: Having alluded to the charges in this general way, I had next explored the ground of defence, and if poffible to conjecture an excufe, for the enormous outrage of breaking up, in tumult and diforder, a court of juftice. I gathered from the questions put to the witneffes, that the defendant meant to infinuate, that he refifted Mr. Lucas' exercife of his right, in order to fave time; but the reading of Mr. Lucas' remarks would not have occupied many minutes; it certainly would bear no proportion to the expence of time and treafure, which might refult to the court and fuitors, from the difgraceful expedient, to which he had reforted.

Another pretence has been fuggefted as an excufe; ignorance of the contents of the paper, and ignorance of the law, on the right of Mr. Lucas. "I am not, fays the learned judge, to be charged and punished, unless it is proved, that I have committed an offence, that I knew the act to be an offence, and committed it with an evil intention." Lawyers are accustomed to hear, that ignorance of the law is no excufe. even in a common farmer who has never opened a law book, What fhall we fay of a prefiding judge, emphatically a legal character, and claiming to be the exclufive organ of the court in which he prefides, fetting up the plea of ignorance as a juftification for fuch an outrage? Of what was he ignorant ? of the fundamental laws of the state! of the provisions of the conftitution! Is it conceivable, that he who was a member of the convention that formed the conftitution; who heard all the cotemporaneous expofitions and animadverfions of his fellowmembers, fhould be thus ignorant of the terms and fair interpretation of the inftrument? others may be at a loss to know the law; but furely this gentleman, who had affifted in framing the plan, by which the affociate judge was made the equal of the prefident, cannot be allowed the plea of ignorance. It is impoffible that he can fo far impofe upon himfelf, as to receive into his mind a conviction, that he did not calculate exactly the quantum of power belonging to every judge on the bench. The fenate have, indeed, heard the defendant's own argument on this point, in the year 1791, fo different from his prefent defence. Yet, let us fuppofe, that he was not informed as to the equal rights of the judges of the fame court, will he declare, that he was ignorant of the law, which prohibits a judge from a riotous and disorderly diffolution of a court of juftice? Is there a gentleman, fo unlettered in legal learning? Is there a child, who has acquired the first rudiments of education, as not to know, that when two judges are neceffary to compose a court, the confent of

both is neceffary to the adjournment, and that it is not in the power of one of them to declare all proceedings fuspended. This knowledge does not require legal erudition; it requires 'only common sense.

Is it poffible, that a plea of ignorance can reach this complicated cafe, in which the law of decorum is as grofsly vio. lated, as the law of the land? Still, however, I mean not to deprive the defendant of any advantage, which he can claim, from the omiffion, to introduce all his irregular and diforderly conduct, into the form of the accufation; and I use it only as evidence of his motives and his manners, in relation to the offences actually charged.

But, let us imagine, that the plea of ignorance may be reafonably allowed, as to the firft interruption of Mr. Lucas, in March term 1800, can any latitude of charity, or indulgence, extend it to the interruption in the June term following? The judge who had fuffered the interruption in March, appealed to the laws of his country; but the fu preme court, conceiving, that as the acts of Mr. Addifon were done as a judge, in court, they had no power to try or punish, refused to grant an information against him. What, however, paffed on the occafion was notorious to every man in the country; and although we ought not to affirm, in par ticular, that Mr. Addison had notice of the proceedings in the fupreme court, as the fact is not in evidence, a sense of character will not permit him to deny it. The opinion of the supreme court, on the equal rights and duties of the judges, conftituting the fame court, is ftated in the Tree of Liberty of the 11th April, 1800; and although I am willing to admit (nay, it is the ftrength of one part of my argument) that a judge is to act upon his own judgment, and is not bound by the judgment of another, however fuperior in ftation, learning, or experience; yet, the plea of ignorance, on a legal queftion, is repelled the moment we find the defendant had a fair opportunity of ascertaining the law, by the authoritative expofition of the highest judicial tribunal of the state.

The defendant fays, and he says truly, that an indictment is not the proper way to try a right; but, fir, we are not trying a right, we are trying an offence. The right which we contend for is the right of the affociate judge to think, and to fpeak. If his ideas were as crude, enthusiastic, and malignant, or his statements as falfe and exaggerated, as any we find in the writings of Barreul and Robinson, it would be as much his right to deliver them, as it was the right of the prefiding judge, to utter the effufions of a party fpirit, against

that

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the illuminati, the jacobins, the democrats, and the legiflas tures of Virginia and Kentucky: Nor could the right of judge Addison to interrupt mr. Lucas, be traced to a better, or more legitimate fource, than the right of Mr. Lucas to correct the errors and misrepresentations of the prefident.

Many of the arguments employed in the defence, lead to a field of difcuffion, that must be the field of the defendant's defeat. Thus, when we contend for the right of Mr. Lucas, he refers us to another course to establish it,-to fome unfpecified form of civil procefs: Yet, when he claimed the right to prevent Mr. Lucas from addreffing the grand jury, did he think either of an information, or of any civil action, to decide the controverfy? No, fir, he took the law into his own hands, and decided by his own act, in favor of his own pretenfions; and having done this wrong, he makes it the bafis of his defence, declaring, in effect, that although the offence was flagrant, and complete on his part, yet, the manner of committing it, enfured him perfect impunity, fince the right must be established by civil procefs; and criminal process could not be instituted for mere ignorance of the law?

