metaphysical, and moral science. Now it seems desirable that we should have a single word for the former class of these mental acts, and another for the latter; and that we should have distinct words for the different mental faculties developed in these different classes of mental acts. The word understanding might be used to denote the faculty to which the former class are referable, and reason, the faculty to which the latter are referable. It would manifestly do something towards clearing mental science of doubts and difficulties, if the operations of the mind to be classed under the word understanding, and those to be classed under reason, should be exactly defined and settled; so that we could distinguish between what is meant by acts of understanding and acts of reason, as really as we now do between what is meant by seeing and what by hearing. It is unnecessary to extend these remarks to the other operations of the mind. My object is to expose the unsoundness of the opinion sometimes advanced, that there are and must be just so many faculties of the mind, and no more; and to show that if we would cultivate in ourselves and others a just and accurate habit of thinking and speaking, we must carefully notice the smaller as well as larger differences among the operations of the mind, and make new and more particular classifications, and employ new and appropriate terms to express them, as occasion requires; and that we must proceed in this way, till all the important relations among our mental acts, whether more obvious, or more minute and recondite, are distinctly and clearly marked. All this, which is desirable and necessary in regard to the operations of the mind generally, is specially so in regard to those which are of a moral nature, and stand in direct relation to divine objects. Here the want of a just and careful discrimination will expose us to dangerous mistakes. It is with an ultimate reference to the exercises or acts, which belong to us as moral and accountable beings, and to the general interests involved in them, that I have entered on the consideration of the present subject. NUMBER II. RECAPITULATION. DISPOSITION, INCLINATION, SUSCEPTIBILITY CONSIDERED. THE remarks made in the previous essay on the manner in which mental operations are classified, and then referred to the mind as possessed of faculties adapted to the different classes of those operations, show clearly the truth of what I suggested at the beginning of the discussion, that what we call the faculties of the mind are not to be considered as distinct parts into which the mind is divided, and which, by being united together, constitute the mind, as different parts or ingredients make up a complex material substance. Locke well observes, that the ordinary way of speaking of the faculties of the mind is apt to breed confusion in men's thoughts, by leading them to suppose that the words denoting those faculties "stand for some real beings in the soul;" or, for "so many distinct agents in us, which have their several provinces and authorities, and command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity and uncertainty." The mind is a simple, indivisible, spiritual being. And when we speak of it as having different faculties, we do nothing more than to say, that the mind itself, a simple, immaterial being, performs so many different kinds of action, and of course has power to perform them. But what we call a power or faculty of the mind is no more a distinct agent, than the faculty of speaking or walking is a distinct agent. The faculty is not the agent, but belongs to the agent. It is the intelligent being, man, and he only, that acts, and acts in such a variety of ways. He thinks, desires, loves, hates, wills, and does all things else which are ascribed to his different faculties. I repeat it, that, strictly speaking, it is not the power or faculty that acts, but the person who is possessed of the power. We do indeed find it conven ient, to keep up the usual expressions, and say, the will chooses, or puts forth a volition, reason compares and judges, etc. But after all, this is a loose way of talking, and far from being philosophically correct. For in strict propriety, it is the intelligent being, the person, that compares, judges, chooses, and performs all other mental acts; and from the fact of his acting in these different ways, we learn that he is capable of it, or has the faculty of doing it. We should keep this in remembrance. And when any obscurity or confusion arises from the more common modes of speech, we shall do well to dismiss them for a time, and adopt language which is strictly and philosophically correct. In this way we may in many instances effectually disentangle a subject under consideration, and obtain views of it which are clear and satisfactory. man. These observations are as true, in regard to moral qualities, as in regard to actions. These qualities belong to the moral being, But in common discourse, we often ascribe moral qualities to particular faculties, and especially to the affections and acts. We say, the affections of the heart, the determinations of the will, and the voluntary actions, are good or bad, praise-worthy or blame-worthy. And it is sometimes represented, that all