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a mistake or error in judgment cannot be alledged against me as a crime. Not only wrong, but wilful wrong, must be made out, or the offence is not compleat. There must be an unlawful act with an evil intention, or you cannot say that there is guilt.

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The fubftance of the allegation against me is, that I ❝ did, at a court of quarter feffions, unjustly, illegally and unconftitutionally, claim, ufurp, and exercife authority not given or delegated to me by the constitution and laws of this com monwealth." The fact specified of this ufurpation is, that I "did unjustly, illegally and unconftitutionally ftop, threaten and prevent John Lucas, a judge of that court, from addreffing a grand jury concerning their rights and duties." From this allegation and fpecification, the conclufion is drawn, of my abufing and attempting to degrade the high offices of prefident and judge as aforefaid, to the denial and prevention of public right, and of the due administration of juftice."

Though this article fufficiently alledge an offence, an unjuft, illegal and unconftitutional act; before I be convicted of this, it must be made out, that this act was clearly unjuft, illegal and unconstitutional; fo manifeftly illegal, that I must have seen it, and could not be mistaken. Unless it be fo clearly made out, no evil intention can be inferred; and, without an evil intention, there can be no crime. I muft not be made a criminal from a mistake of the head, from an error in judgment: Some mischief, fome perversion, fome corruption of the heart must be fhewn. I ask no favor, I claim no indulgence, I defire only juftice; that I may be tried by known and established rules.

Now where is the rule of natural juftice, where is the rule of common law, where is the clause in any ftatute, where is the claufe in the conftitution; that makes it unjuft, or illegal, or unconftitutional, for the prefident of a court, to prevent an affociate judge from delivering a formal charge to a grand jury; I folemnly declare, I know of none; none from which fuch inference can be clearly or even fairly drawn.

Where is the usage to fupport the right claimed for this affociate judge? Was it ever before claimed ? Can a fingle inftance be produced, where, after a prefident had delivered a formal charge to a grand jury, an affociate judge undertook to deliver another formal charge? Shall I be made a criminal for refifting an innovation founded on no law! Is not he the offender who introduces the innovation, rather than he who refifts it.

Manifeft inconvenience would refult from the indulgence of this claim. If one affociate judge may do this, all may do it; and who fhall limit them in the time which each may occupy, or the fubjects on which he will expatiate? Who fhall prevent wild extravagance of opinion, and endless mutual altercation in public? Whither would all this lead? Let all things be done decently and in order."

Every body of men, united for a public purpofe, is a fort of corporation; and forms long practifed among them become, without any exprefs inftitution, a kind of bye laws for regulating their conduct. To break through any of thofe forms is a violation of order and decorum, which requires an exprefs permiffion of the public body to fanction. It is the duty of the prefident of every public body to preferve the ufages and forms of order; and, in this, he can be controlled, not by one member, but by the public body. There are members of this Senate, who are acquainted with proceedings in ecclefiaftical courts. In a prefbytery, for inftance, the moderator opens the meeting with prayer. Suppose, after he has done this, another member prefuming that he could perform this duty more properly, fhould rife up to make another prayer; would not the moderator ftop him? In doing this, would he violate the rights of this member, or obftruct the due adminiftration of the affairs of the church? Could the moderator be proceeded against as an offender? Is he not preferving the decent order of their proceedings? You, fir, as Speaker of this Senate, know that there are certain duties, which, in every public body, it belongs to the prefident exclufively to perform and, though another member may think he can perform thofe duties better, he must not affume them.

I can fee Mr. Lucas' condu& in no other light, than as a ftruggle whether he or I fhould be prefident of the court of Allegheny county. And I folemnly declare to the Senate, in the presence of Almighty God, that I fhould have thought I betrayed the honour of my truft, and failed in my duty, if I had acted otherwife than I have done. If, in this opinion, I err it is a delufion which I cannot overcome. I have confidered it with attention and deliberation; and my judgment compels me to adhere to it. The legislature may make a law, declaring what fhall be done hereafter; and I fhall refpecfully fubmit to it. But to no power on earth, fhort of the legiflature, or a judicial determination of a fuperior court in the point, can I furrender my judgment on this point.

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If I have not very much deceived myfelt, I think it must

now appear to the Senate, that in this accufation, there is no criminality, no fault, not even any error in judgment; and that my conduct is not only innocent, but proper.

It will be obferved, that, in all matters between man and man, in all matters relating to the immediate duties of a jury, either grand or petit, Mr. Lucas has never been restrained or interrupted from expreffing his opinion publicly, and as much at large as he pleased; and that he has been told, that, in these things, he never would be reftrained. The only reftraint that has been laid upon him is, in making obfervations of a general nature, not immediately relating to any fubject before the jury, but fuch as it has been ufual for the prefiding judge of a court, and him only, to make, preliminary to the obfervations on the immediate duties of a grand jury. The reftraint was laid on him, not by me, but by the court; purfuant to all former ufage, to promote harmony, prevent altercation, and preferve order and decorum in the court; and from a fenie of duty, and not from any ill difpofition towards him.*

Thus it appears that Mr. Lucas was not only acting against my opinion, but against the opinion of the court of Allegheny county declared to him. So that it was not I that controlled Mr. Lucas: it was he that erdeavoured to control, not only me, but all the other judges of the court. This is a strange fort of independence for a judge to claim, a power in one to act contrary to the will of all the reft.

