and whenever they shall be in real danger, the present occasion affords proof, that there will be no want of advocates and champions. Indeed, so prompt are these feelings, and when once roused, so difficult to pacify, that if we could prove the alarm was groundless, the prejudice against the appropriations may remain on the mind, and it may even pass for an act of prudence and duty to negative a measure, which was lately believed by ourselves, and may hereafter be misconceived by others, to encroach upon the powers of the House. Principles that bear a remote affinity with usurpation on those powers will be rejected, not merely as errors, but as wrongs. Our sensibilities will shrink from a post, where it is possible they may be wounded, and be inflamed by the slightest suspicion of an assault. While these prepossessions remain, all argument is useless. It may be heard with the ceremony of attention, and lavish its own resources, and the patience it wearies, to no manner of purpose. The ears may be open, but the mind will remain locked up, and every pass to the understanding guarded. Unless, therefore, this jealous and repulsive fear for the rights of the House can be allayed, I will not ask a hearing. I cannot press this topic too far; I cannot address myself with too much emphasis to the magnanimity and candor of those who sit here, to suspect their own feelings, and, while they do, to examine the grounds of their alarm. I repeat it, we must conquer our persuasion, that this body has an interest in one side of the question more than the other, before we attempt to surmount our objections. On most subjects, and solemn ones too, perhaps in the most solemn of all, we form our creed more from inclination than evidence. Let me expostulate with gentlemen to admit, if it be only by way of supposition, and for a moment, that it is barely possible they have yielded too suddenly to their alarms for the powers of this House; that the addresses, which have been made with such variety of forms, and with so great dexterity in some of them, to all that is prejudice and passion in the heart, are either the effects or the instruments of artifice and deception, and then let them see the subject once more in its singleness and simplicity. It will be impossible, on taking a fair review of the subject, to justify the passionate appeals that have been made to us to struggle for our liberties and rights, and the solemn exhortations to reject the proposition, said to be concealed in that on your table, to surrender them for ever. In spite of this mock solemnity, I demand, if the House will not concur in the measure to execute the treaty, what other course shall we take? How many ways of proceeding lie open before us? In the nature of things there are but three; we are either to make the treaty, to observe it, or break it. It would be absurd to say we will do neither. If I may repeat a phrase already so much abused, we are under coercion to do one of them, and we have no power, by the exercise of our discretion, to prevent the consequences of a choice. By refusing to act, we choose. The treaty will be broken and fall to the ground. Where is the fitness, then, of replying to those who urge upon the House the topics of duty and policy, that they attempt to force the treaty down, and to compel this assembly to renounce its discretion and to degrade itself to the rank of a blind and passive instrument in the hands of the treaty-making power? In case we reject the appropriation, we do not secure any greater liberty of action, we gain no safer shelter than before from the consequences of the decision. Indeed, they are not to be evaded. It is neither just nor manly to complain that the treatymaking power has produced this coercion to act. It is not the art or the despotism of that power, it is the nature of things that compels. Shall we, dreading to become the blind instruments of power, yield ourselves the blinder dupes of mere sounds of imposture? Yet that word, that empty word, coercion, has given scope to an eloquence, that, one would imagine, could not be tired, and did not choose to be quieted. Let us examine still more in detail the alter- | treaties; that is the constitutional province of natives that are before us, and we shall scarcely our discretion. Be it so. What follows? fail to see, in still stronger lights, the futility of Treaties, when adjudged by us to be inexour apprehensions for the power and liberty of pedient, fall to the ground, and the public faith the House. is not hurt. This, incredible and extravagant as it may seem, is asserted. The amount of it, in plainer language, is this-the President and Senate are to make national bargains, and this House has nothing to do in making them. But bad bargains do not bind this House, and, of inevitable consequence, do not bind the nation. When a national bargain, called a treaty, is made, its binding force does not depend upon the making, but upon our opinion that it is good. As our opinion on the matter can be known and declared only by ourselves, when sitting in our legislative capacity, the treaty, though ratified, and, as we choose to term it, made, is hung up in suspense, till our sense is ascertained. We condemn the bargain, and it falls, though, as we say, our faith does not. We approve a bargain as expedient, and it stands firm, and binds the nation. Yet, even in this latter case, its force is plainly not derived from the ratification by the treatymaking power, but from our approbation. Who will trace these inferences, and pretend that we have no share, according to the argument, in