and oppofite conclufions out of the fame cafe in law? Is any thing more known than that the fame author and place in that author is forcibly, urged to maintain contrary conclufions and the decifion hard which is the right? Is any thing more frequent in the controverfies of religion than to prefs the fame text for oppofite tenets ? How then comes it to pass that two perfons may not apprehend with reason and honefty what a witnefs, or many, fay, to prove in the understanding of one plainly one thing; but in the apprehenfions of the other, clearly the contrary thing? Muft therefore the one of thefe merit fine and imprisonment, because he doth that which he cannot otherwife do preferving his oath and integrity? And this often is the cafe of the judge and jury" Bufhel's cafe Vaugh. 141.

2. The court was broken up riotously (as Mr. Dallas chooses to express it) and all subsequent proceedings are void. This is no fpecific charge against me. The Senate is not fworn to try it and cannot give a verdict or judgment against me for it. I am not therefore bound to justify or answer it as lawful or unlawful and it can be confidered only as evidence of ill intention.

Solemnities are ufual but not neceffary to adjourn a court. Courts are often adjourned without them. Clerk may fay the court is adjourned to fuch a time. Any judge may fay fo. Any perfon may fay fo by direction of the court. One judge may fay it is my opinion that the court be adjourned to fuch a time, and then go away, and if the other judges, fay nothing and go away the adjournment is compleat. Mr. Lucas did fo. He left the court immediately without publicly diffenting. The adjournment then was compleat. This was either an adjournment or it was not. If it was an adjournment all was well. If it was not an adjournment the court remained. Would any voluntary or accidental going out of the judges without intention to break up the court, be a breaking up of the court! Will any thing be a breaking up of the court but a feparation of the judges for that purpole! There is no danger that any proceedings of the court of Allegheny county in June 1801 will ever be held void.

The true queftion is, did I go away to effect a purpose which I knew to be unlawful.

3. It is made part of the argument against me that I have delivered political charges. This is true fir, and every thing

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that I have done in this way is in print. If the approbation of the greatest man in America be any evidence of their usefulness or if my publishing them be any evidence of my opinion of their innocence, none of them will ever be brought as proof of an ill defign in me ; and this is the only use that can be made of them here. For the Senate will fee that this is no specific charge against me, I am not tried on it, and this Senate cannot convict or acquit me on this ground.

The time was that my doing this was thought useful. Who can say that fuch time may not come again! May I not hold out the example of danger and mischief in other countries as a warning to ourselves? May I not point out the fymptoms of an approaching form, before it burst?

As to the charge of December 1800, of which such horrid account has been made, you have it from the recollection of Mr. Lucas, after an interval of two years. Is this to be relied on as a just statement? It was approved of by other of my affociates and men of moderation. I printed it. Would I have done this, if I had thought it such as it has been reprefented here.

If I have fupported, by any opinions of mine, the former administration, I am equally difpofed, in like manner, to fupport the prefent, on all occafions juftified by my judgment and confcience.

But I will not introduce altercation on the bench; and I abandoned this practice when the difapprobation of a fingle affociate was manifefted.

4. The opinion of the supreme court on the motion for the information is cited as an authority for this profecution and a newspaper printed in Mr Brackenridges houfe containing a statement of this opinion marked in the handwriting of Mr. Lucas," Mr. Brackenridge's ftatement of the proceedings of the fupreme court againft Addifon," is read as evidence of this opinion. This ftatement deferves no credit, because both it and another newfpaper containing a statement plainly made by the fame hand, and a third newspaper read by Mr. Dallas, plainly fhew Mr. Brackenridge's enmity to me, his influence over Mr. Lucas, his operation upon him on other occafions, and in the whole of this tranfaction in fetting him on to deliver charges to jurie, in the motion for the information, and in the petitions which gave rife to this impeachment. This newfpaper carries no credibility, nor is it any evidence that I ever knew the opinion of the fupreme court.

There is a statement by another judge very different from this, and far more credible.

It appears from Mr. Lucas' affidavit, that the cafe was not put fairly to the fupreme court, therefore the opinion of the court in that cafe, is no authority in this.

From the argument of the attorney general, it appears the uniform ufage that the prefiding judge delivers charges to grand juries. From that argument and from the opinion of the court, it appears that the act complained of, was confidered as my act. No man will believe that the chief justice ufed the harsh epithets which Mr. Brackenridge puts in his mouth against me, on an exparte affidavit which I had no opportunity to contradict.

The argument of the attorney general, and the words of the court, even as ftated by Mr. Brackenridge, plainly imply that I ftopt Mr. Lucas from addreffing the jury on their duties; and that this would have been indictable, if done with an evil intention, and only if fo done.

The fact is otherwife! The court ftopt him from addreffing the jury on things not relating to their duties. If either I or the court stopped Mr. Lucas in delivering matter to a jury not relating to immediate duty, no unlawful act was done.