I have never been of that arbitrary high handed difpofition, to make my own will the rule of the court. I have never ufurped power over my affociates, nor borne down their independent judgment. I thank God, if I had entertained fuch a with, they had fenfe and spirit to refist it, and would have taught me to know my place. My affociates and I have acted together with mutual confidence and mutual refpect. They have born teftimony to that :t and it is not my affertion, but theirs that I ask you to believe. And I do now, with fincerity, as if I were standing, not at the bar of this Senate, but at the bar of the great God, the fearcher of the hearts of men; and with a folemnity becoming that aweful occafion, declare, that in my whole proceeding in this matter, I had no other motive, but to protect the honour of my place, and the order and dignity of the court in which I fat. Of this, and of this only, am I guilty. For the unworthy motives aferibed to me in this impeachment, I difclaim and difdain. I feel,

* See Appendix No: 2. † See Appendix No. 3.

that my mind is above them, and I truft my conduct has always been above them.

Who then has abused, who has "attempted to degrade the high offices of prefident and judge, to the denial and prevention of public right, and of the due adminiftration of justice? Who has fet an evil example to others? Let the members of this Senate lay their hands on their hearts, and fay, on their oaths, whether I have done this.

Here Mr. Addison offered to read in argument, the certificates of the affociate judges &c. upon which Mr. Rofs arofe and made the following obfervations.

Mr. Rofs obferved that the defendant's conduct on this occafion, was fimilar to that he had exhibited in the cafe of Judge Lucas. In the morning when he prevented that gentleman from addreffing the grand jury, he was all mildness, all politeness; but in the afternoon he was threatening and determined. So in this court when he offered these certificates among the evidence which was the proper time to confider them, finding fome oppofition, he politely waved the right; now he expects to exhibit them in a fide way which we are bound to refift.

Mr. Dallas rofe to speak, when

Mr. Addifon requested to be indulged a few words.
Mr. Dallas fat down, and

Mr. Addison proceeded. The Senate must have heard me called a party judge; well then, if these certificates of fair and impartial conduct as a judge from my affociates, shall be found to be given by gentlemen of both parties, and being a party judge, is made a crime, ought not I to be permitted to exhibit certificates from the other party to do away fuch impreffion.

General report may be given in evidence, and could not witnefs be brought in to fay what they had heard the other judges fay of my general conduct in office, as well as general private character. What better than certificates from fuch characters? would fuch men certify falfehoods, expecting them to be published? it will not be even infinuated that they would. I wish to read them here, but if I am prevented while there is freedom of the prefs, they are fure to come abroad, they will be published to the world, and will have the weight there to which they are entitled.

One obfervation more and I have done. It is for the ho

nor of the ftate, that I fhould be acquitted, if I am really innocent, more than it is that I fhould be convicted, even if guilty.

I repeat it once more, that this court are not bound down to the ftrict rules of evidence, which govern a common court of justice, conftituted of diftinct judges and jurors.

Mr. Dallas. I agree with the learned gentleman, that the commonwealth is as much interested in the acquittal of the innocent, as it is in the conviction of the guilty. But whether a man is acquitted or convicted, the acquittal or conviction must be the work of legal evidence. I would ask the learned gentleman, but he does not pretend, he does not ftake his legal reputation as a lawyer, if what he offers, he would himself receive as legal evidence. I am certain he would not. And does not the gentleman know, that what fhould be admitted here as legal evidence in his own cafe, must be received in the cafe of every other citizen; for the law knows no diftinction of perfons. It pays no more regard to the characters of prefidents and affociate judges, than it does to that of any other man.

Suppofe an abuse of truft in a more honorable character than either a prefident or an affociate judge. Suppofe the prefident of the United States to commit a mifdemeanor in office, in fome cafes he might from an extenfive executive influence, obtain certificates from every quarter. When he comes before the Senate on impeachment, fhall he rife and fay, I have certificates of good character from every quarter of the union, other ftates have furnished precedents, they receive them, they attend to the:n, and allow them all the effects of legal evidence?

Does judge Addifon claim more than others? if he does he is not entitled to his claim. Let it never be understood that privileges of this kind are extended to the judiciary, deftructive of the great principle of equality on which our conftitution is founded. Let it be known that the rules of teftimony adopted in our courts of law upon long experience, as the greatest fecurity to the pure administration of justice, are not to departed from in any court, and produce a laxity that dif folve them.

The managers were juftified in objecting to the admiffion of thofe certificates as teftimony; they are now juftified in oppofing their being read in argument: General reputation it is faid may be given in evidence. A man can only testify what had

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