which has lodged within us, has had an influence not limited to the time when it took place, but reaching to all following time, and helping to constitute our permanent habit. Thus our present condition may truly be regarded as a kind of index to the antecedent states of our mind, the sum of the impressions made upon us by the affections we exercised the previous moment, the previous hour, and day, and month, and year, and all previous time. How often have we learned by experience, that our feelings through the week have an effect upon us on the Sabbath, and our feelings on the Sabbath, through the week? How evident it is that the thoughts and feelings indulged in childhood and youth have an effect upon character, in manhood, and even in old age! The wrong states of mind of which we are at present conscious, and which may sometimes appear unaccountable, are, in many cases, owing to what took place ten, twenty, or even fifty years ago. And it is not to be doubted, that the state in which the wicked will find themselves in the future world, will be the fair result of all their dispositions, thoughts, affections, and actions, during the time of their probation. With what awe should we be inspired, when we contemplate this constitution, which God has given to our immortal minds! With what fear and trembling should we consider the fact, that an unholy affection, exercised in early childhood, will be followed by a sinful, impenitent life, and a sinful and miserable eternity, unless the grace of God interpose to turn things from their natural course.

REMARKS ON CAUSE AND EFFECT.*

I HAVE read with no ordinary interest, the Essay in the last number of the Repository "on Cause and Effect, in connection with Fatalism and Free Agency. The Editor says, the name of the writer is withheld, on account of very peculiar circumstances. As there are no such circumstances in my case, I shall offer remarks on the Essay in my own name. The writer of the Essay may be one, for whom I entertain a very sincere esteem and affection. I choose to think that he is so; and it will be most agreeable to my feelings to proceed in my remarks with the apprehension distinctly in my mind, that the anonymous author of the Essay, who has given such evidence of ability to write well, possesses also a sincere love of the truth, a full conviction of the narrow limits of human intelligence, humility, candor, reverence for the Scriptures, and every other quality which belongs to the Christian character. Such an apprehension may have a salutary influence upon what I am to write, and it will at least render my employment in writing pleasant.

After all, my concern will be with the subject. And while I shall take the liberty to call in question some of the principal positions which I find in the Essay, it will be my endeavor to guard scrupulously against everything which would be unjust or disre

* First published in the "Am. Bib. Repository," 1840, in reply to "An Essay on Cause and Effect in connection with Fatalism and Free Agency." See Am. Bib. Rep. for Oct. 1839.

spectful to the writer. Indeed I shall refer to the Essay chiefly as an occasion of introducing several topics, which require special attention at the present day.

As the subject under consideration is of a philosophical or metaphysical nature, the following remarks are intended for those, who have a capacity for metaphysical inquiries, and who have so far attended to matters of this kind, that they are prepared to begin where the present discussion begins, without any pains on my part to explain the common principles of mental science.

But I should hardly deem it proper to busy myself in preparing remarks upon the topics here introduced, were it not that they have a bearing upon some very important principles of revelation.

Let it, however, be remembered, that our mode of thinking on this subject cannot alter the facts in the case. If all the men in the world should happen to think, that our being uniformly influenced in our volitions by motives, and our choosing invariably according to the strongest motive, is inconsistent with free moral agency, it would not make it so. Should they be ever so confident, that moral necessity, as explained by Edwards, Day, and others, is the same as fatalism; still it would not make it the same. If it is a law of our nature, that our volitions invariably follow that which is, on the whole, the strongest motive; then, whatever may be our speculations, this law will stand and we shall conform to it in practice, and shall choose and act under the influence of the strongest motive, without the least infringement of our rational or moral freedom. I think the writer of the Essay does himself act on this principle, though against his speculative theory. There were reasons, I suppose, for and against his publishing his Essay; and probably he will find, on reflection, that these reasons were very carefully weighed, and that the most important reasons finally prevailed. So also there were, doubtless, reasons for and against his giving his name to the public. But the special reasons which he had against it, were unquestionably the most weighty in his mind; otherwise, I could not account for it, that he deliberately chose concealment. And who can doubt,

that in all important cases which shall occur hereafter, he will thus weigh the reasons for different determinations, and decide according to that which is, in his view, the strongest. And I am greatly mistaken, if he ever finds, that choosing and acting invariably according to this principle, will interfere at all with his free agency, though his theory might lead him to think that it would. Rational beings will choose and act according to the laws of their intelligent and moral nature, whatever speculative theories they may form in their waking or sleeping hours. The laws of the mind are too firmly established to be shaken by our notions.

I am gratified that the author of this Essay, and some other late writers, make a distinction between desire and volition. It is a source of no small confusion in Edwards's Treatise on the Will, that he considers all the affections and desires as acts of the will. It is, however, manifest, that Edwards himself departs from this large sense of the word, and brings out the distinction which is now contended for, whenever he speaks of the desires or affections of the mind as among the motives to volition. For surely the motive to volition, and volition itself, cannot be the same thing.

I am gratified also, that the writer says distinctly, what Locke and others have been careful to say before, that "the Will is not a separate existence, to which qualities and actions can be ascribed. It is the mind itself which is moved by desire or motive, and the Will is the power which the mind has to choose which of several coëxisting desires shall be gratified."

The writer says; "The point at issue is simply this: Is volition connected with a previous desire or motive as a producing constitutional cause?" The affirmative he thinks is fatalism; the negative, the doctrine of free agency.

The writer takes commendable care to inform us very definitely, what he means by a " producing cause," and how we are to discover its existence. He maintains, that according to the doctrine of free agency, "there is no invariable rule of volition, "—"no fixed connection between any class of desires and volition; "that "desires or motives are only the occasional causes, which enable the mind to exercise its inherent power of action, itself being the

producing cause of its own volitions." He says too, "the only method of proving anything to be a producing cause is to show, that, in given circumstances, there is an invariable rule of change, so that when a cause is put in these circumstances, a certain change invariably follows. It is the unfailing constancy of the result, that enables us to detect the real producing cause. The philosopher, in experimenting to detect causes, is continually seeking to learn which one of the various circumstances cannot have a substitute, which must be invariably an antecedent." He says the same again. "The only method of proving a thing to be a producing cause, is to establish the fact that it is an invariable antecedent."

Our author makes his meaning still more evident by his quotations from Priestley, and the use he makes of them. Priestley says, in common with Edwards, and other distinguished writers: "There is some fixed law respecting the Will;-it is never determined without some motive of choice; and motives influence us in some definite and invariable manner, so that volition or choice is constantly regulated by what precedes it. And this constant determination of the mind, according to the motive presented to it, is all I mean by necessary determination. Through all nature, the same consequences invariably result from the same circumstances." Now our author says, "no intelligent defender of free agency will admit this." And his object in quoting it is to show what he means by fatalism. If we assert, that volition is invariably preceded by the strongest motive, or by that which, at the moment of choice, "seems most agreeable," he says we are fatalists.

To this allegation of the author I now invite the reader's attention.

I cannot but notice, that the author here and there gives an incorrect statement of the question at issue. He represents the doctrine of moral or philosophical necessity as implying, that "there is a particular kind of motive which is the invariable antecedent of volition." He says: "every one allows that motives of some sort are invariably antecedents to volition. This is