tions, and another, of sinful ones. We do not intend to assert, that any one, or any number, of the volitions of the man whom we characterize, has been, or will be, holy or sinful; nor do we, indeed, design to refer immediately to actual volitions at all. Instead of this, we mean to indicate a state of mind generally existing, out of which holy volitions may, in one case, be fairly expected to arise, and sinful ones, in another: such a state as that, if it were to be changed, and the existing state of a holy mind were to become the same with that of a sinful mind, its volitions would thenceforth be sinful; and vice versa. This state is

the cause, which I have mentioned; a cause, the existence of which must be admitted, unless we acknowledge it to be a perfect casualty that any volition is sinful, rather than holy. This cause is what is so often mentioned in the Scriptures, under the name of the heart as when it is said, 'The heart is deceitful,' etc. I have already remarked, that the cause is unknown, except by its effects."

The view of Edwards on this general subject may be learnt from what he says as to the new principle which is given in regeneration. "By a principle of nature in this place, I mean that foundation which is laid in nature, either old or new, for any particular manner or kind of exercise of the faculties of the soul; or a natural habit or foundation for action, giving the person ability and disposition to exert the faculties in exercises of such a certain kind. So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of understanding. that new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense, is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of the will.".

So

I might also refer to Abercrombie, and other respectable writers on mental philosophy, who speak of a right and a wrong state of mind as antecedent to moral exercises, and as having a principal influence in determining what emotions shall arise in the mind.

I shall not here inquire, what views we are to have of the moral nature and relations of this tendency or propensity of the mind to sin. For the present I have meant to consider such a propensity simply as a fact. And respecting this there is a remarkable agreement among men of sense, whether learned or unlearned.

The words, susceptible and susceptibility have of late obtained a remarkable currency. That we may judge of the correctness of the prevailing use, it is necessary to determine their exact signification. According to Johnson, susceptible means- capable of admitting; disposed to admit; susceptibility; quality of admitting; tendency to admit. Webster defines susceptible thus: capable of admitting anything additional, or any change, affection, or influence, — tender, capable of impression. And he gives susceptibility a correspondent sense. When it is said, the mind has various susceptibilities, the meaning is, that it is capable of various states of feeling; capable of exercising, and disposed to exercise, various emotions; that it has the quality of receiving, or an aptitude to receive, various influences or impressions.

In order to a right understanding of this subject, let the following things be considered.

First: There is no way to ascertain what susceptibilities we possess, but by experience; that is, by being conscious of the sensations and emotions which actually take place in ourselves. How could we know that we are susceptible of love and pity, of anger and revenge, if we had never been conscious of these feelings? What reasonable man ever.attributes to the mind any capacity or tendency, which has not been developed by mental acts? As we think, reason, and remember, we know that we have corresponding faculties; and as we love and pity, hate and fear, we know that we have corresponding susceptibilities. How do we know that we are susceptible of pity? From the fact that we have had the emotion. But in what circumstances, or under the influence of what causes, have we had it? I answer; when we have witnessed or imagined cases of suffering. We have never had the feeling of pity on any other occasion. We contend, then, that we are susceptible of this feeling in the circum

stances above mentioned, and in no other. Pity cannot be excited, except by the actual view or the thought of suffering in a fellow

creature.

Suppose a man placed under all the influences suited to make him pleased with the melody and harmony of sounds, and continued through a long life in such circumstances, without the least emotion of pleasure in hearing the most exquisite music. We should say, that he is not susceptible of pleasure from music. Again. Suppose a man, who has long been in a situation most favorable to the cultivation and development of parental affection, to be an utter stranger to any feeling of the nature of parental love. If we should find any one in this state, whether he came into it by the original structure of his mind, or by the practice of intemperance and cruelty; we should say, he is "without natural affection," he has no susceptibility to parental love.