Here, then, let me afk, the affent of the fenate to the alegation, which introduced this part of the fubject, that Mr. Addifon's conduct, on the morning of the 22d June, confummated the offence, with which he is charged in the fecond article of the impeachment. Is it not obvious, that although he did not then refort to words of menace or to phyfical force; yet, that there was a moral force employed, as effectual, to deprive Mr. Lucas of his right, as if he had committed him to prison, or as if he had knocked him down? Even, therefore, if the case rested here, the fenate would no doubt decide, that the fecond article of the impeachment is fully and fairly fubftantiated: But, it will be my duty to proceed, and to fhew, from the accumulation of outrage upon outrage, the monftrous extent to which the defendant's paffions have misled him. At this ftage of the difcuffion, however, the fenate will paufe, to reflect upon the fcene that has been exhibited: And, if they perceive the powers of the court ufurped by a fingle judge; the rights of an affociate judge annihilated; the adminiftration of juftice interrupted and difgraced; and the constitutional diftribution of authority fet at naught ;they will deplore the fatality, which has precipitated the defendant into fuch enormities; they will inflict upon the of fender an exemplary punishment, and reftore peace and order to the adminiftration of justice.

Something has been intimated, to fhew that there were indications of perfonal malice, in Mr. Addifon's first denunciation of Mr. Lucas; but, I will grant, that the petty jarrings of individuals, the heats and jealoufies of private life, that conftitute a cause for impeachment. Whatever perfonal ma. lice rankled in Mr. Addison's heart towards Mr. Lucas, however it might operate to disturb the harmony of focial intercourse, it could not engage the attention of this tribunal, unless it affumed an official form, and was directed into channels injurious to the public interefts. Not private malice, but public ma-.. lice; not perfonal ill-will, but official delinquency; are the fubjects of impeachment but public malice (if I may fo fpeak) is implied in official delinquency; as individual malice is implied in the very act of homicide. Thus, is the official deportment of Mr. Addifon towards Mr. Lucas, from the moment he was publicly denounced, to the laft period of his degradation, by threatening to fend him to jail, we collect the indications of a haughty mind, regardless of the obligations of the law, and fatally bent upon his own aggrandizement, at the expence of official right, decency, and duty. Whatever, therefore, of perfonality was in the motive, the mifchief of the act was public, and carries with it the legal imputation of malice.

We will not go into a detailed examination of Mr. Addison's charges to grand juries; but, it is evident, that, in the best of them, he largely indulged himself in fpeculative points. In thofe inftances, however, let us be fatisfied, in reflecting, that if he did no good, he did no harm; except, indeed, by a waste of that public time, of which he was fo parfimonious, when a brother judge wished to fhare a part. Yet, if the fyftem of Mr. Addifon's charges was to elevate one set of citizens, and to deprefs another, fair play required, that both fides of the queftion should be heard; and in relation to the. "extra matter," or political portions, of his judicial lectures, it was unjust and difhonorable to deny to Mr. Lucas, for himfelf and his friends, the opportunity of vindication and reply.. If Mr. Addifon enjoyed a fuperior degree of learning, and a more extensive sphere of influence, his delinquency was proportionally greater in the abufe of his official truft, to diffeminate. party politics, and to excite domeftic animofity. Nay, the topics of the prefident's charges were often treafon against the vital principle of our government. A reprefentative republic muft languish and expire, if the fource of its life and duration, the right of election, fhall be poisoned, or cut off, or brought into contempt. When, therefore, the prefiding judge inveigh

ed against the iffue of the general elections, as fymptoms of popular corruption, he attempted in effect to undermine the confidence and attachment of the citizens, in the republican inftitution which they had established; and, as far as in him lay, fought to fubvert, what he had fworn to fupport. When fuch an attempt is made by an allufion to the influence of the illuminati, jacobins, democrats, and fecret focieties, upon our elections, he ought to be corrected, and the manner in which Mr. Lucas attempted to correct him was certainly not too feveré for the occafion: We have heretofore heard the tocfin of alarm founded; tales of plots and confpiracies have been anxiously fabricated and circulated by " the friends of order and good government;" and our women and children have been terrified with the impending horrors of taylors, tubs, clues! Nay, the very letters of the alphabet have been marfhalled against the peace of the community; and X, Y, and Z, were, for a while, the fymbols of corruption and outrage, of foreign hoftility, and domestic discord. But thefe bubbles have vanished into air, "thin air ;" the mask has been torn from the face of the impoftor, and the triumphs of the republicans has produced nothing which patriotifm, or humanity, can deprecate, or deplore. But if the ftate of Pennfylvania deferved to be denounced by Mr. Addison, for the refult of the elections of 1799, which only gave a majority of 5000 votes, in oppofition to his wishes, what must be the degree of depravity and degradation, to which her citizens have fince funk, when we find that the majority in 1802, has fwelled to the unprecedented amount of 30,000!

But, to refume the confideration of Mr. Addifon's conduct in the present tranfaction. Soothed by his arts, and affailed by his violence, it redounds to the honor of Mr. Lucas, as a public officer, that he contended for an official right, with fo much steadiness, at the hazard of every perfonal accommodation. Nor is he more to be honored for the manner, in which he claimed the right of speaking, than for the matter, which he intended to deliver. The draft of his addrefs lies before me. Confider what had been faid to the grand juries by Mr. Addison, on political and party topics, and no man can hefitate to pronounce, that the obfervations, proposed to be made by Mr. Lucas, were judicious, relevant, temperate, and conciliatory. Permit me, fir, to read them to the fenate; and, as the defendant has intimated, that he apprehended a confumption of time, from the addrefs, injurious to the more important business of the court, I pray you to mark the period,