the treaty-making power? These opinions, nevertheless, have been advocated with infinite zeal and perseverance. Is it possible that any man can be hardy enough to avow them and their ridiculous consequences? If, as some have suggested, the thing called a treaty is incomplete, if it has no binding force or obligation, the first question is, will this House complete the instrument, and, by concurring, impart to it that force which it wants. The doctrine has been avowed, that the treaty, though formally ratified by the executive power of both nations, though published as a law for our own by the President's proclamation, is still a mere proposition submitted to this assembly, no way distinguishable in point of authority or obligation, from a motion for leave to bring in a bill, or any other original act of ordinary legislation. This doctrine, so novel in our country, yet so dear to many, precisely for the reason, that in the contention for power, victory is always dear, is obviously repugnant to the very terms as well as the fair interpretation of our own resolutions-(Mr. Biount's.) We declare, that the treaty-making power is exclusively vested in the President and Senate, and not in this House. Need I say, that we fly in the face of that resolution, when we pretend, that the acts of that power are not valid until we have concurred in them? It would be nonsense, or worse, to use the language of the most glaring contradiction, and to claim a share in a power, which we at the same time disclaim as exclusively vested in other departments. What can be more strange than to say, that the compacts of the President and Senate with foreign nations are treaties, without our agency, and yet those compacts want all power and obligation, until they are sanctioned by our concurrence? It is not my design in this place, if at all, to go into the discussion of this part of the subject. I will, at least for the present, take it for granted, that this monstrous opinion stands in little need of remark, and if it does, lies almost out of the reach of refutation. But, say those who hide the absurdity under the cover of ambiguous phrases, have we no discretion and if we have, are we not to make use of it in judging of the expediency or inexpediency of the treaty? Our resolution claims that privilege, and we cannot surrender it without equal inconsistency and breach of duty. If there be any inconsistency in the case, it lies, not in making the appropriations for the treaty, but in the resolution itself (Mr. Blount's.) Let us examine it more nearly. A treaty is a bargain between nations, binding in good faith; and what makes a bargain? The assent of the contracting parties. We allow that the treaty power is not in this House; this House has no share in contracting, and is not a party of consequence, the President and Senate alone may make a treaty that is binding in good faith. We claim, however, say the gentlemen, a right to judge of the expediency of| Let me hasten to suppose the treaty is considered as already made, and then the alternative is fairly presented to the mind, whether we will observe the treaty or break it. This, in fact, is the naked question. If we choose to observe it with good faith, our course is obvious. Whatever is stipulated to be done by the nation, must be complied with. Our agency, if it should be requisite, cannot be properly refused. And I do not see why it is not as obligatory a rule of conduct for the legislative as for the courts of law. I cannot lose this opportunity to remark, that the coercion, so much dreaded and declaimed against, appears at length to be no more than the authority of principles, the despotism of duty. Gentlemen complain we are forced to act in this way, we are forced to swallow the treaty. It is very true, unless we claim the liberty of abuse, the right to act as we ought not. There is but one right way open for us, the laws of morality and good faith have fenced up every other. What sort of liberty is that, which we presume to exercise against the authority of those laws? It is for tyrants to complain, that principles are restraints, and that they have no liberty, so long as their despotism has limits. These principles will be unfolded by examining the remaining question: SHALL WE BREAK THE TREATY? The treaty is bad, fatally bad, is the cry. It sacrifices the interest, the honor, the independence of the United States, and the faith of our engagements to France. If we listen to the clamor of party intemperance, the evils are of a number not to be counted, and of a nature not to be borne, even in idea. The language of passion and exaggeration may silence that of sober reason in other places, it has not done it here. The question here is, whether the treaty be really so very fatal as to oblige the nation to break its faith. I admit that such a treaty ought not to be executed. I admit that selfpreservation is the first law of society, as well as of individuals. It would, perhaps, be deemed an abuse of terms to call that a treaty, which violates such a principle. I wave also, for the present, any inquiry, what departments shall represent the nation, and annul the stipulations of a treaty. I content myself with pursuing the inquiry, whether the nature of this compact be such as to justify our refusal to carry it into effect. A treaty is the promise of a nation. Now, promises do not always bind him that makes them. tions for the posts, for indemnity, and for a due observation of our neutral rights, has justly raised the character of the nation. Never did the name of America appear in Europe with more