moral qualities are to be predicated directly of actions, and of actions only. But such representations cannot be literally true; nor can any thinking man seriously believe them to be so. Take an action which is morally wrong, and worthy of blame and punishment. Do we really blame and punish the action? When a man commits the act of stealing; do the civil magistrates condemn and imprison the act? When a man commits the act of murder, is it the murderous act that is put to death? The act itself began and ended perhaps in a moment. And even during that moment, it had no existence separate from the agent. Had we stood by, and witnessed the act of theft or murder, the real object of our disapprobation and abhorrence would have been, the wicked agent himself, the thief, the murderer. The agent has a permanent existence. And though many years may have passed away since the criminal action was perpetrated, the action itself having now no existence except in memory, and no action like it having been committed since, still we hold the agent responsible for it, and consider him to be as really worthy of punishment, as he was at the very time when he was engaged in perpetrating the criminal deed. We do indeed speak familiarly of the wickedness and ill-desert of the act; but, in strict propriety, wickedness and ill-desert can be predicated only of the agent. If we say, the act is wicked and ill-deserving; our real meaning is, that he who commits it is so; as our conduct clearly shows. All human actions and qualities are, then, attributable to man, the agent, and to him only. This view of the subject agrees with the practical judgment of all men. When you read the life of Howard, and attend to the high commendations which the biographer bestows upon his actions, calling them benevolent, philanthropic, humane, kind, self-denying, disinterested, and generous; you understand him as commending Howard himself, and as applying all these honorable epithets to him, as the doer of these actions. In grammatical construction the epithets do indeed belong to his actions. But what of that? Your thoughts always fix upon Howard himself, as philanthropic, humane, self-denying, and disinterested. These attributes truly belong to a person, and to nothing else. And nothing else can be the real object of our esteem, gratitude, or love. When such qualities are predicated of actions, it is only in a secondary, relative sense, as the actions indicate the disposition or character of the person who performs them. To be benevolent, is to wish well to others. Does an action wish well to others? Has an action desire or volition? Can an action enjoy a reward? I have dwelt so long. upon this point, because I have been desirous of making it as clear and certain as possible; and because, though it seems perfectly obvious, and though conscience and common sense always hold it as a plain truth, it has often been overlooked; and men have reasoned about actions, as though the common phraseology, which ascribes moral qualities and relations to them, were literally and philosophically true. In what light then are outward, visible actions to be regarded? I answer; so far as our moral relations are concerned, they are to be regarded principally as indications of the character of the agent; or, if you prefer it, as giving character, that is, visible character to the agent. To God, the character is known before those actions take place which manifest it to us. The searcher of hearts was perfectly acquainted with the internal character of Judas, or the qualities of his mind, before he did those things by which his character was developed. But his fellow men could not search his heart, and accordingly could not know his character, except as his actions made it visible. In like manner the children of Israel were put to various trials in the wilderness, that they might know what was in them; not that they might be made different from what they were, but that they might, by their conduct, discover their own real character, and make it manifest to others. The real, internal character of a man, his character as God sees it, essentially consists in what is usually called his disposition, inclination, or propensity. To say, a man has a benevolent disposition, or a disposition to do good, is the same as to say, he has a benevolent character; he is a benevolent man. -- It has been common with those who have written on mental science, to use the word disposition or inclination, to express not only that current of affection of which we are directly conscious, but also that state of mind which precedes the exercise of affection, and which is developed by it, and which becomes the subject of consciousness by being thus developed. The thing intended by the word disposition is, I think, as clearly apprehended, as anything which relates to the nature and attributes of the mind. If we attend to a few of the instances in which the word is commonly used, we shall find that no one can have any doubt as to its propriety, or any difficulty in understanding it; how abstruse and incomprehensible soever the subject may be, when treated metaphysically. Take the case of Judas, at the grave of Lazarus. His mind, we suppose, was intensely occupied with a variety of thoughts |