These examples are introduced to show what is commonly meant by the word under consideration, and when it is suitable to speak of a person as destitute of a particular susceptibility. A susceptibility to a particular kind of emotion, is that state or quality of mind, which gives rise to such emotion, when fit occasions occur. But when on the fittest occasions, and under all the variety of circumstances, a person remains a total stranger to it, never having anything of that nature arise in his breast; we say, he is not susceptible of it.

But, suppose another case. Let a man be sick of a malignant fever, and consequently incapable, while in that state, either of the pleasure of eating, or of any proper appetite for food. If we should say of such a sick man, that he is susceptible of an appetite for food and of the pleasure of eating, we should say it hypothetically; meaning that he has a constitution from which such an appetite and such pleasure will arise, when he is in a sound and healthy state. His disease is all that prevents.

All that is necessary in such cases, is, to keep in mind the conditions on which the particular feelings or actions referred to, depend, or the circumstances which are indispensable to their existence; and when we would express ourselves with exactness, to ascribe the susceptibility to a man, on those conditions.

These remarks will aid us in answering the question, whether man, in his fallen, unsanctified state, has all the moral susceptibilities which belonged to him originally in his state of innocence, and which would belong to him now, if he should be sanctified; or, to be more specific, whether man, while he continues unrenewed, is susceptible of love to God, and other holy affections. Those who hold the doctrine of total depravity are agreed in believing, that man, while unrenewed, is wholly destitute of holiness; that however favorable the circumstances of his education; however numerous and powerful the motives to piety which are held up before his mind, and with whatever skill and fidelity they may be presented, and however long the trial may be continued; he will never, while unrenewed, have any holy affection. Now this being held by all concerned, what difference can remain except as to the use of words? The only question would seem to be, whether we can properly speak of depraved man while unrenewed, as susceptible of holy affection.

Here let it be kept in mind, that we are speaking of man's moral state, and are using words in a moral sense. Accordingly if any one says, that man is susceptible of holy love without the renewing of the Holy Ghost, his meaning would evidently be, that man, depraved as he is, may have holy love in his heart without the sanctifying influence of the Spirit; and of course, that a man's having holy affection is no proof that he is renewed by the Holy Spirit, and consequently, that man's being in his natural, unregenerate state is no certain proof that he is destitute of holiness. Now all this is directly contrary to the word of God.

If by man's being susceptible of holy affection in his unrenewed state, be meant only, that he possesses all the natural faculties which are necessary to the exercise of holy affection, and that nothing more is necessary, but that God should give him a new heart, or should renew him in the spirit of his mind;-in this sense he is doubtless susceptible of holy love. But this would be using the word in an uncommon sense, and in a sense not suited to the subject. The fact is, that when the word is used in its moral signification, and it is said, that unregenerate man is really

susceptible of love to God, it is implied, that he may have such love in his unregenerate state, and even that he has a tendency, or an aptitude, to holy love. This obvious implication of the word is a sufficient reason why we should not affirm, without qualification, that man in his natural state is susceptible of holy affection,that he is as susceptible of it as one that is renewed. Does not any such representation as this tend to make the impression on the minds of men, that there is no essential difference between the moral state of the regenerate and the unregenerate, and thus to set aside the necessity of a moral renovation by the special influence of the Spirit.

NUMBER III.

THE language sometimes used in books and in common discourse implies, that man is entirely under the control of his will; that his volitions guide and regulate all his bodily and mental powers. According to this representation, the will possesses the chief attribute of a despot, and man is very much in the condition of a slave. Be it so, that the master that governs him is his own will. If the power of that will is absolute, and subject to no limitation or check from truth or reason, who can be sure that it will not exercise as severe and merciless a despotism over him, as any power extraneous to his mind? And would not any man think it a less calamity to be subject to an unreasonable despotism that is distant, than to one that is always near; to a despotism without, than to one that is within?

It is my present object to ascertain what is the fact respecting the power of the will. The office of the will must be considered an important subject in mental philosophy; it is important too in a practical view. For if any one attributes to his will an agency,