It is questionable how far the opinion of one court can control the rules of order of another. But without resting on this; no exparte opinions, no expreffions by the bye, fpoken. by the wifeft judges, were ever confidered as authorities.

But the authority of this cafe, on the only point on which they made a judicial decifion, is decifive in my favor. Admitting fay they, that the facts are as Mr. Lucas has ftated, they do not prove an offence. There is nothing in it which fhews that an impeachment would lie against me. The contrary opinion plainly follows; for it ftates that neither information nor indictment will lie, because there was no malice, no evil intention made appear. If fuch had appeared, the rule to fhew caufe would have been made, and if on it I could not have juftified or excufed, an information would have been ordered against me. The opinion of the court fhews that an information and indictment are the fame, and that neither of them lies but for an offence. Impeachment is like them, a profecution for an offence, a mifdemeanor in office, an unlawful act done with an evil intent in official capacity. And for this the impeached perfon may also be indicted.

5. It is faid that your acquitting me establishes my right to send Mr. Lucas to gaol, to break up the court riotously &c. It establishes no fuch right. No criminal profecution can establish any right. It does not even establish that I acted lawfully. It can only establish that Ì acted without an ill intention. For unless you find an ill intention, you cannot convict. Such is the whole tenor of authorities and God forbid it fhould be otherwife. Make it otherwife and what follows? Every judge in Pennfylvania, must balance his office against his confcience. If he decide according to his confcience he may lofe his office, if the Senate think differently. If he decide againft his confcience he may preferve his office. Is this the state of mind in which you wish to place the judges when they are making up their determination? Such I truft has been the tenor of my whole official conduct as ftated to you in evidence, and known in the western country, that no evil intention can be fairly inferred from this tranfaction.

In the whole of Mr. Dallas's argument and management of this profecution, I have not found that candour which I would have expected from a man who refpects his profeffional character. I expected that he would fairly admit that an information, an indictment, and an impeachment, are all criminal profecutions founded on an offence which must confift of an unlawful act done with an evil intention.

I expected that he would fairly admit that no criminal profecution, no action, no proceeding whatever can be maintained against a judge for an error in judgment; none unlefs he has acted wilfully wrong.

I expected he would have exprefly declared that they meant to urge nothing as a fpecific offence that was not alledged in the articles of impeachment. Yet he has relied on "political charges," and "Riotous breaking up of the court," as unlawful acts, when he ought only to have confidered thofe things as evidence of an evil intention in the unlawful act laid fo far as it was connected with them.

I expected he would have abandoned the first article as unfupportable; as not ftating any unlawful act; For where there is no unlawful act it is immaterial whether the intention be good or evil.

All this I think he would have done in any of the or dinary courts of justice, or he would have received the reprobation of the court and of his brethern of the pro

feffion. How far his conduct here be confiftent with refpect for his own character is for him to judge.

If I have fucceeded, as I truft I have, in fatisfying this Senate, that the articles of this impeachment are light; and that the examination of them fhews no guilt, no unlawful act, no evil intention, no fault, no mifconduct, no mistake; it may be natural to ask whence the petitions against me and whence this impeachment ?

As all information refpecting the petitions was refused me laft feffion, I had no opportunity of enquiring into the characters of the petitioners. Many of them may have been the very dregs of the fociety; they may have been picked up on the highway, or in taverns; ftrangers, boys, and filly men; they may have neither known nor regarded what they figned; they may have been feduced by false pretences to fet down their names Who will fay that all this did not take place! I am well informed that all this did take place. What meafure fo abfurd, that petitioners for it cannot be obtained! Sir, petitions can be got to burn this house, "the gorgeous palace, the folemn temple, the great globe itself, and all who it inhabit". Who does not know the grofs prostitution of petition! The petitions fhew the names and number of figners; but not the names and number of those who refufed to fign, and reprobated the attempt as fcandalous. And of the figners, I venture to fay, nine out of ten would fign a petition against the whole of this proceeding. After all what do the petitions amount to? Out of a district of nearly fixty thousand taxable inhabitants the fedulous industry of two years has procured 680 figners to the petition against me! But fuppofing that the petitions fhew a difpofition in many, to have me removed from office; that may be evidence not of my mifconduct, but of their enmity.

No man can be lefs qualified than I, for avoiding unpopularity. I have no tafte for intrigue, no difpofition for flattering the follies or paffions of men; no propensity to falfe arts; no defire of revenge, to fpur my invention of means to oppofe my adverfaries. I am no hunter of popularity; no bender to the prejudices of the day. In a republican government, it ought to be deemed the honour of an officer, te difcharge his duty with fidelity, regardless of faor refentment; to be guided by the laws and intereft of the country, not by popular prejudices, paffions, or opinions; and to purfue the public good, whether public favour followed it or not. On fuch principles and conduct have I refted my official reputation; and not on trimming

vour