lustre than upon the event of ratifying this instrument. The fact is of a nature to overcome all contradiction. But the independence of the country-we are colonists again. This is the cry of the very men who tell us, that France will resent our exercise of the rights of an independent nation to adjust our wrongs with an aggressor, without giving her the opportunity to say, those wrongs shall subsist and shall not be adjusted. This is an admirable specimen of the spirit of independence. The treaty with Great Britain, it cannot be denied, is unfavorable to this strange sort of independence. Few men of any reputation for sense, among those who say the treaty is bad, will put that reputation so much at hazard as to pretend that it is so extremely bad as to warrant and require a violation of the public faith. The proper ground of the controversy, therefore, is really But I lay down two rules, which ought to unoccupied by the opposers of the treaty; as guide us in this case. The treaty must appear the very hinge of the debate is on the point, to be bad, not merely in the petty details, but not of its being good or otherwise, but whether in its character, principle and mass. And in it is intolerably and fatally pernicious. If loose the next place, this ought to be ascertained by and ignorant declaimers have any where asthe decided and general concurrence of the en-serted the latter idea, it is too extravagant, and lightened public. I confess there seems to me too solidly refuted, to be repeated here. Insomething very like ridicule thrown over the stead of any attempt to expose it still further, debate by the discussion of the articles in detail. I will say, and I appeal with confidence to the The undecided point is, shall we break our candor of many opposers of the treaty to acfaith? And while our country and enlightened knowledge, that if it had been permitted to go Europe await the issue with more than curiosity, into operation silently, like our other treaties, we are employed to gather peacemeal, and so little alteration of any sort would be made article by article, from the instrument, a justi- by it in the great mass of our commercial and fication for the deed by trivial calculations of agricultural concerns, that it would not be gencommercial profit and loss. This is little worthy erally discovered by its effects to be in force, of the subject, of this body, or of the nation. during the term for which it was contracted. If the treaty is bad, it will appear to be so in I place considerable reliance on the weight its mass. Evil to a fatal extreme, if that be its men of candor will give to this remark, because tendency, requires no proof; it brings it. Ex-I believe it to be true, and little short of undetremes speak for themselves and make their niable. When the panic dread of the treaty own law. What if the direct voyage of Ame-shall cease, as it certainly must, it will be seen rican ships to Jamaica with horses or lumber, might net one or two per centum more than the present trade to Surinam; would the proof of the fact avail any thing in so grave a question as the violation of the public engagements? It is in vain to allege, that our faith, plighted to France, is violated by this new treaty. Our prior treaties are expressly saved from the operation of the British treaty. And what do those mean who say, that our honor was forfeited by treating at all, and especially by such a treaty? Justice, the laws and practice of nations, a just regard for peace as a duty to mankind, and the known wish of our citizens, as well as that self-respect which required it of the nation to act with dignity and moderation, all these forbade an appeal to arms, before we had tried the effect of negotiation. The honor of the United States was saved, not forfeited, by treating. The treaty itself, by its stipula through another medium. Those, who shall make search into the articles for the cause of their alarms, will be so far from finding stipulations that will operate fatally, they will discover few of them that will have any lasting operation at all. Those, which relate to the disputes between the two countries, will spend their force on the subjects in dispute, and extinguish them. The commercial articles are more of a nature to confirm the existing state of things, than to change it. The treaty alarm was purely an address to the imagination and prejudices of the citizens, and not on that account the less formidable. Objections that proceed upon error, in fact or calculation, may be traced and exposed; but such as are drawn from the imagination or addressed to it, elude definition, and return to domineer over the mind, after having been banished from it by truth. I will not so far abuse the momentary strength that is lent to me by the zeal of the occasion, as to enlarge upon the commercial operation of the treaty. I proceed to the second proposition, which I have stated as indispensably requisite to a refusal of the performance of a treaty will the state of public opinion justify the deed? No government, not even a despotism, will break its faith without some pretext, and it must be plausible, it must be such as will carry the public opinion along with it. Reasons of policy, if not of morality, dissuade even Turkey and Algiers from breaches of treaty in mere wantonness of perfidy, in open contempt of the reproaches of their subjects. Surely, a popular government will not proceed more arbitrarily, as it is more free; nor with less shame or scruple in proportion as it has better morals. It will not proceed against the faith of treaties at all, unless