of the Spirit; we practise a dangerous delusion upon them; and in this way, we show too, that we ourselves labor under a great mistake, and that we forget the desperate wickedness of the heart. Such is the state of the posterity of Adam, that if they become holy, their holiness will not be "from the will of the flesh, or the will of man," not from any disposition or voluntary agency of theirs, but from the Spirit of God; and the whole of their salvation will result, not from any works of righteousness which they have done, but from the purpose and grace of God. Christian ministers should remember this, and should learn to rely wholly upon divine power and mercy for the conversion and salvation of sinners.

I cannot close this number without remarking distinctly on the mistake of those writers on mental philosophy, who make up their systems without recognizing the peculiar facts which are disclosed in the Scriptures, and in the history of the church. No system of mental philosophy can be considered as complete, which overlooks any of the principal phenomena which the human mind has exhibited. But the time would fail me to speak of all those writers on intellectual and moral philosophy, who entirely neglect the peculiar mental operations and states so fully disclosed in the Scriptures, and whose systems are just what they would be, if man had no natural alienation from God, and just what they would be, if there were no such thing as conviction of sin, and regeneration by the Holy Spirit, and a warfare, throughout the life of Christians, between the law of their sanctified mind and the law of sin in their members. I shall give a single example of the fault referred to. Writers very properly notice it as a law of the mind, that the affections are elicited by a view of proper objects; and then, without considering that man is morally depraved, they represent the clear exhibition of divine truth to the understanding, and the serious consideration of it, as all that is necessary to call forth right affections, overlooking that special divine influence, which is the only efficient cause of holiness in the heart of man. Now this is as palpable a mistake as it would be in writers on health, to represent that wholesome food is all that

is necessary to promote vigor and activity in those who are sick. If there are any facts which ought to be made prominent in a system of mental philosophy, surely they are those which are made prominent in the infallible word of God. For does not he who made and redeemed the soul, know what are its powers and capacities, its dispositions and states, and the laws which govern its operations? And can any one who believes the Scriptures, especially any minister of the gospel, deem it proper to disregard those preeminently important facts which result from man's apostasy, and from the work of Christ and the Holy Spirit in man's salvation? These facts, and the laws of the mind respecting them, which are all involved in sound Christian experience, are as certain and as worthy of consideration in a system of mental philosophy, as the laws of the understanding, of the memory, of conscience, or of the natural affections. And a system which overlooks the former is as defective and as much at variance with the truth, as one would be which should overlook the latter. There is no right mental philosophy, but that which has its chief foundation in the facts revealed in the word of God. The sacred writers, taught by their own experience, and by the Divine Spirit, understood the true philosophy of the human mind, and spoke and acted according to it. And if we would understand it, and apply it to its proper uses, we must learn to think and reason, to speak and act, as they did.

NUMBER IV.

In the last Article on the Philosophy of the Mind, I inquired what influence the acts of the will have over the affections. If the distinction which I have made between the acts of the will and the affections, is kept in mind, this inquiry will be intelligible and important. If not, what does it amount to? If the affections are considered as acts of the will, then the influence which the acts of

the will have over the affections, is the influence which some acts of the will have over other acts of the will; and the influence which the will itself has over the affections, is the influence which a faculty has over its own acts. And what is the influence which a faculty has over its own acts, but simply its putting forth acts? And what is putting forth acts, but acting? To say then, that the will exerts an influence over its own acts, is the same as to say, that the will acts. If it is anything more, what is it?