the strong and decided sense of the nation shall pronounce, not simply that the treaty is not advantageous, but that it ought to be broken and annulled. Such a plain manifestation of the sense of the citizens is indispensably requisite; first, because if the popular apprehensions be not an infallible criterion of the disadvantages of the instrument, their acqiescence in the operation of it is an irrefragable proof, that the extreme case does not exist, which alone could justify our setting it aside. In the next place, this approving opinion of the citizens is requisite, as the best preventive of the ill consequences of a measure always so delicate, and often so hazardous. Individuals would, in that case at least, attempt to repel the opprobrium that would be thrown upon Congress by those who will charge it with perfidy. They would give weight to the testimony of facts, and the authority of principles, on which the government would rest its vindication. And if war should ensue upon the violation, our citizens would not be divided from their government, nor the ardor of their courage be chilled by the consciousness of injustice, and the sense of humiliation, that sense which makes those despicable who know they are despised. I add a third reason, and with me it has a force that no words of mine can augment, that a government, wantonly refusing to fulfil its engagements, is the corrupter of its citizens. Will the laws continue to prevail in the hearts of the people, when the respect that gives them efficacy is withdrawn from the legislators? How shall we punish vice while we practise it? We have not force, and vain will be our reliance, when we have forfeited the resources of opinion. To weaken government and to corrupt morals are effects of a breach of faith not to be prevented; and from effects they become causes, producing, with augmented activity, more disorder and more corruption; order will be disturbed and the life of the public liberty shortened. And who, I would inquire, is hardy enough to pretend, that the public voice demands the violation of the treaty? The evidence of the sense of the great mass of the nation is often equivocal; but when was it ever manifested with more energy and precision than at the present moment? The voice of the people is raised against the measure of refusing the appropriations. If gentlemen should urge, nevertheless, that all this sound of alarm is a counferfeit expression of the sense of the public, I will proceed to other proofs. If the treaty is ruinous to our commerce, what has blinded the eyes of the merchants and traders? Surely they are not enemies to trade, or ignorant of their own interests. Their sense is not so liable to be mistaken as that of a nation, and they are almost unanimous. The articles, stipulating the redress of our injuries by captures on the sea, are said to be delusive. By whom is this said? The very men, whose fortunes are staked upon the competency of that redress, say no such thing. They wait with anxious fear lest you should annul that compact on which all their hopes are rested. Thus we offer proof, little short of absolute demonstration, that the voice of our country is raised not to sanction, but to deprecate the non-performance of our engagements. It is not the nation, it is one, and but one branch of the government that proposes to reject them. With this aspect of things, to reject is an act of desperation. I shall be asked, why a treaty so good in some articles, and so harmless in others, has met with such unrelenting opposition; and how the clamors against it from New Hampshire to Georgia, can be accounted for? The apprehensions so extensively diffused, on its first publication, will be vouched as proof, that the treaty is bad, and that the people hold it in abhorrence. I am not embarrassed to find the answer to this insinuation. Certainly a foresight of its pernicious operation, could not have created all the fears that were felt or affected. The alarm spread faster than the publication of the treaty. There were more critics than readers. Besides, as the subject was examined, those fears have subsided. The movements of passion are quicker than those of the understanding. We are to search for the causes of first impressions, not in the articles of this obnoxious and misrepresented instrument, but in the state of the public feeling. The fervor of the revolutionary war had not entirely cooled, nor its controversies ceased, before the sensibilities of our citizens were quickened with a tenfold vivacity, by a new and extraordinary subject of irritation. One of the two great nations of Europe underwent a change which has attracted all our wonder, and interested all our sympathies. Whatever they did, the zeal of many went with them, and often went to excess. These impressions met with much to inflame, and nothing to re strain them. In our newspapers, in our feasts, and some of our elections, enthusiasm was admitted a merit, a test of patriotism, and that made it contagious. In the opinion of party, we could not love or hate enough. I dare say, in spite of all the obloquy it may provoke, we were extravagant in both. It is my right to avow that passions so impetuous, enthusiasm so wild, could not subsist without disturbing the sober exercise of reason, without putting at risk the peace and precious interests of our country. They were hazarded. I will not exhaust the little breath I have left, to say how much, nor by whom, or by what means they were rescued from the sacrifice. Shall I be called upon to offer my proofs? They are here, they are every where. No one has forgotten the proceedings of 1794.