This way of considering the affections as acts of the will, is, as we have seen, attended with a manifest inconvenience. For if you call the affections, as well as volitions, acts of the will, then you include under the same head two classes of mental acts which are essentially different, one class being in themselves morally good or evil, and the other not. And you yourself recognize the distinction, when you speak of the affections being influenced by the acts of the will. For surely you do not mean to speak of the influence of one thing over another, when both of them are of the same kind. And if they are not of the same kind, how can we discourse about them without confusion, if we include them both under the same name? Those who call the affections acts of the will are obliged to divide the acts of the will into two classes, and to mark these classes by distinct epithets, the constant use of which would be cumbersome. But if you omit them, and call both classes acts of the will merely, how can you discourse about them with clearness? I speak particularly of philosophical discourse, in which precision and exactness are necessary. The same as to the word voluntary. If you make it include not only those bodily and mental acts which follow a volition, but the volitions themselves; you must say in each case in what sense you use it, or you will expose others to mistake by using it ambiguously. You say the moral affections are voluntary. But do you mean, that the moral affections are consequent upon a volition? You reply, no. Why, then, do you use an expression, which, according to its ordinary meating, would convey that sense? If you mean merely, that the affections belong to the

moral faculty, which has generally been called the will, and if, when you say the affections are voluntary, you mean, that they are of a moral nature, and that we are answerable for them; I acknowledge that this may be well enough for the purposes of common discourse among those who understand the word voluntary as you do. But as most men would understand you to mean, that the affections move in obedience to a volition, the expression would generally occasion a mistake.

The reason why it is supposed by many, that we can be accountable for nothing except what is voluntary, has already been suggested. In regard to our external, visible actions, and certain mental actions, it is true, that we are accountable for them only as they are voluntary, that is, subject to the control of the will. From these we get an impression that all the actions which we are accountable for, are voluntary, and under the influence of this impression, we frame our language, and then apply it to quite another kind of actions, that is, the affections, and call them voluntary, not to denote that they are controlled by a volition, but merely that they are of a moral nature; and that we are accountable for them, as we are for those bodily and mental actions which depend on a volition. I would not be strenuous about a particular word. But it is certainly important to avoid ambiguity, and to mark those things which are different by different words. And as I have often noticed the confusion of thought which arises from using the words, will, volition, and voluntary, in a loose indefinite manner, I shall adhere to the sense in which these words have already been explained, and to which there is a manifest leaning in the minds of common people.

No doubt some readers have had a difficulty arise in their minds respecting the position which I have taken. If it be so that our affections are not under the direct influence of the will, and often not under even its indirect influence, then how are we accountable either for the one or the other?

Here our proper business is to show what is the fact in regard to the influence of the will over the affections. Is it true, that we exercise our affections because we will to exercise them, and

as we will to do it? If we find it to be the case, that our affections are thus controlled by a volition, then we will admit the fact, and make it a part of our system of mental philosophy. But suppose the fact to be, that our affections are not governed by an act of the will. Is not this to make a part of our philosophy? Or will you say, that it cannot be so, and that, if we are accountable for our affections, we must be able to control them by an act of the will? Examine the subject then thoroughly. If after all, you find the fact to be as I have stated, will you still say, it cannot be, and if we are accountable for our affections, we must be able to govern them by a volition? But suppose you find that your saying this, will not make it so, and the stubborn fact still comes out to view, that our affections are not under the control of volition. What will you do now? Will you turn caviller, and say, why doth he yet find fault?

While you are contemplating the fact, that the affections are not controlled by volition, take care not to overlook another fact, which is attended with the highest kind of evidence, the fact that you are a moral and accountable being, and that you are good or bad, praise-worthy or blame-worthy according as your affections are. You know this intuitively. Unless your moral nature is totally perverted, you are as certain of it, as of existence. And it would be no more unreasonable and foolish for you to doubt your own existence, than to doubt your moral and accountable agency. You are in truth a moral agent, and are accountable for your affections, whatever may be the manner in which they are excited. The constitution which God has given to the mind, must be perfectly right, and the very fact above stated, which is sometimes thought inconsistent with moral agency, is doubtless essential to it. If the affections, instead of being excited by suitable objects, were governed by a mere act of the will, there would be an end of rational and accountable agency. The ground-work of moral good and evil would be taken away.

In making out a system of mental philosophy, our single inquiry must be, what is matter of fact? How that which we find to be fact, can be reconciled with moral agency, is another question,