* No one has forgotten the captures of our vessels, and the imminent danger of war. The nation thirsted not merely for reparation, but vengeance. Suffering such wrongs, and agitated by such resentments, was it in the power of any words of compact, or could any parchment with its seals prevail at once to tranquillize the people? It was impossible. Treaties in England are seldom popular, and least of all when the stipulations of amity succeed to the bitterness of hatred. Even the best treaty, though nothing be refused, will choke resentment, but not satisfy it. Soon after France declared war against England, citizen Genet (whose civism had assisted the revolution that had just been effected at Geneva), was despatched to the United States for the purpose, as appears by his instructions, of engaging them to take part in the war, and in case the government, from motives of prudence and a desire to remain in peace, could not be enlisted, the people were to be stirred up, and by a revolutionary process, plunged into a contest which has done more injury to the morals and happiness of nations than all the wars of the last century. Citizen Genet, perceiving that the success of this mission could only be expected from a revolutionary movement of the people, commenced his operations at the place of his landing, and by his own agency and that of his partisans, every popular passion was inflamed, and every convenient means employed through all the States, to produce distrust and confusion among our citizens, and a disorganization of our government. During this disgraceful contest between this foreign agent and our executive, the public opinion for a time hung doubtful and undecided-to the honor of our country, virtue and good sense ultimately triumphed over this incendiary. The revolutionary labors of Citizen Genet were performed in the spring and summer of 1793; his instructions were probably early known in England, and the spirit and hostility towards that country, which during this season appeared throughout the United States, together with the numerous equipments in our ports of privateers under French commis sions, must naturally have produced an opinion in the British Cabinet, that the United States would ultimately engage in the war on the side of France. The orders of the sixth of November, and the speech of Lord Dorchester to the Indians, are more satisfactorily accounted for by suppos ing the existence of this opinion in England, than by the extravagant supposition that has been so often made, that they meditated war against the United States because our citizens were free and our government a republic. Every treaty is as sure to disappoint extravagant expectations as to disarm extravagant passions. Of the latter, hatred is one that takes no bribes. They who are animated by the spirit of revenge, will not be quieted by the possibility of profit. Why do they complain, that the West Indies are not laid open? Why do they lament, that any restriction is stipulated on the commerce of the East Indies? Why do they pretend, that if they reject this, and insist upon more, more will be accomplished? Let us be explicit more would not satisfy. If all was granted, would not a treaty of amity with Great Britain still be obnoxious? Have we not this instant heard it urged against our envoy, that he was not ardent enough in his hatred of Great Britain? A treaty of amity is condemned because it was not made by a foe, and in the spirit of one. The same gentleman, at the same instant, repeats a very prevailing objection, that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France. No treaty, exclaim others, should be made with a monarch or a despot: there will be no naval security while those sea-robbers domineer on the ocean: their den must be destroyed: that nation must be extirpated. I like this, sir, because it is sincerity. With feelings such as these, we do not pant for treaties. Such passions seek nothing, and will be content with nothing, but the destruction of their object. If a treaty left king George his island, it would not answer; not if he stipulated to pay rent for it. It has been said, the world ought to rejoice if Britain was sunk in the sea; if where there are now men and wealth and laws and liberty, there was no more than a sand bank for the sea-monsters to fatten on; a space for the storms of the ocean to mingle in conflict. I object nothing to the good sense or humanity of all this. I yield the point, that this is a proof that the age of reason is in progress. Let it be philanthropy, let it be patriotism, if you will, but it is no indication that any treaty would be approved. The difficulty is not to overcome the objections to the terms; it is to restrain the repugnance to any stipulations of amity with the party. Having alluded to the rival of Great Britain, I am not unwilling to explain myself; I affect no concealment, and I have practised none. While those two great nations agitate all Europe with their quarrels, they will both equally desire, and with any chance of success, equally endeavor to create an influence in America. Each will exert all its arts to range our strength on its own side. How is this to be effected? Our government is a democratical republic. It will not be disposed to pursue a system of politics, in subservience to either France or England, in opposition to the general wishes of the citizens: and, if Congress should adopt such measures, they would not be pursued long, nor with much success. From the nature of our government, popularity is the instrument |